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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the influence of tax compliance costs on non-compliance behaviour, 
taken together with the business characteristics and managerial perceptions of corporate 
taxation. The study focuses on corporate Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in 
Malaysia under the Income Tax Self-Assessment System (SAS). This is the first study on 
corporate income tax compliance in the Malaysian context and among the first to 
integrate tax compliance costs, tax attitudes and the likely compliance behaviour of 
corporations, both in Malaysia and internationally. Thus it makes a significant 
contribution given this dearth of international literature on corporate tax compliance. 
 
The study adopts a traditional large-scale postal survey questionnaire technique that has 
been employed extensively by studies of both tax compliance and compliance costs 
studies internationally. Specifically, estimation of tax compliance costs largely follows 
the usual technique used by Pope, the ‘father’ of tax compliance costs studies in Australia 
and Asia. This estimation method was first established by Sandford, the ‘grandfather’ of 
modern tax compliance costs studies, and has been globally employed with some 
modification to the local context. On the other hand, tax attitudes and the likely 
compliance/non-compliance behaviour of SMEs are measured from a business 
managerial or respondent perspective. The above primary postal survey, as well as two 
additional surveys—a web survey of SMEs and a postal survey of tax professionals—
have been undertaken as a measure of consistency of the primary postal survey.  
 
The income tax compliance costs for Malaysian SMEs are estimated at RM9,295 per 
company, amounting to RM1,084 million in aggregate for the 2006 tax year. The findings 
of this study demonstrate that the average income tax compliance costs of SMEs under 
the SAS have decreased significantly by 58 percent in absolute terms. Despite this, the 
increasing composition of both external costs and computational costs, by 16 and 15 
percent respectively, reveals that the role of tax professionals and routine tax works have 
become substantially greater under the SAS regime. The figure for compliance costs 
relative to tax revenue of eight percent is found to be similar to a pre-SAS Malaysian 
 iv
study, and is also within the international range overall. As for the offsetting benefits, the 
value of tax deductibility is estimated to be almost RM1,700 per SME company, RM196 
million in aggregate, or around 18 percent of the compliance costs, thus giving average 
net compliance costs of RM7,595 or RM888 million in total.  
 
The current study provides evidence of the influence of tax complexity and probability of 
tax audit on corporate SME tax non-compliance in Malaysia. Compliance costs, in 
particular, together with two business characteristics, i.e. business size and tax level, and 
the managerial perceptions about tax fairness and the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) 
relationship, are found not to influence corporate tax non-compliance. On the other hand, 
the effect of the remaining four variables, i.e. business length, sector, tax rate and tax 
incentives, is inconclusive. In terms of international comparisons, the effects of business 
size on previous corporate tax compliance are mixed, but the business sector was found 
to influence corporate tax compliance. 
 
Regarding tax compliance costs, the need to recognise the presence and regressivity of 
tax compliance costs upon SMEs should be, at this stage, recognised at the national level. 
Further, at a later stage, such issues should be systematically considered and assessed for 
any major change in tax policy. Findings regarding tax complexity suggest that the IRB 
should continue their tax simplification measures in a more comprehensive manner to 
significantly minimise the compliance burden for all business taxpayers, of any size. In 
terms of tax auditing, the IRB may want to increase substantially the magnitude of such 
activity, and should utilise such information effectively to lift taxpayers’ levels of 
awareness about the likelihood of their businesses being selected for a tax audit.  
 
Finally, it is acknowledged that there are several limitations of the current study, 
including those usually associated with self-reporting mail surveys, which may limit the 
interpretation of the current findings. Despite this, the study makes a significant 
contribution given the limited number of studies in the field of corporate tax compliance 
and tax compliance costs studies, particularly for Malaysian SMEs. Future research into 
 v
this area, including several extensions of this study, could make further valuable 
contributions in this area. 
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KEY GLOSSARY 
 
Additional Costs : Those compliance costs, other than staff time costs, 
usually incurred within the business, such as costs of 
printing, stationery, and communication costs. Also 
known as ‘miscellaneous’, ‘other’ and ‘non-personnel’ 
costs.  
 
Administrative Costs :  The costs incurred by the government in operating a tax 
system. These are the collection costs of the tax 
authority. The term ‘management costs’ is used in the 
Malaysian context.    
 
Compliance Costs : The costs incurred by taxpayers, over and above their 
tax liability, in fulfilling their tax obligations. These are 
gross compliance costs and include three major 
components: money costs, time costs, and psychological 
costs. 
 
Computational Costs : Those compliance costs that are unavoidable and which 
tend to be mostly routine, calculative and incurred on a 
yearly basis. 
 
External Costs : Those compliance costs that are incurred outside of the 
business, comprising fees paid to external tax 
professionals such as accountants and lawyers. 
 
Internal Costs : Those compliance costs that are incurred within the 
business, comprising mainly staff time costs that are 
incurred within the business, plus (non-staff) additional 
costs.  
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Net Compliance Costs : Compliance costs minus cash flow benefits, value for 
tax deductibility and value of managerial benefits. 
Regarding findings of this thesis, the term ‘net 
compliance costs’ refers to gross compliance costs 
minus the value of tax deductibility. 
 
Non-compliance : Non-compliance signifies the failure to fulfil tax 
reporting requirements, either intentionally or 
unintentionally (e.g. by mistake or error). The current 
study focuses on intentional non-compliance. The term 
‘tax evasion’ is also used interchangeably to indicate 
deliberate non-compliance. 
 
Planning Costs : Those compliance costs that are avoidable in theory, but 
incurred by taxpayers to legally minimise their tax 
liability, particularly in the longer run. 
 
Psychological Costs : Costs of the burden of taxpayers having to deal with tax 
affairs, such as stress and anxiety. These costs are not 
measured in the current study. 
 
Ringgit Malaysia 
(RM) 
: The official currency of Malaysia. One unit of the 
Australian Dollar, United Kingdom Pound Sterling, 
United States Dollar, and European Euro are equal to 
RM2.84, RM5.79, RM3.52 and RM4.94 respectively (1 
July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
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Tax Attitudes : Tax attitudes refer to business managerial perceptions 
of taxation. The current study measured six aspects of 
corporate income taxation: complexity, fairness, tax 
structure, tax audit, tax incentives and the relationship 
with tax authority.  
 
Tax Compliance  : Tax compliance means conforming to legal tax 
reporting requirements.  
 
Tax Compliance 
Behaviour 
 
: This study measures tax compliance behaviour from a 
business managerial perspective, which corresponds to 
the likely compliance/non-compliance behaviour. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Malaysia is one of the fastest growing developing countries in Asia, located specifically 
in the South East Asian region, with a land area of just over 330,000 square kilometers 
and a population of about 27 million (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2008). It 
incorporates two main regions, with 11 states in Peninsular Malaysia, and two in 
Northern Borneo. There are also three federal territories. Malaysia is a multi-racial 
country with mainly Malay (53 percent), Chinese (26 percent) and Indian (8 percent) 
ethnic groups. It is also a multi-religious country—predominantly Muslim (61 percent), 
but with strong numbers of Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus (Department of Statistics 
Malaysia 2005). As a former British colony, Malaysia is a member of the 
Commonwealth of Nations, practising a system of parliamentary democracy and a 
Constitutional Monarchy. His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King of Malaysia) 
is the Head of the country and the Prime Minister is the Head of government, who 
exercises the Executive power. 
 
Economically, Malaysia has been transformed from being a largely agricultural 
economy to an increasingly industrialised economy that focuses on manufacturing and 
the services sectors—see, for example, Tan (1993, p. 62) and Embong (1996, p. 528). 
The growth of Malaysia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was recorded at 5.3 percent, 
5.9 percent and 6.3 percent respectively for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007,1 with a total 
contribution from the services and manufacturing sectors amounting to almost 90 
percent, 83 percent and 84 percent for the corresponding years respectively (Treasury of 
Malaysia 2006, p. 29; 2007, p. 26; 2008, p. 38). In 2008 and 2009, GDP growth is 
expected to be 5.7 percent and 5.4 percent respectively (Treasury of Malaysia 2008, p. 
                                                 
1 As an overall comparison, Malaysia’s GDP growth between 2005 and 2007 is about double that of 
Australia, the UK and the US, but lower than that of China, India and Singapore (Source of GDP data: 
International Monetary Fund 2009). 
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38). However, the impact of the 2008/09 global economic crisis is expected to lower 
these original forecasts slightly.  
 
Like the rest of the world, taxation plays a vital economic role in Malaysia and remains 
a main source of government revenue. Taxation has been typically categorised into two 
main types—direct and indirect. The current study focuses on income tax, which is the 
main type of direct taxation in Malaysia, under the Self-Assessment System (SAS). 
 
The income tax SAS was introduced in Malaysia to replace the Official Assessment 
System (OAS) in stages: first to companies from the year of assessment 2001; and, 
subsequently, to individuals and other taxpayers, i.e. club and co-operative societies, in 
2004. The SAS involves a substantial shift of responsibility on to the taxpayers in terms 
of their compliance obligations and burden, particularly to business taxpayers. 
Government regulations, particularly taxation, are a major concern of the business 
sector internationally. The tax regulatory burdens appear to fall disproportionately on 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) worldwide (see for example Sandford, Godwin 
and Hardwick 1989; Pope 1995; Sandford 1995; Evans et al. 1997). This prevalence 
remains true regardless of the tax system or type of taxes. From the perspective of the 
Malaysian tax authority, that is, the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRB), concern 
about tax compliance is among the main reasons for introducing the SAS. This thesis 
addresses this concern by estimating income tax compliance costs, examining tax 
attitudes, and the likely compliant or non-compliant behaviour of corporate SMEs, from 
a business managerial perspective, in the SAS regime. 
 
This chapter starts with an overall background for this research, by briefly highlighting 
the significance of income tax, the significance of tax non-compliance, and the 
importance of SMEs in Malaysia. The research objectives, together with the specific 
research questions, and significance of the study are presented next. This is followed by 
definitions of the key terms employed throughout this thesis. Finally, the structure of 
the thesis is outlined. 
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1.2 INCOME TAX, NON-COMPLIANCE AND SMALL AND MEDIUM 
ENTERPRISES IN MALAYSIA 
 
1.2.1 Significance of Income Tax 
Malaysia relies largely on taxes (particularly direct taxes) for its revenue. Direct taxes in 
Malaysia comprise income tax, petroleum income tax, real property gains tax and stamp 
duty.2 It is evident that direct taxes in Malaysia contribute significantly towards federal 
tax revenue, as shown in Table 1.1. For example, in 2005, direct taxes accounted for 
almost two-thirds of tax revenue.  
 
Table 1.1: Malaysian Federal Tax Revenue, 2002–2008 
Year Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes Federal Tax Revenue 
 RM million Percent RM million Percent RM million Percent 
2002 44,351 66 22,510 34 66,861 100 
2003 43,016 66 21,875 34 64,891 100 
2004 48,703 68 23,347 32 72,050 100 
2005 53,543 66 27,051 34 80,594 100 
2006 a 61,573 71 25,058 29 86,631 100 
2007 a 70,116 73 26,080 27 96,196 100 
2008 a 74,915 73 27,080 27 101,995 100 
a Data for 2006, 2007 and 2008 represent the actual, revised and budget estimates respectively. 
Sources: The Economic Report (Treasury of Malaysia 2005, 2006, 2007) 
Exchange rate RM2.84 = A$1; RM3.52 = US$1; RM5.79 = £1; RM4.94 = €1 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara 
Malaysia). 
 
Income tax is a major source of direct taxes in Malaysia, with corporate income tax 
representing the highest share of income tax revenue, as shown in Table 1.2. For 
example, the income tax collected from this sector was 73 percent, 69 percent and 70 
percent respectively for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Likewise, the corporate sector’s 
contribution to direct taxes, was 49 percent in 2005, 43 percent in 2006 and 44 percent 
in 2007; and federal tax revenue was 33 percent in 2005, 31 percent in 2006 and 32 
                                                 
2 See Chapter Three, subsection 3.2.1. 
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percent in 2007. Although the percentages fell slightly in 2006, the corporate sector 
continues to contribute the highest percentage of income tax, either measured as a 
percentage of income tax, direct tax or federal tax revenue. 
 
Table 1.2: Malaysian Corporate Tax Revenue, 2002–2008 
Year Corporate Tax Corporate Tax as a Percentage of 
 RM Million Income Taxes a Direct Taxes Federal Taxes 
2002 24,642 71 56 37 
2003 23,990 75 56 37 
2004 24,388 70 50 34 
2005 26,381 73 49 33 
2006 b 26,477 69 43 31 
2007 b 30,821 70 44 32 
2008 b 34,806 70 46 34 
a The Petroleum Income Tax is not included.  
b Data for 2006, 2007 and 2008 represent the actual, revised and budget estimates respectively. 
Sources: The Economic Report (Treasury of Malaysia 2005, 2006, 2007). 
Exchange rate RM2.84 = A$1; RM3.52 = US$1; RM5.79 = £1; RM4.94 = €1 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara 
Malaysia). 
 
 
1.2.2 Significance of Tax Non-compliance 
Prior tax research (Kasipillai, Baldry and Prasada-Rao 2000; Abdul and Sheehan 2003) 
indicates that the tax gap in Malaysia could be significant. Kasipillai, Baldry and 
Prasada-Rao (2000, p. 25) estimated that income tax evasion accounts for an average of 
20 percent of actual income tax collection per year in Malaysia over the period 1970 to 
1994.  Subsequent estimates for the years 1995 to 1997 were carried out by Abdul and 
Sheehan (2003). They estimated the taxable income gap was RM75.3 billion, RM92.7 
billion and RM99.1 billion for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 respectively (Abdul and 
Sheehan 2003, p. 33).3  The methodological differences between these two studies, in 
                                                 
3 See subsection 1.5.4. for approximate exchange rates of the major currencies. 
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particular to the terms used, are worth considering.4 No estimates of tax evasion are 
available in Malaysia since 1998. Kasipillai (2003, p. 13) claims that the prevalence of 
tax evasion is a major concern for the government. It is important to note that the work 
of Kasipillai, Baldry and Prasada-Rao (2000) and Abdul and Sheehan (2003) were 
carried out before the implementation of self-assessment. Under the mechanism of self-
assessment, the magnitude of the tax evasion figure is probably higher.  
 
From the perspective of the tax authority, there are no comprehensive estimates of tax 
evasion or non-compliance in Malaysia. However, the IRB publishes annual statistics 
on the amount of taxes and penalties recovered from IRB investigations and audit 
activities.  The additional taxes and penalties cover mainly income tax and other direct 
taxes—for example, the real property gains tax and stamp duty. Kasipillai (1999, p. 48) 
claims that such data provide some evidence as to the magnitude of the problems of 
deliberate non-compliance in Malaysia. The amount of taxes and penalties recovered 
from investigation and audit activities approached almost RM500 million per year up to 
2002, as shown in Table 1.3. In 2003, they had increased significantly to almost RM800 
million, to just over RM1 billion in 2004, and to almost RM1.4 billion in 2005. The tax 
recovery amount, expressed as a percentage of direct and/or federal taxes, indicates a 
stable trend up to 2000, declining slightly in 2001 and 2002, and thereafter growing 
increasingly. In 2005, tax recovery amounts were 2.6 percent and 1.7 percent of direct 
taxes and federal taxes respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Abdul and Sheehan used the term ‘taxable income gap’, which refers to the difference between taxable 
income (as estimated using national accounts) and taxable income (as assessed by the tax authority). On 
the other hand, tax gap refers to the difference between total tax collected and what should have been 
collected. The latter term is often used in the literature (see a review by McManus and Warren 2006).  
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Table 1.3: Additional Taxes and Penalties Recovered from Investigation and Audit 
Activities, 1996–2006 
 Tax Compliance Activity Total Total as a % of 
 
Year 
Investigations a 
(RM Million) 
Audit a 
(RM Million) 
 (RM 
Million) 
Tax 
  Revenue b 
Direct 
  Taxes b 
1996 426.1 n/a 426.1 0.9 1.6 
1997 509.8 20.4 530.2 1.0 1.7 
1998 362.1 100.4 462.5 1.0 1.5 
1999 407.4 35.1 442.5 1.0 1.6 
2000 428.1 41.4 469.5 1.0 1.6 
2001 397.3 51.3 448.6 0.7 1.1 
2002 386.5 77.0 463.5 0.7 1.0 
2003 615.5 182.6 798.1 1.2 1.9 
2004 620.3 429.3 1,049.6 1.5 2.2 
2005 763.0 635.4 1,398.4 1.7 2.6 
2006 903.2 692.7 1,595.9 1.8 2.6 
a The data were obtained from the IRB Annual Report (2001a; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2007; 2008a). As 
at 1 July 2009, the subsequent report is yet to be published.  
b Data on tax revenue and direct taxes were obtained from the Economic Report, Treasury of Malaysia 
(1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007). 
Exchange rate RM2.84 = A$1; RM3.52 = US$1; RM5.79 = £1; RM4.94 = €1 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara 
Malaysia). 
 
The latest data is not available yet,5 but the increasing trend is likely to continue despite 
the current economic recession, especially as percentages of tax revenue and direct 
taxes. If past experience was to be used, then an average of 20 percent of income tax 
collection (Kasipillai, Baldry and Prasada-Rao 2000) or a relative percentage of tax 
recoveries (as shown in Table 1.3) would seem to provide a reasonable indicator of 
income tax evasion overall, covering both business and non-business taxpayers. 
However, the approximate magnitude of tax evasion cannot be determined for SMEs 
due to inadequate data from the IRB and also lack of prior studies in estimating tax 
evasion by different categories of taxpayer (such as by business establishments or size 
                                                 
5 As at 1 July 2009, the 2007 report is yet to be published by the IRB.  
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of business). The above figures signify the overall importance of income tax evasion in 
Malaysia. The tax literature recognises that measuring the true extent of non-
compliance is not possible, but estimates from the tax gap approach are generally used 
to indicate the possible sources and the level of non-compliance (see for example  
Graetz and Wilde 1985; Roth, Scholz and Witte 1989, p. 23; McManus and Warren 
2006).  
 
On the other hand, McKerchar (2002b, p. 8) argues that a better understanding of non-
compliance is of greater priority rather than measuring the tax gap. She believes that 
this will contribute to a better tax system that eventually will reduce the tax gap. The 
current study does not attempt to estimate income tax evasion, but recognises its 
importance in Malaysia. Thus, this thesis examines the issue of income tax non-
compliance in the context of Malaysian SMEs under the SAS regime.  
 
 
1.2.3 The Importance of Small and Medium Enterprises 
This section highlights the importance of the SME sector in Malaysia. Taxation of 
SMEs and major tax-related issues are presented in Chapter Three. Small and medium 
enterprises have played an important role in the economic growth of the nation, 
particularly in developing countries, such as Malaysia. In 2005, there were almost 
520,000 SMEs, comprising around 99 per cent of all enterprises in Malaysia, 
contributing almost 48 per cent of the total value added of the business establishments 
and around 65 per cent of total employment (National SME Development Council 
2006, pp. 19-23). Sole proprietorships account for the highest percentage of SME 
business establishments (69 percent), followed by private limited companies (21 
percent) and partnerships (10 percent). In terms of size, micro businesses account for 
nearly 80 percent of SMEs, as shown in Table 1.4. 
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Table 1.4: Malaysian Small and Medium Enterprises by Size, 2005 
Business size Number Percentage 
Micro 411,849 79.4 
Small 95,490 18.4 
Medium 11,657 2.2 
Total SMEs 518,996 100 
Source: National SME Development Council (2006, p. 21). 
 
As Malaysia aims to be a fully industrialised nation by the year 2020, SMEs will play a 
vital ongoing supportive role in this. Small and Medium Enterprises are also expected to 
complement the activities of the large enterprises through integration into the 
mainstream of the industrial development process (BT Online 1996). For these reasons, 
the SME sector has been continuously supported by the government (Osman and 
Hashim 2003). The importance of SMEs has been further recognised by the 
establishment of the National SME Development Council (NSDC); more importantly, 
the Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. The National SME Development Council 
was established in June 2004 as the highest policy-making body to chart the direction 
and strategies for comprehensive and coordinated development of SMEs across all 
sectors of the economy. At the time of its establishment, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
acted as the Secretariat to the NSDC. In July 2008, the Secretariat function was 
conveyed to the Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation (SMIDEC).6  
 
In terms of tax revenue, the contribution of SMEs is unknown, since no data is publicly 
available. The annual report of the IRB published income tax collection by general 
categories of taxpayer (for example, individual, co-operatives and company) and not by 
size of the businesses. Further, the establishment of an SME could be in the form of an 
incorporated body (company) or unincorporated body (sole-proprietor or partnership). 
Considering this, the amount of income tax paid by SMEs would be included in 
company and individual taxpayers’ assessments. Nonetheless, in recognising the 
                                                 
6 For further information, refer to the NSDC website at http://www.smeinfo.com.my. Recently, on 3 July 
2009, the SMIDEC has been transformed into the SME Central Coordinating Agency, known as the 
Small and Medium Enterprises Corporation Malaysia (SME Corp). 
  9
importance of SMEs in Malaysia, it is presumed that SMEs, as taxpayers, could 
contribute significantly to income tax revenue (corporate tax and personal tax, 
depending on its establishment).  Having recognised the significant role of SMEs and 
their contribution to national growth, particularly tax revenue, the current study 
estimates compliance costs and examines this and other factors (such as SME 
characteristics and attitudes) influencing the taxation compliance behaviour of SME 
companies in Malaysia. 
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
This study examines the determinants of non-compliance behaviour of small and 
medium-sized companies in Malaysia, with particular emphasis on income tax 
compliance costs under the SAS regime. Three research questions have been developed 
to meet the above overall research objective. First, what are the costs faced by SMEs in 
complying with corporate income tax laws in Malaysia for the tax year 2006? Secondly, 
to what extent do compliance costs influence the likely compliance behaviour of SMEs? 
Thirdly, what is the extent of the relationship between compliance costs and compliance 
behaviour, taken together with other variables i.e. characteristics of SMEs, attitudes of 
owner-manager and structure of tax systems? 
 
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study extends the scope of taxpayer compliance research to the area of corporate 
income taxation. This is the first study into corporate tax compliance in Malaysia and 
adds to the very limited international literature on corporate taxation. This study 
examines the determinants of non-compliance behaviour of corporations. Almost all 
prior tax compliance research focussed on the individual taxpayer, with only five 
studies (Rice 1992; Kamdar 1997; Mills 1998; Joulfaian 2000; Hanlon, Mills and 
Slemrod 2005) known to this author investigating the determinants of corporate tax 
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compliance behaviour. Additionally, there are also few theoretical papers or notes that 
relate to corporate tax evasion (Marrelli 1984; Kreutzer and Lee 1986, 1988; Wang and 
Conant 1988; Lee 1998). More importantly, these limited studies were predominantly 
carried out in the US. This study is also probably the first study on corporate tax 
compliance among developing countries and, more importantly, undertaken outside the 
US.  
 
The current Malaysian study specifically focuses on corporate SME businesses. Out of 
the five US empirical studies above, only a study by Rice (1992) is confined to SME 
corporations. Thus, this study contributes more specifically in the context of SME 
taxation. Determinants of non-compliance are examined in this study, with particular 
emphasis directed to the influence of compliance costs on SME non-compliance. The 
international tax literature noted that there is a lack of research that relates compliance 
costs with taxpayer compliance behaviour. In a response to Richardson and Sawyer 
(2001, p. 207), and particularly to Hasseldine (2001, p. 11), this study applies 
behavioural research methods to investigating the linkages between taxpayer 
compliance research and tax compliance costs research.  
 
A study by Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002b) was perhaps the first to merge both 
tax compliance costs and compliance behaviour in a single study. However, their 
findings are not conclusive, but rather tentative due to key methodological limitations 
(Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta 2002b, p. iii, 25).7 Another study, by Yesegat (2009), 
was also conducted at the same time as the current study. The study has used a better 
methodology by employing both quantitative and qualitative methods, but the 
relationship between compliance costs and compliance behaviour is analysed merely 
from experimental data, including the compliance costs figure.8  The Indian study was 
confined to personal taxpayers and the Ethiopian study to value added taxpayers. The 
current study integrates both the tax compliance and compliance costs aspects in the 
context of corporate taxation, SMEs in particular. 
                                                 
7 See Chapter Two, subsection 2.2.1. 
8 See Chapter Two, subsection 2.2.1. 
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Further, the 2006 Malaysian experience of the postponement of the proposed Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) indicates a need for the introduction of Tax Impact Statements 
(TIS)9 regarding major tax changes and/or new tax legislation, particularly those 
affecting SMEs. A lack of recognition of the burden imposed on businesses, regardless 
of size, is among the major reasons causing the indefinite postponement of the GST.10 
Consideration of the tax compliance burden through TIS is useful for the tax policy 
debate. This would be a similar policy to that adopted in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Evans and Walpole 1999). 
 
This study is also significant in providing evidence on the issue of corporate tax 
compliance under the SAS regime. Prior studies show the importance of voluntary tax 
compliance in ensuring effective and efficient implementation of the SAS. 
Consideration of tax compliance costs, some understanding of the attitudes, and the 
likely compliance behaviour of business executives could provide direction to policy 
makers, particularly in enhancing voluntary tax compliance. The Malaysian tax 
authority, as well as foreign tax regimes which currently operate a SAS or intend to 
adopt the system in the future, may significantly benefit from this study.  
 
 
1.5 ANALYSIS OF KEY TERMS 
    
1.5.1 Tax Compliance or Non-compliance 
Tax compliance, simply put, means adherence to tax reporting requirements; that is, that 
the taxpayer files all required tax returns at the proper time and that the returns 
accurately report tax liability in accordance with the tax laws, regulations, and court 
decisions applicable at the time the return is filed (Roth, Scholz and Witte 1989, p. 21). 
Non-compliance, on the other hand, signifies failing to meet tax reporting requirements. 
Non-compliance represents the most inclusive conceptualisation with respect to the 
                                                 
9 Also known as Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) and Compliance Costs Assessment (CCA). 
10 As June 2009, the GST (also known as Value Added Tax) is yet to be implemented in Malaysia. It is 
anticipated that the government will initiate again it after the full recovery from the current economy 
climate.   
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failure to meet tax obligations, whether intentional or unintentional (Kinsey 1984, p. 2). 
Other terms used to describe tax non-compliance include tax evasion, cheating, errors 
and misreporting (Long and Swingen 1991). The term ‘tax evasion’ is often used 
interchangeably with non-compliance in the tax literature despite some differences, 
particularly with reference to intention. Tax evasion, in lay terms, means hiding taxable 
income from the tax authority (Pyle 1989, p. 111).  
 
In Malaysia, non-compliance may take four main forms: failure to submit a tax return, 
understatement of income, overstatement of deductions, and failure to pay assessed 
taxes by the due date (Baldry and Kasipillai 1996). The extent of non-compliance by 
each of these categories is not known (Kasipillai 2003, p. 13), at least publicly. For 
business taxpayers, other forms of non-compliance include failure to perform a number 
of duties and responsibilities as required by the law.11 Intentional non-compliance is 
among the most serious tax offences in Malaysia. It is subject to a fine of at least 
RM1,000 and up to RM20,000 or three years imprisonment, or both, plus a penalty of 
three times the amount of tax undercharged (Section 114, Income Tax Act (ITA) 1967). 
 
The current study focuses on two forms of intentional income tax non-compliance, that 
is, understatement of income and overstatement of deductions.12 A separate analysis of 
the various forms of non-compliance is urged by a number of tax researchers (see 
mainly Long and Swingen 1991, p. 664; Richardson and Sawyer 2001, p. 224). The 
term ‘non-compliance’ is used throughout this thesis, but the term ‘tax evasion’ can also 
be used interchangeably in the context of intentional non-compliance. This study adopts 
a taxpayer orientation by measuring the likely compliance/non-compliance behaviour 
from SME business managerial or respondent perspectives,13 as such findings on 
compliance behaviour throughout this thesis refer to possible compliance/non-
compliance. A similar approach is taken by a number of tax compliance researchers 
internationally e.g. Hite (1988); Reckers, Sanders and Roark (1994); Kaplan, Newberry 
and Reckers (1997); Chan, Troutman and O’Bryan (2000); Kasipillai, Mat-Udin and 
                                                 
11 See Chapter Three, subsection 3.2.2. 
12 See Chapter Four, subsection 4.4.3 and Section 4.5. 
13 See Chapter Four, subsection 4.4.3.  
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Zainol-Ariffin (2003). A few other authors also prefer to use the term ‘compliant 
attitude’ rather than ‘tax compliance’ or ‘tax compliance behaviour’ e.g. Hasseldine 
(1999); Tan and Chin-Fatt (2000); Abdul-Manaf, Hasseldine and Hodges (2005). 
 
1.5.2 Tax Compliance Costs 
Compliance costs of taxation are costs incurred by taxpayers, in addition to their tax 
liability in conforming to the tax requirements. Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989, 
pp. 10-12) defined compliance costs as those costs incurred by taxpayers, or third 
parties such as businesses, in meeting the requirements laid upon them in complying 
with a given tax structure. For a business, the compliance costs include the cost of 
collecting, remitting and accounting for tax purposes; the costs of acquiring relevant tax 
knowledge and information; payments to external professionals; and also costs related 
to incidental and overhead costs (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick p. 10).  
 
Compliance costs of taxation include three major components, namely money costs, 
time costs and psychological costs to the taxpayer (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 
1989, pp. 11-12). The money costs refer to an amount spent on tax advisers or 
professionals (i.e. tax agents, accountants, investment advisers, legal practitioners) and 
expenses relating to taxation guides, books, communication and other incidental costs. 
On the other hand, time costs are incurred on record keeping tax information, 
completing the tax form, or in preparing tax details for the tax professionals, as well as 
time spent on dealing with the tax authorities. Meanwhile, psychological costs refer to 
taxpayers having to deal with his/her tax affairs, such as the anxiety of handling 
complex tax matters.  
 
Compliance costs are also categorised into their sources i.e. internal and external or 
types i.e. computational or planning (e.g. Pope, Fayle and Chen 1991). Internal 
compliance costs refer to both money costs and time costs that are incurred within the 
business. External compliance costs refer mainly to fees paid to external tax 
professionals, such as accountants and lawyers. Computational costs are mostly routine, 
calculative and incurred on a yearly basis. In contrast, planning costs relate to further 
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efforts taken by taxpayers to legally minimise their tax liability, particularly in the 
longer run. 
 
Additionally, Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989, pp. 13-14) recognised cash flow 
benefits and managerial benefits as offsets to compliance costs. Consequently, the term 
‘net compliance costs’ was in use representing compliance costs after offsetting 
benefits. Since managerial benefits cannot be easily measured quantitatively, the 
researcher normally deducts the cash value benefits only in arriving at net compliance 
costs (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992, p. 7). Benefits arising from tax deductibility have 
also been included and estimated as an offsetting benefit of compliance since the mid 
1990s (Allers 1994, pp. 38-40; Evans et al. 1997). 
 
This study estimates compliance costs, covering both the money costs and time costs, 
incurred by the SME companies in complying with corporate income taxation in 2006. 
The estimates are carried out both at the company level (disaggregate) and subsequently 
to a presumed population of SME companies in Malaysia (aggregate). Compliance costs 
are also analysed in terms of the internal/external and computational/planning 
classifications. The current study also estimates the net compliance costs after taking 
into account the value of tax deductibility, both at the firm and aggregate levels. 
Potential cash flow benefits are recognised in this study, but data availability does not 
permit estimation. Thus, the term ‘net compliance costs’ in this thesis refers to gross 
compliance costs minus a value for tax deductibility. More details on compliance costs 
estimates are presented in Chapters Four and Five. 
 
1.5.3 Small and Medium Enterprises 
This study adopts the standard national definition of SMEs established by the NSDC. 
This national definition was adopted in Malaysian on 13 September 2005 (National 
SME Development Council 2005). However, the definition was initially established by 
the NSDC on 1 December 2004 (Bank Negara Malaysia 2004) and was subsequently 
endorsed by them on 9 June 2005. It is important to note that this definition has been 
used earlier to classify SMEs in the SME Annual Report 2005 (National SME 
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Development Council 2006). Prior to 2005, there was no common definition of SMEs 
employed in Malaysia. Various measures have been used, including the number of full-
time employees, annual sales turnover, amount of assets, shareholders’ funds, paid-up 
capital, and combinations of these methods. For example, the SMIDEC, a primary 
government agency responsible for the development of SMEs in Malaysia, has defined 
SMEs as businesses with an annual sales turnover not exceeding RM25 million, and 
with full-time employees not exceeding 150.  
 
Since 2005, the standard definitions for Malaysian SMEs are based on two criteria, 
either the number of employees or annual sales turnover (National SME Development 
Council 2005). Further, the SMEs have been categorised primarily into four sectors: 
manufacturing, manufacturing-related services (MRS), primary agriculture, and other 
services (including information and communications technology). The overall SME 
definitions, based on the number of full-time employees and annual sales turnover by 
sector, are shown in Table 1.5. Importantly, specific criteria, both in terms of staff 
number or turnover level, differ among the manufacturing/MRS sector and the 
services/primary agriculture sector. For example, the upper limit in terms of turnover 
level is RM25 million for SMEs in the manufacturing and MRS sectors compared to 
RM5 million in the services and primary agriculture sectors. 
 
Table 1.5: National SMEs: Definition by Sectors and Criteria 
 Criteria a 
Sectors Number of  
Employees  
Annual Turnover 
(RM)   
Manufacturing    
Manufacturing-related services ≤ 150 ≤ 25 million 
Primary Agriculture    
Services ≤ 50 ≤ 5 million 
a Businesses are to meet either criteria.  
Source: National SME Development Council (2005, pp. 3-5). 
Exchange rate RM2.84 = A$1; RM3.52 = US$1; RM5.79 = £1; RM4.94 = €1 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara 
Malaysia). 
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The NSDC also further distinguishes between micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (see Appendix A). For example, in the manufacturing and MRS sectors, an 
enterprise with full-time employees of less than five or with annual turnover of less than 
RM250,000, is classified as a micro enterprise; with full-time employees of between 5 
and 50, or annual turnover of between RM250,000 and less than RM10 million, as a 
small enterprise; and with full-time employees of between 51 and 150, or with annual 
turnover of between RM10 million and RM25 million, as a medium enterprise. 
Unfortunately, the upper limit for the lowest turnover level used to define SMEs into 
micro enterprises is different between the manufacturing/MRS sectors (i.e. less than 
RM250,000) and the services/primary agriculture sectors (i.e. less than RM200,000).  
 
The current study standardised the turnover amount to RM250,000 so as to facilitate 
responses from all sectors into a single questionnaire. For staff criteria, no adjustment 
was made as the lowest number of staff among all the four sectors is the same, i.e. less 
than five. 
 
1.5.4 Exchange Rate 
All Malaysian monetary data, including compliance costs estimates, throughout this 
thesis are stated in Ringgit Malaysia (RM). As a general guide, one unit of the 
Australian Dollar (A$), United Kingdom Pound Sterling (£), United States Dollar (US$) 
and European Euro (€) are equal to RM2.84, RM5.79, RM3.52 and RM4.94 
respectively (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). Exchange rates for other currencies 
are given in a footnote, where applicable. 
 
 
1.6 PRESENTATION OF THE THESIS 
 
This study is organised into eight chapters, namely introduction, review of tax 
compliance and tax compliance costs studies, taxation of SMEs and major issues in 
Malaysia, research design and methodology, compliance costs estimates of SMEs, tax 
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attitudes and compliance behaviour of SMEs, comparison of findings and discussion, 
and conclusion and policy recommendations. 
 
Chapter One provides the background of the study, research objectives and specific 
research questions, significance of the study, analysis of terms employed, and 
organisation of the remaining chapters. The background of the study highlights the 
likely magnitude of the tax gap, the significance of corporate income tax to federal 
government revenue, and the importance of SMEs in Malaysia. 
 
Chapter Two provides a review of the literature on tax compliance and tax compliance 
costs, focusing on business taxpayers and corporations, in particular. Chapter Three 
presents an overview of income taxation in Malaysia and detailed discussion of income 
taxation of SMEs under the SAS regime. More importantly, the major income tax 
difficulties and issues surrounding the SME sector are highlighted in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Four discusses the research design and methodology adopted in this study. This 
includes survey questionnaire design; survey implementation; population; and the 
sample and method of data analysis, covering mainly the primary postal survey and two 
additional surveys. This chapter also provides detailed discussion on the measurement 
issues and approach adopted in relation to compliance costs and compliance behaviour.  
  
Findings of the study are presented in Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Five presents 
compliance costs estimates of SME companies, covering both the gross and net 
compliance costs, estimated mainly at the firm level, and at the aggregate corporate 
SME level. The analysis of compliance costs by business profiles (including distribution 
by turnover level), cost sources and cost types are also presented in this chapter. 
Chapter Six reports findings on tax attitudes and compliance of SME companies 
measured from a business managerial perspective. The chapter also examines the 
association among variables—that is, compliance costs, tax attitudes and tax 
behaviour—and, more importantly, considers the determinants of compliance 
behaviour. These two chapters (five and six) primarily cover the findings of the main 
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postal survey on SMEs. Findings of the two additional surveys, i.e. SME web survey 
and tax professionals’ postal survey, are also presented, but in less detail, mainly to 
support the primary postal survey.  
 
Chapter Seven compares key findings of the main survey and two additional surveys. 
This comparison broadly shows the consistency of the compliance costs estimates and 
findings on tax attitudes and compliance behaviour in the current study.  This chapter 
also discusses the current findings to earlier relevant studies, both in Malaysia and 
internationally. 
 
Finally, Chapter Eight summarises and discusses the major findings, major policy 
recommendations, limitations of the study, and possible directions for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF STUDIES OF TAX COMPLIANCE AND TAX 
COMPLIANCE COSTS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents a literature review of the two key aspects of this thesis, namely tax 
compliance and tax compliance costs. These reviews are important in providing a 
theoretical background for this study as the current investigation integrates both 
taxpayer compliance and tax compliance costs into a single study. These two aspects are 
considered within both international and Malaysian settings, but focusing on business 
taxpayers. As there are a prolific number of studies internationally that focus on these 
two aspects with individuals, this area is presented broadly, but is followed by a detailed 
review of corporate tax studies. In Malaysia, prior tax compliance studies are restricted 
to individuals, but nearly all compliance costs studies are limited to corporations. As 
such, tax compliance studies cover business individuals in detail, with tax compliance 
costs including all studies. A review of major tax issues in SME corporations is 
presented in Chapter Three. Relevant literature on research methods is covered later in 
Chapter Four. 
 
 
2.2 A REVIEW OF TAX COMPLIANCE STUDIES 
 
2.2.1 International Tax Compliance Studies 
Concern about voluntary tax compliance has led to numerous studies of tax compliance 
issues, particularly income tax. Comprehensive reviews of prior major tax compliance 
studies are provided by Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Richardson and Sawyer 
(2001), the former being well cited in the tax literature. Jackson and Milliron (1986) 
provide a review of 43 tax compliance studies carried out between the 1970s and 1985. 
Richardson and Sawyer (2001), in a similar way, provide a review and synthesis of 
more than 130 tax compliance studies published from 1985 to 1997 and, most 
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importantly, provide discussion on the progress made following suggestions given by 
Jackson and Milliron. Both reviews considered the key tax compliance variables, 
methods employed, issues and theory involved.  
 
Specifically, their reviews identified a number of behavioural determinants of tax 
compliance behaviour. Fischer, Wartick and Mark (1992, p. 3) broadly classify them 
into four categories: demographic e.g. age, gender; proxy for non-compliance 
opportunity e.g. education, income level, income source and occupation; attitudinal e.g. 
ethics, tax fairness, peer influence; and structural e.g. tax complexity, revenue authority 
contact, sanctions, detection probability, and tax rates. The possibility of other factors—
such as compliance costs, tax preparers, framing of tax decisions, and tax incentives—
though recognised are examined less. Overall, the findings of many studies on the 
determinants of tax compliance behaviour of individual taxpayers are somewhat mixed, 
even when different research methods are employed (Jackson and Milliron 1986; 
Richardson and Sawyer 2001). 
 
Besides these two comprehensive reviews, several other reviews are available—for 
example, Fischer, Wartick and Mark (1992); Cuccia (1994); Andreoni, Erard and 
Feinstein (1998) and Hasseldine and Li (1999). Overall these reviews also raise similar 
concerns over the variables influencing tax compliance behaviour. The detail of these 
tax compliance studies is not considered in this section as the current study focuses on 
corporate taxpayers rather than individuals. Nonetheless, relevant findings, mainly to 
business taxpayers, are discussed where appropriate. The fact that tax compliance 
studies predominantly centre on the income tax compliance of individual taxpayers is 
recognised in the literature (Long and Swingen 1991, p. 665; Rice 1992, p. 126; 
Kamdar 1997, p. 37), particularly individuals without a business. 
 
Prior research generally adopts economic deterrence and/or fiscal psychology models in 
explaining the tax compliance behaviour of individuals (Hasseldine and Li 1999, p. 94).  
In terms of a model, the seminal work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) applies a 
financial self-interest model in the context of tax compliance. This model is based on an 
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economics-of-crime approach introduced by Becker (1968). The model suggests that 
tax rate, detection probability and penalty structure are determining factors for 
compliance costs that affect compliance behaviour, as shown in Figure 2.1. Arguably, 
the model only considers the economic variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fischer, Wartick and Mark (1992) expand the model to incorporate the sociological and 
psychological variables as well (Figure 2.2). This expanded model predicts that 
demographic variables indirectly influence tax compliance behaviour through their 
effects on non-compliance opportunities and attitudes.  
 
 
Attitudes and Perceptions 
Taxpayer 
Compliance 
Behaviour 
Demographic 
Variables 
Structure of Tax System 
Non-compliance  
Opportunity 
Source: Fischer, Wartick and Mark (1992, p. 4).
Figure 2.2: Expanded Model of Taxpayer Compliance 
 
Tax Rate 
Detection Probability 
Penalty Structure 
Compliance  
Costs 
Compliance 
Behaviour 
Figure 2.1: Financial Self-interest Model 
Source: Fischer, Wartick and Mark (1992, p. 3) derived from Becker (1968). 
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Many tax researchers have acknowledged that prior tax compliance studies on 
individuals provide a formal framework analysis for the corporate tax compliance 
decision, (see especially Pyle 1989, p. 87; Rice 1992, p. 127; Kamdar 1997, p. 38; 
Joulfaian 2000, p. 698). The remainder of this section focuses on business taxpayers, 
particularly corporate SMEs, as the main focus of this chapter. The literature review 
reveals that there are at least five tax compliance studies that are relevant to corporate 
tax compliance (Rice 1992; Kamdar 1997; Mills 1998; Joulfaian 2000; Hanlon, Mills 
and Slemrod 2005). A summary of these corporate tax compliance studies and their key 
findings are shown in Table 2.1. 
 
The first empirical evidence on corporate income tax non-compliance was provided by 
Rice (1992). Rice used the 1980 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) 
database provided by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). He found no evidence to 
link firm size with tax compliance. However, the fact that this study was confined to 
medium-sized corporations must be noted.  
 
Kamdar (1997, p. 39) argues that further work is necessary before drawing any 
conclusions on the determinants of corporate non-compliance. Kamdar conducted a 
time series analysis by utilising both the standard theoretical model of compliance and 
one extended to include a couple of variables to examine the extent and determinants of 
corporate income tax compliance. The basic compliance model assumes that the amount 
of income reported by a taxpayer is a function of true income, marginal tax rates, 
probability of detections for companies, penalties for non-compliance, and other 
socioeconomic features. Kamdar found that audit rates and profits have a positive and 
significant effect on compliance, suggesting that a greater audit coverage could lead to a 
substantial rise in tax revenues (Kamdar 1997, p. 46). Despite the fact that corporate tax 
evasion was not prevalent in his study, he emphasised that corporate compliance 
improvement could result in significant revenue increases (Kamdar 1997, p. 46). 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Corporate Tax Compliance Studies in the US 
Author(s); year Key Findings on Tax Compliance 
Rice (1992)  Public disclosure tends to improve tax compliance. 
 Profit performance influences tax compliance. 
 The marginal tax rate is negatively associated with compliance. 
 No evidence to link size with tax compliance. 
Kamdar (1997)  Greater audit coverage could lead to substantial rise in tax 
revenues.  
 Lowering marginal tax rate and increasing penalties would not 
necessarily enhance corporate compliance.  
Mills (1996; 1998)   Both the preliminary and the final analysis indicate that audit 
adjustments were found to be increasing as the excess of book 
income over taxable income increases. 
Joulfaian (2000)  Non-compliant firms are more likely to be managed by 
executives who have failed to comply with personal income tax 
than are compliant firms.  
 Marginal tax rates, income level, audit rate and firm size 
influence non-compliance behaviour.  
 Foreign ownership was found to be not significant in determining 
undeclared income. 
Hanlon, Mills and 
Slemrod (2005) 
 55 percent of the firms have a tax adjustment and, in aggregate, 
the adjustment is 0.17 percent of aggregate assets and 0.22 
percent of total sales.  
 Corporate non-compliance was 13.6 percent of the true tax 
liability.  
 Corporate characteristics (i.e. size, foreign/domestic controlled 
companies, multi-national/local business, private/public 
companies and industry type) determine corporate compliance 
behaviour.  
 Greater tax opportunities and executive compensation would lead 
to greater non-compliance, while quality of governance has no 
effect on corporate non-compliance. 
Source: Adapted from Abdul-Jabbar and Pope (2009). 
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In another study, Mills (1998, p. 355) noted that the IRS audit adjustments increase as 
book-tax differences increase, which indicates likely non-compliance. She refers to 
book-tax differences as the differences between accounting income and taxable income. 
She asserts that the book-tax differences act as a possible sign of non-compliance. In 
her preliminary analysis, she measured the book-tax differences in two ways, i.e. pre-
tax book income less taxable income and federal tax expense less tax declared on the 
return (Mills 1996, p. 424). Later, in 1998 (Mills, p. 346), the book-tax differences were 
also measured by using the US deferred income tax expense, particularly for public 
companies. 
 
A study by Joulfaian (2000) also employed the corporate TCMP data. Joulfaian (2000, 
p. 698) argued that managerial preferences might determine corporate compliance 
behaviour. The understatement of personal income tax by managers was used as a proxy 
of managerial preferences. The undeclared amount of corporate net income (in excess of 
US$100) represents the dependent variable and is measured by the differences between 
corrected (through audit) and reported income. The independent variables include 
managerial preferences and other firm attributes—namely audit rate, marginal corporate 
tax rate, net income, sales and foreign ownership—as determinants of compliance 
behaviour. Joulfaian found that non-compliant firms are more likely to be managed by 
executives who have failed to comply with their personal income tax than are compliant 
firms. Thus, he urged tax researchers to incorporate managerial preferences as one of 
the determinants of corporate tax compliance (Joulfaian 2000, p. 701). 
 
More recently, Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod (2005) explored the relationship between 
corporate non-compliance and corporate characteristics. Tax deficiencies proposed by 
the IRS upon audit were mainly used as a measure of non-compliance. In terms of 
corporate characteristics, firm size, industry, foreign ownership, multi-nationality, and 
public or private companies were among characteristics assessed in their study. Larger 
firms were found to be more non-compliant than smaller firms, but medium-sized 
businesses had the lowest rate of non-compliance, suggesting that corporate tax non-
compliance was U-shaped. It is surprising that medium-sized businesses were more 
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compliant than small businesses. Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod acknowledged that such an 
inconsistent pattern is to be connected with the opportunity for non-compliance 
(Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod 2005, p. 27). As for other characteristics of companies, 
they found that foreign controlled companies were less non-compliant than domestic 
companies, multi-national and private companies had a greater deficiency relative to 
non-multinational and public companies respectively, and the overall industry effects 
were significant too. As for other variables, Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod (2005) 
demonstrated that greater tax opportunities and executive compensation would lead to 
greater non-compliance, and that the quality of governance has no effect on non-
compliance, while no evidence was found to support effective tax rates influencing non-
compliance. 
 
Slemrod (2004a, p. 83) argued that the tax situation of both companies and owners is 
closely related, and urged researchers to analyse these simultaneously. He expected a 
similar connection between compliance/non-compliance and compliance costs,14 and 
presumed that tax complexity led to non-compliance as well (Slemrod 2004a, p. 93). Up 
until early 2000, the possible association between compliance costs and tax compliance 
behaviour remained unidentified for either business or non-business taxpayers 
(Hasseldine 2001, p. 9; Richardson and Sawyer 2001, p. 207). An Indian study by 
Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002b) is perhaps among the first to integrate tax 
compliance costs and tax behaviour of personal taxpayers into a single study. However, 
the study is subject to major methodological shortcomings, mainly due to data 
incompleteness, low responses and sample representations.  
 
More recently, Yesegat (2009) has also incorporated these two aspects of compliance in 
an Ethiopian study, but confined to VAT taxpayers. She has employed a mixed method 
approach by using a survey approach, i.e. face-to-face semi-structured questionnaire 
interviews of both taxpayers and tax practitioners, and experimentation with student 
subjects. Compliance costs were found to adversely affect tax compliance behaviour, 
but their relationship was statistically weak, suggesting that VAT compliance improves 
                                                 
14 See Section 2.3 for a review of tax compliance costs studies. 
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to some extent as the compliance costs are reduced.15 A noteworthy aspect is that the 
relationship between compliance costs estimates and compliance behaviour is derived 
primarily from the experimental data, i.e. all variables, including compliance costs, are 
hypothetical in nature.16 Nevertheless, Yesegat (2009, p. 213) believed that an attitude 
question in the semi-structured interview questions to taxpayers supported her overall 
finding.17  
 
2.2.2 Malaysian Tax Compliance Studies 
Despite growing problems of tax non-compliance and evasion in Malaysia,18 very few 
studies have been carried out and not much is known about the extent and determinants 
of such problems, particularly since the implementation of the self-assessment regime in 
Malaysia in 2001. A review of mainly published studies (including conference papers) 
reveals that there are 20 Malaysian tax compliance studies for the period between 1994 
and 2008.19 These studies are either partly or wholly related to tax compliance 
behaviour. Income tax is the primary focus, with two exceptions (Tayib 1998; Abdul-
Manaf 2004), both related to local government taxes.  
  
Similar to international trends on compliance behaviour research, Malaysian studies 
also focused on individual taxpayers. Little attention has been paid to business 
taxpayers, and surprisingly none to the corporate sector. Out of 18 studies on income 
tax compliance behaviour, only one has solely focused on individuals with business 
income, either self-employed or from a partnership (Ramasamy et al. 2003), while the 
other seven studies had some respondents with a business income, mostly self-
employed (Hanefah 1996; Kasipillai 1997; Kasipillai et al. 1999; Abdul 2003; Loo 
2006a; Che Azmi and Perumal 2008; Sia et al. 2008). A few studies sought responses 
respectively from tax professionals (i.e. accountants or tax agents), and tax officers 
                                                 
15 Provided that the probability of detection also increased (Yesegat 2009, p. 214). 
16 Compliance costs were manipulated in terms of 5,000 laboratory tokens plus a certain percent of sales, 
i.e. 1, 5 and 10 percent. These tokens were converted into the Ethiopian currency during the analysis 
stage. 
17 Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement/disagreement to a single statement expressed as 
‘the burden of compliance costs discourages me from fulfilling my VAT obligations’. 
18 See Chapter One, subsection 1.2.2. 
19 Refer Appendix B, for a complete list and summary of these studies. 
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(Che-Ayub 1994; Kasipillai 1997; Singh 2003) and students (Kasipillai, Aripin and 
Amran 2003; Loo 2006b; Ahmad, Hanefah and Mohd Noor 2007) as well. In terms of 
research method, a survey approach, particularly the mail questionnaire, seems to be 
widely used in Malaysian studies. The first study was conducted by Che-Ayub (1994). 
However, she focused on the perceptions of tax officers and tax agents towards the tax 
administrative system and evasion determinants of individual taxpayers in Malaysia. 
 
The study by Hanefah (1996) was probably the first to examine the tax compliance 
behaviour of the Malaysian individual taxpayer, including the self-employed. Hanefah 
investigated the efficiency and the productivity of the Malaysian tax administrative 
system, predominantly in the OAS, with a view to implementing a SAS in Malaysia. As 
part of his research, he studied the perceptions about the income tax administration 
system, tax fairness, and the tax law complexity of personal income tax. To achieve 
this, he adapted the expanded model of taxpayer compliance developed by Fischer, 
Wartick and Mark (1992). Meanwhile, other Malaysian studies partly examined a few 
factors and did not make comprehensive attempts to examine compliance behaviour—
for example, the effects of education (Kasipillai, Aripin and Amran 2003), tax 
knowledge (Ramasamy et al. 2003; Loo 2006a, 2006b), tax fairness, effectiveness of 
the IRB, the compliant attitude of other taxpayers (Ramasamy et al. 2003), ethics 
(Kasipillai, Mat-Udin and Zainol-Arifin 2003) or selected demographic factors 
(Kasipillai and Abdul-Jabbar 2006) on tax compliance. 
 
As there is no specific tax compliance study on corporate taxpayers, some of the major 
findings pertaining to individual business taxpayers are considered in more detail 
below. Studies by Ramasamy et al. (2003) and Abdul (2003) are of particular interest, 
as both studies are largely relevant to the business context. Additionally, studies by 
Hanefah (1996), Loo (2006a), and Sia et al. (2008) considered a substantial number of 
responses obtained mainly from the self-employed and few from partnership businesses. 
Individuals with business income comprised around 21 percent in Hanefah (1996), 37 
percent in Loo (2006a) and between 22 and 94 percent in Sia et al. (2008). Studies by 
Kasipillai et al. (1999) and Che Azmi and Perumal (2008) also cover self-employed 
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taxpayers. However, both studies are not considered in this section as the former study 
had only around four percent of self-employed businesses, and the latter study was 
restricted to tax fairness and did not encompass tax compliance behaviour. The earlier 
findings in this regard are important as they provide a framework for this research.  
 
A summary of key findings on Malaysian tax compliance studies on business 
individuals is shown in Table 2.2. Further details of these studies, together with other 
studies on non-business individuals, are presented Appendix B.20 
 
Ramasamy et al. (2003) exclusively cover small business income taxpayers. Their study 
was conducted by way of an interview survey to examine factors influencing the 
compliance behaviour of small business entrepreneurs in the northern peninsular of 
Malaysia. Four independent variables were used to determine the compliance behaviour 
of individual entrepreneurs. The independent variables were the extent of tax 
knowledge of small entrepreneurs, attitudes towards compliance by other taxpayers, 
attitudes towards the effectiveness of the IRB, and attitudes towards fairness of the tax 
system. Three hundred and twelve individual entrepreneurs were selected by way of 
non-random sampling and interviewed. They had obtained a response rate of 62 percent.  
 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the Ramasamy et al. (2003) study. First, 
attitudes towards other taxpayers’ compliance and attitudes towards tax fairness are 
positively related to small business compliance behaviour. Secondly, and surprisingly, 
the amount of tax knowledge and attitudes towards the effectiveness of the IRB have no 
relationship to the compliance behaviour of entrepreneurs. Ramasamy et al. (2003, p. 
25) suggest that this is probably due to the limitations of the study—the inability to 
differentiate between intentional and non-intentional non-compliance. They argued that 
the reason for non-compliance could be due to ignorance of the tax laws or due to the 
inability to understand the complex nature of tax laws.  
                                                 
20 Other tax studies, i.e. not compliance-related, are outlined in Appendix C. 
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Table 2.2: Malaysian Tax Compliance Studies on Business Income Taxpayers 
Author(s); year Key Findings on Compliance Attitudes and Behaviour 
Hanefah (1996)  Tax law was perceived to be unfair and tax complexity 
existed. 
 Some knowledge and understanding of the tax system 
would enhance compliance.  
Ramasamy et al. 
(2003) 
 Attitudes towards others’ compliance and fairness were 
positively related to compliance behaviour. 
 Tax knowledge and attitudes towards effectiveness of the 
IRB has no relationship to compliance behaviour 
Abdul (2003)  Non-compliance is severe in older persons, males with high 
taxable income levels and those who received non-salary 
income. 
 Tax officers believed that taxpayers’ intention, role of tax 
agents, taxpayers’ ignorance of tax law and financial strain 
were the main reasons for non-compliance. 
Loo (2006a)  Tax knowledge, tax structure, perceptions about tax fairness 
and perceptions about tax administration were found to 
influence tax behaviour, but tax knowledge had the most 
effect. 
 The financial constraints did not show any effect on 
compliance behaviour. 
Sia et al. (2008)  Compliant and non-compliant taxpayers had similar 
perceptions toward tax fairness, tax morals and peer 
influence. 
Source: Abdul-Jabbar and Pope (2009). 
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Abdul (2003) is probably the first to use the official IRB data. She analysed the main 
characteristics of income tax non-compliance from the perspectives of both tax evaders 
(i.e. taxpayers that are found guilty by the IRB for the period 1995 to 1997) and tax 
officers. In scrutinising all 507 individual files of tax evaders, she observed that almost 
99 percent of non-compliance was due to either the failure to declare income (68.2 
percent) or the understatement of income (30.4 percent). The remainder (less than two 
percent) was due to either overstatement of deductions or expenses (Abdul 2003, p. 66). 
 
An interview survey of 60 tax officers shows a slightly different finding. Tax officers 
believed that 63 percent of the non-compliance was due to both failure to declare 
income (30 percent) and understatement of income (33 percent). Another 25 percent 
and 12 percent were in regard to inflating expenses or over-claiming deductions 
respectively. Abdul (2003, p. 70) believed that the difference could be partly related to 
methodologies used for ranking. Tax officers were asked to rank type of non-
compliance in order of importance. On the other hand, evidence on the types of non-
compliance was extracted from the evader’s tax file. Other possible reasons given are 
related to time frame (for example, the actual file data were relevant for the period 
between 1995 and 1997), while tax officers’ responses were obtained from more than 
80 percent of officers who had worked for at least 10 years.  
 
In terms of factors influencing non-compliance, Abdul (2003, pp. 70-71) focused on 
four demographic variables, namely age group, gender, income level and income 
source. She observed that non-compliance was particularly severe in older persons 
(those aged 50 and above), males, individuals with high taxable income levels 
(RM50,000 and over per annum), and those who received income from sources other 
than wages and salaries, for example, sole-proprietors and the self-employed (Abdul 
2003, p. 89). Her study also indicated that around 62 percent of the tax evaders provided 
no reasons at all, while around 34 percent gave reasons such as ignorance of tax law and 
forgetting to declare, or similar reasons, for their evasion (Abdul 2003, p. 91). From the 
perspective of tax officers, the main reasons for non-compliance were believed to be 
taxpayers’ intentional evasion, the role of tax preparers (by way of omission or using 
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loopholes in the tax legislation) followed by taxpayers’ ignorance of income tax law 
and financial strain (Abdul 2003, p. 94). 
 
In an earlier study, Hanefah (1996) examined perceptions of the income tax 
administration system, tax fairness, and the tax law complexity of personal income tax. 
Overall, his findings indicate that tax law is perceived to be unfair and complex. He also 
provides evidence that some knowledge and understanding of the tax system is likely to 
enhance tax compliance. One of his main findings with regard to the self-employed 
taxpayer shows that there is a high tendency for them to appoint tax professionals in the 
SAS regime. 
 
Recently, Loo (2006a) explored the influence of the implementation of the SAS in 
Malaysia on the compliance behaviour of individual taxpayers. She conducted a 
repeated survey design immediately before and after the implementation of the SAS. 
Five independent variables were included, namely assessment system, tax knowledge, 
tax structure, financial constraints and attitude towards tax. Tax compliance behaviour 
is measured by three independent income types: taxable income, exempt income and 
casual income. Overall, her findings indicate that the change from the OAS to the SAS 
has to some extent influenced the compliance behaviour of individual taxpayers. 
Specifically, tax knowledge, tax structure and attitude towards tax were found to 
influence income reporting behaviour; tax knowledge had the greatest effect. As for the 
other two types of compliance, only tax knowledge and tax attitudes were found to be 
significant in both cases. Financial constraints did not show any effect on all types of 
compliance behaviour.  
 
More recently, Sia et al. (2008) compared the factors affecting the compliance 
behaviour of both compliant and non-compliant individual taxpayers. It is worth 
mentioning that both groups of respondents were selected from the IRB database. A 
mail survey was used to gather information from both compliant and non-compliant 
taxpayers. Non-compliant taxpayers are those who had previously received additional 
assessment following tax audits. On the other hand, compliant taxpayers are assumed to 
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be from those who have not been audited. Their study obtained an overall response rate 
of almost 10 percent. Interestingly, just over 94 percent of the non-compliant 
respondents were those from self-employed or partnership businesses. Meanwhile, 
about 22 percent of the compliant respondents came from this group. Overall, the study 
by Sia et al. (2008) indicates that both groups of taxpayers had similar perceptions 
toward tax fairness, tax morale and others’ compliance. 
 
Similar to the international studies, these Malaysian studies also broadly indicate that 
the attitudes of individual taxpayers, particularly towards tax fairness, tax rate structure, 
and tax administration, influence their tax compliance behaviour. Thus, the current 
study considers these three variables in the context of corporate SME taxation. 
Perceptions towards corporate tax complexity and probability of tax audit are also 
included so as to recognise the relevance of these factors in the SAS regime. Having 
acknowledged the importance of tax incentives to the SME sector internationally (see 
especially Freedman 2003; Crawford and Freedman 2008),21 attitudes to such tax 
incentives are also examined. The above review shows that no prior Malaysian studies 
examined the effect of tax compliance costs on tax compliance behaviour, even for non-
business individuals. The current study emphasises and contributes to this potential 
linkage in particular. A review of tax compliance costs studies internationally and in 
Malaysia is presented in the section below. 
 
 
2.3 A REVIEW OF TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS STUDIES 
 
2.3.1 International Compliance Costs Studies 
The financial self-interest model suggests that tax rate, detection probability and penalty 
structure are determining factors of compliance costs that eventually affect tax 
compliance behaviour. The importance of compliance costs in influencing compliance 
behaviour and the lack of empirical research in examining this relationship has been 
                                                 
21 See also Chapter Three, subsection 3.4.4. 
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discussed succinctly above.22 Nonetheless, evidence shows that international research 
into estimating tax compliance costs has grown strongly since the 1990s (Sandford, 
Godwin and Hardwick 1989; Pope 1995; Sandford 1995; Evans et al. 1997). 
Compliance cost estimates in the modern era have been conducted internationally, 
mainly in the UK, the USA, Australia and Canada for over 20 years, and now cover 
other countries, including Netherlands, Spain, Croatia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong, India, South Africa, and more recently Ethiopia. Currently, the 
requirement of a Tax Impact Statement (also known as Regulatory Impact Statement 
and Compliance Costs Assessment) for tax law changes is a normal practice in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, 
including Australia, the European Union, New Zealand, the UK and the US (Evans and 
Walpole 1999, p. 21). 
 
The development of earlier research on tax compliance costs has been discussed in three 
phases by Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989, pp. 27-34), covering the period 
between the 1930s and early 1980s. Earlier attempts were carried out in the 1930s to 
1960s in North America, followed by the Europe phase from the 1960s to 1970s, and 
finally a worldwide phase from the 1980s onwards. More recent studies that have been 
conducted since the 1980s to early 2002 are outlined by Evans (2003b). Studies that 
have been carried out thereafter include those in Australia (Board of Taxation 2007; 
Lignier 2008), the UK (Chittenden, Kauser and Poutziouris 2005; Chittenden et al. 
2005; Kauser et al. 2005; Mathieu, Waddams and Antwi 2007), the US (Guyton et al. 
2003; DeLuca et al. 2005; Guyton et al. 2005), Canada (Vaillancourt and Clemens 
2008), Croatia (Blazic 2004), Slovenia (Klun 2004a, 2004b), South Africa (SBP 2005) 
and the newest in Ethiopia (Yesegat 2009). Broadly, these studies cover a range of 
taxes, with income tax and VAT/GST being the largest in number. The current study 
focuses on business income tax and SME corporations in particular, thus key findings of 
the relevant studies are discussed in this section. Notwithstanding this, overall findings 
of comprehensive studies of all major taxes are given where applicable. 
 
                                                 
22 See Section 2.2. 
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The first study on taxation compliance costs was carried out by Haig (1935) about 75 
years ago on large corporations using a mail survey covering all federal and state taxes 
in the US. In the UK, a systematic and exhaustive study on compliance costs was 
carried out by Sandford (1973). Sandford used a survey method in collecting responses 
mainly from individuals, including the self-employed, on personal income tax. His main 
finding reveals that compliance costs amounted to between 1.9 and 3.4 percent of total 
tax revenue. He also noted that low income taxpayers had higher compliance costs (on 
the average) as a fraction of income compared to higher income taxpayers. This 
provides evidence of the presence of regressivity. Thereafter, following a number of 
pioneering UK compliance costs studies by Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989), a 
considerable number of studies have been undertaken globally. This includes 
comprehensive studies of all federal taxes in Australia (Pope et al. 1990 – 1994; Evans 
et al. 1997), New Zealand (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992) and the Netherlands (Allers 
1994).  
 
Recently, Evans (2003b), in reviewing prior studies in taxation operating costs, has 
highlighted that there are at least 100 published studies into compliance costs, 
administrative costs or both. Out of these, Evans added that more than 60 publications 
have taken place since 1980 to early 2002. Evans (2003b, p. 66) noted that the first 
study in the Asia–Pacific region was only published in Australia in 1990, following 
pioneering work by Pope, Fayle and Duncanson (1990). Subsequently, Pope headed a 
series of four compliance costs studies on major Australian federal taxes, covering a 
wide range of taxes, including personal income tax, company income tax (Pope, Fayle 
and Chen 1991; 1994), fringe benefits tax (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1993a) and wholesale 
sales tax (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1993b). The compliance costs of these federal taxes 
were estimated at A$7,873 million in 1990/91,23 representing 11.9 percent of the total 
tax revenue from those federal taxes and 2.1 percent of GDP (Pope 1995, p. 103). A 
review of all five studies by Pope et al. indicates that compliance costs in Australia are 
significant, regressive and politically sensitive in nature, especially towards smaller 
                                                 
23 A$1 = RM2.84 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
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businesses. These findings in particular have focussed government attention onto the 
issue of the compliance burden in Australia (Rimmer and Wilson 1996). 
 
Since a series of studies by Pope et al., a number of studies have been conducted in 
Australia, including the comprehensive study of compliance costs by Evans et al. 
(1997). This study (often referred to as the ATAX study) provides further evidence on 
the regressivity of tax compliance costs on small businesses in particular. In 1994/1995, 
tax compliance costs of small business, irrespective of their legal entity, measured per 
A$1,000 of turnover, were at least nineteen times greater than for both medium and 
large business (Evans et al. 1997, pp.79-80).24 The remainder of the Australian studies 
were conducted by Wallschutzky and Gibson (1993), Rametse and Pope (2002), CPA 
Australia (2003), Evans (2003a), Tran-Nam and Glover (2002a), Evans, Tran-Nam and 
Jordan (2002), Glover and Tran-Nam (2005), and more recently specific studies on 
small business (Board of Taxation 2007; Lignier 2008). Evans (2003b, p. 69) observed 
that most studies on business operating costs are not specific to any one sector, but take 
account of all business segments. However, studies on small businesses tend to focus on 
the GST (Wallschutzky and Gibson 1993; Rametse and Pope 2002; Tran-Nam and 
Glover 2002a; CPA Australia 2003; Glover and Tran-Nam 2005).  
 
In New Zealand, tax compliance costs of business taxes were estimated to be almost 
NZ$1.9 billion, with income tax compliance costs amounting to just over NZ$1.2 
billion or 19 percent of tax revenue in 1990–91 (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992, p. 
107).25 Recently, Brunton (2005) estimated tax compliance costs for SMEs,26 covering 
four types of taxes, i.e. income tax, GST, PAYE and Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT). The 
average costs incurred by the SMEs in complying with such taxes were NZ$4,024, with 
almost 90 percent related to income tax (51 percent) and the GST (39 percent). Besides 
these, an annual survey has also been carried out by Business New Zealand/KPMG 
since 2003, covering all business compliance costs, including tax-related, employment-
related and environmental-related costs. Tax compliance costs consistently made up the 
                                                 
24 Refer Evans et al. (1997), Table 5.11 p.79, for details. 
25 NZ$1 = RM2.28 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
26 Only internal time costs and external costs were computed in Brunton (2005).  
  36
largest share of compliance costs, for example around 40 percent for the years 2005 to 
2007 (Business New Zealand/KPMG 2005, 2006, 2007) . 
 
In the Netherlands, total compliance costs to business in 1989 were estimated at Gld7.2 
billion27 or four percent of tax revenue (Allers 1994, p. 124).28 The use of a single 
question postcard survey to assess the non-response bias is one substantial contribution 
made by this author to the methodology of estimating tax compliance costs.  
 
In the US, a number of studies, in particular by Slemrod and his colleagues (Slemrod 
and Sorum 1984; Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992; Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996; 
Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002) have been undertaken since the mid-1980s. Other US 
studies include those by Little (1988), Lassila and Smith (1997), Guyton et al. (2003; 
2005), and a recent specific study on small businesses (DeLuca et al. 2005).29 
Regarding the US studies, Pope (2005, p. 206) observed that the business compliance 
costs studies in the US tend to emphasise larger corporations.30 For overall compliance 
costs, few US estimates are available, i.e. by Halls (1993), Slemrod (2004b) and 
Moody, Warcholik and Hodge (2005). Slemrod (2004b) estimated that the US federal 
tax compliance costs in 2004 amounted to US$125 billion or 13.4 percent of tax 
revenue, comprising US$85 billion and US$40 billion (or 11 percent and 24 percent of 
corresponding tax revenue) for individuals (including those with a business income) and 
other business taxpayers respectively.31  
 
The recent estimates by Moody, Warcholik and Hodge (2005, p. 2), however, indicated 
a much higher figure for 2004,32 i.e. US$244 billion or 24 percent of tax revenue. 
Vaillancourt and Clemens (2008, pp. 59-60) argue that the differences between these 
US estimates are largely methodological, in particular the hourly rate used in valuing 
                                                 
27 The Guilder (Gld) was the national currency at the time of study. Since 1999, the Netherlands, as a 
member of the European Community (EU) adopted the Euro Dollar (€). 
28 Covers all business taxes, including income tax (both individuals and corporations) and VAT. No 
separate details available for income tax. 
29 Findings reported in this conference paper are preliminary in nature. 
30 See the latter part of this section for details. 
31 US$1 = RM3.52 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia).  
32 These estimates cover a period of between 1990 and 2015. 
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taxpayer time. Further, the 2004 Slemrod estimates were based on his (and his 
colleagues’) prior surveys; on the other hand, Moody, Warcholik and Hodge (2005) 
relied on the IRS time estimates that were then converted into dollar values. 
Nonetheless, both estimates indicated the same findings regarding an increasing trend of 
compliance costs and its distributional effect on low income earners or smaller 
businesses.  
 
In Canada, despite a number studies focusing on specific taxes having been conducted 
since 1989 (Vaillancourt 1989; Plamondon and Associates Inc 1993; Erard 1997a),  
only recently total estimates of all tax compliance costs, including for business taxes, 
were available (Charron, Chow and Halbesma 2008; Vaillancourt and Clemens 2008). 
The estimated compliance costs of all taxes in 2005 was between C$16.2 billion and 
C$25.0 billion, with  business tax compliance costs amounted to C$13.0 billion or 1.0% 
of GDP (Vaillancourt and Clemens 2008, pp. 73-74).33 Specific ratios relative to 
business taxes are not reported separately by the authors, but the overall ratio indicates 
that total compliance costs comprise between 3.0 percent and 4.7 percent of all federal, 
provincial and local total revenues or between 1.2 percent and 1.8 percent of GDP in 
2005 (Vaillancourt and Clemens 2008, p. 78). In 2008, costs for the business sector to 
comply with all types of taxes34 amounted to C$12.6 billion or 2.7 percent of total tax 
revenue (Charron, Chow and Halbesma 2008, pp. 13-14 and 19-20). 
 
In Asia, a couple of business tax compliance costs studies were conducted in Singapore 
(Ariff, Loh and Talib 1995; Ariff, Ismail and Loh 1997), and subsequently followed by 
similar studies in Hong Kong (Chan et al. 1999), and Malaysia (Loh et al. 1997; 
Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 2001).35 A comparative analysis of these Asian studies 
undertaken by Ariff and Pope (2002, p. 25) indicate that compliance costs, as per 1,000 
corresponding currency units of turnover, incurred by small companies are almost ten 
times higher than for large companies. One noteworthy aspect is that all the Asian 
                                                 
33 C$1 = RM3.03 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
34 Comprising payroll taxes, business income tax, GST or harmonized sales tax (HST), provincial sales 
taxes and property taxes. 
35 Further analysis of these Asian studies is provided by Ariff and Pope (2002) in a single reference. See 
subsection 2.3.2 below for details on the Malaysian studies. 
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studies focussed on the corporate sector, with nearly all on public companies and only 
one on SMEs. More importantly, all these studies estimated compliance costs at the 
company disaggregate level only. In Singapore, Ariff, Ismail and Loh (1997, p. 1258) 
provided evidence of a significant decrease of tax compliance costs per public listed 
company, from S$78,396 (in 1994) to S$54,615 (in 1995).36 The average tax 
compliance costs per public listed company in Hong Kong were estimated at 
HK$346,483 for the tax year 1995–1996 (Chan et al. 1999).37 Recently, a couple of 
Asian studies were conducted in India (Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta 2002a, 2002b), 
covering both individual and corporate taxpayers. These Indian studies did not report 
the overall average compliance costs in monetary terms either for individuals or 
companies, but rather expressed it as a percentage of turnover, fixed assets and/or costs 
per employee. All these Asian studies have conclusively supported the presence of a 
fixed costs effect on smaller firms and ensuing regressivity. 
 
A more detailed account of tax compliance costs studies is not provided in this 
chapter;38 interested readers should refer mainly to Sandford (1995), Evans, Pope and 
Hasseldine (2001), Ariff and Pope (2002), Evans (2003b) and Pope (2005). One 
remarkable aspect is the incidence of a fixed cost effect irrespective of business size. 
Nearly all prior studies outlined above indicate that business tax compliance costs fall 
heavily to smaller firms when expressed as a percentage of turnover or tax paid. The 
same pattern applies for a single type of tax and over all taxes i.e. at the aggregate level 
for all types of business taxes. Further, key findings of all major studies, both earlier 
and recent studies up to 2002, continue to indicate that the compliance costs are high, 
very regressive (especially towards smaller firms and/or in the case of GST) and 
increasingly attracting political attention (Pope 2005, p. 210; 2007, pp. 522-523). 
 
                                                 
36 S$1 = RM2.43 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
37 HK$1 = RM0.45 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
38 Other than details and discussion of the relevant international studies on corporate business income 
taxation (see next paragraph) and all Malaysian studies (see subsection 2.3.2 below). 
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As the current study is confined to SME companies, a summary of compliance costs 
studies on corporate taxation in particular is presented in Table 2.3.39  The first UK 
study on corporations was conducted for the tax year 1986-87, and indicated that 
compliance costs were estimated at £300 million or 2.2 percent of corporate tax revenue 
(Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989, p. 140).40  In a later study, but confined to UK 
listed corporations, total compliance costs were estimated at £265 million, which 
showed an increase of around 34 percent in the period 1991–1996 (KPMG 1996). More 
recently, specific estimates on SME companies under the SAS regime conducted by 
Kauser et al. (2005, pp. 21-22) indicate that the aggregate compliance costs of SME 
companies in the UK amounted to £608 million. This study did not report the average 
compliance costs, but analyses compliance costs in percentile terms by business size in 
contrast to the 1989 Sandford findings. Their findings indicate that the regressivity of 
compliance costs upon small business remains an important concern (Kauser et al. 
2005, p. 21). 
 
In Australia, there were two studies on corporate compliance costs—the first on public 
companies (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1991) and the second covering all companies (Pope, 
Fayle and Chen 1994)—with findings from the former study superseded by the latter 
study. The 1990-91 compliance costs of companies’ income taxation were estimated at 
A$3,246 million or 22.9 percent of companies’ income tax (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994, 
p. 13), representing the largest compliance costs portion (41 percent) of all income taxes 
(Pope 1995, pp. 103-104).41  
 
                                                 
39 This summary covers studies undertaken since the late 1980s until recently. More details are presented 
in Appendix D. For earlier studies, including those on corporate businesses, refer Sandford, Godwin and 
Hardwick (1989, pp. 225 - 230). 
40 £1 = RM5.79 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
41 A$1 = RM2.84 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
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Table 2.3: Summary of Corporate Tax Compliance Costs Studies Worldwide a  
Authors(s); (year) Country Key Findings on Compliance Costs b 
Sandford, Godwin 
and Hardwick (1989) 
UK Compliance costs in 1986–87 were ₤300 million or 2.22 
percent of corporate tax revenue. 
Pope, Fayle and Chen 
(1991) 
Australia  Compliance costs of public companies in 1986–87 were 
between A$646 million and A$1.341 million, or 11.4 percent 
to 23.7 percent of corporate tax revenue. 
Pope, Fayle and Chen 
(1994) 
Australia  Compliance costs of companies’ income tax in 1990–91 
amounted to A$3,245.9 million or 22.9 percent of tax 
revenue. 
Ariff, Loh and Talib 
(1995) 
Singapore In 1994, the average compliance costs per listed company 
were S$78,396. 
Slemrod and 
Blumenthal (1996) 
US Compliance costs for large companies in 1992 were US$1.57 
million in average, and US$2.08 billion in total i.e. 3.2 
percent of revenue yield. 
KPMG (1996) UK Compliance costs of listed companies in 1995–96 were ₤265 
million. 
Slemrod (1997) US In 1996, the average compliance costs for large companies 
increased to US$1.9 million (1992: US$1.57 million), 
indicating an 8.1 percent increase in real terms. 
Ariff, Ismail and Loh 
(1997) 
Singapore The 1995 average compliance costs per listed company 
decreased significantly to S$54,615 (1994: S$78,396). 
Erard (1997a) Canada The combined federal-provincial income and capital tax 
compliance burden for the top 500 corporations in 1995 was 
estimated at C$507,000 per company, C$250 million in 
aggregate, or about 5 percent of taxes paid. 
Chan et al. (1999) Hong Kong The average tax compliance costs per public listed company 
in 1995–96 were estimated at HK$346,483. 
Slemrod and 
Venkatesh (2002) 
US The compliance costs per company in 2000 were 
US$254,451, between US$21 billion and US$22.3 billion in 
aggregate, or between 28 percent and 29.6 percent of tax 
revenue. 
Bertolucci (2002) Brazil The total compliance costs were R$7.2 billion. 
Chattopadhyay and 
Das Gupta (2002a) 
India  The corporate compliance costs for 2000–01 were around 5.6 
percent to 14.5 percent of tax revenues. 
Klun (2004b) Slovenia In 2002, compliance costs per company were SIT 1.5 million 
or 4.2 percent of tax revenue; 1.00 percent of GDP. 
Blazic (2004) Croatia Compliance costs for 2001-02 were HRK27,113 per company 
and  HRK2,038.6 million in aggregate level, representing  
around 1.2 percent of the GDP.  
a Refer Appendix D, for more details. Studies in Brazil, Slovenia and Croatia also included other business taxes paid 
by corporations. Studies that cover corporations as part of a comprehensive study on all business taxes and/or 
taxpayers were not included. These include studies in New Zealand (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992), the Netherlands 
(Allers 1994) and Australia (Evans et al. 1997).  
b Compliance costs refer to gross compliance costs, stated in relevant national currency.  
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In the US, the income tax compliance costs of large companies in 1992 were estimated 
at US$1.5 million per company, and US$2 billion in aggregate or around 3.2 percent of 
tax revenue (Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996, pp. 481, 421).42 In 1996, the compliance 
costs of US large companies increased to US$1.9 million per company, which is equal 
to 8.1 percent of real increase in average compliance costs (Slemrod 1997, p. 7). In 
2000, compliance costs for both large and medium sized-companies were estimated at 
US$254,000 per company, around US$22 billion in aggregate terms, i.e. 29 percent of 
tax (Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002, pp. 24-27). Thereafter, compliance costs estimates of 
corporations take into account partnerships as well, i.e. Slemrod (2004b) and Moody, 
Warcholik and Hodge (2005). 
 
Compliance costs for the largest Canadian corporations were estimated to be C$507,000 
per company, amounting to C$250 million in aggregate or five percent of tax revenue 
(Erard 1997a, pp. 4-5).43 Another Canadian study by Erard (1997b) specifically 
considered medium-sized corporations, but was concerned with perceptions about the 
compliance burden and thus did not estimate the compliance costs.  
 
The most recent studies on corporations, i.e. for the tax year 2001-02, were conducted 
in Croatia (Blazic 2004) and Slovenia (Klun 2004b). For Asian countries, nearly all 
studies estimated compliance costs on corporations; with estimates for Singapore, Hong 
Kong and India presented in the above section,44 while prior Malaysian estimates are 
discussed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 US$1 = RM3.52 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
43 C$1 = RM3.03 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
44 For a comprehensive review, refer Ariff and Pope (2002). 
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2.3.2 Malaysian Compliance Costs Studies 
Compliance costs studies, in a similar trend to compliance behaviour, also have long 
been ignored in Malaysia. Prior literature indicates that, to date, there are only three 
published studies on the costs of compliance in Malaysia. The first study, conducted by 
Loh et al. (1997) in 1995, examined the income tax compliance costs of public listed 
companies in Malaysia. The second study, conducted by Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 
(2001) in 2000 focused on SMEs. The third study was conducted by Mansor, Saad and 
Ibrahim (2003) in 2001. This study is probably the first study conducted under the SAS 
regime. However, it does not measure compliance costs in monetary terms; instead it 
focuses on the relative increase in the time spent on various tax compliance activities. In 
addition to these three studies, a study by Sapiei and Abdullah (2008) is probably the 
first on tax compliance costs of individual taxpayers. However, the study only estimated 
tax compliance costs, partially in monetary terms and the remainder in time spent. A 
summary of the major findings of these Malaysian compliance costs studies is shown in 
Table 2.4.45  
                                                 
45 Additional details are provided in Appendix E. 
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Table 2.4: Earlier Income Tax Compliance Costs Studies in Malaysia 
Author(s); 
(year) 
Respondents 
(year of study)
Main Outcomes a 
 
Loh et al. 
(1997) 
Public Listed 
Companies  
(1995) 
 The average compliance costs per public listed 
company was RM68,836 with 72 percent of 
the compliance costs external in nature.  
 Compliance costs decrease as company size 
increases. 
 Computational costs (61%) forms a major 
portion of compliance costs. 
Hanefah, 
Ariff and  
Kasipillai 
(2001) 
SME 
Companies 
(1999) 
 The average compliance costs per SME 
company was RM21,964, with 75 percent of 
the costs derived internally. 
 Computation costs form 59 percent, while the 
remaining (41%) was planning cost. 
 Compliance costs were four times more 
regressive than listed company. 
Mansor, 
Saad and 
Ibrahim, 
(2003) 
SME 
Companies 
(2002) 
 The major source of increase in compliance 
costs (measured in terms of relative increase of 
time spent) was time spent with tax agents 
(78.83%), followed by time spent in learning 
tax law changes (55.4%). 
Sapiei and 
Abdullah 
(2008) 
Individuals, 
including self-
employed 
(2007) 
 
 The average time spent on compliance 
activities by individual taxpayers was 70.6 
hours per annum. 
 The average money cost per taxpayer was 
RM187.90. 
 A large majority of taxpayers (71%) prepared 
their own tax return.      
a See Appendix E for additional details. 
Source: Abdul-Jabbar and Pope (2008b, p. 8). 
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Due to their methodological similarities, it is useful to compare the results of the first 
two studies, both of which were conducted prior to the introduction of the SAS. The 
average compliance costs of SMEs in absolute values are almost one-third of the large 
companies,46 as shown in Table 2.5. Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai (2001) emphasised 
that the composition of both internal and external costs, as measured by costs 
percentage, of SMEs were completely different for large companies. Hanefah, Ariff and 
Kasipillai (2001) found that SMEs rely heavily on internal resources to comply with the 
tax laws. On the contrary, large companies depend on the use of external advisers (Loh 
et al. 1997). More importantly, both studies confirmed the regressive nature of tax 
compliance costs among smaller companies in Malaysia. Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 
(2001) observed that the fixed cost effect of compliance costs is substantially greater for 
SMEs compared to the public listed companies studied by Loh et al. (1997). 
 
Table 2.5: Compliance Costs in Malaysia prior to the Self-Assessment System 
Costs Components Large Company a SME Company b 
 RM Percentage RM Percentage 
Internal 19,176 28 15,493 75 
External 49,660 72   5,210 25 
Overall 68,836 100   20,703 c 100 
a 1995 Loh et al. (1997) figures. 
b 1999 Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai (2001) figures. 
c The total was less than the overall mean costs of RM21,964 due to differences in the response number. 
Source: Adapted from Pope and Abdul-Jabbar (2008, p. 53 - Table 5).  
 
Arguably, Ariff and Pope (2002) show that the tax compliance costs incurred by 
Malaysian companies, either large or small firms, are substantially low compared with 
other Asia–Pacific countries, as shown in Table 2.6. For example, the average 
compliance costs for smaller firms in Malaysia is only six percent of compliance costs 
of larger firms, compared to 17 percent and 19 percent in Singapore and Hong Kong 
                                                 
46 The inflation rate, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) change over the period 1995 to 
1999 was between 2.6 and 3.5 percent per annum, except for 5.2 percent in 1998 (Treasury of Malaysia 
1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004).  
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respectively. It must be emphasised that a comparative analysis by Ariff and Pope only 
considered public listed companies in the respective three countries. 
 
Table 2.6: Average Costs of Complying with Corporate Income Tax: Listed Firms 
Countries (Currency) All Small Medium Large 
Hong Kong (HK$) 346,483 85,950 
(0.19) 
272,410 
(0.60) 
456,339 
(1.00) 
Malaysia (RM) 68,836 15,048 
(0.06) 
43,848 
(0.17) 
253,920 
(1.00) 
Singapore (S$) 78,396 36,446 
(0.17) 
61,715 
(0.28) 
216,575 
(1.00) 
Source: Ariff and Pope (2002, p. 41 - Table 2.5). Ratios in parenthesis are added by the author. 
Exchange rate HK$1 = RM0.45; S$1 = RM2.43 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
 
Interestingly, in contrast to tax behavioural studies, the Malaysian tax compliance costs 
studies have tended to emphasise the corporate sector rather than the individual 
taxpayer. The current study also focuses on the corporate sector under the SAS regime; 
however, it specifically targets the SME sector due to its importance in the national 
economy.47 
 
 
2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The literature review above shows that although a large number of studies on individual 
tax compliance behaviour exist, there is a paucity of research on the corporate sector, 
with no study yet to be undertaken in the Malaysian setting. The current study targets 
the corporate sector, specifically the SMEs, as recognition of their importance to the 
Malaysian economy.  Further, the lack of research examining the effect of tax 
compliance costs on tax compliance behaviour is observed for all taxpayers, including 
both individuals and businesses. This gap is apparent both at the international level and 
in Malaysia. Thus, compliance costs, in particular, have been chosen as among the key 
                                                 
47 See Chapter One, subsection 1.2.3. 
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determinants of tax compliance in the current study. Other influences included are 
business characteristics (such as business size, sector and the length in business), tax 
attitudes and perceptions (such as on complexity, fairness and structure of tax system) 
from a business managerial perspective.48 
                                                 
48 See Chapter Four, subsection 4.10.4 and Chapter Six, Section 6.7, for more details on other variables. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TAXATION OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES  
AND MAJOR ISSUES IN MALAYSIA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter starts with an overview of Malaysian taxation and highlights recent major 
income tax changes (including for tax year 2009), with particular emphasis on SME 
taxation under the SAS regime. Discussion of the major income tax difficulties and 
issues facing the SME sector is the central aim of this chapter. Understanding the tax 
issues surrounding SMEs is imperative as it offers some background and motivation 
regarding the current study. Unless otherwise stated, this chapter primarily covers 
relevant provisions under the ITA 1967 that are applicable to the year of assessment 
2006 and onwards. 
 
 
3.2 MALAYSIAN INCOME TAXATION UNDER SELF-ASSESSMENT 
 
3.2.1 Overview 
The Malaysian federal government’s tax revenue comprises direct and indirect taxes. 
Direct taxes are under the administration of the IRB. On the other hand, indirect taxes 
are administered by the Royal Malaysian Customs Department (RMC). Both tax 
authorities are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. The IRB was 
established in accordance with the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia Act 1995, which 
allows autonomy in the administration and effectiveness of direct taxes. On the 
contrary, the RMC is a government agency. A summary of direct and indirect taxes in 
Malaysia is presented in Table 3.1. All the taxes are administered under different Acts 
of Parliament. For example, income tax is governed by the ITA 1967, real property 
gains tax is under the Real Property Gains Tax Act (RPGTA) 1976, whilst sales tax and 
service tax are covered by the Sales Tax Act 1972 and Service Tax Act 1975 
respectively. 
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Table 3.1: Types of Federal Taxes in Malaysia 
Direct tax Indirect Tax 
Income Tax   
Charged on individuals, companies and 
other entities (such as clubs and 
associations) deriving income from 
businesses, employment, dividends, 
interest, rents, royalties, pensions, 
annuities and other periodical payments.  
Sales Tax 
A single stage tax levied on certain 
imported and locally manufactured goods. 
The general rate of sales tax is 10 percent. 
 
Petroleum Income Tax  
Charged on businesses deriving income 
from petroleum operations. 
 
Service Tax 
Imposed on certain goods and services 
provided in certain prescribed 
establishments. Service tax is charged and 
levied at the rate of five percent. 
Real Property Gains Tax a 
A capital gains tax imposed on the 
disposal of real property and/or shares in a 
real property company.  
 
Excise Duties 
Levied on selected products manufactured 
in Malaysia. For example cigarettes, 
liquor and motor vehicles. 
Stamp Duty  
A transaction based tax imposed on 
instruments, such as tenant agreements, 
purchases and transfers of property. 
Customs Duties  
Comprised of export and import duties. 
The customs duties vary according to the 
type of goods imported or exported. 
a Gains from disposals from 1 April 2007 are exempt from the Real Property Gains Tax.  
Source: Pope and Abdul-Jabbar (2007), Table 2, updated for recent tax changes. 
 
Typically, income tax constitutes a major federal tax liability both for business and non-
business taxpayers. The chargeability of other forms of direct and indirect taxes 
depends mainly on the nature of the business and/or transaction. For example, service 
tax is levied on certain goods and services provided in certain prescribed establishments 
and stamp duty is a transaction-based tax on instruments. In addition to federal 
government taxes, businesses are required to comply with the state and local 
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government taxes, which include property taxes (assessment tax and land tax) and 
various business permits and licensing. This chapter is confined to income taxation of 
SMEs.  
 
3.2.2 Duties and Responsibilities of Business Taxpayers 
Business taxpayers, regardless of their size, are required by law (i.e. ITA 1967), 
essentially, to file an annual tax return (Sections 77 and 77A), and to keep sufficient 
records and documentation (Sections 82 and 82A). Corporate taxpayers are required to 
observe further additional tax requirements (e.g. Sections 107, 107B, 107C and 108). 
Businesses are also required to implement the Schedular Tax Deduction (STD) Scheme 
(Section 107(1) and Income Tax–Deduction from Remuneration Rules 1994) and to 
furnish certain returns on behalf of their employees (Section 83). Further, in the case of 
tax audit, taxpayers are required to provide reasonable assistance and facilities to the 
IRB officers (Section 80). Each of these duties is discussed in detail below. 
 
Section 77 of the ITA 1967 requires business taxpayers to give notice of chargeability 
of income tax by way of filing an annual tax return. Generally, the filing of tax returns 
depends on the category of the taxpayer. Corporate taxpayers (including trust bodies 
and co-operative societies) are required to furnish a tax return for each year of 
assessment within seven months after the financial year-end (Section 77A). On the 
other hand, individuals have to submit their tax returns not later than 30 April in the 
year following the relevant year of assessment (Section 77). Non-compliance to this 
provision could lead to a penalty of between RM200 and RM2,000 and/or 
imprisonment of up to six months (Section 112). Taxpayers are also required to ensure 
the correctness of their tax return. Further penalties apply in the case of non-compliance 
(Sections 113 and 114).  
  
As for documentation, Section 82 of the ITA 1967 requires every business taxpayer to 
keep adequate business records for seven years. For this purpose, records include books 
of account recording receipts and payments or income and expenditure, invoices, 
vouchers, receipts and other relevant documents to verify the accounting entries 
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[Section 82(9)]. The Act also requires businesses with an annual turnover exceeding 
RM150,000 to issue serially printed receipts and retain a duplicate copy of each receipt 
[Section 82(1)(b)]. The IRB has issued three public rulings pertaining to keeping 
sufficient records, shown in Table 3.2. A public ruling (PR) is issued by the IRB to 
provide guidance to taxpayers and revenue officers as well with a view to minimise 
ambiguous interpretations of tax law. In 2003, Section 82A extended the duty to keep 
documents to all taxpayers (i.e. regardless of their business turnover), specifically in 
ascertaining chargeable income and income tax payable. Documents in this provision 
refer to documents as statements of  income and expenditure, and invoices, vouchers, 
receipts and other relevant documents to verify the tax return [Section 82A(6)]. Failure 
to maintain adequate records and documents makes one liable to a fine between RM300 
and RM10,000 or to imprisonment for a period of up to one year, or both (Section 
119A).  
 
Table 3.2: Public Rulings on Records and Documentations 
Title  Number Date of Issue 
Keeping sufficient records (companies and  
co-operatives) 
PR 4/2000 30 June 2001 a 
Keeping sufficient records (individuals and 
partnerships) 
PR 5/2000 30 June 2001 a 
Keeping sufficient records (persons other than 
companies and co-operatives) 
PR 6/2000 30 June 2001 a 
a These rulings are the revised versions of earlier rulings issued on 1 March 2000. 
 Source: Inland Revenue Board (2001b). 
 
Corporate taxpayers are required to observe additional requirements that were 
introduced since the implementation of the SAS, and due to the corporate imputation 
system, these requirements are applicable to resident companies. Since the SAS, Section 
107C requires companies to furnish an advance estimate of tax (Form CP 204) and 
make instalment payments to the IRB (Form CP 205).49 Effective 2008, new SME 
companies are exempted from this requirement during their first two years of 
                                                 
49 For details refer the IRB website at http://www.hasil.org.my. 
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operation.50 The amount of the tax estimate shall not be less than 85 percent of the 
previous year’s tax payable and shall be made in advance (i.e. by no later than 30 days 
before the beginning of the basis period for that year of assessment). The estimated tax 
shall be paid in 12 equal instalments commencing from the second month of the basis 
period (on or before the 10th day). Revision is allowed in the sixth and/or ninth month of 
the basis period. Regarding the imputation system, companies will continue to comply 
with the relevant provisions under Section 108; for example, maintaining dividend 
franking account (Form R) that needs to be furnished together with their annual tax 
return (Form C). Though the imputation system was replaced by the single tier system 
commencing in 2008,51 it must be emphasised that the current study covers the 2006 tax 
year where the imputation system was in effect. Failure to comply with these provisions 
may lead to a penalty (between RM200 and RM2,000) and/or imprisonment (up to six 
months) for each offence (Section 120).  
 
Apart from specific duties relating to their own business taxation, businesses are further 
required to execute additional duties on behalf of their employees (i.e. third party tax). 
The STD was introduced in 1995 and is comparable to pay as you earn (PAYE) and pay 
as you go (PAYG) in the UK and Australia respectively. Under the STD scheme, 
employers are required to deduct monthly tax on behalf of their employees’ 
employment income and forward the amounts to the IRB by the 10th of the month 
following the month when the tax deduction is made. The deduction depends on the 
personal circumstances of each employee and requires businesses to keep their 
employees’ records up-to-date. Penalties (up to RM1,000 or imprisonment for a period 
of up to six months, or both) are imposed on those failing to comply with the 
requirements (Rule 17, Income Tax–Deduction from Remuneration Rules 1994). 
Businesses are also required to provide the IRB with annual returns (Form E and CP 
8A) relating to their employees (Section 83). The return is to be made yearly on all 
employment income. Further, the businesses also need to notify the IRB on the 
                                                 
50 See subsection 3.2.3 for details. 
51 Refer subsection 3.2.3 for details.  
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appointment of new employees, of employees ceasing employment and/or leaving 
Malaysia.52  
 
In the case of a tax audit, a taxpayer must provide reasonable assistance and facilities to 
the IRB officers. A public ruling entitled ‘providing reasonable assistance and facilities’ 
was issued by the IRB (2000a) in this regard (PR 7/2000). Nonconformity to this 
provision may mean a taxpayer is liable to a fine between RM1,000 and RM10,000 or 
to imprisonment for a term of up to one year, or to both (Section 116). 
 
3.2.3 Recent Major Business Income Tax Changes 
In the year 2000, two major reforms took place in Malaysia, namely, the move from the 
preceding year assessment (PYA) to current year assessment (CYA) and the 
introduction of the SAS. Another recent major reform, a single-tier company income tax 
system, was introduced to replace the corporate imputation system in 2008. Besides the 
above general and company-specific tax reforms, two particular changes apply to SME 
companies only, namely, the introduction of dual corporate tax rates (in 2003) and 
exclusion from advance tax estimates and monthly payments (effective in 2008).     
 
The SAS was implemented in stages, starting with companies from the year 2001 and 
subsequently to other taxpayers (i.e. individuals, partnerships and co-operatives) in 
2004. Prior to years of assessment 2001 (for companies) and 2004 (for personal and 
other taxpayers), income tax in Malaysia was assessed under the OAS. Under the OAS 
system, taxpayers were required to submit their annual tax returns by a stipulated 
period—within 30 days from the issuing date of notice of assessment or within six 
months after the business year-end respectively for the individual and corporate 
taxpayer. The IRB then issued a notice of assessment, payable within 30 days. Since 
2005, income tax in Malaysia has been fully administered under the SAS regime. The 
introduction of the SAS involved a substantial shift of responsibility on to the taxpayers 
in terms of their compliance obligations. A tax audit will be conducted by the IRB to 
                                                 
52 Details of these requirements and relevant forms are available on the website of the IRB at 
http://www.hasil.org.my. 
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ensure that taxable income has been duly recognised and expenses properly claimed. 
Any understatement of tax will result in heavy penalties being imposed by the IRB. 
Generally, in the SAS, taxpayers are required to compute and pay their income tax. 
Companies are required to observe additional requirements. These requirements include 
an advance estimation of the tax liability and payment of monthly tax instalments (also 
in advance) as provided for in the new Section 107C of ITA 1967.53  
 
Following the SAS, a number of significant amendments have been made. A number of 
public rulings have also been issued since 2000. The simplification of the business basis 
period, re-categorisation of capital expenditure for capital allowance purposes, and the 
full capital allowance for small value assets are some of the major income tax 
simplifications that have been introduced since the implementation of the SAS. 
Regarding simplification of the business basis period, all individual business taxpayers 
are required to close their accounting year on 31 December each year. By contrast, a 
basis period for a company will follow the financial year-end. Sections 20 and 21 of the 
ITA 1967 have been amended and a new section, 21A, has been introduced. 
Additionally, three related public rulings were issued in the year 2000 and consequently 
superseded by the later version in 2001, shown in Table 3.3. 
                                                 
53 See subsection 3.2.2. 
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Table 3.3: Public Rulings on Basis Period 
Subject  Number Date of Issue 
Basis period for a non-business source PR 1/2000 a 1 March 2000 
Basis period for a business source (companies and 
co-operatives) 
PR 2/2000 a 1 March 2000 
Basis period for a business source (individuals and 
persons other than companies and co-
operatives) 
PR 3/2000 a 1 March 2000 
Basis period for a non-business source (individuals 
and persons other than companies/co-
operatives) 
PR 4/2001 30 April 2001 
Basis period for a business source (co-operatives) PR 5/2001 30 April 2001 
Basis period for a business source (individuals and 
persons other than companies/co-operatives) 
PR 6/2001 30 April 2001 
Basis period for business and non-business sources 
(companies) 
PR 7/2001 30 April 2001 
a These rulings were superseded by the four subsequent rulings (i.e. PR4/2001–PR7/2001). 
Sources: Inland Revenue Board (2000b; 2001c). 
 
For capital allowances, the simplification is made by re-classifying 16 capital 
expenditures under the plant and machinery category to only three sub-categories, i.e. 
heavy machinery and motor vehicles, plant and machinery, and furniture and office 
equipment. Accordingly, a large variety of capital allowance rates were reduced to three 
rates only. Another simplification of capital allowance took place in 2006, which allows 
small value assets of up to RM1,000 each to be given a 100 percent allowance in the 
purchased year. Nonetheless, a sum of such allowance is restricted to a maximum of 
RM10,000 per year.54 A public ruling entitled ‘special allowances for small value 
assets’ was issued on 27 March 2008 (Inland Revenue Board).  
                                                 
54 Starting 2009, this restriction is not applicable to SME companies (Ministry of Finance Malaysia 
2008). 
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Effective 2008, the corporate tax imputation system was replaced by a single-tier 
company income tax system. Under this single-tier system, the corporate tax is imposed 
at the corporate level (and represents a final tax) and the dividends distributed to 
shareholders are exempted from tax. The single tier system certainly would simplify the 
procedures (Section 108) for effecting dividend distributions and arguably would reduce 
both the administrative costs (to the tax authority) and tax compliance costs (to the 
taxpayer) that together comprise tax operating costs.  
 
Specifically to the SME sector, but confined to a company, two additional measures 
have been introduced. The first is dual corporate tax rates in 2003. Under this structure, 
SME companies, with paid-up capital of up to RM2.5 million, are subject to a tax rate 
of 20 percent for the first RM500,000 (from 1 January 2004; RM100,000 in 2003) of 
taxable income and the remaining income is subject to the normal corporate tax rate of 
25 percent (from 1 January 2009; 26 percent in 2008; 27 percent in 2007). The most 
recent amendment relates to the estimation of tax payable and payment of a monthly tax 
instalment. In order to relieve the cash flow constraints faced by SMEs, in particular 
during the initial stages of operation, SME companies are not required to furnish an 
estimate of tax payable or make instalment payments for their first two years from 
business commencement. 
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3.3 KEY FEATURES OF INCOME TAXATION FOR SMALL AND 
MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
 
Small and Medium Enterprises in Malaysia are subject to income tax, either as 
individual (unincorporated businesses) or as corporate taxpayers (incorporated 
businesses), depending on the business establishment. The income taxation of both 
incorporated and unincorporated businesses are governed by the ITA 1967, with similar 
tax provisions. Generally, unincorporated SMEs are treated as individuals, hence 
subject to progressive tax rates and eligible for personal reliefs and rebates. On the 
contrary, incorporated businesses, either SMEs or large enterprises, are treated in 
similar ways, with a few exceptions or incentives. For example, SME companies are 
given a deduction for pre-incorporated expenses. A summary of major differences in 
income tax treatment for corporate and individual taxpayers is shown in Table 3.4. For 
example, an individual taxpayer is subjected to progressive tax rates and eligible for 
personal reliefs and rebates. On the other hand, depending on the size of the company, 
corporate taxpayers are subject to either a flat rate (for large companies) or dual tax 
rates (for SME companies), without any personal reliefs and rebates. SME companies 
with paid-up capital of up to RM2.5 million are eligible for the dual corporate tax rates 
introduced in 2003.55 Under this structure, SME companies are subject to a tax rate of 
20 percent for the first RM500,000 (RM100,000 prior to 2004) of taxable income and 
the remaining income is subjected to a normal corporate tax rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Effective 2009, SME companies that are controlled by another company with a paid-up capital 
exceeding RM2.5 million do not fall within the meaning of SME companies for tax purposes (Ministry of 
Finance Malaysia 2008).   
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Table 3.4: Major Differences between Corporate Business and Individual Taxation 
Aspects Corporate  Individual a  
 
Tax rate(s) 
Corporate tax rate is 25 
percent (from 1 January 
2009; 26 percent in 2008; 27 
percent in 2007; 28 percent 
in 2006). 
 
A dual rate applies for SME 
companies since 2003, i.e. 
the first RM500,000 of 
taxable income is taxed at 20 
percent (from 1 January 
2004; RM100,000 in 2003) 
and the remaining income is 
subject to the normal 
corporate tax rate. 
 
Individual is subject to 
progressive tax rates of 
between 0 and 28 percent.  
Non-residents are subject to a 
flat rate of 28 percent. 
 
Starting 2009, the highest tax 
rate for both resident and non-
resident individuals has been 
reduced from 28 percent to 27 
percent. 
 
 
Basis of assessment   
 
Financial year-end 
 
Calendar year 
Availability of reliefs and 
rebates in ascertaining 
taxable income 
 
 
Not eligible 
 
Eligible 
Availability of certain tax 
deductions, including a 
double deduction under the 
ITA 1967.  
 
 
Available to some SME 
companies 
 
Not applicable 
Requirements relating to the 
imputation system. b  
 
 
Yes 
 
Not applicable 
Requirements with regards to 
the SAS, specifically to:  
 estimate tax liability  
 make monthly payment 
 submit a tax return 
 
 
 
Yes c 
Yes c 
Yes 
 
 
 
Not applicable  
Not applicable  
Yes 
Availability of tax incentives, 
such as pioneer status and 
investment tax allowance 
under the Promotion of 
Investments Act (PIA), 1986.  
 
Available for certain sectors, 
mainly to manufacturing, 
agricultural, tourism and 
high-technology companies.   
 
 
Not available, except for 
agricultural sectors 
a Applicable to resident individuals only, unless stated otherwise. 
b The corporate imputation system applies up to year of assessment 2007. A single-tier company income 
tax system applies starting from 2008 (see discussion above in subsection 3.2.3). 
c Starting 2008, SME companies are exempted from this requirements for their first two years from 
business commencement (see discussion above in subsection 3.2.3). 
Source: Pope and Abdul-Jabbar (2007), Table 4, updated for recent tax changes. 
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3.4 MAJOR INCOME TAX DIFFICULTIES AND ISSUES FOR SMALL 
AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
 
3.4.1 Overall Perspective  
The regulatory nature of duties and obligations of taxpayers, more importantly under 
the SAS, places an enormous burden and cost upon the business sector, particularly to 
SME sectors. The income tax regulatory burden upon businesses, regardless of their 
form and/or size, is among key business regulatory concerns for the business sector 
globally (Pope 2008). The international experiences often indicate the difficulties faced 
by SMEs in managing government laws and regulations (Fernandez and Oats 1998, p. 
162), particularly in maintaining proper records for management and taxation purposes 
(Small Business Deregulation Task Force 1996, p. 2; Evans, Carlon and Massey 2005, 
p. 289). The issues facing small businesses in relation to regulatory costs are a 
worldwide phenomena and almost identical globally (Chittenden, Kauser and 
Poutziouris 2003) and in Malaysia (Hanefah and Al-Mureshi 1991; Kasipillai and Liew 
2004). These include a lack of understanding of the regulatory requirements, frequent 
changes in regulations, and high fixed costs (Chittenden, Kauser and Poutziouris 2003, 
p. 110). 
 
From an overall business perspective Malaysian SMEs face many problems and 
constraints, which mainly include financial, managerial and technological aspects 
(Hashim 2007). Adding to this core business concern and also existing business 
regulatory requirements, the regular amendments to the various laws, taxation in 
particular, the introduction of the SAS and increasing complexities of the tax system 
may have further adverse impacts on SMEs. The following subsections highlight the 
issues concerning business record keeping, complexity of tax law, legal forms of 
business entities, and more importantly, compliance costs arising from tax regulatory 
requirements. 
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3.4.2 Record Keeping and Documentation 
The difficulties of Malaysian SMEs in managing business laws (Kasipillai and Liew 
2004), and specifically in maintaining appropriate records for business and taxation 
purposes (Hanefah and Al-Mureshi 1991), are evident. More than 15 years ago, 
Hanefah and Al-Mureshi (1991) observed that the predominant services provided by 
accounting firms to small business clients are book-keeping and taxation. The lack of 
proper records could cause small businesses to fail to comply with business taxation 
requirements (Abdul-Jabbar 1996). On the contrary, Hanefah and Al-Mureshi (1991) 
hypothesised that medium-scale enterprises may not have as many problems in this 
aspect, but to what extent this remains true in the SAS environment has not been 
researched.   
 
Prior to the implementation of the SAS to individual taxpayers (i.e. before 2005), a 
number of studies had been conducted which included self-employed taxpayers (see for 
example Kasipillai et al. 1999; Ramasamy et al. 2003; Palil 2005a), and SMEs 
(Hanefah and Al-Mureshi 1991). Overall, these studies showed that the issues relating 
to book-keeping and documentation for tax purposes remain relevant. Even a salary 
earner with a simple tax situation may have difficulties (Loo and Ho 2005; Palil 2005a), 
and particularly self-employed business persons (small business) need to consider 
obtaining external tax advice. The same may also apply to medium-sized firms, but not 
as much to small firms. Thus, it is anticipated that additional record keeping 
requirements (Section 82A) that were introduced since the implementation of the SAS 
could further add to the existing record keeping responsibility (Section 82) of the SMEs, 
small business in particular. More interestingly, with a government plan to introduce the 
GST,56 maintaining additional records and documentation were completely essential. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 In February 2006, the proposed GST was postponed indefinitely (Ministry of Finance Malaysia 2006b). 
See also Chapter One, Footnote 10. 
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3.4.3 Tax Complexity 
Some degree of tax complexity for individual taxpayers, including those with business 
income, was evident in Malaysia under the OAS (Hanefah 1996). Later, immediately 
prior to the implementation of the SAS, Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai (2001, p. 96) 
argued that the Malaysian business tax system appeared to be becoming increasingly 
complex. Nonetheless, Ariff and Pope (2002) believed that some tax simplification 
measures implemented towards the end of the 1990s and early 2000s had been of some 
relief for Malaysian taxpayers, and thus considered the level of tax complexity in 
Malaysia (determined by its compliance costs) as very low compared with other Asia–
Pacific countries, such as Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore (Ariff and Pope 2002, p. 
9). The extent of tax complexity is yet to be examined under the SAS regime. However, 
Kasipillai (2005, p. 26) observed that there is a growing list of deductions for various 
forms of relief (such as deduction for reading materials and a relief for education, 
serious disease, and parent medical expenses) for individuals, including small business 
owners. He raised concern over the possible difficulties faced by taxpayers in 
interpreting and taking advantage of the amendments.  
 
A number of public rulings have been issued by the IRB since the SAS. Regrettably, 
some of the rulings, for example, rulings on the basis period, have been revised and 
amended within just a year of their initial introduction. The fact that a growing list of 
public rulings may increase the tax complexity should be recognised. Chittenden, 
Kauser and Poutziouris (2003, p. 110), in their review of the tax compliance cost studies 
within small businesses in the US, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, noted that the 
incompetency of small business (in particular) in dealing with complex tax regulations 
has affected them more severely than large firms. A straightforward approach to lessen 
such tax complexity issues, at least from the business taxpayer’s perspective, is by 
outsourcing tax obligations to tax professionals, but this generally increases tax 
compliance costs.57 Pope (1993b, p. 70) asserts that high costs of tax compliance are the 
product of the complex nature of the tax system and low costs indicate otherwise. 
 
                                                 
57 See subsection 3.4.5. 
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3.4.4 Business Legal Form 
Small and Medium Enterprises in Malaysia take three forms: self employed, 
partnerships and companies. However, for income tax purposes, SMEs are treated either 
as personal or as corporate taxpayers, depending on the business establishment. 
Partnership businesses are not taxed directly, but their individual partners are subject to 
personal income tax based on their income portion from the partnership business. A 
brief summary of income tax treatment for corporate and personal taxpayers has been 
presented earlier in this chapter.58 Arguably, the choice of business form is somewhat 
troublesome to the SME sector as they need to consider the best business form to suit 
their circumstances (see mainly Freedman 2003; Crawford and Freedman 2008), 
particularly during the early stages of business establishment. From a taxation 
perspective, consideration may entail two aspects, namely, the effective tax rates and 
the investment incentives.  
 
First, the effective tax rate of SME companies with a taxable income up to RM500,000 
is 20 percent (2003 onwards). On the other hand, business individuals with a taxable 
income (i.e. income after deductions of personal and other reliefs) of more than 
RM179,000 will exceed 20 percent (2003 onwards). Secondly, corporate firms are often 
entitled to various tax incentives in Malaysia. The incentives are available under the 
Promotion of Investments Act (PIA) 1986 (such as pioneer status and investment tax 
allowance) and ITA 1967 (such as reinvestment allowance and a deduction for pre-
incorporated expenses). Most of these incentives are not available for unincorporated 
businesses, except in the agricultural sectors. The mechanism of incentives vary 
depending on a number of factors, e.g. type of incentive, business sector and whether a 
small-scale company or not. Regrettably, most of the incentives are mutually exclusive, 
thus requiring an analysis of costs and benefits. For example, a company enjoying 
pioneer status could not apply for other types of incentives. Businesses need to consider 
a number of options that best suit their circumstances. Such numbers of tax incentives 
almost certainly increases the complexity of the tax laws and ensuing tax compliance 
costs.  
                                                 
58 See Section 3.3—Table 3.4. 
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Despite general tax advantages to personal business taxpayers, in terms of effective tax 
rates (when taxable income is less than RM179,000) and to corporate taxpayers, in 
terms of both tax rates (when taxable income exceeds RM179,000) and tax incentives, it 
must be emphasised that the nature, duties and responsibility of all business taxpayers59 
are similar regardless of their business form and size. In Malaysia, SMEs in the form of 
companies seem to have relatively more tax advantages. Thus, the favourable tax policy 
to corporate businesses is not surprising. In practice, however, the choice of business 
form is not solely dependent on tax aspects. A number of business regulations and cost 
considerations are probably essential. For example, the Companies Act 1965 requires 
financial statements of Malaysian corporate entities, regardless of their size, to be 
audited annually, thus incurring compliance costs in terms of financial reporting. 
 
Complicating factors in considering and designing [income] tax provisions for small 
businesses have been discussed by a number of authors (see mainly Freedman 2003; 
Chittenden and Sloan 2007; Crawford and Freedman 2008). This includes the role and 
effect of market failure; size disadvantages (which covers the compliance costs issue); 
keeping the small business intact; and political economy considerations (Crawford and 
Freedman 2008). They argue that favourable policies for small businesses are 
acceptable primarily in the case of market failure, and to some extent due to compliance 
costs considerations (Crawford and Freedman 2008). They found that the tax system 
has a significant impact on the choice of business form in the UK. The UK experience 
also shows that policy makers tend to overlook unincorporated entities (Freedman 2003, 
p. 34) in this regard. Overall, a simple tax system (Freedman 2003), which focuses on 
minimising tax compliance costs and lowering tax rates for all businesses (Pope 2008, 
p. 34), is  preferable to too many special provisions, which potentially leads to tax 
complexity (Freedman 2003, p. 15) and distortion of the choice of business legal form 
(Freedman 2003; Crawford and Freedman 2008).  
 
 
 
                                                 
59 See subsection 3.2.2. 
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3.4.5 Tax Compliance Costs 
Malaysian businesses incur costs to comply with all mandatory tax requirements,60 and 
related considerations,61 which are additional to their tax liability. The introduction of 
the SAS was mainly motivated by the aim of increasing the collection rate, to reduce the 
cost of collecting taxes, and to increase voluntary compliance (Kasipillai 2005, pp. 26-
27). The SAS environment involves a substantial shift of responsibility on to taxpayers 
in terms of their compliance obligations, with tax professionals expected to play a 
significant role in providing services to taxpayers in complying with the tax laws. 
Consequently, compliance costs are expected to increase significantly during the early 
years of the SAS implementation (Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 2001; Ariff and Pope 
2002; Mathieu, Waddams and Antwi 2007). In the longer term, the relative level of 
compliance costs will depend upon a range of factors, particularly the complexity of the 
tax laws and frequency of tax changes. As discussed in Chapter Two,62 prior to the 
SAS, there were only two published studies on the cost of tax compliance in Malaysia 
(Loh et al. 1997; Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 2001). More importantly, both 
confirmed the regressivity of tax compliance upon smaller business. The effect of the 
SAS upon the compliance costs of Malaysian businesses is yet to be investigated. This 
study updates compliance costs estimates for SMEs under the SAS regime.  
 
 
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has presented details on income taxation, duties and responsibilities of 
business taxpayers under the SAS regime. This covers the overall business perspective 
and issues specific to the SME business sector. The burden of tax compliance, in 
particular concerning business record keeping, the level of tax complexity, the choice of 
legal entity, and more importantly the incidence of tax compliance costs, are among the 
major income tax issues that face Malaysian SMEs. 
                                                 
60 See subsections 3.2.2 and 3.4.2. 
61 See subsections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. 
62 See Chapter Two, subsection 2.3.2. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter focuses on various features of the research plan and methodology adopted 
in this study. As described in Chapter One, this study consists of two parts: the first 
estimates the compliance costs of SME companies in Malaysia; the second examines 
the determinants of corporate income tax compliance behaviour, with particular 
emphasis on income tax compliance costs. The current study followed a positivist 
paradigm to research, employing quantitative methods. The paradigm relies on 
deductive reasoning, whereby researchers seek knowledge based on observed facts. 
Most existing research in taxation has adopted a positivist approach (Abdul-Manaf 
2004). The current research was carried out by way of the survey method, employing a 
large-scale mail survey (primary survey) and two additional surveys. The next section 
provides a brief background on the survey method in the context of social sciences, and 
more specifically in the area of tax research. This is followed by a discussion on the 
method of data collection adopted in this study. The questionnaire development and the 
pilot interviews are then discussed, followed by a detailed explanation of the survey 
implementation procedure undertaken. Particulars with regards to population of the 
study, the sampling process and the issue of non-response bias are provided also. The 
final section outlines the analytical methods adopted in this study.  
 
 
4.2 SURVEY RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
Survey research is the most widely employed method in the social sciences (Babbie 
1989). The major advantage of survey research is the feasibility of obtaining a wide 
range of standardized information from a large population, which is cost beneficial 
(Babbie 1989, p. 258; Kerlinger and Lee 2000, p. 613). However, survey research does 
have some key limitations, which include the lack of in-depth information, the fact that 
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it is demanding in terms of resources (Kerlinger and Lee 2000, pp. 613-614), and that it 
may be lacking in realism (Babbie 1989, p. 258). Despite these limitations, the survey 
method remains a popular method in the social sciences. Thus, it is not surprising this 
method is the most commonly used in business research (Baruch 1999; Griffis, Goldsby 
and Cooper 2003, p. 237), including  small business (Dennis 2003; Bartholomew and 
Smith 2006) and tax research as well. The latter includes studies on tax attitudes and 
behaviour (Jackson and Milliron 1986; Richardson and Sawyer 2001) and tax 
compliance costs (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989, p. 52). 
 
In the tax compliance literature, a comprehensive review of Jackson and Milliron 
(1986) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001) noted four methods that are mainly 
employed in tax compliance studies: surveys, experiments, analytical approaches and 
regression modelling. Up to 1985, the survey method was the most frequent method 
used in the tax literature (Jackson and Milliron 1986). Thereafter, the trend continued 
but with a slight increase in the experimental method. Nevertheless, the survey method 
remained a popular method amongst tax compliance researchers (Richardson and 
Sawyer 2001). It is possibly still the most popular research design in the tax compliance 
literature. A recent publication by Torgler (2007) is also largely based on the survey 
research method. During the period 1986 to 1997, the progress in the experimental 
method was relatively significant and it became more popular than the survey method 
(Richardson and Sawyer 2001). The most significant factor in this growth is the 
increased realism in the experimental setting (Richardson and Sawyer 2001, p. 235).63  
 
The methodological issues and the advances made in all four methods since 1985 have 
been fully discussed by Richardson and Sawyer (2001, pp. 223-240). It suffices to say 
that all four methods remain utilised in tax research and are subject to measurement 
difficulties to some extent. The most alarming concerns the honesty and validity of self-
responses (Jackson and Milliron 1986; Richardson and Sawyer 2001).64 Nevertheless, 
no empirical support exists to assert that one method is more accurate than the others 
                                                 
63 Realism could be incorporated into survey methods as well via hypothetical tax scenarios. See further 
discussion in Section 4.4.3. 
64 Section 4.4.3 provides a brief discussion of the issue of self-reporting. 
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(Long and Swingen 1991). Likewise, the survey method is largely employed in 
researching compliance costs, both internationally (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 
1989; Pope 1995; Evans et al. 1996) and in the Asia–Pacific countries (Ariff and Pope 
2002). 
 
This study has incorporated both the tax compliance costs and tax compliance/non-
compliance issues into one study, although the emphasis is on the former. In view of 
this, a survey research method is employed to obtain data on tax compliance costs and 
attitudinal information on a number of tax aspects i.e. fairness, complexity and 
behaviour. The introduction of the SAS has further influenced this current study to be 
undertaken in the form of a large-scale survey. Malaysia is still in the initial phase of 
developing compliance costs of taxation as a policy area. Sandford (1995, p. 402) 
strongly asserts that, for the process of convincing the government of the importance of 
tax compliance costs, a large-scale survey is the best starting point. 
 
 
4.3 DATA COLLECTION METHOD AND STRATEGY 
 
Survey data can be obtained in different ways, which include interviews (either face-to-
face or telephone), questionnaires (either administered personally, by mail, e-mail or 
web) and panel discussion groups. The relative advantages and disadvantages of these 
methods in social sciences, in particular the mail questionnaires, and personal and 
telephone interviews, are discussed by Babbie (1989, pp. 253-254) and Miller (1991, 
pp. 141-167). Broadly, a personal interview is superior to the other methods, but is the 
most expensive and, perhaps, a difficult form of securing information (Miller 1991, p. 
168; Kerlinger and Lee 2000, p. 601). On the contrary, mail questionnaires have 
considerable advantages in terms of cost and ease of getting information (Miller 1991, 
p. 140). Arguably, each of these data collection methods has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. But evidence shows that surveys are more often carried out by mail than 
by other approaches (Dillman 1991; Bartholomew and Smith 2006). As a general guide, 
it is recommended that researchers weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of the 
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available methods in relation to their research context and resources (Babbie 1989; 
Miller 1991; Sandford 1995, p. 386; Evans et al. 1996, pp. 24-15). 
 
As a result, it is common for researchers to use any method, or a combination of 
methods, that fit their specific circumstances and constraints. Numerous survey 
approaches have been utilised in tax research, including mail questionnaires 
(Wallschutzky 1984; Porcano 1988; Collins, Milliron and Toy 1992; Hite and McGill 
1992; Reckers, Sanders and Roark 1994; Wartick 1994; Hasseldine 1999; Wenzel 2002; 
Hasseldine and Hite 2003),  self administered questionnaires (Song and Yarbrough 
1978; Chan, Troutman and O'Bryan 2000; Webley, Cole and Eidjar 2001), face-to-face 
interviews (Dornstein 1987), telephone interviews (Hite 1997) or a combination of at 
least two approaches (Long and Swingen 1987). However, the use of mail surveys is 
predominant. A similar trend is also observable in Malaysia.65 Apart from the coverage, 
speed and cost factors, this predominance is also due to the realism of the approach, as 
almost all tax authorities worldwide tend to rely on the mail system to communicate 
with taxpayers (Wartick 1994; Hasseldine 1999).  
  
As for specific tax compliance costs studies, Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989 p. 
52) have discussed the advantages and disadvantages of seven methods of estimating 
compliance costs (1989, pp. 52-54): (i) highly structured questionnaires/interview 
schedules; (ii) semi-structured or unstructured interviews; (iii) time and motion studies; 
(iv) participant observation/action research; (v) other types of case study, e.g. studies of 
the comprehensibility of tax forms; (vi) archive research by using records of 
government department, tax advisers, etc; and (vii) simulation or modelling exercises.  
 
Largely, tax compliance costs studies also use large-scale mail questionnaire studies 
(Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989; Sandford 1995, p. 378; Pope 2000, p. 10; 
Evans 2003b, p. 71; Slemrod 2004a, p. 81) and are often supplemented by face-to-face 
interviews and/or telephone interviews (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989, p. 52; 
Sandford 1995, p. 404). The advantages and disadvantages of these methods, 
                                                 
65 See Appendix B column three. 
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particularly mail surveys and interview surveys, in tax compliance costs studies are 
fully considered by Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick  (1989, pp. 52-53) and Sandford 
(1995, pp. 378-386). 
 
Suffice it to say, cost-effectiveness is frequently cited as a key advantage of mail 
questionnaires over interview surveys (Babbie 1989; Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 
1989; Miller 1991; Sandford 1995; Evans et al. 1996). Moreover, a mail survey adds 
more weight in a sensitive area such as taxation, as the approach provides genuine 
anonymity and eliminates the bias of the interviewer (Sandford 1995, p. 384; Evans et 
al. 1996, p. 24). Additionally, the mail survey is also often preferred given the practical 
difficulties of scheduling interviews with geographically scattered business respondents 
(Vaillancourt 1989, p. 5). On the contrary, major weaknesses of mail surveys include 
that they are distinctly centred on the response rate and the quality of responses (Miller 
1991, p. 141; Sandford 1995, p. 378; Evans et al. 1996, p. 24; Kerlinger and Lee 2000, 
p. 603). The importance of assessing whether non-respondents could differ in their 
responses is largely acknowledged in the behavioural research literature (see for 
example Armstrong and Overton 1977; Kerlinger and Lee 2000, p. 603).66  A similar 
trend is also observable for both tax compliance (Jackson and Milliron 1986; 
Richardson and Sawyer 2001) and tax compliance costs (Sandford, Godwin and 
Hardwick 1989; Allers 1994; Pope 1995; Sandford 1995, p. 378; Evans et al. 1996, p. 
24) studies. Nonetheless, a number of measures are available to minimise those possible 
shortcomings, mainly response-related. 
 
In the social sciences, more specifically in the field of business and organisational 
research, the Total Design Method (TDM)67 developed by Dillman (1978) is often used 
to gain fully the benefits of a mail survey. The TDM was subsequently expanded and 
known as the Tailored Design Method (Dillman 2000). The expansion was made to 
adapt the original TDM to different survey situations, including business surveys. 
                                                 
66 The issue of a non-response bias is addressed in Section 4.9. In tax compliance costs study, Allers 
(1994) is the first to address the issues of non-response statistically. 
67 Dillman (2007, Chapter 10, pp. 323-351) discussed a number of differences between individual and 
business surveys and stressed the importance of placing additional concern on the context of business 
studies.  
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Dillman (2007, pp. 323-351) discussed a number of differences between individual and 
business surveys and stressed the importance of placing additional concern on the 
context of business studies. The TDM strategy provides comprehensive guidance 
focusing on three major specific survey areas, namely, principles for writing questions 
(pp. 32-78), principles for designing the questionnaire (pp. 79-148) and detailed 
implementation procedures (pp. 149-193). The approach in general consists of the 
following five key elements: (i) a respondent-friendly questionnaire, (ii) repeated 
mailings of up to five contacts with the respondent, (iii) an inclusion of stamped return 
envelopes, (iv) a personalised correspondence, and (v) a prepaid financial incentive. 
 
In the context of small business, Forsgren (1989) recommends the researcher use 
altruistic appeal in the covering letter, consider proper design of the questionnaire and 
assure anonymity for a sensitive study as further measures that could possibly increase 
the response rate. In another recent development, Dennis (2003) argues that not all 
measures had improved the response rate. Dennis recognises only four specific 
measures, namely follow-ups and reminders, monetary incentives, university 
sponsorship and stamped return envelopes, as consistently improving the response 
rates.68  
 
As for specific tax research, strategies to improve response rates and quality are 
frequently highlighted in the tax compliance costs literature as compared to tax 
compliance research. A review of major international tax compliance costs studies, 
mostly undertaken in the late 1980s and early 1990s, by Sandford (1995, pp. 378-379) 
highlighted the following 17 considerations as improving the rate and quality of the 
responses: 
 
i. Clear wording of the questions. 
ii. Careful layout and design of the questionnaire. 
iii. Questionnaire length being as short as possible. 
iv. Backing of relevant people and organisations. 
                                                 
68 For a detailed list, particularly of the other two categories, refer Table 1 in Dennis (2003, p. 282).  
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v. Personalising the cover letters for the questionnaire. 
vi. Providing a reply paid envelope. 
vii. Promising confidentiality and anonymity. 
viii. Carrying out a pre-pilot test. 
ix. Carrying out a pilot survey very carefully. 
x. Appropriate timing of the survey. 
xi. Sending two reminders, and enclosing a further copy of questionnaire in the 
second reminder. 
xii. Scrutinizing and validating the responses. 
xiii. Selecting an advisory committee. 
xiv. Obtaining advance publicity. 
xv. Sending photo-montage press cuttings with the reminder. 
xvi. Using a telephone reminder. 
xvii. Making available a pre-paid telephone help line. 
 
In the Australian context, Pope (1995, pp. 110-111) emphasised a number of other 
specific aspects that are worth considering, which include: using a single page 
questionnaire of four pages (printed in coloured paper and folded into a booklet format); 
discussing the questionnaire with tax experts, tax officials and tax academics; 
investigating attitudes and opinions (using a five-point or seven-point Likert scale); 
offering respondents an opportunity to express their views (by asking a few open-ended 
questions at the end of the questionnaire); and also giving respondents the option of 
providing their contact details. Another major recent comprehensive Australian study 
by Evans et al. (1996, p. 25) also provide incentives in order to address the issue of 
possible low responses. 
 
To a large extent, all the above specific measures in the area of small business and tax 
studies are comparable to the TDM strategy. All tax compliance costs studies in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong tended to benefit from Pope’s approach (Ariff and 
Pope 2002). Even a recent study by Rametse (2006) in the Australian GST context 
followed Pope’s approach.  
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It is apparent that the above discussions tend to substantiate the use of a large-scale mail 
survey in the current study from several research perspectives, namely SMEs, tax 
compliance behaviour, and tax compliance costs. Specifically, a mail survey approach 
appears to be the most appropriate method, mainly on the ground that the study covers a 
large population of SMEs nationwide, which can be achieved within reasonable cost 
and speed. Additionally the current study deals with corporate business taxation. A mail 
survey approach as recommended by Sandford (1995, p. 385) was therefore adopted. 
However, recognising that there are a few major pitfalls to large-scale mail surveys, 
additional measures and strategies have become pre-requisites to improving the 
response rate, the quality of the response, and to reduce non-responses as well. 
Accordingly, this study is conducted with a careful consideration of the measures 
highlighted above. Broadly, the following specific measures were adopted in this study: 
 
i. Questions were worded carefully, were kept as short as possible and were easy to 
respond to.  
ii. Questionnaire layout and design was based on a technique mainly suggested by 
Pope (1995) and Dillman (2007), including bold print for questions, light print for 
answer choices, and white boxes for answer spaces.  
iii. A separate covering letter, which was hand signed, was used in both initial mail 
outs and in the second reminders. 
iv. The support of SMIDEC was obtained and was stated in the covering letter. 
v. The study was conducted with the University Utara Malaysia (UUM) affiliation. 
vi. The official stationeries of the UUM (i.e. letter head, outgoing envelopes, and 
reply paid envelopes) were used in all mailings, except for postcards, which were 
printed using the UUM logo.  
vii. Anonymity is assured in both the covering letter and in the questionnaire. 
viii. The covering letters and outgoing envelopes are personalised as possible in all 
three mailings. 
ix. A two reminders system was used, with a further copy of the questionnaire 
enclosed in the second reminder. 
x. A stamped return envelope was provided. 
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xi. Appropriate timing of the survey was considered. 
xii. A pilot survey via personal interviews with tax experts and tax academics was 
conducted. 
xiii. Contact details of the researcher, both official (telephone, address and e-mail 
address) and a personal mobile number were made available for any queries. 
xiv. Attitudes and opinions were investigated using a five-point Likert scale. 
xv. Respondents were given an opportunity to express their views to a number of 
open-ended questions. 
xvi. Respondents were given the option of providing their contact details. 
xvii. Responses were scrutinized and validated. 
 
More details with regards to the above measures are incorporated in the later three 
subsections,69 covering the development of the questionnaire, pilot interviews and 
survey implementation. Sandford strongly urged researchers to consider some 
interviews, particularly in the initial stage (i.e. before carrying out mail survey), to be 
followed by a further interview, mainly to clarify responses (Sandford 1995, p. 404). 
Accordingly, this current study also used a personal interview approach during the pilot 
stage and a telephone follow-up interview during the data validation stage.  
 
Besides the above mail survey (main survey), a web-survey has been undertaken by an 
e-mail invitation to all corporate SMEs with an e-mail address. Having acknowledged 
that the web survey could be carried out to increase the sample size, and most 
importantly, with no significant additional costs, the additional web survey is employed 
in the current study. The findings of the web survey can be used as a measure of the 
consistency of the mail survey.70  
 
 
 
                                                 
69 See Sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. 
70 See subsection 4.11.1 for further details of the web survey. 
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4.4 MEASUREMENT ISSUES AND APPROACH 
 
4.4.1 Estimating Compliance Costs 
Estimating tax compliance costs seems straightforward, perhaps in theory. In a simple 
form, the compliance costs of a taxpayer are equal to internal costs plus external costs.71 
Unfortunately, this raises a few measurement concerns in practice (Sandford, Godwin 
and Hardwick 1989), which are associated with the valuation of internal time, treatment 
of overheads or joint costs, the unit of measurement (either physical quantity, monetary 
or costs ratio), the validity of survey estimates, measurement of psychological costs, 
and the possible offsets and benefits of compliance (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 
1989, p. 14 and pp. 35-39; Pope 1993a, pp. 43-59; Allers 1994, pp. 51-56; Pope, Fayle 
and Chen 1994, pp. 27-28; Sandford 1995, pp. 394-400; Evans et al. 1996, pp. 15-16).72 
These issues have been of considerable concern to tax compliance costs researchers, 
especially during the early years of modern tax compliance costs research (1980s and 
1990s). Currently, the issues are still relevant and perhaps impossible to resolve 
completely. However, to a large extent, suggestions made and approaches adopted to 
address these issues are now providing clearer direction and guidance in estimating 
compliance costs.  
 
The main issues relate to internal time valuations and joint costs (Sandford 1995, p. 
394), which are highlighted by almost all key tax compliance costs researchers 
(Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989; Allers 1994; Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994; 
Evans et al. 1996). The issue of time valuation is noticeably debatable in the case of 
personal income tax, including those with business income, but does not arise for 
corporate business taxpayers (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994, p. 27), since the appropriate 
wage rate could be imputed in the estimates (Allers 1994; Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994). 
Specifically, Pope, Fayle and Chen (1994) and Allers (1994) use respondents’ estimates 
of time spent and hourly wage rate (for various personnel levels) to value the internal 
time costs, whereas, Evans et al. (1997, pp. 38 - 40) exploit the market rate as a basis 
                                                 
71 See definition of compliance costs in Chapter One, subsection 1.5.2. 
72 For a detailed discussion, refer to these references. 
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for their valuation. Both approaches add reliability to the estimates as those rates could 
be checked against internal or external information (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992, p. 
25; Sandford 1995, p. 398), which consequently permit extreme values adjustment 
(Allers 1994, p. 54; Pope 1995, p. 114) as well.  
 
The current study deals with corporate business taxpayers and, thus, for the first issue, 
follows a similar approach (respondents’ estimates of time spent and hourly wage rate) 
advocated by Pope, Fayle and Chen (1994) in valuing and estimating the internal time 
costs spent by companies. The technique was successfully applied in all prior studies in 
the Asia–Pacific countries, including Malaysia (Ariff and Pope 2002).  
 
The second issue is associated with the treatment of overhead costs, particularly for 
joint costs. Theoretically, the relevant portion of the costs should be included as part of 
the compliance costs (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989, p. 14; Sandford 1995, p. 
396). However, a common practice in tax compliance studies is to exclude the overhead 
costs. Sandford (1995, p. 396) and Evans et al. (1997, p. 29) assert that excluding 
overhead costs is perhaps reasonable to small businesses, given that the effect could be 
insignificant. Normally, prior studies excluded the overhead costs, either by requiring 
the respondents to exclude the overhead costs and/or by necessitating them to consider 
entirely a direct cost on specific activities or taxes (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 
1989, p. 268; Sandford and Hasseldine 1992, p. 132; Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994; Evans 
et al. 1997; Rametse 2006). As for the other costs, i.e. overhead costs, Sandford et al. 
(1989, p. 268), Pope et al. (1994, question 14) and more recently Rametse (2006, 
question 15), had also asked respondents to state the cost’s nature and the amount 
involved. The current study pursued a similar approach to Sandford et al. (1989) and 
Pope et al. (1994) in dealing with the joint costs issue. Specifically, the respondent is 
asked to exclude the overhead costs while considering their internal time spent on tax 
work, but a further question is asked to elicit information on other non-staff (additional) 
costs.    
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Other issues, such as measuring psychological costs, though recognised in the literature 
(Allers 1994, p. 55; Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994, p. 26; Sandford 1995, p. 400) are 
highly debatable and yet to be established. Moreover, psychological costs are 
considered as not part of the ‘pure’ compliance costs (Evans et al. 1997, p. 3). Hence, 
the current study omitted psychological costs.  
 
4.4.2 Benefits of Tax Compliance 
As presented earlier,73 the tax compliance literature recognises three offsetting benefits 
of tax compliance: managerial benefits, tax deductibility and cash flow benefits 
(Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989, pp. 13-14). Compliance costs were further 
broken into gross compliance costs and net compliance costs.74 The approach adopted 
with regards to these benefits is discussed next. 
 
Managerial Benefits 
Managerial benefits for companies are less considerable, as a company is required to 
carry out record keeping activities mainly for financial purposes (Sandford, Godwin and 
Hardwick 1989, p. 144). Thus, it is normal to exclude managerial benefits in the 
corporate tax compliance costs study (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989) and even 
in the study of other taxes (such as VAT and income tax of business individuals) as well 
due to measurement difficulties (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989, p. 14; Pope, 
Fayle and Chen 1994, p. 28; Tran-Nam 2001). Nonetheless, two UK studies (Sandford 
et al. 1981; National Audit Office 1994) have estimated the value of managerial 
benefits for VAT taxpayers. In Australia, two recent studies (Rametse 2006; Lignier 
2008) have also attempted to quantify managerial benefits to their sample of business 
taxpayers.75 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 See Chapter One, subsection 1.5.2. 
74 See Chapter One, subsection 1.5.2. 
75 It must be emphasised that valuation of managerial benefits is not the main aim of their respective 
studies. 
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Tax Deductibility 
Allers (1994) and Evans et al. (1997) highlighted that part of the compliance costs, 
which are directly associated with taxable profits, is tax deductible. The deductibility of 
external and incidental costs is justified (Allers 1994, p. 40; Evans et al. 1997, p. 12). 
On the other hand, the deductibility of internal time costs is somewhat arguable (see 
Allers 1994, p. 40), especially in the case of personal taxpayers. As a result, previous 
studies normally consider internal time spent as disallowable in the case of personal 
taxpayers, including those with business income (Allers 1994; Evans et al. 1997). Allers 
adopted a conservative approach by disallowing internal time costs even for a business 
taxpayer (1994). Conversely, Evans et al. (1997, p. 12) argue that all tax compliance 
costs are tax deductible. In the case of corporate SMEs, it is reasonable to assume that 
the work of an owner-manager and/or their employees is often business-related. As 
demonstrated by Evans et al. (1997), it is best to treat the internal time costs as tax 
deductible. Following this, the current study considered all three tax compliance cost 
components (i.e. internal time costs, external tax fees and additional non-staff costs) as 
tax deductible. However, similar to Evans et al, (1997) non-taxable SMEs are assumed 
to gain only 50 percent of the tax deductibility benefit.  
 
Cash Flow Benefit 
Under the SAS, income tax is charged on a current year basis and corporate income tax 
is payable in 12 advance monthly instalments plus a final payment (if any) within six 
months after the end of the accounting period. It is normal to assume that profits are 
accruing evenly throughout the accounting period and the cash flow benefit dates from 
when the profit is actually earned (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989, p. 144; Pope, 
Fayle and Chen 1994, p. 70). As such, no cash flow benefits are presumed for a monthly 
tax instalment as the instalments are related to their relevant profit period. However, a 
cash flow benefit (or loss) may arise if there is a final payment (or a refund situation). 
The cash flow benefits value is largely dependent on the amount of final tax payment, 
the time interval between profit derivation and tax payment, and the relevant interest 
rate. It is important to note that the monthly instalment is dependent on the estimated 
tax liability of each company and the amount is allowed to be revised further, either in 
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the sixth or ninth month. The actual tax liability will be available only after the end of 
the accounting period, but before the end of a further six months period. Theoretically, 
the timing of this study permits the gathering of such information. But, on the other 
hand, it is most likely that requiring such detailed information on tax payments could 
significantly affect the response rate of the study. Thus, respondents are required only to 
estimate their range of tax liability (not the actual amount). As a result, data availability 
does not permit estimates of the value of the cash flow benefit (or loss). Even if all 
necessary data is available, the value of cash flow benefit (or loss) is most likely to be 
very small as the majority of SMEs’ respondents in the current study estimated their tax 
level at either nil (24 percent) or up to RM100,000 (60 percent).  
 
4.4.3 Measuring Compliance Behaviour 
Measuring tax compliance behaviour is extremely difficult and the most challenging 
task in the field of taxation (Long and Swingen 1991, p. 655; Webley et al. 1991, p. 29; 
Hasseldine and Li 1999, p. 98). Tax compliance literature largely noted three 
approaches in measuring the non-compliance behaviour of an individual taxpayer; 
namely, self-reports, experimental and tax audits (Long and Swingen 1991, p. 657; 
Elffers, Robben and Hessing 1992, p. 546). The self-report and experimental methods 
are taxpayer-oriented, whereas tax auditing is return-oriented. Under the self-report 
method, taxpayers are asked to report their filing behaviour, which could be asked 
directly (first person) and/or indirectly (third person). The experimental method requires 
taxpayers to make compliance decisions in an experimental setting (normally in a lab 
setting). On the other hand, tax auditing relies on actual facts and data from the tax 
authorities that are available within, and/or compiled through, audit activities (for a 
comprehensive discussion refer to Long and Swingen 1991, pp. 657–664). 
 
Self reporting is the most common method in tax research (Webley et al. 1991, p. 30; 
Elffers, Robben and Hessing 1992, p. 546; Fischer, Wartick and Mark 1992; Hasseldine 
and Li 1999, p. 98) and is relatively easy, less costly, with less ethical concerns, and 
most importantly, perhaps the best available practical option (Weigel, Hessing and 
Elffers 1987, p. 217). On the contrary, Collins, Milliron and Toy (1992, p. 6) 
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acknowledged the fact that no single approach is superior to others. Despite some 
methodological limitations, for example, some form of distortion and social desirability 
bias (Long and Swingen 1991; Webley et al. 1991; Elffers, Robben and Hessing 1992), 
self-reporting has been extensively used in measuring tax non-compliance, both 
internationally and in Malaysia. It is often operationalised either by requiring responses 
to past evasion behaviours and/or hypothetical or experimental tax scenarios. Kirchler 
and Maciejovsky (2001, p. 181) assumed that the use of a scenario describing possible 
actions of a third party (indirect measure) can reduce the possible social desirability 
bias. A summary of prior studies of individual taxpayers who had used the self-
reporting method, either relating to taxpayers’ past evasion behaviour, hypothetical tax 
behaviour, or both, is presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Self-reporting Measurement in Prior Tax Compliance Studies 
Researcher(s) Type of  Tax Behaviour  
 Past  Hypothetical 
International Studies:   
Mason and Calvin (1978; 1984) √  
Wallschutzky (1984)  √ 
Elffers, Weigel and Hessing (1987) a, b √  
Hite (1988)  √ 
Porcano (1988) √ √ 
Violette (1989)  √ 
Klepper and Nagin (1989) c  √ 
Collins, Milliron and Toy (1992) √  
Elffers, Robben and Hessing (1992) d √  
Hite and McGill (1992) c  √ 
Fischer (1993)  √ √ 
Hasseldine, Kaplan and Fuller (1994) √  
Reckers, Sanders and Roark (1994)  √ 
Kaplan, Newberry and Reckers (1997) c  √ 
Hasseldine (1999) √ √ 
Chan, Troutman, and O’Bryan (2000)  √ 
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001)  √ 
Webley, Cole and Eidjar (2001) √ √ 
Wenzel (2002) c √ √ 
Hasseldine and Hite (2003)  √ 
Wenzel (2005a)  √ 
Wenzel (2005b) √  
Malaysian Studies:   
Ramasamy et al. (2003) c  √ 
Kasipillai, Mat-Udin and Zainol-Arifin (2003) c  √ 
Kasipillai and Abdul-Jabbar (2006) √ √ 
Sia (2008)  √ 
a Also appeared as Hessing, Elffers, and Weigel (1988). 
b Measured non-compliance by way of both self-reporting and tax audit approaches. 
c Responses obtained from both direct (first person) and indirect (third person) measures. Other studies 
mostly have used a direct measure. 
d Measured non-compliance by way of all three approaches, i.e. self-reporting, experiments and tax audits. 
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As for corporate taxpayers, an earlier discussion on corporate compliance behaviour76 
highlighted five studies that targeted the corporate sector (Rice 1992; Kamdar 1997; 
Mills 1998; Joulfaian 2000; Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod 2005). All those five studies 
were conducted in the US, and mainly using data from the IRS to measure corporate tax 
behaviour.  
 
In Malaysia, no micro data is available publicly for either individual or corporate 
taxpayers. Generally, tax data is published by the IRB (by way of an annual report) and 
the Treasury or Central Bank (by way of economic reports). Other government 
agencies, particularly the Department of Statistics, normally reproduce this general data. 
Thus, the audit-based approach is almost impossible without the full cooperation of the 
IRB. Up until now, perhaps only two studies have used the IRB official data, but 
confined to individual taxpayers. Both studies were carried out by IRB officers (Abdul 
2003; Sia et al. 2008). Therefore, researchers are left with a taxpayer-oriented approach, 
either the self-report or experimental methods. To what extent these options could be 
applied to the context of the company as a taxpayer is debatable. Slemrod (2004a, p. 83) 
argued that the tax situation of both companies and owners is closely related, 
particularly in small business. Along the same lines, Joulfaian (2000, p. 698)  drew the 
conclusion that non-compliant firms are more likely to be managed by executives who 
have failed to comply with personal income tax (measured using TCMP data) than are 
compliant firms. He has urged  tax researchers to incorporate managerial preferences 
into the study of corporate tax compliance (Joulfaian 2000, p. 701).  
 
The concept of managerial preferences assumes that the corporate behaviour of SMEs is 
influenced by actions and preferences made by their executives. Following suggestions 
by Joulfaian (2000)  and Slemrod (2004a), this study utilised the concept of managerial 
preferences as a proxy to measure corporate compliance behaviour. However, as 
discussed earlier,77 a large-scale mail survey was considered from several possible 
research and methodological perspectives. An experimental method was not employed 
                                                 
76 Refer Chapter Two, subsection 2.2.1. 
77 See Section 4.3. 
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as all previous studies have tended to use students as experimental subjects, which 
solely relates to individual taxpayers. Accordingly, self-reporting is considered the most 
appropriate technique as the current study focused exclusively on the corporate tax 
behaviour of Malaysian SMEs. It is important to note that the use of hypothetical tax 
scenarios in the survey increased realism by incorporating one of the key elements of 
the experimental method, to some extent. Indeed, Hasseldine and Hite (2003, p. 522) 
described this approach as a mail field experiment. 
 
Having decided to measure non-compliance behaviour via the self-reporting method, 
the specific types of non-compliance to be measured and the hypothetical scenarios to 
be given are considered next. The tax literature strongly emphasised the need for a 
separate analysis of the various forms of non-compliance (Long and Swingen 1991, p. 
664; Richardson and Sawyer 2001, p. 224). There are relatively more studies that have 
measured both understatement of income and overstatement of deductions in a single 
study, as shown in Table 4.2. The Malaysian studies, though very few in number, show 
a similar pattern.  
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Table 4.2: Specific Types of Non-compliance in Prior Tax Compliance Studies 
Researcher(s)  Specific Behaviour Measured 
 Understatement 
of Income 
Overstatement 
 of Deductions 
International Studies:   
Mason and Calvin (1978; 1984) a √ √ 
Wallschutzky (1984) √  
Elffers, Weigel and Hessing (1987) √ √ 
Hite (1988) √  
Porcano (1988) a √ √ 
Klepper and Nagin (1989) √ √ 
Violette (1989) √  
Collins, Milliron and Toy (1992) √ √ 
Elffers, Robben and Hessing (1992) √ √ 
Hite and McGill (1992)  √ 
Fischer (1993) √ √ 
Hasseldine, Kaplan and Fuller (1994) √ √ 
Reckers, Sanders and Roark (1994) √  
Kaplan, Newberry and Reckers (1997) √  
Hasseldine (1999) √ √ 
Chan, Troutman and O’Bryan (2000) √ √ 
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001) √ √ 
Webley, Cole and Eidjar (2001) √ √ 
Wenzel (2002) √ √ 
Hasseldine and Hite (2003) √  
Wenzel (2005a)  √ 
Wenzel (2005b) √ √ 
Malaysian Studies:   
Ramasamy et al. (2003) a √ √ 
Kasipillai, Mat-Udin and Zainol-Arifin (2003) a √ √ 
Kasipillai and Abdul-Jabbar (2006) √ √ 
a The study also measured failure to submit a tax return as specific non-compliance behaviour. 
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As for the tax scenario or context, as shown in Table 4.3, prior studies tend to provide a 
hypothetical scenario that relates to either self-employed or additional cash income 
situations. It is possible that non-compliance is often widespread, mainly in a self-
employed situation (Wallschutzky 1984, p. 381; Violette 1989, p. 94; Kaplan, Newberry 
and Reckers 1997, pp. 44-45). The current study considers corporate tax behaviour from 
a business respondent view, thus a self-employed scenario is appropriate. 
 
Table 4.3: Non-compliance Context in Prior Tax Compliance Studies 
Researcher(s)  Tax Context 
 Self  
Employed 
Extra  
Cash  
Income 
Work- 
related 
 Expenses 
 
Other 
International Studies: a     
Hite (1988) √ √   
Porcano (1988) a  √   
Klepper and Nagin (1989) √    
Violette (1989)  √   
Hite and McGill (1992)   √  
Reckers, Sanders and Roark (1994) √    
Kaplan, Newberry and Reckers (1997) √    
Hasseldine (1999)  √ √  
Chan, Troutman and O’Bryan (2000) √    
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2001) √    
Webley, Cole and Eidjar (2001)    √ b 
Wenzel (2002)   √  
Hasseldine and Hite (2003)  √   
Wenzel (2005a)   √  
Malaysian Studies:     
Ramasamy et al. (2003) √ √  √ c 
Kasipillai, Mat-Udin and Zainol-Arifin (2003) √ √  √ c 
Kasipillai and Abdul-Jabbar (2006)  √ √  
a  The study by Wallschutzky (1984) was not listed as it could be linked to either self-employed or extra 
cash receipts situations.  
b  Respondents were asked to state their views with regards to opportunities to pay less tax.  
c This study also includes other non-compliance situations, such as failure to file a return and failure to 
make payment within the due dates.  
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4.5 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
 
This section discusses the survey instrument used in the current study. To a large extent, 
the advice and suggestions made by a number of authors in the field of survey methods 
(mainly Dillman 1978; Fowler 1995, pp. 78-103; Dillman 2007) and tax compliance 
costs research (mainly Pope 1993a; Sandford 1995; Evans et al. 1997) were considered 
in writing and designing the questionnaire. Additionally, a number of available 
questionnaires (in part or in full) from both tax compliance (Christensen, Weihrich and 
Gerbing 1994; Roberts 1994; Hanefah 1996; Hasseldine 1999; Ramasamy et al. 2003; 
Abdul-Manaf 2004) and compliance costs (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992; Hanefah, 
Ariff and Kasipillai 2001; Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002) studies were also considered 
carefully. A copy of the survey questionnaire used is available in Appendices F (the 
English version) and G (the Malay version). The final survey questionnaire was divided 
into four sections, referred to as Sections A to D. 
 
Section A of the questionnaire (questions 1 to 8) was designed to obtain the 
characteristics of an SME company, which among other things includes the company’s 
sector, size (by both sales and staff criteria) and the estimated tax liability. Section B 
(questions 9 to 13) was designed to obtain information that was used to estimate the 
income tax compliance costs. Respondents were required to estimate their compliance 
costs to all three cost components, i.e. internal time spent (and appropriate wages rate 
by staff category), additional non-staff costs, and external tax fees. This section also 
elicited information with regards to tax-related difficulties faced by the company, the 
main reason for using external tax professionals and the approximate proportion of 
income tax routine and planning work. The section mainly drew on the prior business 
income tax compliance costs surveys, in particular studies by Pope, Fayle and Chen 
(1994) and Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai (2001). The Pope et al. study was considered 
as an important reference since it is a specific compliance cost study on companies. The 
study by Hanefah et al. is confined to Malaysian SME companies. All requested 
information, for both Sections A and B, is related to the financial year and/or tax year 
2006.  
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Section C (questions 14 to 16) is concerned with the perceptions and opinions towards a 
number of tax aspects and behaviours. Pope (1995, p. 110) noted that taxpayers’ 
attitudes and opinions could be investigated in a tax compliance study so as to provide 
respondents an opportunity to express their views. Specifically, respondents in the 
current study were asked for their perceptions and opinion (15 items in question 14) on 
the fairness (5 items), complexity (4 items) and tax rate structure (3 items) of the 
corporate tax system, their relationship with IRB officials (1 item), the probability of a 
tax audit (1 item) and incentives (1 item). The questions used for attitudinal aspects in 
the current study were developed from a number of previous tax compliance studies, as 
shown in Table 4.4. All these items were measured by way of a five-point Likert scale. 
The Likert scale has been used extensively in the area of tax compliance research, both  
internationally (for example, Fischer, Wartick and Mark 1992; Christensen, Weihrich 
and Gerbing 1994; Hasseldine, Kaplan and Fuller 1994; Reckers, Sanders and Roark 
1994; Richardson 2005), and in Malaysia (see Hanefah 1996; Ramasamy et al. 2003; 
Abdul-Manaf 2004). Out of 15 items, 11 items were measured using a response scale of 
‘strongly disagree to strongly agree’,  the remaining used a scale of ‘much less taxes to 
much more taxes’ and ‘much less fair to much more fair’ (two items respectively). 
 
Table 4.4: Main References in Developing Questions for Attitudinal Aspects  
Aspects Number of Items Source(s) a 
Corporate tax fairness 5 Roberts (1994) 
Corporate tax complexity 4 Christensen, Weihrich and Gerbing 
(1994)  
Corporate tax rate   3 Christensen, Weihrich and Gerbing 
(1994) 
Relationship with the IRB  1 Pope, Fayle and Chen (1994) 
Probability of tax audit 1 Abdul-Manaf (2004) 
Tax incentives for SMEs  1 Abdul-Manaf (2004) 
a Adapted to suit the corporate income tax context. 
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As for compliance behaviour, two types of non-compliance behaviour, namely 
understatement of income (question 15) and overstatement of deductions (question 16), 
were measured by presenting an independent hypothetical tax scenario respectively. 
Both tax scenarios deal with a self-employed business situation and required three 
responses (i.e. sub questions a, b and c) for each scenario. Indirect (third person) 
responses were required for sub-questions (a) and (c). On the other hand, sub-question 
(b) necessitated a direct (first person) response. A combination of both direct and 
indirect measures was recommended by Kaplan, Newberry and Reckers (1997) to 
mitigate the sensitive nature of the study. As for an indirect response, respondents were 
asked to judge the probability of non-compliance behaviour of the person (third person) 
described in the scenario. The probability ranges from zero to 100 percent, with a 10 
percent interval for each, and adapted from prior studies (Violette 1989; Hasseldine and 
Kaplan 1992; Kaplan, Newberry and Reckers 1997). For a direct (first person) answer, 
the respondents were asked to indicate their extent of agreement and/or disagreement by 
way of a five-point Likert scale between strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (5) to 
the possible action of non-compliance behaviour of the person described in the scenario. 
The earlier Malaysian studies also used a similar response category (Kasipillai, Mat-
Udin and Zainol-Arifin 2003; Ramasamy et al. 2003). 
 
Section D covers general comments and suggestions with regards to the tax compliance 
burden. This section solicited respondents’ views on the relative level of compliance 
costs (mainly to test non-response bias),78 given the possible amount of the claim from 
government that could compensate compliance costs incurred by the their companies, 
and also specific suggestions to reduce SMEs’ tax preparation work, plus other 
comments and/or suggestions relating to the taxation of SME companies. This section 
also requested respondents to indicate their position in the company. This procedure has 
enabled the researcher to make follow-up phone calls in the process of data validation.79 
 
                                                 
78 The issue of non-response bias was addressed specifically in Section 4.9.  
79 See Appendix P. 
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A respondent-friendly questionnaire is one of the five elements of the TDM method. 
Dillman had stressed the importance of questionnaire design, in particular with regards 
to a self-administered questionnaire (2007, p. 95). He urged researchers to consider a 
number of principles with regards to writing (pp. 50-77) and designing the 
questionnaire (pp. 96-134). Major writing principles that have been adopted in the 
current study include the use of simple words, question wordings similar to previous 
studies (but modified to suit the current study), use of a five-point Likert scale, 
emphasis on specific time referents (i.e. tax year 2006), and eliminating respondents 
from making unnecessary calculations. As for questionnaire design, among major 
principles that have been employed are the use of bold print for questions, light print for 
answer choices, white colour box for answer spaces, background colours (either shaded 
or otherwise), blank spacing between questions and answer choices, providing 
instructions in the appropriate section of the questions, and most importantly the use of 
a consistent format throughout the questionnaire. 
 
Having considered the above factors, the final survey questionnaire was prepared in 
English and another translated version was made available in the Malay language. It is 
common in Malaysia to make available both versions, mostly in a single printout. 
Generally, for business-related surveys, the main language is English, which is visible 
in a normal font. The Malay language is included as an italic font (for example in 
Abdul-Manaf and Abdul-Jabbar 2006; Kasipillai and Abdul-Jabbar 2006). However, a 
review of Malaysian tax studies 80 revealed that only studies by Hanefah (1996) and 
Abdul-Manaf (2004) reported the use of two separate sets of questionnaires, one in 
English, the other in Malay language. The current study employed two separate versions 
of the questionnaire. The dual version was considered necessary to substantially reduce 
the length of the questionnaire and, most importantly, to obtain a reasonable response 
rate. The printing of background colour differentiated the English (printed in orange) 
and the Malay (printed in blue) versions of the questionnaire. The respondents were 
given the option of responding to either version. This option was clearly stated in the 
covering letter. A single-page of questionnaire, more specifically A3 size paper folded 
                                                 
80 A list of studies reviewed is provided in Appendix B. 
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into A4 size paper, was among the main design layouts recommended by Dillman 
(1978; 2007) to increase the response rate. The single page design was successfully 
implemented in nearly all of Pope et al.’s studies (1990; 1993a; 1993b; 1994) and 
recently by Rametse (2006). 
 
 
4.6 PILOT INTERVIEWS 
 
Initially, two phases of the pilot study were conducted to ensure the questionnaire was 
well understood. The first phase involved a personal interview with three tax 
professionals and five tax academics in the northern region and four universities 
respectively. The view of both tax professionals and tax academics are essential to add 
validity to the survey instruments. Prior to the actual interview, structured interview 
questions, together with a covering letter emphasising the importance of the study, were 
distributed. The approach was considered as a way of preparing the experts for the 
interview. The draft instrument was built upon earlier tax compliance costs and 
behavioural studies.81 Secondly, a pilot study was conducted by way of a personal 
interview among a small sample of SME companies in the northern region of Malaysia. 
The interview was conducted with the help of the SME Bank of Malaysia (SME Bank). 
Similar to a pilot interview of tax experts, the structured interview questions and the 
covering letter highlighting the value of the study were distributed in advance to 18 
SMEs. The covering letter was addressed to managing directors of those SMEs and was 
personally delivered by the SME Bank. A week after, a follow-up call was made to seek 
their appointment to the study. However, only 11 SMEs agreed to participate in the 
study. The remaining seven SMEs were unable to participate due to either their head 
office being located elsewhere, not having commenced their operations, or refusing to 
take part. The final interview was conducted successfully with only nine SMEs due to 
the busy schedule of the other two SMEs. 
 
                                                 
81 See Section 4.5. 
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Following pilot interviews, two key modifications plus a few adjustments were made to 
ensure that the questionnaire was easily understood by the respondents. The main 
alterations were related to internal time spent and wages (question 9), and to both tax 
scenarios (question 15 and 16). Firstly, in relation to the internal time spent and wages, 
the basis for responses was standardised to a monthly basis. The pilot interview 
questions asked respondents to estimate their internal time spent on income tax 
activities on a yearly basis and the appropriate average wage rate on an hourly basis. 
During the interview, the author noted that a number of SMEs had to compute the 
hourly wage rate for relevant staff categories, as the basis of employment-related 
payment in Malaysia is on a monthly basis. The change was crucial so as to avoid 
respondents making unnecessary computations (Dillman 2007, pp. 77-78). As a 
measure of consistency, the basis for time spent was also changed from a yearly to a 
monthly basis. Secondly, simplifications to the tax scenarios were essential so as to 
make them short and straightforward. Additionally, following the tax experts’ views, 
the amount involved in each scenario was increased from RM5,000 to RM10,000. The 
other adjustments made were mainly on the presentation and layout of the questionnaire 
for ease of response.  
 
Additionally, during the pilot study, both tax professionals and tax academics 
highlighted the importance of the tax professional’s role in the Malaysian SME context. 
Evidence also indicates that at least 91 percent of Malaysian SMEs employ tax 
professionals to manage their tax affairs (Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 2001, p. 91; 
Mansor, Saad and Ibrahim 2003). Thus it would be useful to examine whether there is 
any difference between tax professionals and SMEs with regards to both tax attitudinal 
and behavioural aspects. As such, a supplementary survey was carried out among the 
tax professionals.82 
 
 
                                                 
82 See subsection 4.11.2 for further details of the survey of tax professionals. 
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4.7 SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION  
 
The importance of the implementation procedure is demonstrated in research on 
business (Dillman 2007), small business (Forsgren 1989; Dennis 2003) and even 
taxation (Pope 1995; Sandford 1995; Evans et al. 1996). In fact, almost all suggestions 
made by them for improving mail survey weaknesses are implementation-related. For 
example, four out of five TDM elements and 11 out of 17 of Sandford’s suggestions are 
implementation-related.83 Accordingly, the current study places a greater emphasis on 
the implementation procedures by integrating many of these suggestions. However, this 
study was able to adapt four key elements of TDM and 12 elements of Sandford. A few 
other options, though considered, were not implemented due to mainly financial 
constraints. 
 
The actual survey was carried out with the support of SMIDEC and relates to the tax 
year 2006. The data collection period spanned three months, between July 2007 and 
September 2007. The survey period was considered the most appropriate as all SMEs 
were expected to have completed their corporate income tax submission for the tax year 
2006. The deadline for corporate tax returns in Malaysia varies according to their 
financial year-end, specifically within six months after the financial year-end. For 
example, a company that ends their financial year on the 31 December 2006 is required 
to furnish their tax return by 30 June 2007.  
 
The survey questionnaire was mailed to 1,300 targeted respondents in SME companies 
in peninsular Malaysia. A survey of this nature is possibly best answered by the owner-
manager or a person most responsible for the financial affairs of the SME. However, it 
is most likely that the financial role in SMEs may not be linked to a specific post due to 
its characteristics. Accordingly the survey targeted a chief executive officer or 
managing director. The survey package was personalised with their name and position 
in the company appearing on both the cover letter and outgoing envelope. However, not 
all SMEs in the sample had such details. Accordingly, the survey was personalised to 
                                                 
83 Refer Section 4.3 for more details. 
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the next available name on the sample list by stating their post as well, provided that it 
had some link to an accounting-related function. For the remaining SMEs without 
specific contact details, or contact details that were not related to an accounting role, the 
survey was addressed to ‘Manager/Accountant’. As shown in Table 4.5, the large 
majority of the sample (71 percent) was personalised, with almost 58 percent either 
addressed to a chief executive officer or managing director. 
 
Table 4.5: Mail-out Personalisation 
  Number of SMEs Percentage  
Personalised a     
     Chief Executive Officer 153 11.8 
     Managing Director  594 45.7 
     Director/Executive Director 18 1.4 
     Accountant, Finance Manager or Equivalent 44 3.4 
     General Manager/Manager 112 8.6 
Sub-total 921  70.8 
Non-personalised   
     Manager/Accountant 379 29.2 
Overall 1,300 100.0 
a Both name and position of respondent appears in all outgoing mails. 
 
 
As shown in Table 4.6, three mailings have been used in the current study. The initial 
mailing was made on 5 July 2007, followed by a postcard reminder three weeks later 
and a final reminder four weeks after the first reminder. These intervals are a bit longer 
than recommended by Evans et al. (1996), but considered appropriate in the Malaysian 
context.84  
 
                                                 
84 All mailings were based in Kedah. It is important to allow for different working days in seven (out of 
nine) states in peninsular Malaysia. The weekend in Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu is on Friday, while 
in other states the weekend is on Sunday. 
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Table 4.6: Mailing Pattern of the Study  
Mailing Pattern  Mailing Date Mailing Number 
Initial Mailing  5 July 2007 1,300 
First Reminder a  26 July 2007 1,174 b 
Final Reminder a 22 August 2007 1,124 b 
a Reminders were sent to the entire sample. 
b Less than 1,300 due to the exclusion of undelivered mailings during the earlier mail out.  
 
The initial mailing included a personalised covering letter, the questionnaire in both 
English and Malay versions, and a stamped return envelope. The covering letter 
explained the purpose of the study, emphasised that the study was independent and 
conducted with the support of SMIDEC. The letter was printed on the original 
stationery of UUM and was hand-signed by the researcher.85 UUM stationery was also 
used for both the outgoing and reply envelope. Although the use of original stationery is 
costly, it was important to obtain a good response rate. No identification number was 
made on all outgoing mail as taxation is a sensitive area and, most importantly, in order 
to offer complete anonymity. As a result, both reminders were sent to the entire sample, 
but excluded a number of undelivered mailings, mainly due to change of address.86  
 
The first reminder was sent via a postcard.87 The postcard thanked those who had 
already responded and called for a reply from those who had not responded. The final 
reminder88 was sent together with a further copy of the full questionnaire,89 a single 
question survey,90 so as to determine any non-response bias, with a new stamped reply 
envelope. The size of the reply envelope sent with the second reminder was slightly 
different from the initial mailing in order to allow for better monitoring of response 
waves. Similar to the first mailing, the reminder letter sent was personalised.91 
 
                                                 
85 See Appendix H. 
86 See Chapter Five, Table 5.2. 
87 See Appendix I. 
88 See Appendix J. 
89 See Appendix F. 
90 See Appendix K. 
91 See paragraph above Table 4.5. 
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4.8 POPULATION AND SAMPLE OF THE STUDY 
 
The study focused on corporate income taxation, but was confined to small and 
medium-sized companies in peninsular Malaysia. There is no comprehensive list of 
taxpayers publicly available in Malaysia. The current study used the SME directory 
available via the SME information portal managed by the Secretariat to the National 
SME Development Council. The portal was recently launched in early 2006 and is 
publicly accessible via http://www.smeinfo.com.my. The directory was considered as 
the most suitable list of population as it is based on the new national definition of 
SMEs. As at 15 June 2007, there were 14,388 SMEs registered with the NSDC. The 
gross population of the current study was derived at 9,912 companies after excluding 
SMEs in Eastern Malaysia, namely in Sabah, Sarawak and the Federal Territory of 
Labuan, and non-corporate SMEs, as shown in Table 4.7. Further, recognising a low 
number of representations in the primary agriculture and mining sectors, the net 
population of the study was further reduced to 9,669. 
 
Table 4.7: Gross and Net Population of the Study 
  Number of SMEs 
Gross Population as at 15 June 2006   14,388 
Less : SMEs in Eastern Malaysia a     
Sabah 570   
Sarawak 601  
Federal Territory of Labuan  40 (1,211) 
Less:  Non-corporate SMEs  (3,265) 
Total SMEs in peninsular Malaysia  9,912 
Less:  Sectors with low numbers    
Primary agriculture 215  
Mining 28 (243) 
Net Population  9,669 
a Inclusive of non-corporate SMEs. 
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Having decided on the population for the study, the sampling size and selection are 
considered next. Hair et al. (1998, p. 12) advised researchers to be fully aware of the 
impact of sample size on the statistical test. From a different perspective, Garson (n.d.) 
noted that the sample size does not depend on the population size and contended that a 
sample size over 1,500 is hardly ever needed. Nonetheless, Krejcie and Morgan (1970), 
developed a scientific table for determining sample size by taking into account 
population size. The table suggests a sample size of 370 and 375 for a given population 
of 10,000 and 15,000 respectively. Roscoe (1975), for instance, argues that a sample 
size of more than 30 and less than 500 is appropriate for most research. 
 
The views presented above suggest that a sample size of anywhere between 372 and 
1,500 is adequate. However, in the specialist field of tax compliance costs studies, 
particularly for business taxpayers, many studies use greater sample sizes—for 
example, 1,870 public companies (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1991), 9,094 Value Added 
Tax traders in the UK (Sandford et al. 1981), 9,541 GST/business taxpayers (Sandford 
and Hasseldine 1992), 3,000 companies (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994), 1,329 companies 
(Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996) and 2,500 companies in the US (Slemrod and 
Venkatesh 2002), 8,039 business taxpayers in Evans et al. (1997), and more recently, 
4,000 small businesses in Rametse and Pope (2002). It is important to note that most of 
these studies, to varying extents, received funding from external organisations; for 
example, the Australian Tax Research Foundation (for Pope et al. studies), the 
Economic and Social Research Council (for the UK studies) and the Tax Foundation 
and Inland Revenue Services (for the US studies).  
 
In view of mainly financial constraints,92 the current study considered a sample size of 
around 1,000 (i.e. 10 percent of the net population) to be reasonable. Nevertheless, the 
final sample size was increased to 1,300 so as to allow for the possibility of returned or 
undelivered mail. This study used a stratified proportionate sampling technique and 
random selection respectively to obtain a representative sample. A proportionate sample 
                                                 
92 Financial assistance sought from a number of research institutes in Malaysia failed, mainly due to the 
doctoral nature of the study.  
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was drawn from each category of the business sector. The population and sampling 
frame of the current study is presented in Table 4.8.  
 
Table 4.8: Population and Sample Size by Stratified Proportionate Sampling 
Sector 
Number of 
Companies 
Percentage of 
Population 
Sample 
Size 
   Manufacturing  5,239 54 702 
   Services  2,158 22 286 
   Manufacturing-related services 848 9 117 
   Construction 734 8 104 
   Others 690 7 91 
Overall 9,669 100 1,300 
 
 
4.9 NON-RESPONSE BIAS 
 
Having recognised the typically low response rate in mail surveys, it is imperative to 
examine the possibility of non-response bias. Researchers in the social sciences, 
including business, accounting and economics, normally investigate the presence of 
non-response bias by comparing responses received from early and late respondents 
(Armstrong and Overton 1977; Wallace and Mellor 1988; Graham and Harvey 2001; 
Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley 2002; Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson 2006; Brau and 
Fawcett 2006). If repeated mailings are used, wave analysis is used to compare 
responses between mailings or waves (Armstrong and Overton 1977). Under this 
approach, the late respondents are assumed to be proxies for non-respondents.  
 
The approach is also adopted by a number of tax compliance researchers (for example 
in Abdul-Manaf 2004; Lai, Sheikh-Obid and Meera 2004; Evans, Tran-Nam and 
Andrew 2007). However, in the specific field of tax compliance costs studies, the use of 
a single question survey in a postcard, as introduced by Allers (1994), is the most 
common practice nowadays (for example, Evans et al. 1997; Rametse and Pope 2002; 
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Blumenthal and Kalambokidis 2006). Accordingly, the current study measured the issue 
of non-response bias using both approaches, the first by using a single question survey 
in the reminder and the second by employing wave analysis. 
 
The first approach involved comparing the responses to a single key question (question 
17) in both the full questionnaire survey and the single postcard survey.93 A total of 94 
respondents, or 8.4 percent of the net sample, replied to the single question survey. As 
shown in Table 4.9, both groups of respondents perceived compliance costs almost 
identically, with a similar trend. Initially, a number of responses showed an increasing 
trend as the perceived level of compliance costs increases, but the trend decreases 
immediately after the perceived level is about neutral. This indicates that the non-
respondents would have similar perceptions as respondents.  
 
Table 4.9: Comparative Perceived Level of Compliance Costs 
Level of   Full Survey  Single Question Survey 
 Compliance Costs Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Very Low  4 2 5 5 
Low 20 12 7 7 
Neutral  82 47 46 49 
High 40 23 20 21 
Very high 27 16 16 17 
      173 a 100       94  100 b 
Overall Mean c   3.38 3.37 
a Number of respondents equals to 175, with two missing items. 
b Does not total up to one hundred percent due to rounding. 
c Out of five. 
 
                                                 
93 See Appendices F, G and K. 
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For the purpose of wave analysis, responses received were divided into three waves: 
those who responded after the initial mailing but before a first reminder, those who 
responded after the first reminder but before a second reminder was sent, and those who 
responded after the second reminder. A comparison is made between the waves on a 
number of key variables to determine whether responses changed significantly between 
those periods. The variables are the sector (question 2), number of staff (question 4), 
annual turnover (question 6), the perceived level of compliance costs (question 17), 
possible behaviour of underreporting (question 15b) and possible behaviour of 
overstating deductions (question 16b). The variables include both categorical (questions 
2, 4 and 6) and ratio (questions 15b, 16b and 17). Chi-square and one-way analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) tests were conducted for three categorical variables and three ratio 
variables respectively. No significant differences were found for all six variables, 
suggesting no bias was present in all three waves of responses.  
 
Thus, both approaches suggest fairly similar responses between respondents and non-
respondents, thereby removing the possibility of significant non-response bias in this 
study. 
 
 
4.10 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.10.1 Overall Approach 
Data are analysed mainly using descriptive statistics, correlation and regression 
analyses. For this purpose, all data were entered into the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS). Frequency and means analysis were used mainly in analysing 
the profile of the responding SMEs and compliance costs estimation respectively. Mean 
analysis was also used in analysing perceptions and opinions towards a number of tax 
attitudinal aspects and tax behaviours. The next subsections explain specific methods of 
data analysis by type of research questions.94 
 
                                                 
94 See Chapter One, Section 1.3. 
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4.10.2 Compliance Costs Estimation 
The compliance costs of taxation (research question one) was estimated and analysed, 
mainly following methodology established by Sandford, the ‘grandfather’95 of tax 
compliance cost studies and consequently adapted in the pioneering work of Pope et al. 
(1991–1994) in Australia, and later further advanced by Evans et al. (1997) in Australia. 
It is important to note that the current study also benefited from other tax compliance 
research as well (e.g. Allers 1994, Hanefah Ariff and Kasipillai 2001). Recognising this 
study targeting corporate taxpayers, more specific consideration was given to a study by 
Pope, Fayle and Chen (1994) on companies’ income taxation. Some of the major 
measurement difficulties were discussed earlier.96  
 
Apart from those, one noteworthy aspect to consider in the Malaysian context is with 
regards to size of measure to be used. In Malaysia, the size of SMEs is based on a 
mixture of both turnover and staff measures.97 However, the NSDC definition varies 
between sectors and measures too, which possibly could lead to distortion. Almost all 
major prior studies analyse business compliance costs mainly in terms of firm size, 
mostly proxies by turnover level (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989; Sandford and 
Hasseldine 1992; Allers 1994; Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994; Evans et al. 1997). The 
other proxies used are category of annual tax remittance (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994),98 
and employment size (Allers 1994). Almost a similar trend was observed in the Asia-
Pacific studies as well (Ariff, Loh and Talib 1995; Ariff, Ismail and Loh 1997; Chan et 
al. 1999; Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 2001). Despite various measures, the firm size 
was found to be strongly and consistently related to the level of tax compliance burden 
of business taxpayers (Allers 1994; Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996; Evans et al. 1997; 
                                                 
95 As acknowledged by Tran-Nam and Evans (2002) in recognition of Sandford’s scholarly contribution 
to the tax compliance costs discipline.  See also Evans, Pope and Hasseldine (2001). 
96 See subsection 4.4.1. 
97 See Chapter One, subsection 1.5.3. 
98 The primary analysis of Pope, Fayle and Chen (1994, p. 54) uses annual tax remittance categories being 
a proxy for firm size, as the measure corresponded to published Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 
statistics. 
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Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002; Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod 2005).99 The same holds true 
even within small business taxpayers (DeLuca et al. 2005, p. 80).  
 
Accordingly, the turnover level is considered of primary interest, and it is also 
comparable to previous studies. Additionally, compliance costs are analysed in terms of 
alternative size measures, namely number of staff employed and the NSDC definition. 
The compliance costs were further analysed in terms of other SMEs’ characteristics, 
such as business sector and business length. Apart from analysing compliance costs at 
the total company level, compliance costs distribution was analysed in terms of its type 
(either computational or planning), and their sources (either internal or external). 
Additionally, the aggregate compliance costs of SME companies in Malaysia are 
estimated by multiplying the average compliance costs to SME populations. Due to data 
availability on the population of SME companies, the current study assumed that the 
average compliance costs are the same, regardless of their specific sizes, either micro, 
small and medium companies. Further details are presented in Chapter Five.100  
 
This study also estimated the possible values of offsetting benefits of tax compliance, 
namely tax deductibility.101 Subsequently, compliance costs, after allowing for 
offsetting benefits of tax compliance, were computed, both at the firm and overall 
levels.  
 
4.10.3 Relationship between Compliance Costs and Compliance Behaviour   
Having outlined tax compliance costs estimation, it would be useful to examine the 
effects of compliance costs on corporate tax behaviour. The current study measured two 
types of non-compliance behaviour, namely underreporting of income and 
overstatement of deductions. As presented earlier,102 it is important to remember that 
                                                 
99 The US studies tend to conduct a statistical analysis/test to establish the relationship between firm size 
and the tax compliance burden, whereas researchers in other parts of the world (with the exception of 
Allers in the Netherlands) generally carry out comparisons with firm size to investigate the regressive 
nature of tax compliance costs. Nonetheless, the ultimate idea remains the same, namely that firm size 
relates to the tax compliance burden.  
100 See Chapter Five, Section 5.9. 
101 See Chapter Five, Section 5.10. 
102 See subsection 4.4.3. 
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both tax behaviours were measured by way of two independent hypothetical tax 
scenarios. The relationship between compliance costs and both types of compliance 
behaviour (research question two) was analysed descriptively and by way of correlation 
analysis, as well as employing other comparative analysis (mainly t-tests or ANOVA). 
Additionally, in a similar way, a relationship between compliance costs and other tax 
attitudinal tax aspects, namely fairness, tax complexity, and other structural features of 
tax systems was carried out as well. 
 
4.10.4 Determinants of Compliance Behaviour 
And finally, factors influencing non-compliance behaviour of SME companies (research 
question three) was carried out by way of multivariate regressions. A number of prior 
studies in tax compliance had used regression (for example Mason and Calvin 1984; 
Hasseldine, Kaplan and Fuller 1994; Webley, Cole and Eidjar 2001; Wenzel 2002) in 
their analysis. Details of the model specification in the current study, covering both 
dependent and independent variables, and findings are presented in Chapter Six.103  
 
 
4.11 ADDITIONAL SURVEYS 
 
4.11.1 Web Survey 
As presented earlier,104 the main survey questionnaire was also carried out by way of a 
web survey. The web survey considered almost 42 percent of the net population105 or 
4,033 SMEs having an e-mail address. The web survey follows a similar approach to 
the mail survey,106 except that a slightly different questionnaire layout,107 and additional 
number of contacts are used. A different layout of the questionnaire was considered to 
suit the web survey context. In terms of contact, advanced e-mail notification,108 and 
three reminders (as compared to two in the mail survey) were adopted in the web 
                                                 
103 See Chapter Six, Section 6.7. 
104 Refer end of Section 4.3. 
105 See Table 4.7 in Section 4.8. 
106 Refer Sections 4.5 to 4.7. 
107 See a print copy of the web questionnaire in Appendix L.  
108 Advance e-mail notifications are sent through an email group created for the purpose of the current 
study.  
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survey.109 The third and the final reminder requested respondents to complete a single 
question web survey.110 These two additional reminders are considered essential in 
order to address a comparatively low response rate in a web survey, and more 
importantly no additional costs were involved. 
 
The web survey was conducted by an e-mail invitation to 3,535 SME companies. This 
sample frame is derived after excluding a number of duplicate email addresses111 and 
SMEs that had been selected in the mail survey. The web sampling frame by sector is 
shown in Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10: Sample Size of Web Survey 
Sector Number of Companies Percentage 
   Manufacturing  708 20.0 
   Services  1,396 39.5 
   Manufacturing-related services 581 16.4 
   Construction 387 10.9 
   Others 463 13.1 
Overall 3,535 100.0 a 
a Does not total up to one hundred percent due to rounding. 
 
The survey was implemented five weeks after the initial mail-out of the postal survey 
with the assistance of the Computer Centre of UUM. The e-mailing pattern of a web 
survey is summarised in Table 4.11. The intervals of web-contacts of between one and 
two weeks were shorter than the mail survey as no lead time is required in a web-
survey. 
 
                                                 
109 See the content of the advanced e-mail notification, initial email and reminders in Appendix M. 
110 The single question in the web survey is the same as for the primary postal survey (refer Appendix K). 
111 See Appendix N, Table N.1 for details. 
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Table 4.11: E-mailing Pattern of the Web Survey 
Mailing Pattern  E-mailing Date E-mailing Number 
Advanced Notification  9 August 2007 3,535 
Initial emailing  16–30 August 2007 a 3,516 b 
First Reminder 6 September 2007 3,446 b 
Second Reminder 18 September 2007 3,417 b 
Final Reminder 4 October 2007 3,401 b 
a Due to a technical failure, initial emails were sent during the two week period.  
b Less than 3,535 due to exclusion of replied and out of frame responses.  
 
In terms of personalisation, just over 91 percent of the contacts are non-personalised e-
mails addressed to ‘Manager/Accountant’, as shown in Table 4.12. Due to availability 
of contact details, personalised e-mails were sent to 309 SMEs only, mainly to either the 
Chief Executive Officer or Director. 
 
Table 4.12: Personalisation in the Web Survey 
  Number of SMEs Percentage  
Personalised a     
     Chief Executive Officer/Managing Director 111 3.1 
     Director 107 3.0 
     Accountant, Finance Manager or Equivalent 15 0.4 
     General Manager/Manager 76 2.1 
Sub-total 309 8.7 b 
Non-personalised c   
     Manager/Accountant 3226 91.3 
Overall 3,535 100.0 d 
a Emails are sent to either a specific officer or relevant position address of the SMEs. 
b The sub-total does not add up to 8.7 due to rounding. 
c Emails are sent to the general company or inquiry address of the SMEs. 
d Does not total up to one hundred percent due to rounding. 
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A non-response test, similar to the primary mail survey112 and conducted through a 
single questionnaire survey and wave analysis, indicates similar findings between 
respondents and non-respondents.113 The findings are presented in Chapters Five and 
Six.114 
 
4.11.2 Survey of Tax Professionals 
As briefly discussed earlier,115 considering tax professionals’ views is important with 
regards to corporate SME taxation. A survey of tax professionals was carried out to 
validate and support corporate SME respondents’ views on some tax attitudinal and 
behavioural aspects. The questionnaires were mailed to 300 tax professionals who are 
members of the Malaysian Institute of Taxation (MIT). As at early August 2007, there 
were 2,504 MIT members in Malaysia.116 As the MIT members’ details are not 
available publicly, the random selection of 300 tax professionals and the mailings were 
carried out by the MIT personnel. The survey questionnaire, together with a reply 
stamped envelope, was distributed by the MIT in their third quarterly correspondence 
(second week of September) to members. A lack of correspondence details does not 
allow any follow up procedure to be carried out. 
 
Similar to the main mail survey, a single page questionnaire, folded into booklet form, 
was adopted. The covering letter explaining the purpose of the study was printed on the 
top of the first page of the questionnaire. The survey questionnaire was divided into 
four sections, referred to as Sections A to D.117 Section A was designed to obtain brief 
demographics and background information of tax professionals; Sections B and C relate 
to external tax fees and perceptions on tax attitudes and behaviour of tax professionals 
respectively; and finally Section D covers comments and suggestions. This 
questionnaire survey was built upon the main postal SME survey questionnaire, 
                                                 
112 See Section 4.9. 
113 A comparative analysis of the perceived level of compliance costs in a full and single question is 
provided in Appendix N, Table N.10. 
114 See Sections 5.12 and 6.8. 
115 See Section 4.6. 
116 Personal communication with the Malaysian Institute of Taxation, 16 August, 2007. 
117 The survey questionnaire is provided in Appendix O. 
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discussed earlier,118 but modified to suit the tax professional context. This survey 
questionnaire was prepared in the English version only as the English language is 
widely used in the business of tax professionals. The survey findings are reported in 
Chapter Six.119 
 
 
4.12 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has presented the various aspects of research design and methodology 
adopted in this study. The strengths and weaknesses of each design and method have 
been compared succinctly, both in the context of social sciences and specific tax 
research. A number of measurement issues and approaches adopted pertaining to both 
tax compliance costs and compliance behaviour have been discussed. Questionnaire 
development, pilot interviews, and the actual survey implementation undertaken have 
been described in detail. These cover the main SME postal survey, and two additional 
surveys—the SME web survey and the tax professionals’ survey. Information with 
regard to population, sampling process, and non-response bias has been addressed as 
well. Finally, the methods of data analysis employed in this study have been explained. 
The findings and analysis are presented in the next two chapters.  
                                                 
118 See Section 4.5. 
119 See Section 6.9. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COMPLIANCE COSTS ESTIMATES  
OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the analysis obtained through the postal survey, the 
primary survey instrument. The analyses start with overall responses and outline the 
profile of the sample SMEs. The main part of this chapter presents compliance costs 
estimates of Malaysian SMEs for the survey year 2006. The estimates cover both gross 
and net compliance costs, conducted mainly at firm level, but also aggregate level. 
Overall, the chapter covers analyses of Sections A and B of the survey questionnaire. 
An analysis of Section C is presented in Chapter Six. Additionally, the compliance costs 
estimates of the web survey and relevant analysis, conducted using the same survey 
instrument,120 are presented to add support to compliance costs estimates from the main 
postal survey. 
 
 
5.2 RESPONSES AND RATE 
 
Out of 1,300 questionnaire sent, a total of 175 useable questionnaires were returned, 
which represents an overall response rate of 15.7 percent of the net sampling frame. 
Detailed information of responses, taking into consideration the gross sample, out of 
frame, useable and unusable responses, is presented in Table 5.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
120 See Section 4.11. 
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Table 5.1: Sample Frame and Response Rate for Postal Survey  
  Number of SMEs 
Gross Sample Frame  1,300 
(-) Out of Frame a 176 
(-) Unusable Responses 8 
Net Sample Frame 1,116 
    
Useable Responses 175 
Useable Response Rate (%) 15.7 
a See Table 5.2 for details. 
 
The net sample frame, as shown in Table 5.1, totalled up to 1,116 SMEs, after allowing 
for out of frame and unusable replies. A total of eight responses were discarded due to 
incompleteness (four cases), non-SMEs’ response (three cases) and an extreme outlier 
(one case). The out of frame replies were largely due to change of business addresses 
(82 percent) and/or invalid addresses (9 percent). Further details are shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2: Out of Frame Responses  
 Number of SMEs Percentage 
Change of address 145 82.4 
Invalid address 15 8.5 
Refused to participate 9 5.1 
Dormant/ceased business 6 3.4 
Large company 1 0.6 
Total 176 100.0 
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Out of 175 useable responses, the large majority of SMEs responded to the English 
version (142 responses or 81 percent) and the remaining to the Malay version (33 
responses or 19 percent). Nearly half of the respondents are either Chief Executive 
Officers or Managing Directors of SMEs, followed by Managers at just more than one-
quarter, as shown in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Respondents’ Position 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Chief Executive Officer 18 10.3 
Managing Director/Director 59 33.7 
Manager 46 26.3 
Accountant 15 8.6 
Other 37 21.1 
Total 175   100.0 
 
The majority of responses received from Chief Executive Officers and Managing 
Directors is not surprising as almost 60 percent of the survey is addressed personally to 
them.121  Responses from Accountants comprised nearly nine percent. The remaining 
one-fifth fall within the ‘other’ category; a detailed breakdown is shown in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Position of ‘Other’ Respondents 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Accounting Staff  17 46.0 
Non-Accounting Staff  15 40.5 
Not Mentioned 5 13.5 
Total 37 100.0 
 
Seventeen and fifteen respondents are accounts-related staff (i.e. accounting or finance 
clerks, executives or supervisors) and non-accounting staff (i.e. administrative clerks, 
executives or officers) respectively. Unfortunately, another five respondents did not 
                                                 
121 See Section 4.7, Table 4.5. 
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disclose their positions. Overall, it is reasonable to assume that the survey was 
predominantly completed by a person who has some financial knowledge of their 
respective business.  
 
All responses were scrutinised for validity and a number of telephone follow-up calls 
were made (to respondents with telephone numbers) to address the issue of possible 
incorrect or extreme responses, and to address any missing items (see Appendix P). 
 
 
5.3 PROFILE OF RESPONDING SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
 
This section presents a business profile of the responding SMEs, both by general 
business and specific size measures. General business profile includes financial year-
end, business sector, and business length. Business size measures consist of staff, 
turnover and the National SME Development Council (NSDC) criteria. Additionally, 
the way the SMEs manage their corporate income tax affairs, either internally, 
externally or both, is presented. Nearly 70 percent of the SMEs end their business either 
on the 31 December (55 percent) or 30 June (14 percent), as shown in Table 5.5. The 
remainder, 30 percent, end their accounts on dates other than 31 December and 30 June. 
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Table 5.5: SMEs by Financial Year-end 
Financial Year-end Number of SMEs Percentage 
31 January 2 1.1 
28 February 5 2.9 
31 March 5 2.9 
30 April 5 2.9 
31 May 5 2.9 
30 June 24 13.7 
31 July 3 1.7 
31 August 8 4.6 
30 September 13 7.4 
31 October 2 1.1 
30 November 6 3.4 
31 December 97 55.4 
Total 175 100.0 
 
The variation in the financial year-end of SMEs is not surprising as the tax year for a 
corporate taxpayer is based upon their financial year-end. More importantly, the tax 
year is not contingent on business size. For example, a company having its financial 
year-end on 30 June 2006 is subject to tax for the year of assessment 2006. 
 
As for the main business sector, the highest response was from the services sector (44 
percent), followed by the manufacturing (21 percent), as shown in Table 5.6. 
Comparing the sample responses to the overall SME population in Malaysia is, 
unfortunately, problematical. This is because the population as a whole was not 
available at the point of survey. As discussed earlier,122 the sample was drawn from a 
list of SMEs that registered with the NSDC. This probably represents a low proportion 
of the true Malaysian SME population. However, some indication of the 
representativeness of the survey responses may be obtained by way of a comparison 
                                                 
122 See Chapter Four, Section 4.8. 
  110
with the sample population itself and other official data i.e. the Department of Statistics 
and the Malaysian Treasury. 
 
Table 5.6: SMEs by Main Business Sector 
Business Sector 
Number of 
SMEs 
Sample 
Percentage 
SMEs 
Population a 
Manufacturing 37 21.1 54.2 
Manufacturing-related Services 32 18.3 8.8 
Services 77 44.0 22.3 
Construction 27 15.4 7.6 
Other           2 1.1 7.1 
Total 175  100.0 b 100.0 
a From Table 4.8 in Chapter Four. The percentages are adjusted to two decimal points. 
b Does not total up to one hundred percent due to rounding. 
 
The highest number of responses were received from the services sector (44 percent), 
followed by manufacturing, manufacturing-related and construction, as shown in Table 
5.6. Survey responses received from all sectors were not comparable to a proportion of 
the population used in this study. The responses received from the services, 
manufacturing-related and construction sectors were almost twice as high, but the 
manufacturing sector was around half when compared to the sample population. As the 
manufacturing sector is often targeted as a research subject in Malaysia, the lack of 
responses from this sector is not surprising. It is also possible that SMEs are confused 
about differentiating the manufacturing-related and services sectors.123 It is likely that 
some respondents, who are not sure of their sector, may have indicated ‘other sector’.124 
Thus the manufacturing sector could be under-represented and the other three sectors 
are likely to be over-represented.  
                                                 
123 The annual national economic report issued by the Malaysian Treasury does not specify 
manufacturing-related services as a separate sector. 
124 The actual response received from this sector was 25, but was reclassified using the respondents’ 
remarks about their specific business nature. For example, SMEs engaged in trading, wholesaling, health 
and hotel were re-categorised as services sector, which is in line with the classification of economic 
activities across sectors based on Malaysian Standard Industrial Classification (MSIC) 2000 codes (see 
Appendix 2 of the National SME Development Council definitions for small and medium enterprises in 
Malaysia—attached in Appendix A). 
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From an overall population perspective, the Department of Statistics (2007, p. 9) 
reported that the services sector is the largest SME sector (representing 86.6 percent) in 
Malaysia, followed by the manufacturing sector (7.2 percent). Both the services and the 
manufacturing sectors also have been significant contributors to Malaysian economic 
growth. For example, in 2007, the national GDP growth was recorded at 6.3 percent, 
with the services and manufacturing sectors contributing 5.0 and 1.0 percentage points 
respectively (Treasury of Malaysia 2008, p. 38, Table 3.1). The data also shows that the 
contribution from the services sector is gradually increasing. Over the period of 
between 2002 and 2007, except for 2003 and 2004, the services sector registered higher 
growth compared to manufacturing (Treasury of Malaysia 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008). The gradual shift in the structure of the Malaysian economy in recent years 
from manufacturing to services is acknowledged (Treasury of Malaysia 2007, p. 25). 
The services sector is expected to contribute significantly to the national economy in 
2008 and 2009 (Treasury of Malaysia 2008, p. 38). It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that the proportion of responses received in the current study is broadly representative 
of the Malaysian SME population.  
 
Regarding business length, Table 5.7 reveals that almost 95 percent of responding 
SMEs have been in business for at least two years, with 78 percent of them for more 
than five years. This indicates that the responding SMEs have had tax-related 
experience for some time.  
 
Table 5.7: SMEs by Length of Business 
Business Length Number of SMEs Percentage 
Less than 2 years a 8 4.6 
2 to 5 years a 30 17.1 
More than 5 years 137 78.3 
Total 175 100.0 
a These categories are combined into a single category of up to five years 
throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
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As for business size, the newly approved definition of Malaysian SMEs is based on 
either the number of employees or annual sales turnover. The SME profiles, based on 
these individual measures, are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 respectively, and later by 
NSDC definition in Table 5.10.  
 
Table 5.8: SMEs by Number of Staff Employed 
Number of Staff Number of SMEs Percentage 
4 or less 35 20.0 
5 to 19 85 48.6 
20 to 50 40 22.9 
51 to 150 14 8.0 
151 or more 1 0.6 
Total 175 100.0 a 
a Does not total up to one hundred percent due to rounding. 
 
In terms of employment size, as shown in Table 5.8, 92 percent of respondent 
companies have up to 50 personnel employed, with almost 49 percent of all companies 
having staff in the ‘5 to 19’ category. As for turnover level, Table 5.9 shows that almost 
75 percent of the respondents are from the first three categories, with about the same 
number of respondents for each category. The remaining respondents are in the next 
three levels of turnover, with about equal representation in each category. More 
importantly, responses in the last three levels of turnover are small. Hence, primary 
compliance costs analysis throughout this thesis is carried out by combining all these 
responses (n = 44) into a turnover level of between RM5 million and above. 
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Table 5.9: SMEs by Turnover Level 
Turnover Level Number of SMEs Percentage 
Less than RM250,000 37 21.1 
RM250,000 to RM999,999 48 27.4 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999 46 26.3 
RM5,000,000 to RM9,999,999 a 17 9.7 
RM10,000,000 to RM24,999,999 a 14 8.0 
RM25,000,000 or more a 13 7.4 
Total 175  100.0 b 
a These categories are combined into a single category of RM5 million or more 
throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
b Does not total up to one hundred percent due to rounding. 
 
Having analysed SMEs on the basis of both staff and turnover measures separately, it is 
important to classify them into the NSDC classification of SMEs. However, technical 
difficulties arise as different criteria (by staff and/or turnover) apply for manufacturing 
and manufacturing-related sectors on the one hand, and the non-manufacturing sector 
(services, construction and others) on the other. For example, a SME company with 
between 20 and 50 personnel would be classified as a small business in the 
manufacturing sector, but as a medium business in the non-manufacturing sector. Even 
within the same sector, different criteria may result in different sized SMEs. For 
example, a company could be categorised as micro-sized by staff criteria and as small-
sized by turnover criteria. In such cases, the lower criterion is employed, as adapted by 
the NSDC (personal communication, 16 October 2007). Table 5.10 presents responses 
from SMEs based on the NSDC classification.  
 
Table 5.10: Size of Business by the NSDC Definition 
Business Size Number of SMEs Percentage 
Micro 54 30.9 
Small 98 56.0 
Medium 23 13.1 
Total 175 100.0 
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Table 5.10 shows that all 175 companies are within the definition of SMEs in Malaysia, 
with more than half being small companies, followed by nearly one-third being micro 
companies. In addition to these business characteristics, the survey requested 
respondents to indicate their company’s paid-up capital. This information is important 
as SME companies are eligible for certain tax incentives (e.g. dual tax rates) only if 
their paid-up capital is equal or less than RM2.5 million. More than 93 percent of 
respondent companies had paid-up capital of up to RM2.5 million, as shown in Table 
5.11. The remaining seven percent though would not qualify as SME companies for tax 
purposes, but are still within the definition of SMEs as per the NSDC classification. As 
a result, those companies are included in the analysis throughout this thesis.  
 
Table 5.11: SMEs by Paid-up Capital 
Paid-up Capital  Number of SMEs Percentage 
RM500,000 or less 105 60.3 
RM500,001 to RM2,500,000 58 33.3 
RM2,500,001 or more 11 6.3 
Total  174 a   100.0 b 
a Number of respondents equals 174. There was one missing value.   
b Does not total up to one hundred percent due to rounding. 
 
Finally, respondents are asked to provide information pertaining to two tax aspects: 
first, their estimated tax liability; and secondly, on the possibility of a tax refund. The 
large majority of SMEs estimated their 2006 tax liability to be either nil (24 percent) or 
up to RM100,000 (60 percent), as shown in Table 5.12. Further, 15 percent provide 
estimates of between RM100,000 to less than RM1 million. Only two companies 
estimated a tax liability of RM1 million and above. As expected, consistent with their 
turnover levels,125 the last four levels registered a small number of responses. Thus, for 
the purpose of the compliance costs analysis later, these are merged to form a new level 
of RM100,000 and above (n = 28).  
 
 
                                                 
125 See Table 5.9. 
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Table 5.12: Estimated Tax Liability, 2006  
Estimated Tax Liability Number of SMEs Percentage 
No tax 42 24.4 
RM1 to RM99,999 102 59.3 
RM100,000 to RM249,999 a 12 7.0 
RM250,000 to RM499,999 a 9 5.2 
RM500,000 to RM999,999 a 5 2.9 
RM1,000,000 or more a 2 1.2 
Total 172 b 100.0 
a These categories are combined into a single category of RM100,000 or more 
throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
b Number of respondents equals 172. There were three missing values.   
 
Since the introduction of the SAS in Malaysia, all companies, regardless of size, are 
required to estimate their tax liability in advance and to pay their taxes in advance in 
equal monthly instalments. Under this system, a tax refund is possible if the total 
instalments paid exceed the actual tax liability that is determined after the year-end. 
Only around 25 percent of the SMEs (or 43 respondents) expect a tax refund. The 
remaining large majority (76 percent or 132 respondents) did not expect a tax refund for 
the year of assessment 2006. The possible tax refund amount varies widely, from as low 
as RM333 to as high as RM100,000, with an average refund of RM31,452, as shown in 
Table 5.13.  
 
Table 5.13: Tax Refunds, 2006 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Tax Refund  (RM) 31,452 333 100,000 35,323 
Number of respondents equals 37. There were six missing values.   
 
However, the use of average tax refund amounts may not be generalised to the 
taxpaying population as the actual refund depends on each individual SME. Broadly, 
the possible tax refund for each tax level is shown in Table 5.14. 
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Table 5.14: Tax Refunds by Tax Liability, 2006 
Estimated Tax Liability  Number of SMEs Average Tax Refund (RM) 
Nil (No tax) 6 18,083 
RM1 to RM99,999 18 14,946 
RM100,000 or more a 12 57,182 
Overall 36 b   29,548 c 
a This is a merged category. For details refer Table 5.12. 
b Number of respondents equals 37. There was one missing value.  
c Due to the missing value (note b), the amount is lower than RM31,452 as cited in Table 5.13. 
 
Finally, in terms of sources of income tax work, a specific question (question 13) was 
asked on the usage of external advisors. As for internal tax work, this is implied from 
their responses towards internal time spent on tax activities (question 9). Nonetheless, it 
is fortunate that respondents specifically stated they had outsourced their tax affairs in 
the space provided. An analysis of these two questions into source of income tax work 
is summarised in Table 5.15.  
 
Table 5.15: Source of Income Tax Work in 2006  
 Number of SMEs Percentage 
Internal and External 159 90.9 
No External (i.e. internal only) 10 5.7 
No Internal (i.e. external only) 6 3.4 
Total 175 100.0 
 
Nearly 91 percent of the SMEs performed their income tax work by using both their 
internal resources and paid external advisors, as shown in Table 5.15. The remaining 
nine percent revealed that no income tax work is conducted either internally (six 
companies) or externally (ten companies). This small proportion is realistic as there 
may be some SMEs who fully outsourced their tax-related work. On the contrary, some 
other SMEs who have expertise in this regard can conduct their own tax affairs. 
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5.4 INTERNAL COSTS OF COMPLIANCE 
 
5.4.1 Tax Difficulties faced by the Small and Medium Enterprises 
As presented earlier,126 respondents were asked to indicate tax-related difficulties in 
complying with corporate income taxation. Respondents were given the option to select 
more than one area. The most highly ranked difficult areas are ‘estimating income tax 
payable’ (17 percent), ‘understanding the income tax legislation’ (14 percent), and the 
‘increasing burden of record keeping requirements for tax purposes’ (14 percent), as 
shown in Table 5.16. The least ranked difficult area is ‘dealing with external tax 
professionals’ (five percent). Surprisingly, ‘maintaining records for income tax 
purposes’ is ranked eight (out of nine). It seems that maintaining records was not 
perceived as a major problem for SMEs. But concern on the increasing burden of record 
keeping requirements is evident. Specific responses for each of the problem areas are 
shown in Table 5.16 (right column). For example, 65 percent of the SMEs indicate 
having problems pertaining to estimating their income tax payable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126 See Chapter Four, Section 4.5.  
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Table 5.16: Tax-related Difficulties for SMEs in 2006 
 Number of Overall Percent 
 Responses Percent of Cases 
Estimating Income Tax payable 106 16.8 65.0 
Understanding Income Tax legislation 87 13.8 53.4 
Increasing burden of record keeping for tax 
purposes 
87 13.8 53.4 
Implementing the Income Tax changes 81 12.9 49.7 
Cash flow position to pay monthly tax 
instalments 
78 12.4 47.9 
Short period of time to lodge the tax return 58 9.2 35.6 
Dealing with the tax authority 53 8.4 32.5 
Maintaining records for Income Tax purpose 49 7.8 30.1 
Dealing with external tax advisers 31 4.9 19.0 
Total  630 a 100.0 - 
a Total responses exceed 175 as each respondent was allowed to select more than one aspect. 
 
 
5.4.2 Internal Staff Time 
Respondents were required to estimate their monthly average time spent in relation to 
four different categories of personnel on tax activities and their corresponding wage 
rates. However, for the purpose of analysis, monthly hours are converted to a yearly 
basis and adopted throughout this thesis. A summary of yearly hours spent on tax 
activities is shown in Table 5.17. 
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Table 5.17: Yearly Hours Spent on Tax Activities by Staff Categories, 2006 
Staff Categories Mean Minimum a Maximum Standard Deviation 
Manager/Accountant  126 0 552 129 
Accounting Staff 229 0 1,200 266 
Administrative Staff 133 0 1,200 225 
Other Staff 87 0 1,008 178 
Overall 575 0 3,000 511 
a Six respondents spent no internal time (see Table 5.15). Around 75 percent of respondents estimated 
time spent as a combination of staff, namely, two (28 percent), three (14 percent) and four (33 percent) 
categories.  
 
 
The average internal time spent on income tax activities for the tax year 2006 is 575 
hours, as shown in Table 5.17. At the firm level, time spent ranges from zero time (i.e. 
no internal time) to 3,000 hours. Specifically, time spent by ‘manager/accountant’ 
ranges from none to 552 hours per annum, while accounting and administrative staff 
spend up to 1,200 yearly hours respectively, and the other staff spend up to 1,008 yearly 
hours. 
 
5.4.3 Time Valuation 
Appropriate wage rates of relevant staff categories are presented in Table 5.18. This 
information is crucial in converting total time spent to internal time cost. The average 
monthly wage rate for ‘manager/accountant’ is almost RM3,500, which ranges widely 
between RM1,000 and RM7,000, as shown in Table 5.18. The variation may relate to 
their business characteristics. It is also possible that some respondents, particularly 
owner-managers, may be responsible for several functions in their company. For 
example, in addition to their general management function, owner-managers may 
perform an accounting role as well.  As for accounting staff, the average rate is just over 
RM1,500, specifically ranging between RM400 and RM3,200. The remaining two 
categories of staff receive an average of almost RM1,000 and RM750 respectively. The 
actual rate for both of these categories ranges between RM300 and RM1,600. 
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Table 5.18: Monthly Wage Rates (RM) by Staff Categories, 2006 
Staff Categories a Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Manager/Accountants  (130)  3,445 1,000 7,000 1,458 
Accounting Staff          (133) 1,541 400 3,200 700 
Administrative Staff     (101) 978 350 1,600 410 
Other Staff                     (75) 741 300 1,600 458 
a The number of respondents is given in parenthesis. The actual number was less than 175 since wage 
rates only apply if there was time spent in the respective staff categories. 
 
 
5.4.4 Mean Internal Costs 
The internal staff costs are computed by multiplying the internal time spent on tax 
activities by their relevant staff categories with their respective hourly wage rates. For 
this purpose, the internal time spent and their appropriate wages, as presented above in 
Tables 5.17 and 5.18, are used. The internal time spent is straightforward annual hours 
spent. However, the wage rates are on a monthly basis. As a result, wages are converted 
into hourly wage rates. The hourly wage rates are computed by dividing monthly wage 
rates by monthly working hours. The Malaysian Employment Act 1955 (Section 60I) 
stipulated 26 days is to be used as the number to determine an hourly wage rate. A 
normal working day is eight hours, which at 26 days is 208 hours per month. 
Accordingly, respective wage rates were divided by 208 hours to derive an hourly rate. 
Internal costs of taxation are then derived by a summation of internal staff costs of all 
four categories of staff. Importantly, the computation is carried out at the disaggregate 
level, i.e. for each SME. The results of this procedure are presented in Table 5.19. The 
average internal costs of SMEs are estimated at RM4,862, with a maximum cost of 
almost RM30,000.  
 
 
Table 5.19: Internal Time Costs, 2006 
Cost Category Mean Minimum a Maximum Standard Deviation 
Internal Costs (RM) 4,862 260 29,839 4,949 
a Excluding six SMEs that have no component of internal costs (see Table 5.15). 
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5.5 EXTERNAL COSTS OF COMPLIANCE 
 
5.5.1 Mean External Tax Fees 
As presented earlier,127 almost 95 percent of SMEs have used external tax professionals 
in managing their corporate tax affairs for the year of assessment 2006. External costs 
of compliance are a straightforward monetary cost charged by external tax professionals 
solely on tax activities. It is common in Malaysia to have tax fees charged separately 
from financial audit or other fees. However, it is possible that some SMEs may refuse to 
indicate their actual tax fees. Thus, respondents were asked to provide or estimate their 
external tax fees for the financial year 2006. The average tax fee paid by SME 
companies in 2006 is RM3,786, with the lowest and highest fee being RM150 and 
RM15,000 respectively, as shown in Table 5.20. 
 
Table 5.20: A Summary of External Tax Professional Fees, 2006 
Cost Category Mean Minimum a Maximum Standard Deviation 
Tax Fees (RM) 3,786 150 15,000 3,945 
a Excluding ten SMEs that have no component of external costs (see Table 5.15). 
 
 
5.5.2 Reasons for Using External Services 
The respondents were asked to indicate the main reason for using a paid external tax 
professional. As it is possible that there could be a number of reasons, respondents were 
given a choice to select more than one response. The most stated reason is the lack of 
technical knowledge internally (28 percent), followed by the complexity of the tax laws 
(23 percent) as shown in Table 5.21. Specifically, almost 81 percent and 67 percent of 
the respondents indicate a lack of technical knowledge and tax law complexity 
respectively as their main reason for using tax professionals. The lowest response is for 
the purpose of income tax planning, where just over 39 percent have identified this 
reason. 
 
                                                 
127 See Table 5.15. 
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Table 5.21: Main Reason for using External Tax Professionals in 2006 
Main Reason Number of Overall Percent 
 Responses Percent of Cases 
Technical knowledge is not readily available 
internally 
129 28.1 80.6 
Income tax matters are too complicated 105 22.9 65.6 
External opinion was required 86 18.7 53.8 
It is more cost-effective to use external tax 
professionals 
76 16.6 47.5 
For income tax planning 63 13.7 39.4 
Total          459 a  100.0        - 
a Total responses exceed 175 as each respondent was allowed to select more than one aspect. 
 
 
5.6 ADDITIONAL COSTS OF COMPLIANCE 
 
5.6.1 Mean Additional Costs 
Broadly, additional non-staff costs are incurred both within a company and by external 
professionals. In Malaysia, it is common for tax professionals to reimburse those costs 
from their tax clients. The amount is included in the tax invoice, but shown separately 
from tax fees. A similar approach is practiced in the context of financial auditing. Just 
over 37 percent of the respondents (or 65 respondents) incurred other non-staff 
additional costs in meeting their corporate income tax requirements. The remaining 
large majority (63 percent or 110 respondents) did not spend any amount of additional 
costs in 2006. Additional non-staff costs range widely from RM20 to RM6,000, as 
shown in Table 5.22.  
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Table 5.22: A Summary of Estimated Additional Non-staff Costs, 2006 
Cost Category Mean Minimum a Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Additional Costs (RM) 646 20 6,000 1,583 
a Excluding 110 SMEs that spent no additional costs. 
 
5.6.2 Nature of Additional Costs 
As for the nature of costs, 60 respondents (out of 65) provided details to an open-ended 
question on the nature of their non-staff additional costs. The respondents stated 
between one and four cost items. Four cost items, namely postage and courier, 
stationery, travelling and printing, comprise more than 90 percent of responses, as 
shown in Table 5.23. Specifically, for individual cost items, the most stated cost is 
postage and courier (57 percent), followed by stationery (52 percent), travelling cost (47 
percent) and printing and documentation (25 percent). 
 
Table 5.23: Nature of Additional Costs in 2006 
 Number of Overall Percent 
Cost Description Responses Percent of Cases 
Postage and Courier 34 28.6 56.7 
Stationery  31 26.1 51.7 
Travelling 28 23.5 46.7 
Printing & Documentation 15 12.6 25.0 
Communication (Telephone/Fax)   3 2.5 5.0 
Software-related   1 0.8 1.7 
Miscellaneous  7 5.9 11.7 
Total        119 a 100.0 - 
a Number of respondents equals 60. Another five have missing values. Total responses exceed 60 
as respondents were allowed to select more than one aspect. 
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5.7 MEAN COMPLIANCE COSTS 
 
5.7.1 Overall Mean Compliance Costs 
Compliance costs estimation in this thesis mainly follows similar approaches used by 
earlier studies in Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong (Pope, Fayle and Chen 
1994; Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 2001; Ariff and Pope 2002). The compliance costs 
estimation is derived by totalling all three cost components, namely internal time costs, 
external tax fees, and additional non-staff costs. For this purpose, the average costs of 
each component are used. Almost all major prior tax compliance costs studies have used 
the average cost method (e.g. Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989; Pope, Fayle and 
Chen 1994; Sandford 1995; Evans et al. 1997). One exception is in the context of 
personal taxpayers, where Evans et al. (1997), have utilised a ‘trimmed mean’ after 
eliminating the largest and the lowest five percent of the values respectively. For 
business taxpayers, they have used the average approach (Evans et al. 1997, p. 8). 
Evans et al. argue that the presence of extreme values is less likely in the context of 
business taxpayers. It is prudent to take a cautious approach and therefore remove the 
effects of outliers at the data validation stage (see Appendix P). 
 
Following the average approach, the mean compliance costs of Malaysian SME 
companies by costs component are summarized in Table 5.24. The average compliance 
cost is almost RM9,300 per company.  The largest portion of the average compliance 
costs is associated with the internal time cost (52 percent), and another 41 percent is a 
direct monetary cost paid to external advisors. The remaining seven percent is related to 
additional non-staff costs to comply with the tax laws. 
 
Table 5.24: Estimated Mean Compliance Cost by Components, 2006 
Cost Component  Mean Costs (RM) Cost Breakdown (%) 
Internal Costs 4,863 52 
External Costs  3,786 41 
Additional Non-staff Costs     646   7 
Total 9,295 100 
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At the individual SME level, a detailed analysis revealed that compliance costs 
estimates range from just over RM600 to almost RM38,000, as shown in Table 5.25.  
 
Table 5.25: Estimated Compliance Costs at SME level, 2006 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Compliance Costs (RM) 9,295 612 37,773 7,116 
 
For the purpose of a sensitivity analysis, the computation was carried out for the 135 
complete cases only, i.e. excluding 40 cases which have at least one missing item. 
Using this approach, compliance costs are increased to RM9,715 or by only 4.5 percent. 
This increase is not surprising since the missing pattern is considered as missing 
completely at random (MCAR) and the mean substitution for missing values is 
conservative in nature (Hair et al. 1998). Thus, it is reasonable to assume the estimates 
are about the same, regardless of the missing items replaced. As a result, subsequent 
analysis of the current study will be primarily based on all 175 cases. 
 
5.7.2 Compliance Costs by Small and Medium Enterprise Profile 
Having estimated mean compliance costs at the overall SME level, compliance costs are 
now analysed in terms of the specific characteristics of SMEs, focusing on the absolute 
dollar amount, at least initially. The distribution effect of compliance costs is discussed 
later in subsection 5.7.3. 
 
Table 5.26: Mean Compliance Costs by Turnover, 2006 
Turnover Level 
 
Number of 
Respondents 
Mean Costs  
(RM) 
Less than RM250,000 37 8,162 
RM250,000 to RM999,999 48 7,086 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999 46 9,673 
RM5,000,000 and more a 44 12,262 
Overall 175 9,295 
a This is a merged category. For details refer Table 5.9. 
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There is a trend of increasing compliance costs as the turnover level increases, as shown 
in Table 5.26.128 An exception is noted for SMEs with a turnover level of between 
RM250,000 and RM1 million, with this category having the lowest compliance costs. 
Although this exception may suggest a U-shaped trend, this is not supported 
statistically. Specifically, a post hoc test reveals that significant differences exist 
between SMEs in the first two turnover levels (up to RM1 million) and the last turnover 
level (at least RM5 million).  
 
An alternative measure of size is the number of staff employed. Compliance costs (in 
absolute value) increase as the size (measured by staff) becomes larger, as shown in 
Table 5.27. However, the ANOVA test did not reveal any significant differences (f = 
2.341, p = 0.057) in terms of staff levels. 
 
Table 5.27: Mean Compliance Costs by Staff Level, 2006  
Number of Staff a 
 
Number of 
Respondents 
Mean Costs  
(RM)  
4 or less 35 7,466 
5 to 19 85 8,981 
20 to 50 40 10,609 
51 to 150 14 10,937 
Overall 174 a 9,295 
a Number of respondents equals 175. A respondent with more than 151 staff was excluded. 
 
Compliance costs are further analysed by business sector, length in business and paid-
up capital. For the business sector (Table 5.28), compliance costs for the manufacturing 
and construction sectors are relatively higher compared to the other sectors. However, 
an ANOVA test did not reveal any significant mean differences within business sectors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
128 The compliance costs differences among turnover levels are supported by an ANOVA test (f = 4.734, 
p = 0.003). 
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Table 5.28: Mean Compliance Costs by Sector, 2006 
Business Sector a 
Number of  
Respondents 
Mean Costs  
(RM) 
Manufacturing 37 10,428 
Manufacturing-related services 32 9,701 
Services 77 8,219 
Construction 27 10,473 
Overall 173 a 9,295 
a Number of respondents equals 175. Two respondents in the ‘other’ category were excluded. 
 
Small and medium enterprises having paid-up capital of up to RM500,000 have the 
lowest mean compliance costs of RM8,069 compared to the other two categories of 
capital, as shown in Table 5.29. The ANOVA test shows a statistical difference (f = 
4.362, p = 0.014) between groups, suggesting that the compliance costs of smaller 
SMEs (companies with paid-up capital of up to RM500,000) are lower in absolute 
terms.  
 
Table 5.29: Mean Compliance Costs by Paid-up Capital, 2006  
Paid-up Capital 
Number of 
 Respondents 
Mean Costs  
(RM) 
RM500,000 or less 105 8,069 
RM500,001 to RM2,500,000 58 11,395 
RM2,500,001 or more 11 10,373 
Overall 174 a 9,223 b 
a Number of respondents equals 174. There was one missing item. 
b The total was not equal to RM9,295 due to differences in the response number. 
 
In terms of length in business (Table 5.30), SMEs that have been in business for up to 
five years appear to have lower compliance costs compared to those SMEs that have 
been in business for at least five years. Similar to the business sector (Table 5.28), no 
significant differences are evident for business length. 
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Table 5.30: Mean Compliance Costs by Length in Business, 2006 
Years in Business 
Number of  
Respondents 
Mean Costs  
(RM) 
Up to 5 years a 38 7,980 
More than 5 years 137 9,659 
Overall 175 9,295 
a This is a merged category. For details refer Table 5.7. 
 
Compliance costs were then analysed by size as per NSDC criteria. Similar to the other 
size measures, tax compliance costs increase as the size of SMEs increase, as shown in 
Table 5.31. Unfortunately, the ANOVA test did not reveal any significant differences in 
terms of the NSDC size. 
 
Table 5.31: Mean Compliance Costs by SMEs as per NSDC Criteria, 2006 
Business Size 
Number of 
Respondents 
Mean Costs  
(RM) 
Micro 54 7,741 
Small 98 9,777 
Medium 23 10,888 
Overall 175 9,295 
 
As noted earlier,129 compliance costs by size (that is measured by turnover groups) 
indicate a significant statistical difference between turnover levels, but not by size as 
per the NSDC classification. The results are not surprising since the NSDC 
classification of a SME into micro, small and medium is somewhat mixed with both 
turnover and staff criteria, and more importantly different specific levels apply among 
different sectors.130 
 
 
                                                 
129 See paragraph below Table 5.26. 
130 See Chapter One, subsection 1.5.3. 
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5.7.3 Distribution of Compliance Costs 
The distribution of compliance costs of Malaysian SMEs by size, expressed as a 
percentage of turnover, follow the usual regressive pattern, as shown in Table 5.32. Tax 
compliance costs as a percentage of turnover for SMEs in a less than RM250,000 level 
are 6.5 percent, followed by about one percent of those in the turnover level of 
RM250,000 to RM1 million, and 0.32 percent for those in the RM1 million to RM5 
million turnover category. Compliance costs for SMEs having turnover of at least RM5 
million are only 0.08 percent. It is apparent that the relative costs, as a percentage of 
turnover, fall significantly as the turnover level increases. As an extreme comparison, 
the compliance costs percentage for SMEs in the lowest turnover level is as much as 82 
times higher than for the highest level of turnover. The compliance costs for SME 
companies, taken as a single category, are estimated to be around 0.19 percent of their 
average weighted turnover level. 
 
Table 5.32: Mean Compliance Costs as Percentage of Turnover, 2006 
Turnover Level a, b Compliance  Costs   
 Mean (RM) Percentage of Turnover 
Less than RM250,000                (37) 8,162 6.53 
RM250,000 to RM999,999        (48) 7,086 1.13 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999  (46) 9,673 0.32 
RM5,000,000 and more              (44) 12,262 0.08 
Overall                                      (175) 9,295    0.19 c 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses.  
b The denominator used is the midpoint of the turnover category, except for the largest, where RM15 
million is used, because the actual mean size of the turnover is not available.  
c The denominator used for the overall SME turnover category is RM5 million. This denominator is 
derived by weighting all the midpoints of the turnover level, rounded to the nearest million. 
Weighting using the original turnover levels (see Table 5.9) also results in a similar figure. 
 
 
A similar trend is evident even when compliance costs distributions are analysed in 
terms of all three cost components (internal, external and additional costs), as presented 
in Tables 5.33, 5.34 and 5.35. The internal costs for SMEs in the less than RM250,000 
turnover level are as much as six times higher in percentage terms as the next level 
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(Table 5.33). At an extreme comparison, the internal costs percentage in the lowest 
turnover level is as much as 95 times higher than for the highest level. 
  
Table 5.33: Mean Internal Costs as Percentage of Turnover, 2006  
 Internal Costs   
Turnover Level a, b Mean (RM) Percentage of Turnover 
Less than RM250,000                (37) 4,721 3.78 
RM250,000 to RM999,999        (48) 4,174 0.67 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999  (46) 5,081 0.17 
RM5,000,000 or more                (44) 5,503 0.04 
Overall Internal Costs               (175) 4,862   0.10 c 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses.  
b The denominator used is the midpoint of the turnover category, except for the largest, where 
RM15 million is used, because the actual mean size of the turnover is not available. 
c The denominator used for the overall SME turnover category is RM5 million. See also Table 5.32. 
 
As for the regressivity of the external costs, SMEs in the less than RM250,000 level are 
as much as 49 times higher than the last level of turnover (Table 5.34). This finding 
shows that the regressivity of internal costs are almost double compared to external 
costs.  
 
Table 5.34: Mean External Costs as Percentage of Turnover, 2006 
 External Costs   
Turnover Level a, b Mean (RM) Percentage of Turnover 
Less than RM250,000                (37) 2,445 1.96 
RM250,000 to RM999,999        (48) 2,521 0.40 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999  (46) 4,156 0.14 
RM5,000,000 or more                (44) 5,909 0.04 
Overall External Costs             (175) 3,786   0.08 c 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses.  
b The denominator used is the midpoint of the turnover category, except for the largest, where 
RM15 million is used, because the actual mean size of the turnover is not available. 
c The denominator used for the overall SME turnover category is RM5 million. See also Table 5.32.  
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Finally, a similar regressive pattern towards smaller SMEs is also evident for additional 
costs percentage, as shown in Table 5.35. Overall, as expected, compliance costs as a 
percentage of turnover, either measured by overall costs, internal costs, external costs or 
additional costs, shared one major similarity, which is the incidence of the fixed costs 
effect.  
 
Table 5.35: Mean Additional Costs as Percentage of Turnover, 2006  
 Additional Costs   
Turnover Level a, b Mean (RM) Percentage of Turnover 
Less than RM250,000                 (37) 996 0.800 
RM250,000 to RM999,999         (48) 391 0.060 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999   (46) 436 0.014 
RM5,000,000 or more                (44) 850 0.006 
Overall Additional Costs          (175) 646   0.013 c 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. 
b The denominator used is the midpoint of the turnover category, except for the largest, where 
RM15 million is used, because the actual mean size of the turnover is not available. 
c The denominator used for the overall SME turnover category is RM5 million. See also Table 5.32.  
 
In terms of absolute value, only the external costs increase as the turnover level 
increases. The significant mean difference between turnover levels was confirmed by 
way of an ANOVA test (f = 8.405, p = 0.000). A further examination with a post hoc 
test reveals that considerable differences exist between SMEs in the first two turnover 
levels (up to RM1 million) and the last turnover levels (at least RM5 million). On the 
other hand, both the internal and additional costs are found to be similar, regardless of 
the turnover levels. Though a direct comparison indicates a possible U-shaped trend, the 
ANOVA tests suggest no statistical mean differences among turnover levels to both 
internal costs (f = 0.591, p = 0.622) and additional costs (f = 1.661, p = 0.177) 
respectively. Analysis with regards to overall compliance costs was discussed earlier.131 
 
 
 
                                                 
131 See previous subsection 5.7.2. 
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5.7.4 Compliance Costs Analysis by Internal-External Ratio 
The internal-external compliance costs ratio is computed by dividing the means of 
internal and external costs respectively to derive an overall mean for compliance costs. 
The approach adapted was similar to that used in earlier studies (Pope, Fayle and Chen 
1994; Ariff, Ismail and Loh 1997; Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 2001). For analysis 
purposes, as in all previous studies, additional costs are considered to be incurred 
internally. In Malaysia, broadly, additional costs are incurred mainly within the 
company and to some extent by the external professional. The current study did not 
attempt to measure this specifically as it is too demanding to obtain such detailed 
information via a survey.   
 
Overall, the internal and external component of compliance costs is 59 and 41 percent 
respectively, suggesting relatively more tax compliance activities were conducted 
internally. It is useful to scrutinize the internal-external costs ratio by turnover and other 
key SME profiles. The internal-external compliance costs ratio analysed by turnover 
level, as shown in Table 5.36, indicates that the internal costs (external costs) ratio is 
decreasing (increasing) as the turnover level increases. The internal costs ratio of SMEs 
in the lowest turnover level (less than RM250,000) is six, 13 and 18 percent higher than 
the second, third and the highest turnover levels respectively, or 11 percent higher than 
the overall internal costs ratio of 59 percent. An ANOVA test reveals that the mean 
differences are significant at the five percent significant level (f = 2.715, p = 0.022). 
The findings suggest that the smaller the SMEs, the higher their internal costs ratio and 
the lower the external costs respectively, suggesting a considerable reliance on the 
internal costs component. 
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Table 5.36: Mean Internal-External Costs Ratio by Turnover, 2006 
 Sources of Costs (%) 
Turnover Level a Internal Costs b External Costs  
Less than RM250,000                 (37) 70 30 
RM250,000 to RM999,999         (48) 64 36 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999   (46) 57 43 
RM5,000,000 or more                 (44) 52 48 
Overall                                       (175) 59 41 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses.  
b Inclusive of additional non-staff costs. See Tables 5.33 and 5.35 for the separate details. 
 
A similar trend is also evident in terms of the alternative size measures, as shown in 
Table 5.37. The internal-external ratio differences among alternative size measures are 
relatively small compared to the ratio by the turnover level. The smallest SMEs 
measured by turnover level indicate an internal-external ratio of 70:30 (Table 5.36), 
compared to 65:35 and 67:33 in terms of employment size and the NSDC size measures 
respectively (Table 5.37). Nonetheless, regardless of the size measures, the association 
between size of the SME and their internal-external costs ratio is clear. 
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Table 5.37: Mean Internal-External Costs Ratio, 2006 (by Alternative Size 
Measures) 
 Sources of Costs (%) 
Size Measure a Internal Costs b External Costs 
Staff level   
4 or less       (35) 65 35 
5 to 19        (85) 61 39 
20 to 50      (40) 57 43 
51 to 150    (14) 47 53 
SME by NSDC size   
Micro          (54) 67 33 
Small          (98) 60 40 
Medium      (23) 44 56 
Overall (175) 59 41 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses.  
b Inclusive of additional non-staff costs. See Tables 5.33 and 5.35 for the separate details. 
 
As for business length, Table 5.38 indicates that SMEs that have been in business for 
less than five years have relatively higher internal reliance, expressed as a percentage of 
compliance costs, compared to SMEs that have been in business for more than five 
years. However, it must be emphasised that, in absolute terms,132 both internal and 
external cost components of newer SMEs are low compared to older firms. 
 
Table 5.38: Mean Internal-External Costs Ratio by Business Length, 2006 
 Sources of Costs (%) 
Years in Business a Internal Costs b External Costs  
Less than 5 years (38) 64 36 
More than 5 years (137) 58 42 
Overall (175) 59 41 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses.  
b Inclusive of additional non-staff costs. See Tables 5.33 and 5.35 for the separate details. 
                                                 
132 See Table 5.30. 
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As for the business sector, the construction sector has a relatively high internal reliance 
of 65 percent compared to other sectors, as shown in Table 5.39. This is perhaps due to 
differences in the accounting practices, in particular income recognition-related, that 
have led the construction sector to rely more on their internal sources compared to other 
sectors. On the other hand, services and manufacturing-related services have as much as 
a nine percent higher external costs ratio compared to the construction sector. The result 
is not surprising as a large majority of SMEs in the manufacturing-related services (94 
percent) and services sector (68 percent) have been in business for more than five years. 
This finding is supported by a Pearson Chi square test at 10 percent significant level (p 
= 0.067). A relatively higher external ratio is as expected as the costs breakdown 
analysis by business length (Table 5.38) indicates this tendency. Nonetheless, this 
general finding must be interpreted cautiously because of the low response number in 
the construction sector. 
 
Table 5.39: Mean Internal-External Costs Ratio by Business Sector, 2006 
 Sources of Costs (%) 
Turnover Level a, b Internal Costs b External Costs 
Manufacturing          (37) 62 38 
MRS                        (32) 56 44 
Services                   (77) 56 44 
Construction             (27) 65 35 
Overall  (173) 59 41 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. The ‘other’ sector has two respondents, 
and thus is excluded. 
b Inclusive of additional non-staff costs. See Tables 5.33 and 5.35 for the separate details. 
 
In terms of tax liability, Table 5.40 shows that the internal-external costs ratio for SMEs 
without tax liability is at a 10 percent margin compared to an overall ratio of 59:41. It is 
apparent that the higher the tax liability, the lower (higher) are their internal (external) 
costs ratio. 
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Table 5.40: Mean Internal-External Costs Ratio by Estimated Tax, 2006 
 Sources of Costs (%) 
Turnover Level a Internal Costs b External Costs 
No tax                      (42) 69 31 
RM1 to RM99,999  (102) 58 42 
RM100,000 or more c (28) 54 46 
Overall (172) 59 41 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. Three respondents did not indicate their tax level. 
b Inclusive of additional non-staff costs. See Tables 5.33 and 5.35 for the separate details. 
c This is a merged category. For details refer Table 5.12. 
 
 
5.7.5 Compliance Costs Analysis by Computational-Planning Ratio 
This section analyses compliance costs by its nature, either computational or planning. 
Computational costs are mostly routine, calculative, and centred on a yearly basis. In 
contrast, planning costs relate to additional efforts taken by taxpayers to legally 
minimise their tax liability, particularly in the longer run. The respondents were 
requested to estimate their approximate percentage of income tax computational and 
planning work for both internal and external components. 
 
The overall breakdowns of computational and planning costs were 76 percent and 24 
percent respectively. The approach adapted in this study was similar to that used in 
Pope, Fayle and Chen (1994) and Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai (2001), except the 
percentile was requested for the overall internal and external components. Interestingly, 
a similar breakdown was recorded for both internal and external tax work. Nonetheless, 
differences exist at the SME level as the nature of tax work conducted internally and 
externally may differ substantially. Accordingly, using the breakdown given by the 
respondents, it is possible to calculate computational and planning costs for internal and 
external costs separately. These figures were then used to derive computational and 
planning percentages respectively. The computational-planning costs ratio was analysed 
by turnover levels and other key SMEs profile.  
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The computational-planning costs ratio, analysed by turnover level, is shown in Table 
5.41. The computational (planning) costs range between 69 percent (31 percent) and 76 
percent (24 percent) of the compliance costs of SMEs. Overall, the computational-
planning costs ratio is about the same regardless of the turnover levels. An exception is 
observed for the SMEs with a turnover level of less than RM250,000. However, the fact 
that this turnover level has only 23 responses must be treated with some caution. 
 
Table 5.41: Mean Computational-Planning Costs Ratio by Turnover, 2006 
 Types of Costs 
Turnover Level a Computational Planning 
 RM Percent RM Percent 
Less than RM250,000                (23) 5,941 69 2,684 31 
RM250,000 to RM999,999       (37) 5,302 75 1,769 25 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999 (40) 7,666 75 2,496 25 
RM5,000,000 or more b              (44) 9,638 76 3,074 24 
Overall                                     (134) 7,217 74 2,474 26 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. Forty-one respondents did not indicate their 
estimated percentage for at least one of their computational or planning costs. 
b This is a merged category. For details refer Table 5.9. 
 
Computational-planning costs ratio, analysed by staff number and the NSDC definition 
(Table 5.42), indicate a slight increase (decrease) in the computational (planning) ratio 
as the size becomes larger, particularly over the smallest SMEs. Some caution is 
necessary in interpreting this overall trend as a few categories, particularly the highest 
level, have less than 30 responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  138
Table 5.42: Mean Computational-Planning Costs Ratio by Other Size Measures, 
2006 
 Types of Costs 
Size Measure a Computational Planning 
 RM Percent RM Percent 
Staff level b     
4 or less (21) 5,005 71 2,011 29 
5 to 19   (65) 6,668 74 2,302 26 
20 to 50 (33) 9,110 77 2,731 23 
51 to 150  (14) 8,195 75 2,742 25 
SME by NSDC size     
Micro (32) 5,395 69 2,382 31 
Small (80) 7,586 76 2,425 24 
Medium (22) 8,528 75 2,787 25 
Overall (134) 7,217 74 2,474 26 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. Forty-one respondents did not indicate their 
estimated percentage for at least one of their computational or planning costs. 
b One respondent with more than 151 staff was excluded. 
 
By business sector (Table 5.43), the services sector has the highest computational cost 
breakdown (79 percent) and the ratio was significantly different from other sectors 
(between 71 and 74 percent).133 This partly could be explained by the business length. It 
was found that almost one-third of the respondents in the services sector were less than 
five years old.134 On the other hand, manufacturing and construction sectors have as 
much as an eight percent higher planning costs ratio compared to the services sector. 
Similar to findings with regards to internal-external costs ratio, income recognition 
policy may have led the construction sector to focus more on tax planning aspects 
compared to other sectors.  As for the manufacturing sector, a large number of 
respondents (86 percent) have been in business for more than five years. It is likely that 
older businesses might pay more attention to tax planning aspects rather than to the 
                                                 
133 Supported by ANOVA test at the five percent significant level (f = 2.646, p = 0.036). 
134 Chi-square was significant at 10 percent level (p = 0.067). 
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usual tax computation issues. For example, a careful consideration is certainly needed 
pertaining to any tax incentive, unutilised capital allowances and/or business losses 
during the previous year(s). 
 
Table 5.43: Mean Computational-Planning Costs Ratio by Sector, 2006 
 Types of Costs 
Business Sector a Computational Planning  
 RM Percent RM Percent 
Manufacturing (26) 7,894 71 3,238 29 
MRS (24) 8,423 74 2,974 26 
Services (62) 6,326 79 1,666 21 
Construction (21) 7,734 71 3,217 29 
Overall (133) 7,217 74 2,474 26 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. Forty-one respondents did not indicate their 
estimated percentage for at least one of their computational or planning costs. Additionally, two 
respondents from the ‘other sector’ are excluded. 
 
Regardless of their length in business, SMEs are found to have a similar computational-
planning costs ratio (Table 5.44). A statistical t-test confirms this pattern being at the 
five percent significant level. 
 
Table 5.44: Mean Computational-Planning Costs Ratio by Business Length, 2006 
 Types of Costs 
Years in Business a Computational Planning 
 RM Percent RM Percent 
Less than 5 years (28) 5,925 75 1,972 25 
More than 5 years (106) 7,559 74 2,607 26 
Overall  (134) 7,217 74 2,474 26 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. Forty-one respondents did not indicate their 
estimated percentage for at least one of their computational or planning costs. 
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As for tax liability, Table 5.45 shows that the cost percentages are similar for SMEs 
who are either in the tax level of up to RM100,000 or do not have a tax obligation. On 
the other hand, SMEs who are in the combined tax level of more than RM100,000 have 
a relatively higher computational costs ratio. The findings suggest that the 
computational ratio is relatively higher as the tax level increases. 
 
Table 5.45: Mean Computational-Planning Costs Ratio by Estimated Tax, 2006 
 Types of Costs 
Estimated Tax a Computational Planning 
 RM Percent RM Percent 
No tax (27) 5,752 72 2,199 28 
RM1 to RM99,999 (79) 6,617 73 2,425 27 
RM100,000 or more b (26) 10,651 79 2,821 21 
Overall (132) 7,235 75 2,457 25 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. Forty-one respondents did not indicate their 
estimated percentage for at least one of their computational or planning costs. Additionally, two 
respondents failed to indicate their estimated tax level.  
b This is a merged category. For details refer Table 5.12. 
 
To sum up, it is apparent that the high level of compliance costs is associated with 
computational components and the remaining are planning-related. The highest 
percentage of computational cost (79 percent) is for SMEs in the services sector and for 
SMEs with an estimated tax liability of more than RM100,000. The differences between 
services and non-services sectors are evident statistically at the five percent level (p = 
0.036). By contrast, micro SMEs (69 percent) have the lowest computational costs ratio.  
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5.8 POSSIBLE COMPENSATION AND COMPLIANCE COSTS 
 
The respondents were asked to estimate the possible amount of compensation that they 
would claim from the government for the time and money spent by their company in 
complying with tax laws (Appendix F, question 18) in order to check the consistency of 
the tax compliance costs estimation. One hundred and six respondents (out of 175) 
provided an answer to this question. A detailed check revealed that missing items were 
prevalent among smaller companies, in particular 28 percent in the turnover level of less 
than RM250,000, followed by 25 percent in the RM250,000 to RM1 million category. 
 
The average compensation amount that would be claimed by SMEs is RM7,334, as 
shown in Table 5.46. Specifically, the possible compensation ranges from as low as 
RM100 to as high as RM20,000. 
 
 Table 5.46: Possible Compensation Amount, 2006 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Compensation (RM) 7,334 100 20,000 6,849 
Number of respondents equals 106. Sixty-nine respondents did not indicate their expectation level. 
 
The findings show that the average compensation amount of RM7,334 is 21 percent 
lower than the average compliance costs estimate of RM9,295 in the current study, 
suggesting lower compensation expectations. However, it must be acknowledged that 
the difference could be due to differences in the response number (106 compared to 175 
in compliance costs estimates). Compliance costs for the 106 cases gave a re-estimate of 
RM9,545, which is just 2.6 percent higher than the average compliance costs estimate 
(RM9,295). Thus, it is appropriate to assume that the compliance costs estimation for 
this study is reasonable, which adds reliability to current estimates overall.135 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
135 See also Section 5.11. 
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Table 5.47: Compensation by Turnover Levels and as Percentage of Turnover, 
2006 
 Compensation 
Turnover Levels a, b Mean (RM) Percentage of Turnover 
Less than RM250,000               (18) 3,572 2.86 
RM250,000 to RM999,999       (31) 6,000 0.96 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999 (30) 7,150 0.24 
RM5,000,000 or more c             (27) 11,577 0.08 
Overall                                     (106) 7,334   0.15 d 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. See also table note 5.46.  
b The denominator used is the midpoint of the turnover category, except for the largest, where 
RM15 million is used, because the actual mean size of the turnover is not available. 
c This is a merged category. For details refer Table 5.9. 
d The denominator used for the overall SME turnover category is RM5 million. See also Table 5.32. 
 
A similar compensation trend is evident also in terms of turnover levels, as shown in 
Table 5.47. It appears that the amount of possible monetary compensation increases as 
the turnover levels increase. However, expressed as a percentage of turnover, the 
possible claim is higher for smaller SMEs, which provides evidence of the regressivity 
of compliance costs. These findings are similar to the tax compliance costs estimate (see 
Table 5.32). Similar findings, both in terms of the magnitude and regressivity of 
expected compensation, were also reported by Rametse (2006) for start-up GST 
compliance costs in an Australian context. 
 
 
5.9 AGGREGATE GROSS COMPLIANCE COSTS ESTIMATES 
 
In estimating aggregate gross compliance costs, the established practice in compliance 
costs studies is to use the mean compliance costs (derived from sample) to the revenue 
population data (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989; Sandford and Hasseldine 1992; 
Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994). To ensure that the estimate reflects the population as a 
whole, multiplication is carried out for each category of the taxpaying population to 
arrive at an overall weighted aggregate cost. A number of measures have been used in 
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categorising the business taxpaying population, and include taxable turnover (Sandford, 
Godwin and Hardwick 1989), turnover (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992), annual tax 
remittance (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994), and gross income category by business size 
and legal form (Evans et al. 1997). In the case of data unavailability, researchers 
normally make assumptions about and/or adjustments to taxpaying population based on 
the best available data. For example, Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989, p. 138) 
and Sandford and Hasseldine (1992, p. 85) adjusted the available GST population to 
arrive at the business income tax and corporation tax population respectively. Having 
succinctly discussed the practice of estimating aggregate compliance costs, the 
following paragraph highlights the approach adopted in the current study.   
 
In 2005, there were 116,650 or 21.3 percent SME companies in Malaysia (Department 
of Statistics Malaysia 2007). Thereafter, no updates are available, including those of the 
total number of SMEs in Malaysia. Even the recent 2007 SME annual report, published 
by the NSDC (2008), referred to the earlier 2005 figure. Due to data availability, the 
current study assumes that the number of SME companies in 2005 and 2006 are the 
same.136 It is recognised that there is a possibility that both new companies and 
deceased (or insolvent) companies would affect the total number of SME companies. 
However, it is less likely there will be significant changes in just one year. Thus, for the 
purpose of estimation, the figure of 116,650 companies is assumed as the total 
population.  
 
Having established a population figure for SME companies in 2006, it is crucial to have 
the appropriate percentage of SME companies by any size measure. Unfortunately, such 
details are not available. The IRB, through their annual report, only provide monetary 
data in terms of tax revenue by types of taxes. Thus, further distinction in terms of 
company size is not achievable. The researcher is left with the assumption that all 
116,650 SME companies are a single category.137 Following this assumption, the 
                                                 
136 Malaysia’s economy growth rate, as measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) change, in 2005 
and 2006 was 5.2 and 5.8 percent respectively (Treasury of Malaysia 2006). 
137 Another alternative is to use the sample proportion of business size (as shown earlier in Table 5.9). 
However, this possibility is not considered further, because the extent to which the sample proportion 
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aggregate compliance costs of SME companies in Malaysia is estimated at RM1,084 
million for the tax year 2006. The computation is made as follows:  
 
    Aggregate compliance costs  
= Mean compliance costs  x  number of SME companies 
 =   RM9,295   x   116,650 
=   RM1,084,261,750                Equation 5.1 
 
 
5.10 ESTIMATION OF OFFSETTING BENEFITS 
 
The tax compliance costs literature recognises three compliance benefits as offsets to 
compliance costs: cash flow benefits, managerial benefits, and tax deductibility. As 
discussed in Chapter Four,138 managerial benefits do exist, but do not add benefits to the 
corporate sector. Thus, in the context of SME companies, the value of cash flow 
benefits and tax deductibility are relevant. Unfortunately, due to data availability, the 
current study was not able to determine the value of cash flow benefits.139 As a result, 
the current study only estimates the value of tax deductibility. The estimates of tax 
deductibility are presented below. 
  
Benefits arising from tax deductibility have been recognised as early as in 1963 
(Johnston 1963), but only a few prior studies (Allers 1994, pp. 38-40; Evans et al. 1997; 
Tran-Nam and Glover 2002b), and more recently Rametse (2006), have estimated the 
value of tax deductibility,  which is normally estimated following a few assumptions. 
For example, Evans et al. (1997) assumed that taxable businesses would have full 
benefits of tax deductibility, while non-taxable businesses would only benefit from 50 
percent of the amount. Rametse (2006), on the other hand, has used a slightly modified 
approach, similar to Tran-Nam (2000), by estimating a tax deductibility value to the 
                                                                                                                                               
represents the population distribution (by turnover level) is not known and could not be checked due to 
data limitations.  
138 See subsection 4.4.2. 
139 See subsection 4.4.2. 
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monetary compliance costs only (i.e. by excluding internal time cost). The modification 
is made due to the non-taxability of some GST traders, such as non-profit organisations, 
government departments, and universities.  
 
The Rametse approach is not considered in the current estimates, as the approach is 
possibly more relevant in the context of GST. Further, the current study focuses on the 
corporate sector, which is legally taxable. Therefore, Evans et al.’s approach is 
considered more relevant to this study. The Evans et al. (1997, p. 31) approach, in a 
mathematical form, reads as follows: 
 
 
   Value of tax deductibility benefits = [0.5 (1 + p) t] CC 
   Where:  p = percentage of taxable business 
  t = Average marginal tax rate   
  CC = Aggregate compliance Costs             Equation 5.2 
 
 
The Evans et al. approach (the aggregate approach) in the current Malaysian study is 
applied at the firm or disaggregate level140 by multiplying firm compliance costs by a 
marginal tax rate of 20 percent for taxable SMEs or 10 percent (i.e. half of the benefits) 
for non-taxable SMEs. The taxability of SMEs is determined based on their estimates of 
tax liability.141 Following this approach (the firm approach), the value of tax 
deductibility ranges between RM61 and RM7,555, with an average of RM1,677 per 
SME, as shown in Table 5.48. 
 
Table 5.48: Average Value of Tax Deductibility, 2006 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Tax Deductibility (RM) 1,677 61 7,555 1,446 
 
 
                                                 
140 Evans et al. (1997) computed the value of tax deductibility at the aggregate level. 
141 See Table 5.12. 
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The aggregate tax deductibility benefits for Malaysian SME companies in 2006 are 
estimated at RM196 million, which is derived as follows:  
 
   Aggregate value of tax deductibility  
= Mean value of tax deductibility   x number of SME companies 
 = RM1,677    x  116,650 
= RM195,622,050                 Equation 5.3 
 
Alternatively, following the aggregate approach, the value of tax deductibility would be 
RM190 million, derived as follows:  
 
 
   Aggregate value of tax deductibility 
= [0.5 (1 + p) t] CC 
= [0.5 (1 + 0.756) 0.20] RM1,084,261,750 
= RM190,396,363                  Equation 5.4 
 
In applying the aggregate approach in the Malaysian context, two assumptions are 
made. First, the percentage of taxable SMEs is assumed to be 75.6 percent. Due to a 
lack of official data on taxable SMEs in Malaysia, this percentage is taken from the 
current survey.142 Secondly, the average marginal corporate tax rate is assumed to be 20 
percent.143 
 
By comparison, the value of tax deductibility derived from the firm approach (RM196 
million) is relatively higher than the value determined by employing the aggregate 
                                                 
142 Refer Table 5.12. 
143 As presented in Table 5.12, 102 (or 78.5 percent) of taxable SMEs (130) are subject to a tax rate of 20 
percent. While the remaining 21.5 percent, in addition to a tax of 20 percent for their first RM500,000 of 
taxable income, are also subject to a normal corporate tax rate of 28 percent (in 2006) for any amount 
exceeding RM500,000. If this average rate is used, then a weighted average tax rate would be 21.72 
percent (i.e. [78.5 (20) + 21.5 (28)] percent). If this marginal alternative tax rate is used, the value of tax 
deductibility following the aggregate approach would be RM206.78 million (or around 8.6 percent higher 
than RM190.4 million). 
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approach (RM190 million). The small difference of around 2.7 percent is technically 
not surprising due to the slight measurement difference. As a measure of consistency, a 
similar approach is adopted in estimating aggregate compliance costs of SME 
companies (i.e. firm approach),144 so the value of tax deductibility is estimated at 
RM195.62 million. Specifically, these estimates are multiplied by the average dollar 
value/costs to the SME population number. 
 
 
5.11 NET AGGREGATE COMPLIANCE COSTS ESTIMATES 
 
The net corporate tax compliance costs for the tax year 2006, both at the company and 
aggregate level, is estimated at RM7,618 and RM889 million respectively, as shown in 
Table 5.49. Specifically, the tax deductibility benefits for Malaysian SME companies 
comprised around 18 percent of total compliance costs in 2006. At the SME level, it is 
apparent that the net compliance costs of RM7,618 is similar to the possible 
compensation amount of RM7,334,145 which adds consistency to the overall estimates 
of the current study. As discussed earlier,146 it must be emphasised that these estimates 
do not take into account the possible cash flow benefits for SME companies due to data 
availability and the insignificance of the amount. 
 
Table 5.49: Estimated Compliance Costs of SME Companies, 2006 
 Per SME  
(RM) 
Aggregate 
(RM million) 
Gross Compliance Costs 9,295 1,084.3 
(-) Tax Deductibility  1,677 195.6 
Net Compliance Costs 7,618 888.7 
 
 
 
                                                 
144 See Section 5.9. 
145 See Table 5.46. 
146 See Section 5.10. See also Chapter Four, subsection 4.4.2. 
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5.12 THE WEB SURVEY 
 
5.12.1 Overall Responses and Business Profile 
A total of 75 useable questionnaires were returned, which represents an extremely low 
response rate of around two percent of the net sampling frame. Relevant details of the 
sampling frame and responses are presented in Appendix N, Table N.1. This subsection 
highlights the key profile of the responding SMEs in the web survey. Also highlighted 
are the tax-related difficulties faced by the SMEs and their reason for engaging tax 
professionals. Details of these responses are summarised in Appendix N, Tables N.2 to 
N.6.  
 
For the general business profile (Table N.3), two-thirds of the SMEs end their business 
on 31 December, followed by 12 percent on 30 June. The most frequently stated sector 
is service (54 percent), followed by manufacturing (20 percent) and manufacturing-
related (18 percent). The vast majority of respondents have been in business for more 
than five years (64 percent), or at least for two years (22 percent). Almost 78 percent of 
the responding companies carried out income tax work both internally and externally. 
As for business size (Table N.4), almost half and one-third of the respondents are in the 
category of between ‘five and 19’ and ‘four or less’ categories of employees 
respectively. A large majority of the responding sample (87 percent) estimated their 
2006 tax liability as either none (30 percent) or up to RM100,000 (57 percent). 
 
The most highly ranked tax difficulty area is ‘estimating income tax payable’ (19 
percent), with 70 percent of the SMEs indicating they have problems pertaining to 
estimating their income tax payable, as shown in Table N.5, Appendix N. Difficulties 
with regard to cash flow (17 percent) is ranked second, followed by ‘increasing burden 
of record keeping requirements for tax purpose’ (13 percent), and ‘maintaining tax 
records’ (12 percent). The least ranked difficult aspects are ‘dealing with the tax 
authority’, ‘deadlines for submitting tax return’, and ‘dealing with tax professionals’. 
Finally, the main reason for SMEs employing tax professionals (Table N.6) is the lack 
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of technical knowledge internally (30 percent), followed by the cost-effective factor (27 
percent) and tax complexity (21 percent). 
 
5.12.2 Compliance Costs Estimates 
The average compliance costs of SME companies for the web survey, estimated by a 
similar approach to the mail survey,147 amounted to RM9,282. A summary of the 
detailed costs component and their corresponding lowest, highest, and standard 
deviation is shown in Table 5.50. The average internal costs are estimated at RM6,194, 
with a minimum and maximum cost of RM87 and nearly RM40,000 respectively. Refer 
to Appendix N for a summary of yearly internal time spent on tax activities (Table N.7) 
and their corresponding average wage rates (Table N.8) respectively. The average 
external costs amount to almost RM2,800. The lowest external costs in the sample are 
RM200, and the highest fees are RM10,000. As for additional non-staff costs, the 
average costs are just over RM300, ranging between RM200 and RM5,000.  
 
Table 5.50: Compliance Cost Estimation by Components, 2006 (Web Survey) 
Costs Type Mean  
RM 
Minimum 
RM a 
Maximum 
RM 
Standard Deviation 
RM 
Internal 6,194   87 39,693 8,016 
External 2,784 200 10,000 2,545 
Additional Non-staff    304 200   5,000    768 
Overall 9,282 455 46,846 9,193 
a Excluding SMEs with no components of internal, external and additional costs respectively. 
 
In terms of the costs component, the highest components consist of internal costs of 70 
percent, inclusive of additional non-staff costs, and the remaining 30 percent are 
external costs. As for their cost nature, the computational and planning costs are 75 and 
25 percent respectively. The detailed analyses of compliance costs by business 
characteristics, both in terms of sources (i.e. internal-external) and nature (i.e. 
computational-planning), are not considered in more detail due to the low number of 
                                                 
147 See Section 5.7.1. 
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responses (see Appendix N, Tables N.3 and N.4). A summary of mean compliance costs 
analysed by business characteristics at the overall level, cost sources and cost types, is 
presented in Table N.9, Appendix N. 
 
5.12.3 Compliance Costs Distribution 
Tax compliance costs, as a percentage of turnover, decreased significantly from 4.3 
percent to only 0.1 percent as the turnover level increases (Table 5.51). This implies the 
incidence of a fixed costs effect on the smaller SMEs. However, caution needs to be 
taken as the number of responses to each turnover level is less than 30.  For the overall 
SME category, the compliance costs are estimated at 0.19 percent of the weighted 
turnover level. 
 
Table 5.51: Compliance Costs as Percentage of Turnover, 2006 (Web Survey) 
 Compliance  Costs   
Turnover Level a, b Mean (RM) Percentage of Turnover 
Less than RM250,000                (19) 5,398 4.32 
RM250,000 to RM999,999        (21) 9,629 1.54 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999  (24) 9,531 0.32 
RM5,000,000 and more             (11) 14,780 0.10 
Overall Compliance Costs         (75) 9,282   0.19 c 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses.  
b The denominator used is the midpoint of the turnover category, except for the largest, where RM15 
million is used, because the actual mean size of the turnover is not available. 
c The denominator used for the overall SME turnover category is RM5 million. See also Table 5.32.  
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Similar findings are also observed for all three components of compliance costs, as 
shown in Table 5.52. 
 
Table 5.52: Costs Component as Percentage of Turnover, 2006 (Web Survey) 
Turnover Level a 
Costs  Component 
As a Percentage  of Turnover 
 Internal   External Additional  
Less than RM250,000 2.72 1.34 0.26 
RM250,000 to RM999,999 1.08 0.41 0.04 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999 0.21 0.11 0.005 
RM5,000,000 or more  0.07 0.03 0.005 
Overall b 0.12 0.06 0.01 
a The denominator used is the midpoint of the turnover category, except for the largest, where 
RM15 million is used, because the actual mean size of the turnover is not available.  
b The denominator used for the overall SME turnover category is RM5 million.  See also Table 5.32. 
 
 
5.12.4 Possible Compensation and Compliance Costs 
The average compensation amount that could be claimed by SMEs in the web sample is 
RM7,042 (Table 5.53). The amount of possible compensation increases as the turnover 
levels increase, but the difference is statistically not significant. Further, the amount of 
expected compensation is around 24 percent less than the overall compliance cost 
estimates of RM9,282 for the web survey. A similar trend is reported by Rametse 
(2006, p. 143) in the Australian GST start-up costs context. 
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Table 5.53: Compensation by Turnover Levels and as Percentage of Turnover, 
2006 (Web Survey) 
 Compensation  
Turnover Levels a, b Mean (RM) Percentage of Turnover 
Less than RM250,000                (15) 2,936 2.35 
RM250,000 to RM999,999        (16) 6,981 1.12 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999  (16) 8,906 0.30 
RM5,000,000 or more                  (7) 11,714 0.08 
Overall                                        (54) 7,042   0.14 c 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. There were 21 missing cases. 
b The denominator used is the midpoint of the turnover category, except for the largest, where 
RM15 million is used, because the actual mean size of the turnover is not available. 
c The denominator used for the overall SME turnover category is RM5 million. See also Table 5.32.  
 
A comparative analysis between compliance costs (Table 5.51) and compensation 
amounts (Table 5.53), by the turnover levels, indicates that SMEs in all four turnover 
levels expected lower compensation. The highest difference is observed for the SME in 
the turnover level of less than RM250,000. The expected compensation of RM2,936 is 
around 46 percent lower than their compliance costs estimates of RM5,398. Though the 
findings indicate a considerable difference between compliance costs estimates and the 
expected compensation, the presence of a fixed cost effect is evident in terms of 
percentage of turnover. The usual limitation applies as a response to each turnover level 
being less than 30.   
 
5.12.5 Tax Deductibility and Aggregate Compliance Costs 
The value of tax deductibility for the web survey is estimated at RM1,637 per SME 
company (Table 5.54). More specifically, the amount is estimated as being as low as 
RM80 to as high as RM9,400 per company.  
 
Table 5.54: Average Value of Tax Deductibility, 2006 (Web Survey) 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Tax Deductibility (RM) 1,637 80 9,369 1,740 
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Following a similar approach to the primary survey,148 the gross and net aggregate tax 
compliance costs amounted to RM1,083 million and RM892 million respectively, as 
shown in Table 5.55. At the firm level, the net compliance costs are estimated to be 
RM7,645. Overall, tax deductibility covers around 18 percent of gross tax compliance 
costs of SME companies. 
 
Table 5.55: Compliance Costs Estimates, 2006 (Web Survey) 
 Per SME  
(RM) 
Aggregate 
(RM million) 
Gross Compliance Costs 9,282 1,082.7 
(-) Tax Deductibility  1,637 191,0 
Net Compliance Costs 7,645 891.7 
 
 
 
5.13 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the response and compliance costs estimates 
for the main postal survey questionnaire. The estimated average income tax compliance 
costs for the tax year 2006 are almost RM9,300 per SME company. Fifty two percent of 
the average compliance costs are internal time costs, forty one percent tax fees paid to 
external professionals, and additional costs (non-staff) accounts for seven percent. 
Computational and planning costs ratios account for 74 and 26 percent of all costs 
respectively. The usual regressive nature of compliance costs for Malaysian SMEs has 
been confirmed. As for the offsetting benefits, the value of tax deductibility is estimated 
to be almost RM1,700 per SME company. At the aggregate level, the compliance costs 
of SME companies in Malaysia are estimated to be RM1,084 million for the tax year 
2006. The estimated total value of tax deductibility amounts to RM196 million, 
representing approximately 18 percent of the gross compliance costs. Overall, SME 
companies incurred net aggregate compliance costs of RM888 million in 2006. Analysis 
                                                 
148 See Sections 5.9 to 5.11. 
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of a separate web survey confirms the reliability of the estimates made in the main 
postal survey. A further comparative analysis is made in Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
TAX ATTITUDES AND COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR  
OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This section mainly draws on Sections C and D of the survey questionnaire. 
Additionally, compliance costs estimates (derived from Section B of the 
questionnaire)149 are used in measuring the association between compliance costs and 
both tax attitudes and the likely tax behaviour. Tax attitudes and behaviour of corporate 
SMEs are measured from a business managerial or respondent perspective. Similar to 
the previous chapter, the primary analysis of this chapter is obtained from the postal 
survey. Additionally, findings from both the SME web survey and the tax professionals’ 
postal survey are presented. 
 
 
6.2 TAX ATTITUDES OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
 
6.2.1 Assessment of Reliability and Validity 
As presented in Chapter Four,150 respondents were asked to state their perceptions 
towards 15 tax attitudinal statements. All these statements are grouped into six aspects: 
tax complexity, tax rate structure, tax law fairness, relationship with IRB officials, 
probability of a tax audit, and incentives to SMEs. As the measurements of tax 
complexity, tax rate structure and tax law fairness involved more than one item for each 
aspect, both a reliability and validity test was performed.  
 
The measurements used in this study are considered reliable and consistent as the alpha 
coefficients were above the acceptable value of 0.7 (Nunnally 1978; Hair et al. 1998; 
Sekaran 2003), as shown in Table 6.1. 
                                                 
149 See Chapter Five, Section 5.7. 
150 See Chapter Four, Section 4.5. See also Table 4.4. 
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Table 6.1: Reliability Coefficient of Tax Attitudinal Aspects 
Tax Aspects Number of Items Alpha Coefficients 
Complexity a 3 0.725 
Fairness  5 0.717 
Rate  3 0.702 
IRB Relationship 1 - 
Audit 1 - 
Incentives  1 - 
a One item was taken out to get an acceptable alpha coefficient. 
 
As for validity, the views of both tax professionals and tax academics were considered 
in the questionnaire design.151 For tax attitudinal aspects with more than one item, a 
factor analysis confirmed that all items measure perceptions towards tax complexity, tax 
fairness and the tax rate respectively. The SPSS output on the rotated component matrix 
is shown in Appendix Q.  
 
All tax attitudinal items were measured using a five-point Likert scale.152 However, for 
analysis purposes, SMEs who responded ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ were 
grouped as a single category. Similar treatment applies for SMEs who indicated 
‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’. The ‘neutral’ responses remained as indifferent. The re-
coding is necessary so as to address low responses in either the ‘strongly agree’ or 
‘strongly disagree’ category. A number of previous studies both internationally (see for 
example Webley, Cole and Eidjar 2001; Torgler 2007) and in Malaysia (see Hanefah 
1996; Kasipillai et al. 1999; Abdul-Manaf 2004) have adopted this approach. 
Additionally, a mean score analysis is also used in analysing each attitudinal aspect. 
Findings on all six attitudinal aspects of corporate income tax are presented next. For 
tax complexity, tax fairness and the tax rate structure, findings are presented both for 
each statement and overall aspects, respectively. All 15 tax attitudinal statements and 
their respective variable name used throughout the thesis are shown in Table 6.2. 
                                                 
151 See Chapter Four, Section 4.6. 
152 See Chapter Four, Section 4.5. 
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Table 6.2: Tax Attitudinal Statements 
 Wording of the Statements Variable Name
Personally I consider corporate Income Tax return preparations difficult. Comp 1 
Corporate Income Tax law is relatively simple. Comp 2 
Complexity in the Income Tax law is necessary so that companies are treated 
fairly. 
 
Comp 3 
Corporate Income Tax is so complicated that only people who can afford to 
pay tax professionals can take advantage of most legal ways to save 
much taxes. 
 
Comp 4 
I believe that each company’s officers have a moral obligation to report all of 
their company’s income and pay the correct amount of Corporate Income 
Tax. 
 
Fair 1 
Do you believe that the move to self-assessment system made the corporate 
tax laws more or less fair? 
 
Fair 2 
Overall, has the move to the self-assessment system made the distribution of 
the Corporate Income Tax burden among small, medium and large 
companies more or less fair? 
 
Fair 3 
Do you believe that as a result of changes in the Corporate Income Tax during 
the past five years SME companies are paying more or less taxes? 
 
Fair 4 
Do you believe that as a result of changes in the Corporate Income Tax during 
the past five years large companies are paying more or less taxes?  
 
Fair 5 
A fair tax rate should be the same for every company, regardless of their size 
(small, medium, or large). 
 
Rate 1 
Large companies have greater ability to pay Income Tax, so it is fair that they 
should pay a higher rate of tax than small and medium companies.  
 
Rate 2 
It is fair that high-profit companies should pay a higher rate of tax than low-
profit companies. 
 
Rate 3 
I believe that the relationship with the Inland Revenue Board officers has 
improved since the implementation of the self-assessment system. 
IRB 
Relationship 
The chances of being audited (tax audit) are so low that it is worthwhile trying 
to ‘cut corners’ a little on corporate income taxes for various reasons.  
Audit 
I believe that compared to large companies, more favourable tax treatments 
should be given to small and medium-sized companies. 
Incentives 
For analysis purposes, Comp 2 and Fair 4 are reverse coded. 
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6.2.2 Tax Complexity 
This subsection presents respondents’ views on corporate income tax law complexity. A 
summary of findings is shown in Table 6.3. The first statement relates to corporate 
income tax return preparation (Comp 1). Nearly 55 percent of the respondents indicated 
that a corporate income tax return preparation is difficult, compared to less than eight 
percent who indicated otherwise, while the remaining 38 percent indicated a neutral 
view. As for the second statement, nearly half of the respondents disagreed that 
corporate income tax law is relatively simple (Comp 2), another two-thirds and one-
tenth indicated a neutral and in agreement view respectively. The third item claims that 
the complexity in the income tax law is necessary so that companies are treated fairly 
(Comp 3). More respondents (42 percent) regarded the complex nature of tax law as 
being necessary than otherwise (24 percent), and another 34 percent indicated a neutral 
view. For the fourth and last statement, just over 58 percent of the respondents agreed 
that only people who can pay for tax professionals can exploit tax benefits legally 
(Comp 4), followed by another 12 percent who disagreed, with another 30 percent being 
indifferent. 
 
Table 6.3: Attitudes towards Corporate Income Tax Complexity 
  
Mean 
 
Median
Standard 
Deviation 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree 
Comp 1 3.59 4.00 0.82 13 
 (7.4) 
66  
(37.7) 
96  
(54.9) 
Comp 2 2.51 2.0 0.80 88  
(50.3) 
69  
(39.4) 
18  
(10.3) 
Comp 3 3.15 3.00 0.99 42  
(24.0) 
60  
(34.3) 
73  
(41.7) 
Comp 4 3.60 4.00 0.91 21  
(12.0) 
52  
(29.7) 
102  
(58.3) 
Complexity a 3.56 3.67 0.68 - - - 
Number of respondents equals 175. The percentage of responses is given in parentheses. 
a Comp 3 was taken out to get an acceptable alpha (see Table 6.1). Comp 2 is reverse coded. The 
reversed mean is 3.49. 
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All statements, except ‘Comp 3’, have a mean score of between 3.49 and 3.60, which 
reveals a strong agreement towards the presence of tax complexity. The overall mean 
score for tax complexity is 3.56, which demonstrates the complex nature of corporate 
income tax as perceived by the respondents. Tax complexity analysed by respondents’ 
business characteristics reveal that a significant mean difference is observed only in 
terms of the estimated tax levels. A relatively lower complexity level is perceived by 
SMEs without tax liability (3.32) compared to those who are subjected to tax (3.61). 
 
6.2.3 Tax Fairness 
Respondents’ perceptions toward corporate income tax fairness is summarised in Table 
6.4. To the first statement on fairness (Fair 1), a large majority of the respondents (76 
percent) agreed that each company’s officers have a moral obligation to report all of 
their company’s income and pay the correct amount of corporate income tax. The 
second (Fair 2) and third (Fair 3) statements relate specifically to the SAS. More than 
half of the respondents indicated a neutral view with regards to both corporate tax laws 
fairness (57 percent) and corporate income tax burden among small, medium and large 
companies (59 percent). The last two statements (Fair 4 and 5) also relate indirectly to 
the SAS. The fourth statement asked respondents as to whether SME companies are 
paying more or less taxes (Fair 4), and the fifth statement asked a similar question in the 
context of large companies (Fair 5). The majority of respondents indicated a neutral 
view to both statements. The remaining respondents were roughly divided between 
respondents who agreed or disagreed. 
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Table 6.4: Attitudes towards Corporate Tax Fairness 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard  
Deviation 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree a 
 
Neutral 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree a 
Fair 1 3.86 4.00 0.88 12 
(6.9) 
30 
(17.1) 
133 
(76.0) 
Fair 2 3.12 3.00 0.74 28 
(16.0) 
99 
(56.6) 
48 
(27.4) 
Fair 3 3.06 3.00 0.81 32 
(18.3) 
103 
(58.9) 
40 
(22.9) 
Fair 4  2.94 3.00 0.77 46 
(26.4) 
95 
(54.6) 
33 
(19.0) 
Fair 5 3.01 3.00 0.72 33 
(19.1) 
105 
(60.7) 
35 
(20.2) 
Fairness b 3.22 3.20 0.53 - - - 
Number of respondents equals 175. Total responses of less than 175 are due to missing value(s). The 
percentage of responses is given in parentheses. Total percentage for Fair 3 is not equal to 100 due to 
rounding. 
a Slightly different response category was used for Fair 2 and 3 (much less fair to much more fair) and 
Fair 4 and 5 (much less taxes to much more taxes) respectively. 
b Fair 4 is reversed coded. The reversed mean equals 3.06. 
 
The overall mean score of 3.22 indicates that the corporate tax system is perceived to be 
relatively fair. A further analysis in terms of all business characteristics reveals no 
statistical difference between the respondents. 
 
6.2.4 Tax Rate 
Respondents’ views regarding fairness of the corporate tax rate were obtained on three 
tax rate structures: flat (Rate 1), proportional (Rate 2) and progressive (Rate 3). A 
summary of responses is presented in Table 6.5. Just over 45 percent agreed to a flat 
rate structure (Rate 1) compared to 55 percent who indicated agreement on both the 
proportional (Rate 2) and progressive rate (Rate 3) structures. A mean comparison 
indicates that the proportional (Rate 2) and progressive (Rate 3) tax rates are perceived 
to be fairer than a flat rate (Rate 1), which has rather a neutral view.  
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Table 6.5: Attitudes towards Corporate Tax Rate Structure 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree 
Rate 1  3.13 3.00 1.16 60 
(34.3) 
36 
(20.6) 
79 
(45.1) 
Rate 2  3.41 4.00 1.14 42 
(24.0) 
37 
(21.1) 
96 
(54.9) 
Rate 3 3.48 4.00 1.05 36 
(20.6) 
42 
(24.0) 
97 
(55.4) 
Tax Rate 3.34 3.33 0.88 - - - 
Number of respondents equals 175. The percentage of responses is given in parentheses. 
 
An overall mean average of 3.34 indicates that the corporate tax rate structure is 
perceived to be relatively fair. Further, analysis of the mean reveals a similar 
perception, regardless of their specific business characteristics. 
 
6.2.5 Other Attitudinal Aspects 
In addition to the above three aspects of corporate income tax, respondents were asked 
for their perceptions on three other tax attitudinal aspects, namely, their relationship 
with IRB officials, the probability of a tax audit, and finally tax incentives to SMEs. 
Almost half of the respondents indicated a neutral view as to whether to their 
relationship with the IRB officers has improved since the introduction of the SAS, as 
shown in Table 6.6. Just over one-third of the respondents agreed about the improved 
relationship with the IRB officers and the remaining one-fifth disagreed. Overall, a 
mean score of 3.15 indicates a relatively better relationship with the IRB under the SAS 
regime. 
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Table 6.6: Other Tax Attitudinal Aspects 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
Agree/ 
Strongly  
Agree 
IRB 
Relationship
3.15 3.00 0.90 32 
(18.3) 
84 
(48.0) 
59 
(33.7) 
Audit  2.75 3.00 0.98 72 
(41.1) 
63 
(36.0) 
40 
(22.9) 
Incentives 4.15 4.00 0.75 5 
(2.9) 
19 
(10.9) 
151 
(86.3) 
Number of respondents equals 175. The percentage of responses is given in parentheses. For tax 
incentives, the total percentage does not equal 100 due to rounding. 
 
As for tax audits, relatively more respondents (41 percent) disagree that the probability 
of a tax audit is low, compared to those who demonstrate agreement (23 percent) or an 
indifferent view (36 percent). Broadly, a mean score of 2.75 indicates that the 
respondents were somewhat uncertain with regards to the probability of their company 
being subjected to a tax audit. Regarding tax incentives, a large majority of respondents 
(86 percent) believed that more favourable tax treatments should be given to SME 
companies. A mean score of 4.15 is the highest mean score in the current study, 
suggesting respondents’ very strong agreement about more tax incentives to SMEs. For 
all three aspects, ANOVA tests fail to indicate any significant mean differences, 
suggesting similar perceptions regardless of their business profile.  
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6.3 TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR OF SMALL AND MEDIUM 
ENTERPRISES 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four,153 two types of non-compliance behaviour, namely 
understatement of income and overstatement of deductions, are measured by way of 
both indirect and direct responses for each hypothetical scenario. Nonetheless, the direct 
response was primarily used in the current study.154 Similar to tax attitudinal aspects, 
responses to a five-point Likert scale were simplified into three categories: those who 
are in agreement (strongly agree and agree), those who are in disagreement (strongly 
disagree and disagree), and neutral responses (remain indifferent).  
 
Nearly 60 percent of the respondents indicated disagreement to the possible action of 
underreporting behaviour, as shown in Table 6.7, suggesting more compliant behaviour. 
Another 23 percent were indifferent. Overall, respondents were inclined towards 
compliance. As for overstating deductions, around 41 percent of the respondents 
indicated disagreement to the possible action of overstating deductions, suggesting 
compliant behaviour. About 29 percent were indifferent. The remaining 30 percent 
tended to support overstating deductions. Broadly, relatively more respondents (60 
percent) were compliant towards underreporting behaviour as compared to 
overstatement of deductions (41 percent).  
 
                                                 
153 See subsection 4.4.3. See also Section 4.5 
154 See Chapter Four, Section 4.5. 
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Table 6.7: Respondents’ Views towards Non-compliance Behaviour  
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree 
Understatement 
of Income 
2.28 2.00 1.22 102 
(59.3) 
39 
(22.7) 
31 
(18.0) 
Overstatement 
of Deductions  
2.76 3.00 1.31 71 
(41.3) 
50 
(29.1) 
51 
(29.6) 
Both Non-
compliance a 
2.52 
 
2.50 1.11 - - - 
Number of respondents equals 172. The percentage of responses is given in parentheses. 
a This refers to the combined category of both understatement of income and overstatement of deductions. 
 
In terms of income reporting, an overall mean score of 2.28 indicates that the 
respondent leans towards tax compliance. However, for overstating behaviour, an 
overall mean score of 2.76 indicates that the large majority of SMEs are likely to show 
compliant or neutral behaviour. Comparatively, compliance in terms of income 
reporting is better than tax deductions. The median scores of 2.00 and 3.00 for income 
reporting and tax deductions demonstrate this trend as well. At the firm level, a 
combined mean score of 2.52 for both non-compliance situations indicates likely 
compliance behaviour too. 
  
Further, respondents were asked to indicate their view on the possibility of not 
complying to only part of the RM10,000 stated for both scenarios.  The specific amount 
is not stated but left to the respondent to judge, which mathematically could be worth 
less than RM10,000. Respondents were given three options (yes, no, unsure) on the 
likely non-compliance of the person stated in the scenario. The results of the possible 
partial non-compliance are shown in Table 6.8.  
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Table 6.8: Respondents’ Views towards partial Non-compliance Behaviour 
Possibility of   
Non-compliance 
Partial  
Understatement of Income 
Partial  
Overstatement of Deductions 
 
Number of  
Respondents 
Percentage 
 
Number of  
Respondents 
Percentage 
 
Yes 41 23.8 52 30.2 
No 66 38.4 72 41.9 
Unsure 65 37.8 48 27.9 
Total       172 a 100.0        172 a     100.0 
a Number of respondents equals 172. Three values are missing.  
 
The highest percentage of respondents, i.e. 38 percent and 42 percent for understating 
and overstating behaviour respectively, rejected the possibility of partial non-
compliance, as shown in Table 6.8. On the other hand, nearly 24 percent and just over 
30 percent of the respondents view that there is a possibility of partial non-compliance 
behaviour for income understating and deduction overstating behaviour respectively. In 
contrast to non-compliance involving the full amount of the gross transaction (see Table 
6.7), relatively more respondents are likely to comply in terms of partial deductions 
rather than to partial income reporting. The result is as expected, since partial non-
compliance, mainly with regards to deductions, could be exposed to a much higher risk 
of detection during a tax audit. As for income reporting, some caution is necessary as 
‘unsure’ responses in the sample are about equal to compliant SMEs (both 38 percent). 
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6.4 RELATIONSHIP OF TAX ATTITUDES AND TAX BEHAVIOUR 
 
The relationship between each tax attitudinal aspect and likely tax compliance 
behaviour is examined by way of correlation analysis. As tax complexity, tax fairness 
and the tax rate structure consisted of more than one item, the mean for the three 
respective items was used. As for the remaining three tax attitudes, they were left in 
their original form of a five-point Likert scale. The summary results of the correlation 
analysis are shown in Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.9: Tax Attitudinal Aspects and Tax Behaviour: Correlation Analysis 
  Understatement 
of Income 
Overstatement 
of Deductions 
Both  
Non-compliance 
Complexity    + 0.150 b   + 0.232 a   + 0.220 a 
Fairness - 0.043 - 0.050 - 0.053 
Rate + 0.149 + 0.071 + 0.124 
Incentives + 0.023 + 0.049 + 0.041 
Audit   + 0.152 b   + 0.211 a   + 0.208 a 
IRB relationship + 0.104 - 0.024 + 0.043 
Positive (+) or negative (-) signs denote a direct or indirect relationship respectively.   
a Significant at the one percent level. b Significant at the five percent level.  
 
Tax complexity and probability of an audit are found to be consistently and positively 
correlated with understatement of income, overstatement of deductions and combined 
types of compliance, shown in Table 6.9. The statistical significance is higher (one 
percent level) for accuracy of deductions and both non-compliances as compared to 
income reporting (five percent level).  This finding indicates that an increase in the 
complexity level will increase the possibility of non-compliance. The likely non-
compliance is also expected to increase if the chances of being audited are perceived to 
be too low. Though the relationships are significant, the correlation coefficient (around 
0.2) indicates a weak association among tax complexity and tax audit to both types of 
non-compliance behaviours, either measured according to types (two independent 
behaviours) or at the SME level (combined). 
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The finding also shows that both understatement of income and overstatement of 
deductions are highly correlated (correlation coefficient equal to 0.535); more 
importantly, both are at the 99 percent confidence level. This suggests that those who 
are compliant in terms of income reporting (or tax deductions) would probably be 
compliant with regards to tax deductions (or income reporting). 
 
Overall, the direction of the associations between the compliance types and all six 
attitudinal aspects are similar, except for the perceived IRB relationship. A direct 
association is observed between the perceived IRB relationship and income reporting 
behaviour, indicating the better the perceived relationship between respondents and the 
IRB, the more likely this is to increase the possibility of non-compliance. On the other 
hand, an indirect relationship is evident for tax deductions behaviour (and combined tax 
behaviours), suggesting the better the perceived relationship with the IRB, the lower the 
likelihood of the overstatement of deductions (and combined non-compliance).  
 
As for tax fairness and tax incentives, their relationship to likely compliance behaviour 
is in the expected direction. A better perceived fairness is likely to decrease the 
possibility of non-compliance and vice versa. As for tax incentives, the stronger 
anticipation of tax incentives is likely to increase the possibility of non-compliance. It is 
possible that a few available incentives during the survey period were not sufficient. As 
such, the respondents may compensate themselves by performing non-compliant 
activities. However, an unanticipated direction is noted for the tax rate structure. A 
positive perception on the tax rate structure is likely to increase the possibility of non-
compliance, which is supposed to be to the contrary. Nonetheless, perceptions towards 
tax fairness, the tax rate, tax incentives and the IRB relationship are not statistically 
associated with the likely compliance behaviour.  
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6.5 RELATIONSHIP OF TAX ATTITUDES AND COMPLIANCE COSTS 
 
The relationship between six tax attitudinal aspects and mean compliance costs is 
investigated through correlation analysis. Following a similar approach as in Section 
6.4, the respective combined averages are used for aspects that have more than one 
item, and the remaining attitudes were left to be in the original form of a five-point 
Likert scale. The relationship with the IRB official is the only aspect that indicates a 
significant association to compliance costs, as shown in Table 6.10. A positive sign 
indicates a direct association between the perceived IRB relationship and compliance 
costs estimates, suggesting the better relationship could lead to higher compliance costs.  
 
Table 6.10: Tax Attitudes and Compliance Costs: Correlation Analysis 
 Tax Attitudinal Aspects Compliance Costs 
Complexity + 0.022 
Fairness - 0.088 
Rate + 0.056 
Incentives + 0.084 
Audit - 0.075 
Relationship + 0.178 a 
Positive (+) or negative (-) signs denote a direct or indirect relationship respectively.   
a Significant at the five percent level.  
 
A further analysis of compliance costs estimates between response categories, as shown 
in Table 6.11, demonstrates that compliance costs are 41 percent higher for those who 
perceived a better IRB relationship compared to those who perceived otherwise. On the 
other hand, the compliance costs of those who are indifferent to the IRB relationship are 
quite similar to those who do not perceive an improved relationship. 
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Table 6.11: Perceived IRB Relationship and Compliance Costs  
Perceived Better Relationship a Mean Compliance Costs (RM) b 
Yes (59) 11,596  
No (32) 8,240 
Neutral (84) 8,081 
Overall (175) 9,295  
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. 
b Compliance costs between response categories is significant at the one percent level. 
 
As for the other aspects, both positive and negative associations are evident (see Table 
6.10 above). Positive associations are observed for tax complexity, the tax rate structure 
and tax incentives. The findings suggest that the higher the tax complexity level, the 
better perceived the tax rate structure and the higher the expectation for tax incentives, 
this would lead to higher compliance costs respectively. On the other hand, a negative 
association for tax fairness and tax audits indicates that a low fairness level and a low 
chance of a tax audit would possibly lead to higher compliance costs. However, with the 
exception of the perceived IRB relationship, a lack of statistical significance provides 
an unconvincing association between compliance costs and the other five tax attitudinal 
aspects. 
 
 
6.6 RELATIONSHIP OF TAX BEHAVIOUR AND COMPLIANCE COSTS 
 
The relationship between compliance costs and likely tax compliance behaviour is 
measured by way of correlation analysis. Similar to tax attitudes, responses to the likely 
tax behaviour remained in their original form of a five-point Likert scale. The 
correlation coefficients for understatement of income, overstatement of deductions, and 
to both non-compliance suggest a very weak direct association between compliance 
costs estimates and non-compliance behaviours, as shown in Table 6.12. An increase 
(or decrease) in compliance costs would probably lead to non-compliance (or 
compliance) behaviour. Though the direction of both relationships is in the expected 
direction, this study fails to provide any statistical significance. 
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Table 6.12: Tax Behaviour and Compliance Costs: Correlation Analysis 
 Non-compliance Type Compliance Costs 
Understatement of Income + 0.002 
Overstatement of Deductions + 0.009 
Both Non-compliance a + 0.007 
Positive (+) sign denotes a direct relationship.   
a This refers to the combined category of both understatement of income and overstatement 
of deductions. 
 
Further, compliance costs are analysed by way of the three response categories, i.e. 
SMEs with compliant, non-compliant and neutral views. This analysis is carried out to 
get an impression on the magnitude of compliance costs towards compliance behaviour. 
The mean compliance costs by both the underreporting of income and overstating of 
deductions respectively are presented in Table 6.13. 
 
Table 6.13: Understatement of Income and Mean Compliance Costs 
Tax Behaviour a Mean Compliance Cost (RM) 
Complying SMEs (102)   9,620 
Non-complying SMEs (31) 10,269 
Neutral (39)  7,424 
Overall  (172)    9,239 b 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. 
b The costs are less than the reported mean compliance costs of RM9,295 due to differences 
in the response number. 
 
Complying SMEs with likely reporting behaviour tend to have relatively lower 
compliance costs (RM9,620) than those with likely non-complying behaviour 
(RM10,269), as shown in Table 6.13. Those with neutral responses have the lowest 
costs (RM7,424). The results seem to suggest that SMEs with higher compliance costs 
possibly tend to not comply in terms of income reporting. However, mean comparisons 
by way of the statistical t-test did not indicate any significant association between 
compliance costs and understatement of income, at the five percent significant level. 
 
  171
On the contrary, no clear trends of compliance costs are noticeable in the case of 
overstating deductions, as shown in Table 6.14.  This finding suggests that the 
compliance costs are about the same as their overall mean compliance costs regardless 
of their likely tax behaviour. The statistical t-test155 also suggests a lack of a significant 
relationship between overstatement of deductions and compliance costs level. 
 
Table 6.14: Overstatement of Deductions and Mean Compliance Costs    
Tax Behaviour a Mean Compliance Cost (RM) 
Complying SMEs (71) 9,293 
Non-complying SMEs (51) 9,389 
Neutral (50) 9,010 
Overall (172)   9,239 b 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. 
b The costs are less than the reported mean compliance costs of RM9,295 due to 
differences in the response number. 
 
Additionally, the relationship between compliance costs and likely tax compliance 
behaviour is investigated for the non-compliance involving part of the RM10,000 as 
well. A similar finding is observed for partial non-compliance as well, as shown in 
Table 6.15. The likely complying respondents to both reporting behaviour and 
deduction behaviour have lower compliance costs (RM7,794 and RM8,884 
respectively) than those who are likely not to comply (RM10,609 and RM9,690 
respectively).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
155 At the five percent significant level. 
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Table 6.15: Partial Non-compliance Behaviour and Mean Compliance Costs 
Tax Behaviour  
Understatement  
of Income a 
Overstatement  
of Deductions a 
 Mean (RM)  Mean (RM)  
Complying SMEs    7,794 (66) 8,884 (72) 
Non-complying SMEs 10,609 (41) 9,690 (52) 
Neutral   8,760 (65) 8,948 (48) 
Overall b   9,239  (172) 9,239 (172) 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. 
b The costs are less than the reported overall mean compliance costs of RM9,295 due to differences in the 
response number. 
 
Overall, having observed a lack of a statistical relationship between compliance costs 
and possible compliance behaviour independently, for both compliance situations 
(whether measured for the full RM10,000 and/or part of the amount for each tax 
situation), it is important to analyse non-compliance behaviour at the SME level. For 
this purpose, only respondents with likely compliance behaviour to both underreporting 
and overstating situations are categorised as complying SMEs. Non-complying SMEs 
are those respondents with non-compliance to one or both situations. Additionally, there 
were also SMEs that chose to be indifferent for both non-compliance situations.  
 
Compliance costs by these classifications are summarised and presented in Table 6.16. 
Although complying SMEs seem to have relatively higher compliance costs (RM9,776) 
than non-complying SMEs (RM9,233), the margin is reasonably small, i.e. less than six 
percent. The statistical t-test also failed to indicate an association between compliance 
costs and compliance behaviour at the SME level.156  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
156 At the five percent significant level. 
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Table 6.16: Compliance Behaviour and Mean Compliance Costs: Firm Level 
Tax Behaviour a Mean Compliance Cost (RM) 
Complying SMEs (60) 9,776 
Non-complying SMEs (88) 9,233 
Neutral (24) 7,919 
Overall (172)    9,239 b 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. 
b The costs are less than the reported mean compliance costs of RM9,295 due to differences in the 
response number. 
 
Overall, the current study does not indicate any significant statistical relationship 
between compliance costs and likely compliance behaviour. Regardless of the amount 
in consideration, either RM10,000 or part of the RM10,000, a similar finding is evident. 
 
 
6.7 DETERMINANTS OF COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR 
 
A regression analysis was carried out to examine the determinants of SME income tax 
non-compliance. Two main regression analyses were carried out separately for each of 
the two likely behaviours: understatement of income (Model 1) and overstatement of 
deductions (Model 2). Additionally, a third regression analysis was also conducted by 
combining both types of non-compliance at the SME level (Model 3). The independent 
variables included were those relating to SME business characteristics, tax attitudinal 
aspects and compliance costs estimates. Business characteristics include four variables: 
sector, length, size, and tax liability. The annual turnover criterion is used as the 
primary size measure. Further regression analyses were performed for all the three 
models by employing the staff and NSDC size measure respectively. Technically, the 
regression model takes the following form: 
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Where: 
 
 
Dependent Variables: Non-compliance Behaviour 
 
Types of Tax Behaviour  Measurement 
   
Understatement of Income  
[Model 1]  
 
: Agreement towards underreporting of income 
was obtained via a five-point Likert scale. Higher 
scores indicate likely non-compliance behaviour. 
 
Overstatement of Deductions  
[Model 2] 
: Agreement towards overstatements of deductions 
was obtained via a five-point Likert scale. Higher 
scores indicate likely non-compliance behaviour. 
 
Both Non-compliances   
[Model 3] 
: An average of scores from Model 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-Compliance Behaviour 
= ∂ 0 + β1Sector + β2 Year + β3 Size + β4 Tax + β5Complexity 
+ β6 Fairness + β7 Rate + β8 Relationship + β9Audit + β10 Incentives 
+ β11Costs + ei 
 
Equation 6.1 
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Independent Variables: 
Business Sector 
[Sector] 
: There are five sectors: manufacturing, manufacturing-related 
services, services, construction, and other. The ‘other’ sector 
had two respondents and thus were excluded. For the 
purpose of regression analysis, three dummy variables were 
used with the services sector as the reference sector.  
 
Business Length 
[Year] 
: Business length was reclassified into two categories: up to 
five years and more than five years. A category of less than 
two years in the actual survey was merged due to low 
responses. 
 
Business Size : (to use one proxy at one time) 
  Annual Turnover [Turnover], or 
The original six levels of turnover were classified into four 
levels due to the low number of responses in the last three 
categories. For regression purposes, three dummy variables 
were created with a turnover level of between RM250,000 
and RM1 million as the reference level. 
 
 
 
 Number of Staff [Staff], or 
Only four levels of staff are considered. The fifth level was 
excluded since it has only one response. For regression 
purposes, three dummy variables were used with number of 
staff between five and nineteen as the reference staff group. 
 
  Size NSDC [NSDC] 
Responding companies were re-classified into micro, small 
and medium enterprises following the NSDC definition. For 
the purposes of regression analysis, two dummy variables 
were created with small enterprises as a reference category. 
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Estimated Tax 
[Tax] 
: The original six levels of the estimated tax were reduced to 
three so as to recognise a low number of responses in the last 
four levels. For the purpose of regression analysis, two 
dummy variables were used with the tax level of between 
RM1 and RM100,000 as a reference level. 
 
Tax Complexity 
[Complexity] 
: Three statements were used to measure tax complexity via a 
five-point Likert scale. Higher scores indicate higher tax 
complexity. 
 
Tax Fairness 
[Fairness] 
: Five statements were used to measure tax fairness via a five-
point Likert scale. Three types of response scale were 
employed: strongly agree to strongly disagree; much less fair 
to much more fair; and much less taxes to much more taxes. 
Higher scores indicate higher tax fairness. 
 
Tax Rate  
[Rate] 
: Three statements were used to measure the tax rate 
perception via a five-point Likert scale.  Higher scores 
indicate higher tax rate fairness. 
 
IRB Relationship 
[Relationship] 
: The perceived relationship with the IRB was measured via a 
five-point Likert scale to a single statement. Higher scores 
indicate a better relationship with the IRB official. 
 
Tax Audit  
[Audit] 
: A single statement was used on the probability of tax audit 
via a five-point Likert scale. The higher the scores, the 
greater the likelihood of tax auditing.  
 
Tax Incentives  
[Incentives] 
: A single statement was used to measure views related to tax 
incentives via a five-point Likert scale. Higher scores 
indicate agreement towards further incentives. 
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Compliance Costs 
[Costs] 
: Compliance costs estimation was made up of internal staff 
costs, external tax fees and other non-staff costs on tax 
activities. The compliance costs range from RM612 to 
RM37,773 (see Chapter Five, Table 5.25). For regression 
purposes, compliance costs estimates were transformed into 
log10 to reduce the skewness of the variable (skewness). 
 
Assessments of the assumptions underlying regression analysis revealed that all the four 
assumptions, i.e. normality, linearity, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity, were not 
violated. Further details are presented in Appendix R. A summary result of regressions 
analysis, by using turnover as a primary business size proxy, is presented in Table 6.17. 
Detailed results are presented in Appendix S, Table S.1. 
 
Table 6.17: Summary of Results of Multiple Regressions 
 Understatement  
of Income 
(Model 1) 
Overstatement  
of Deductions 
(Model 2) 
Both  
Non-compliance 
(Model 3) 
Results:    
R2 0.122 0.176 0.172 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.089 0.084 
Standard Error 1.204 1.250 1.059 
F-value 1.315 2.016 1.958 
P-value 0.195   0.015 a    0.019 a 
a Significant at the five percent level. 
 
The regression models were statistically significant (at the five percent level) in relation 
to overstatement of deductions and to both types of non-compliance, as shown in Table 
6.17. Around nine percent of the variability of overstatement of deductions is accounted 
for by the independent variables in Model 2. Three variables, namely sector, tax 
complexity, and tax audit, were found to be significant determinants of overstating 
behaviour. The results suggest that SMEs with a high perceived complexity level, low 
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likelihood of tax audit, and SMEs in the construction sector were likely to be non-
compliant in terms of accuracy of tax deductions.  
 
As for the combined non-compliant model (Model 3), the same three variables 
(business sector, level of tax complexity, and likelihood of tax audit) are found to be 
determinants of both types of non-compliance behaviour. Additionally, business length 
is found to be a significant determinant, suggesting that SMEs with less than five years 
in business were likely to demonstrate non-compliant behaviour. As for understatement 
of income (Model 1), similar variables (tax complexity, tax audit and business length) 
are found to be among significant indicators of income reporting behaviour as well. 
Nonetheless, the income reporting model (Model 1) is not significant at the five percent 
level 
 
Similar findings are also observed for the alternative business size measures. 
Additionally, business length is also found to be a significant determinant of overstating 
behaviour in terms of the NSDC size measure. A detailed result of multiple regressions 
by the alternate size measure (staff and NSDC) is presented in Appendix S, Table S.2. 
Overall, regressions analyses suggest that tax complexity, probability of tax audits, 
business sector and business length have a significant influence on the accuracy of tax 
deductions and overall tax reporting behaviour at the SME level. 
 
 
6.8 FINDINGS OF THE WEB SURVEY 
 
6.8.1 Introduction 
The attitudinal aspects of corporate income tax and the likely compliance behaviour of 
the respondents in a web survey are presented at the overall mean scores. All analysis 
presented in this section follows a similar approach to the postal survey, except with 
regard to each specific response. Analysis for each attitudinal aspect and behavioural 
item is not considered in more detail as recognition of the low number of responses in 
the specific response category. Details of responses are presented in Appendix N, Table 
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N.11. Similar to the postal survey, the measurements used are considered adequate, both 
in terms of reliability and validity. 
 
6.8.2 Tax Attitudes 
Key findings on all six attitudinal aspects are shown in Table 6.18. For tax complexity, 
a mean score of 3.60 illustrates the perceived complex nature of corporate income 
taxation. In terms of tax structure, mean scores of 3.45 demonstrate the corporate tax 
rate is perceived to be relatively fair. A similar finding is observed in terms of tax law 
fairness. For tax incentives, a mean score of more than four indicates a high expectation 
of tax incentives for SMEs.  However, a neutral view is evident for the relationship 
between the IRB and SMEs. Similarly, a mean score of 2.90 indicates an almost neutral 
view with regards to the probability of a company being selected for a tax audit. 
 
Table 6.18:  Tax Attitudes in the Web Survey 
Tax Aspects Mean  Median Standard Deviation 
Complexity 3.60 3.67 0.80 
Fairness  3.34 3.40 0.67 
Rate  3.45 3.67 1.11 
Incentives  4.12 5.00 1.28 
Audit 2.90 3.00 1.42 
IRB Relationship 3.04 3.00 1.09 
Number of respondents equals 75. 
 
Additionally, analysis of tax attitudes by respondents’ business characteristics reveals 
no statistical difference between respondents, except for tax fairness at the ten percent 
significant level. Small and Medium Enterprises that are subjected to a tax of more than 
RM100,000 perceived corporate income taxation as fair (3.67) compared to those not 
subjected to tax (3.12). 
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6.8.3 Tax Behaviour 
Analysis of mean scores indicates that respondents lean towards compliance in terms of 
income reporting, but are indifferent for deduction of expenses, as shown in Table 6.19. 
A combined mean score of 2.78 for both non-compliance situations demonstrates that 
SMEs are prone to compliant behaviour.  
 
Table 6.19: Respondents’ Views towards Non-compliance Behaviour (Web Survey)  
Non-compliance Type Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Understatement of Income 2.48 3.00 1.35 
Overstatement of Deductions  3.06 3.00 1.33 
Both Non-compliance a 2.78 3.00 1.20 
Number of respondents equals 72. Three values are missing.  
a This refers to the combined category of both understatement of income and overstatement of deductions. 
 
In terms of non-compliance for part of the RM10,000, the highest response received 
(nearly 39 percent, as shown in Table 6.20) indicates an indifferent view for both 
situations, followed by compliant behaviour. However, caution needs to be taken as all 
the three response categories had less than 30 responses each. 
 
Table 6.20: Respondents’ Views towards Partial Non-compliance Behaviour (Web 
Survey) 
Possibility of   
Non-compliance 
Partial  
Understatement of Income 
Partial  
Overstatement of Deductions
 
Number of  
Respondents 
Percentage 
 
Number of  
Respondents 
Percentage 
 
Yes 18 25.0 20 28.6 
No 26 36.1 23 32.9 
Unsure 28 38.9 27 38.6 
Total           72 a 100.0            70 a     100.0 
a Number of respondents less than 75 due to missing cases.   
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6.8.4 Relationship of Tax Attitudes, Behaviour and Compliance Costs 
The relationship between tax attitudes and likely tax behaviour is presented first, 
followed by the relationship of both tax attitudinal and behavioural aspects towards 
compliance costs. The tax rate structure and tax audits are significantly associated with 
each and both types of non-compliance behaviour in a positive direction, as shown in 
Table 6.21. Additionally, tax complexity and tax incentives are associated with 
understatement of income and overstatement of deductions respectively. Tax incentives 
are also positively correlated to combined non-compliance behaviour. A significant 
correlation is observed as well between the two types of tax behaviour, suggesting 
compliance in terms of one aspect is very likely to influence the other behaviour, as 
shown in Table 6.21. 
 
Table 6.21: Tax Attitudes and Behaviour: Correlation Analysis (Web Survey) 
  Understatement 
of Income 
Overstatement  
of Deductions 
Both  
Non-compliance 
Tax Attitudes:    
Complexity - 0.280 b - 0.24 - 0.197 
Fairness - 0.29 + 0.13 + 0.002 
Rate + 0.296 b + 0.268 b + 0.321 a 
Incentives + 0.183 + 0.305 b + 0.257 a  
Audit + 0.407 a + 0.265 b + 0.394 a 
IRB relationship + 0.085 + 0.050 + 0.075 
Tax Behaviour:    
Understatement of Income - + 0.566 a + 0.893 a 
Overstatement of Deductions + 0.566 a - + 0.884 a 
Positive (+) or negative (-) signs denote a direct or indirect relationship respectively.   
a Significant at the one percent level. b Significant at the five percent level.  
 
On the contrary, all tax attitudinal aspects and tax behaviour (by each type and 
combined non-compliance) are found to be not statistically associated to compliance 
costs of taxation, as shown in Table 6.22.  This finding fails to provide the relevancy of 
compliance costs in the context of tax attitudes and likely tax behaviour of SMEs.   
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Table 6.22: Tax Attitudes, Behaviour and Compliance Costs: 
Correlation Analysis (Web Survey) 
  Compliance Costs 
Tax Attitudes:  
- Complexity + 0.092 
- Fairness + 0.006 
- Rate - 0.086 
- Incentives - 0.061 
- Audits + 0.078 
- IRB Relationship - 0.063 
Tax Behaviour:  
- Understatement of Income + 0.006 
- Overstatement of deduction + 0.072 
- Both Non-compliance a + 0.039 
Positive (+) or negative (-) signs denote a direct or indirect relationship 
respectively.   
a This refers to the combined category of both understatement of income and 
overstatement of deductions. 
 
 
6.8.5 Determinants of Compliance Behaviour 
Regression analysis indicates that all three models (i.e. understatement of income, 
overstatement of deductions, both non-compliances) are significant; however, at a 
different statistical level, as shown in Table 6.23. The adjusted R2 suggest that 21 
percent, 17 percent and 25 percent of the variations are explained by the independent 
variables in the Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Probability of tax audits and perception 
towards the tax rate are the two variables found to be significant in all three models. 
Further, tax complexity and tax incentives are also significant in Model 2 and the other 
two models (1 and 3) respectively. Detailed results are presented in Appendix N, Table 
N.12. 
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Table 6.23: Summary of Results of Multiple Regressions (Web Survey) 
 Understatement  
of Income 
(Model 1) 
Overstatement  
of Deductions 
(Model 2) 
Both  
Non-compliance 
(Model 3) 
Results:    
R2 0.394 0.373 0.428 
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.169 0.252 
Standard Error 1.198 1.218 1.035 
F-value 2.115 1.825 2.431 
P-value 0.022 b 0.055 c 0.008 a 
a Significant at the one percent level. b Significant at the five percent level. c Significant at the 10 
percent level.  
 
As for alternative size measure, regression analyses indicate almost identical findings 
with regards to the statistical significance of the models, and also in terms of factors 
influencing tax non-compliance. Detailed regression results by the alternative size 
measure are presented in Appendix N, Table N.13. Evidence shows that the probability 
of tax audits and tax rate fairness are significant in all three models’ analyses by 
alternative size measures as well. Additionally, tax complexity and tax incentives are 
significant in some models respectively, e.g. tax complexity in Models 1 and 3; tax 
incentives in Models 2 and 3. Other variables, such as sector and tax level, are also 
significant in Model 2. 
 
 
6.9 FINDINGS OF THE PROFESSIONAL SURVEY 
 
6.9.1 Responses and Profile  
The sample population comprised of 300 members of the Malaysian Institute of 
Taxation (MIT).157 Thirty-one respondents completed the questionnaires giving a 
response rate of 10.3 percent. This response rate is considered low, but reasonable, as 
no follow-up procedures were carried out and accessing a professional accountant is 
                                                 
157 See Chapter Four, subsection 4.11.2. 
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usually difficult. The profile of respondents is presented in Table 6.24. A large majority 
of the respondents (84 percent) work either in a non big-four firm or tax firm, and the 
remainder (16 percent) work in a big-four accounting firm. Around 65 percent of the 
respondents are partners, followed by 23 percent of managers. A large number of 
respondents indicated having specific-tax experience for more than 10 years (71 
percent) or at least for five years (19 percent). 
 
Table 6.24: Profile of Responding Tax Professionals 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Workplace   
Big-four Firm 5 16.1 
Non Big-four Firm 15 48.4 
Tax Firm 11 35.5 
Position   
Partner 20 64.5 
Manager 7 22.6 
Supervisor 1 3.2 
Senior 3 9.7 
Tax Experience    
Less than 5 years 3 9.7 
5 to 10 years 6 19.4 
More than 10 years 22 71.0 
Overall 31   100.0 
Number of respondents equals 31. 
 
In terms of tax clients, responding professionals indicate that on average, 81 percent of 
their tax clients are SMEs, with around 81 percent of those SME clients in the form of 
companies, as shown in Table 6.25. In other words, almost two-thirds of all tax clients 
of the responding tax professionals are SME companies.  
 
 
  185
Table 6.25: Average SME Tax-client: All Firm-types and Companies 
SME tax client Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
All firm-types (%) 81 25 100 21 
Companies (%) 81 30 100 19 
Number of respondents equals 31. 
 
Section B of the tax professional survey requested responses on three aspects: first, the 
average tax fees charged by tax professionals to SME companies in 2006 and its 
computational-planning costs percentages; secondly, tax-related difficulties faced by 
SME companies; and, thirdly, the main reason for SME companies employing tax 
professionals. Both the second and third aspects are requested from the tax 
professional’s perspective. 
 
Tax professionals were specifically asked to state both their lowest and highest range of 
tax fees charged to SME companies. Overall, the lowest fees charged range between 
RM200 and RM5,000 and the highest fees range from as low as RM500 to as high as 
RM15,000. These figures are used to compute the overall average fees charged by the 
responding tax professionals. Thus, at the respondent level, the overall average tax fee 
is estimated at RM3,023, as shown in Table 6.26.  
 
Table 6.26: Average Tax Fees, 2006: Tax Professionals’ Views 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Tax Fees (RM) 3,023 375 9,000 2,500 
Number of respondents equals 31. 
 
Tax professionals appear to indicate a high computational component of compliance 
costs. Specifically, the average computational and planning costs were estimated at 85 
and 15 percent of compliance costs respectively, as shown in Table 6.27. 
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Table 6.27: Tax Fees Composition into Computational and Planning Costs: Tax 
Professionals’ Views 
Cost Nature Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Computational (%) 85 50 100 15 
Planning (%) 15 0 50 15 
Number of respondents equals 31. 
 
Estimating income tax payable and understanding income tax legislation are ranked as 
the main tax-related difficulties faced by the SME companies, with almost 78 percent of 
the respondents indicating those possibilities respectively, as shown in Table 6.28. The 
third difficulty is expanding the record keeping requirements for tax purposes (61 
percent). The least ranked difficulty, as expected, is dealing with external advisors. 
 
Table 6.28: Tax-related Difficulties for SMEs: Tax Professionals’ Views 
 Number of Overall Percent 
 Responses Percent of Cases 
Estimating Income Tax payable 24 16.1 77.4 
Understanding Income Tax legislation 24 16.1 77.4 
Increasing burden of record keeping for     
tax purposes 
19 12.8 61.3 
Cash flow position to pay monthly tax 
instalments 
19 12.8 61.3 
Implementing the Income Tax changes 18 12.1 58.1 
Dealing with the tax authority 18 12.1 58.1 
Maintaining records for Income Tax purpose 17 11.4 54.8 
Short period of time to lodge the tax return 8 5.4 25.8 
Dealing with external tax advisers 2 1.3 6.5 
Total 149 a 100.0 - 
a Number of respondents equals 31. Total responses are higher as respondents were allowed to select 
more than one aspect.   
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Nearly 97 percent of the respondents believed that the lack of technical knowledge 
within the SME is the main reason for SMEs employing tax professionals, as shown in 
Table 6.29. The next stated reason is the complexity of the tax laws (65 percent), 
followed by cost factors (55 percent) and tax planning purposes (55 percent). The least 
ranked reason is a demand for an external opinion (48 percent). 
 
Table 6.29: Main Reason for SMEs using Tax Professionals: Tax Professionals’ 
Views 
 Number of Overall Percent 
 Responses Percent of Cases 
Technical knowledge is not readily available 
internally 
30 30.3 96.8 
Income tax matters are too complicated 20 20.2 64.5 
It is more cost-effective to use external tax 
professionals 
17 17.2 54.8 
For income tax planning 17 17.2 54.8 
External opinion was required 15 15.2 48.4 
Total           99 a  100.0         - 
a Number of respondents equals 31. Total responses are higher as respondents were allowed to select 
more than one aspect.   
 
 
6.9.2 Tax Attitudes and Behaviour from Tax Professionals’ Viewpoints 
A survey of professionals has six attitudinal aspects (similar to postal and web survey) 
plus another aspect on the benefit of record keeping. Findings on tax attitudes are 
presented at the overall mean scores for each of the seven aspects respectively. Mean 
analysis of each individual statement is presented in Appendix T, Table T.1. As for tax 
behaviour, analysis follows a similar approach to the postal and web survey. A detailed 
analysis of response categories is not considered in this section due to the low number 
of responses, both in the overall and specific response categories.  
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The highest mean score is observed for record keeping benefits (3.87), followed by tax 
incentives (3.84), as shown in Table 6.30. This suggests the respondents’ recognition of 
record keeping benefits and agreement about more tax incentives for SMEs. In terms of 
fairness, an average score of 3.32 demonstrates that the corporate tax system is 
perceived to be relatively fair. The lowest score for tax audits (2.48) signifies that tax 
professionals were somewhat doubtful with regards to the probability of their SME 
client being subjected to a tax audit. For the remaining attitudes, a mean score of around 
3.00 indicates that tax professionals are generally indifferent in terms of tax complexity, 
the tax rate structure, and the IRB relationship.  
 
Table 6.30:  Tax Professionals’ Views towards Tax Attitudes 
Tax Aspects Mean  Median Standard Deviation 
Complexity 3.19 3.33 0.56 
Rate  3.06 3.00 0.67 
Fairness  3.32 3.40 0.41 
Incentives  3.84 4.00 0.97 
Audit 2.48 3.00 1.09 
IRB Relationship 2.94 3.00 1.09 
Record Keeping Benefit 3.87 4.00 0.58 
Number of respondents equals 31.  
 
Regarding tax behaviour, mean scores of around two indicate that tax professionals lean 
towards tax compliance in all three cases, as shown in Table 6.31. Further, correlation 
analysis indicates that tax professionals that are compliant in terms of income reporting 
(or tax deductions) would probably be compliant with regards to tax deductions (or 
income reporting) as well. 
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Table 6.31: Tax Professionals’ Views towards Non-compliance Behaviour  
Non-compliance Type Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Understatement of Income 2.10 2.00 1.27 
Overstatement of Deductions  2.19 2.00 1.30 
Both Non-compliance 2.14 2.00 1.21 
Number of respondents equals 31.  
 
The relationship between tax attitudinal aspects and likely compliance behaviour 
examined by way of correlation analysis revealed no statistical association between any 
attitudinal aspects and any types of compliance behaviour. Similarly, regression 
analysis revealed none of the tax attitudes are statistically significant to any type of 
compliance behaviour from the tax professionals’ viewpoints. The independent 
variables considered only six tax attitudinal aspects, plus perception towards record 
keeping benefits. A summary of correlation and regressions analysis is presented in 
Appendix T, Tables T.2 and T.3. 
 
 
6.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has analysed the tax attitudes and likely tax behaviour of a business 
managerial respondent based on responses to the SME postal survey. Overall, the 
findings have shown that the Malaysian corporate tax system is perceived to be 
complex yet relatively fair in terms of tax laws and tax rate structure. Business 
respondents are anticipating more tax incentives from the government and believe that 
their relationship with the IRB has improved since the implementation of the SAS. One 
noteworthy aspect is that the respondents seem uncertain about the likelihood of the 
IRB performing tax audits on SMEs.  
 
In terms of likely compliance behaviour, SME companies are largely compliant towards 
both income reporting and tax deductions behaviour, either measured for the full 
amount of RM10,000 or part of the RM10,000. In terms of the relationship, the findings 
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indicate that the complexity of the corporate tax law and the probability of tax audits are 
statistically associated with both types of tax behaviour. The possibility of non-
compliance behaviour increases as the tax complexity level increases and the 
probability of tax audits decreases. Further, non-compliance in terms of income 
reporting (or tax deductions) could possibly affect the accuracy of the deductions (or 
income reporting). However, no statistical relationship is evident between tax 
compliance costs and the compliance behaviour of SMEs, measured both in terms of 
income reporting, tax deductions and at the SME level. Analysis of findings from a 
separate SME web survey and tax professionals’ postal survey have also been 
presented. Overall, both surveys support findings of the main SME postal survey. A 
further comparative analysis is made in Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
COMPARISON OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter compares key findings of the main SME postal survey and the SME web 
survey. A comparison is also made to the relevant findings in the tax professionals’ 
surveys. This chapter mainly focuses on the similarities and differences within the two 
SME surveys and with the tax professionals’ survey. This chapter also compares current 
findings with prior relevant findings, both in Malaysia and from an overall international 
perspective.  
 
 
7.2 COMPLIANCE COSTS ESTIMATES 
 
7.2.1 Comparison with Web Survey 
The compliance costs in both the SME postal and web surveys resulted in almost 
similar estimates of RM9,300 per SME company, as shown in Table 7.1. This 
comparable finding adds reliability to compliance costs estimates in the current study. 
The computational and planning costs percentages were also comparable between the 
surveys. However, the internal costs (or external tax fees) percentage in the postal 
survey was 11 percent lower (or higher) than the web survey. This difference may be 
partly due to the amount of tax expertise or knowledge available within the firm’s 
personnel. 
 
Evidence shows that more tax works were conducted by the Manager/Accountant in the 
web survey. The average internal time spent in the web survey (616 hours) is 41 hours 
higher than in the postal survey (575 hours),158 with relatively more hours (on average 
37 hours) spent by either the Manager or Accountant. Internal time costs in such 
occurrences are definitely high (as higher wage rates apply) compared to companies that 
                                                 
158 See Table 5.17 and Appendix N, Table N.7. 
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rely on other staff categories. The average wage rates are also relatively higher in the 
web survey in all four staff categories. For example, the average hourly wage rate for 
the Manager/Accountant in the web survey (RM3,591) was RM146 higher than the 
postal survey (RM3,445).159 At the same time, external tax fees are likely to be lower as 
more tax works, particularly computational in nature, are performed internally. It is 
important to note that the average wage rate used in the current study is based on the 
respondents’ figures (similar to Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994), thus varying between 
companies in the survey sample. The current study was mainly interested in the 
compliance costs estimates at the firm level. Thus, a standard wage rate approach, 
similar to the study by Evans et al. (1997) and Rametse (2006), was not employed. 
 
Table 7.1: Compliance Costs Estimation by Survey Method, 2006  
 Postal Survey Web Survey 
Tax Compliance Cost (RM) a  
- Average per Firm 
 
9,295 
 
9,282 
Component of Costs (RM) a   
- Computational    7,217 b (74) 7,362 b (75) 
- Planning    2,474 b (26) 2,409 b (25) 
Sources of Costs (RM) a   
- Internal c  5,509  (59) 6,498  (70) 
- External   3,786  (41) 2,784  (30) 
a All monetary values are in current year prices. The percentage is given in parentheses. 
b Total costs were not equal to average compliance costs due to differences in the response number. 
c Inclusive of non-staff additional costs. 
 
 
A comparable finding is evident as well in terms of costs distribution. The usual 
regressive pattern of compliance costs is confirmed, in both the postal and web survey, 
as shown in Table 7.2. The regressive nature of compliance costs upon small businesses 
is revealed with the lowest turnover level being around two percent more severe in the 
postal survey. Nonetheless, it must be noted that all turnover categories in the web 
                                                 
159 See Table 5.18 and Appendix N, Table N.8. 
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survey have less than 30 responses in each level. For the SME companies, overall 
compliance costs expressed as a percentage of turnover in both surveys result in the 
same figure, i.e. 0.19 percent. 
 
Table 7.2: Compliance Costs Distribution by Survey Method, 2006 
Turnover Level a Postal Survey Web Survey 
 Compliance Costs 
as a Percentage of Turnover 
Less than RM250,000 6.53 (37) 4.32 (19) 
RM250,000–RM999,999 1.13 (48) 1.54 (21) 
RM1,000,000–RM4,999,999 0.32 (46) 0.32 (24) 
RM5,000,000 or more 0.08 (44) 0.10 (11) 
Overall 0.19 (175) 0.19 (75) 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. The denominator used is the midpoint of the 
turnover category, except for the largest, where RM15 million is used, because the actual mean size 
of the turnover is not available. 
 
The gross and net aggregate compliance costs for the Malaysian SME companies 
indicate comparable estimates as well, as shown in Table 7.3.  
 
Table 7.3: Aggregate Compliance Costs by Survey Method, 2006 
 Postal Survey 
(RM million) 
Web Survey 
(RM million) 
Gross Compliance Costs 1,084.3 1,082.7 
(-) Tax Deductibility  195.6 191.0 
Net Compliance Costs 888.7 891.7 
    
Largely, findings indicate that the compliance costs estimates in the postal survey, both 
in terms of amount (at the SME and aggregate level) and costs distribution, are 
consistent and supported by the web survey.  
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7.2.2 Comparison with Prior Malaysian Studies 
This section compares compliance costs estimates to the Malaysian SME companies 
under the SAS regime (i.e. current study) with an earlier pre-SAS study by Hanefah, 
Ariff and Kasipillai (2001). The comparison is realistic as a similar approach was 
adopted in both studies,160 which was mainly based on Pope, Fayle and Chen (1994) in 
Australia, especially in terms of methodology.  
 
The average compliance costs of RM9,295 in the current study is almost 58 percent 
lower than the RM21,964 in the pre-SAS study, as shown in Table 7.4. The 16 percent 
increase in the proportion of external work demonstrates that tax professionals, as 
expected, play a significant role in the SAS regime. The increasing nature of routine or 
computational income tax work, from 59 percent to 74 percent, also corroborates the 
current estimate. 
                                                 
160 The main difference is with regard to SME definitions. The pre-SAS study defines SMEs as 
companies with employees not exceeding 150 and with annual sales turnover not exceeding RM250 
million. The current study adopts the newly standardised national definition (see Chapter One, subsection 
1.5.3). 
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Table 7.4: Compliance Costs of Malaysian Small and Medium Enterprises 
          Prior Study a Current Study b 
Tax year 1999 2006 
Scope  Corporate Income Tax Corporate Income Tax 
Coverage  Northern region of 
Peninsular Malaysia 
Peninsular Malaysia 
Tax Compliance Cost (RM) c  
- Average per Firm 
 
          21,964 
 
           9,295 
Component of Costs (RM) c   
- Computational 12,960 (59) 7,217 d (74) 
- Planning     9,004 (41) 2,474 d (26) 
Sources of Costs (RM) c      
- Internal  15,493 d (75)   5,509 (59) e 
- External     5,210 d (25) 3,786 (41) 
a Source: Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai (2001). The useable responses equal 67. 
b Data from the current study. The useable responses equal 175. 
c All monetary values are in current year prices. The percentage is given in parentheses. 
d This total is not equal to overall mean costs due to differences in the response number. 
e Inclusive of non-staff additional costs. 
Source: Adapted from Abdul-Jabbar and Pope (2008a, p. 305 - Table 9). 
 
A relatively high proportion of both external tax fees and computational costs is 
theoretically and practically reasonable in the SAS regime. However, the overall 
decrease in the compliance costs is contrary to the presumed expectation. To some 
extent, these cost decreases may be because it has been more than six years since the 
implementation of the SAS in Malaysia. The previous study related to the tax year 1999 
and the data was collected in 2000. It is important to highlight that there were two major 
tax changes announced in 1999 (Ministry of Finance Malaysia), namely the introduction 
of the SAS and the application of a current year basis to replace the existing preceding 
year basis.161 Another possible explanation for the compliance costs decline may relate 
to the economic climate when the previous study was conducted. A major Asian 
financial crisis during  the period of the prior study by Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 
                                                 
161 See Chapter Three, subsection 3.2.3 for details. 
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(2001) may have encouraged Malaysian SMEs to grossly overstate their compliance 
costs. The timing of the current study is perhaps suitable given that no major income tax 
changes took place during the study period, i.e. 2007 or tax year 2006. Moreover, the 
possibilities of high initial costs or start-up effects have been removed as the SAS has 
been in place for more than six years in 2007.  
 
A similar trend was evident in Australia. Evans et al. (1997) indicates that compliance 
costs (on the basis of tax revenue and gross domestic product) were found to be 
relatively lower, either at individual, business or overall levels, as compared to a series 
of studies lead by Pope (Pope, Fayle and Duncanson 1990; Pope, Fayle and Chen 1991, 
1993a, 1993b; Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994) prior to the SAS in Australia. However, 
methodological differences should be observed when comparing these studies in 
Australia.162 The fact that studies led by Pope were conducted prior to the SAS which 
began in 1992, and the study by Evans et al. (1997) was carried out during the SAS, is 
often overlooked and not highlighted in the literature (Mathieu, Waddams and Antwi 
2007, p. 2). As a result, and citing several other key compliance costs studies 
internationally, Mathieu, Waddams and Antwi (2007, pp. 2-3) emphasised the 
possibility of high total tax compliance costs in countries where the SAS is well 
established, low costs where the SAS is not implemented, and of intermediary costs for 
countries where the SAS has recently been introduced. The compliance costs level from 
these theoretical points of view and the current study is illustrated in Table 7.5.163 From 
this perspective, compliance costs estimates in the current study should be relatively 
higher than the pre-SAS study, at least initially. 
 
 
                                                 
162 For example, Evans et al. (1997) did not make comparison, either at the disaggregate level or in 
absolute terms, but rather expressed compliance costs at the aggregate level both as a percentage of tax 
revenue and GDP. 
163 Compliance costs expressed in different terms, i.e. to tax revenue or GDP, may result in a different 
interpretation, especially in terms of costs distribution (Ariff and Pope 2002, p. 42).  
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Table 7.5: Comparative Tax Compliance Costs Level a 
Stages of the SAS b International c Asia–Pacific d Malaysia e 
Pre-SAS Low Low Low 
SAS (introduction) Intermediate High - f 
Post-SAS (short term) - f Intermediate/High g Very Low 
Post-SAS (long term) High Low/Intermediate g - h 
The hyphen mark (-) indicates a period in which no study has been carried out, or is yet to be carried out. 
a In absolute dollar terms. See also Footnote 163. 
b Mathieu, Waddams and Antwi (2007) classifies countries in three stages: without the SAS (pre-SAS), 
recently implemented SAS (SAS) and well established SAS (post-SAS). The current author further 
divided post-SAS into short term and long term, as substantial periods of time are likely to be needed 
for the SAS to be well established.  
c Overall, covering all types of taxpayers (source: Mathieu, Waddams and Antwi 2007). 
d Mainly on public companies, covering Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong (source: Ariff 
and Pope 2002).  
e SME companies only (sources: Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 2001; and the current study). 
f  Possibly ‘intermediate’ or ‘high’. See also note b. 
g The level depends on the effectiveness of the SAS implementation (Ariff and Pope 2002).  
h Possibly ‘low’ or ‘intermediate’.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two,164 there were two compliance costs estimates of 
Malaysian SMEs conducted immediately prior to the SAS, and importantly after the 
government plan to introduce the SAS was announced. Unfortunately, no estimates 
were undertaken during the initial implementation of the SAS in Malaysia. It is likely 
that during the early stages of the SAS there could be a substantial increase in 
compliance costs and, eventually (i.e. after six years of SAS implementation), the costs 
decrease, as evident in the current study.  
 
The possible increase in the compliance costs, at least during the early years of the SAS 
implementation, was also anticipated in the Asia–Pacific countries, including Malaysia 
(Ariff and Pope 2002). For subsequent years, Ariff and Pope (2002, p. 277) stressed the 
likelihood of costs declining in the longer run, provided that the SAS was implemented 
effectively. Accordingly, they recommended further research to be undertaken to 
examine the compliance costs trend. Despite being contrary to the international trend 
(Mathieu, Waddams and Antwi 2007), the current lower estimates of compliance costs 
                                                 
164 See subsection 2.3.2.  
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provide support to the possible decreasing trend as anticipated by Ariff and Pope 
(2002). 
  
The significant decline is likely due to the effectiveness of the SAS implementation, 
mainly as a result of numerous simplification measures taken by the IRB. The most 
important of these include the substantial reduction of capital expenditure categories for 
capital allowance purposes, the simplification of the business basis period, the 
introduction of dual tax rates for SMEs, and permitting 100 percent capital allowance 
for small value assets during the relevant purchased year (effective from years of 
assessment 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2006 respectively).165 A similar trend is evident in 
Singapore. Ariff, Ismail and Loh (1997, p. 1258) found a significant decrease of 30 
percent in the tax compliance costs was evident just one year (1994 to 1995). They 
strongly believed that the decrease was primarily attributable to the simplification 
measures taken by the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS). Therefore, it is 
most likely that the numerous efforts taken by the IRB have resulted in significant 
benefits for the business community in Malaysia, SMEs in particular. Despite the low 
compliance costs finding in the current study, the regressive nature of compliance costs 
for SME business is even greater in the current estimates, as shown in Table 7.6.  
 
                                                 
165 See Chapter Three, subsection 3.2.3. 
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Table 7.6: Compliance Costs Distribution of Malaysian Small and Medium 
Enterprises 
Prior Study a Current Study b 
Turnover   
(RM Million) 
Compliance Costs  
as a Percentage of  
Turnover c 
Turnover  
(RM Million) 
Compliance Costs  
as a Percentage of 
Turnover d 
  Less than 0.25 6.53 
Less than 5 1.20 0.25 – 1 1.13 
  1- 5 0.32 
  5 or more  0.08 
5–50 0.07   
    
More than 50 0.02   
Overall 0.10 Overall 0.19 
a 1999 figures from Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai (2001). 
b 2006 data from the current main postal survey.  
c Computed using a similar approach to the current study as the information is not available in the 
previous study. These figures, however, should be treated cautiously. The denominator used is the 
midpoint of the turnover category, except for a category of more than RM50 million, where RM55 
million was used. For the overall category, RM23 million is used, which is derived by weighting the 
midpoints of the turnover level, rounded to the nearest million.  
d The denominator used is the midpoint of the turnover category, except for the largest, where RM15 
million is used. The denominator used for the overall category is RM5 million (see Table 5.32).  
 
 
Tax compliance costs expressed as a percentage of tax revenue also suggested a similar 
concern, as shown in Table 7.7. Compliance costs relative to tax liability have possibly 
grown slightly from almost eight percent during the OAS to just over nine percent under 
the SAS. However, these figures, which are derived under certain assumptions,166 
should be treated cautiously as the corresponding actual tax revenue is not available in 
both studies. A simple direct comparison, even within the same country, could be 
misleading (Evans et al. 1998, p. 110); thus a number of companies in the previous 
study (i.e. SME with turnover of over RM50 million), which certainly would not be 
considered as SMEs under the current definitions, were excluded in deriving the 1999 
                                                 
166 Refer note a, Table 7.7.  
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figures.167 Further, it must be emphasised that a lower tax rate applied in 2006 due to a 
tax rate deduction and the formation of dual tax rates for corporate SMEs.168 
 
Table 7.7: Compliance Costs Relative to Tax Liability a  
Tax Year Compliance  
Costs 
(RM) 
Tax  
  Liability b 
(RM) 
Compliance Costs 
as a  percentage of 
Tax Liability 
1999 c 1,400,787 18,038, 015 7.77 
2006 d 1,626,593 17,325,000 9.39 
a Based on sample companies. 
b Actual tax liability is not available. Data for 1999 refers to estimated tax as declared by the respondents. 
The tax liability in the current study is the sum of the midpoints of the estimated tax level as reported by 
the 172 respondents (see Table 5.12). For the tax level of RM1 million and above, RM1.5 million is used 
as a midpoint.  
c Figures from Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai (2001, p. 93 - Table 8), adjusted by excluding figures from 
respondents with turnover of over RM50 million. Some respondents in the turnover level between RM5 
million and RM50 million that may have exceeded RM25 million are not excluded due to lack of details.  
d Data from the current study. 
 
 
Despite a significant decline (58 percent) in average tax compliance costs in absolute 
terms, the regressive nature of compliance costs upon Malaysian small businesses 
remains an important area in tax policy considerations. Tax compliance costs as a 
percentage of tax liability raised further concern. The IRB is expected to continue its 
efforts in introducing further tax simplification measures to all business taxpayers. This 
policy is in line with recommendations made by Freedman (2009). The IRB may want 
to consider a specific policy on the compliance costs of SMEs in addressing their 
regressive nature in a more systematic and comprehensive approach.169 
 
 
                                                 
167 Refer note b, Table 7.7.  
168 In 1999, the corporate tax rate was 28 percent.  In 2006, SME companies with a taxable income of up 
to RM500,000 were subject to a tax rate of 20 percent, and 25 percent to the remainder. See also Chapter 
Three, subsection 3.2.3. Compliance costs percentage is sensitive to factors affecting tax revenue, 
particularly tax rates (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992, p. 111). 
169 See Chapter Eight, Section 8.3.  
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7.2.3 Comparison with International Studies 
Despite many differences, both in terms of taxation (e.g. structure, types and rates) and 
methodology (e.g. data quality, sample frame, response rates and timing of survey), 
international comparisons of the compliance costs estimates are useful to support the 
overall findings between countries (see especially Sandford 1995, pp. 405 - 408) and 
also within the same country (Evans et al. 1998, p. 109). A direct comparison of 
estimates may not be useful, thus researchers often employ compliance costs as 
proportions of tax revenue (Sandford 1995, p. 406) and/or GDP (Pope, Fayle and Chen 
1994, p. 85). The former is common in almost all international comparisons, but the 
latter has been suggested as a better measure (Pope 1994, p. 100; 2003, p. 70). Overall, 
tax compliance costs studies undertaken between the early 1980s and 2002 imply that 
compliance costs of a specific tax, e.g. personal income tax, corporate income tax, GST, 
are normally between two percent and 10 percent of the revenue yield from those taxes, 
or up to 2.5 percent of GDP (Evans 2003b, p. 71). 
 
Comparison of the Malaysian SME compliance costs estimates with relevant earlier 
international findings is useful in this context. Unfortunately, no previous international 
study focuses specifically on estimating tax compliance costs of SME companies,170 but 
mostly targets listed companies, with one study also including medium-sized 
companies.171 The earlier Malaysian study (Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai 2001) was the 
first to consider SME companies and the current study is probably the second.172 As 
such, a comparison is carried for relevant studies on corporate income taxation. Other 
major international studies that include corporations as part of their comprehensive 
studies on business income taxation, for example, those of  New Zealand (Sandford and 
Hasseldine 1992) and Australia (Evans et al. 1997) though useful to some extent, are 
not considered in detail in this comparison.  
 
                                                 
170 A Canadian study by Erard (1997b), although focused on SMEs, was concerned with SME perceptions 
about the compliance burden and did not estimate compliance costs. 
171 See Chapter Two, subsection 2.3.1. See also Appendix E. 
172 See earlier subsection 7.2.2 for comparison of these two Malaysian studies.  
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For this purpose, all prior studies in other Asian countries (Hong Kong, Singapore and 
India) are included as illustrative of developing countries, with only India adopting the 
SAS. Studies in Australia, the UK, the US and Canada represent corporate compliance 
costs in developed countries, with the US and Canada adopting the SAS since the early 
1940s, Australia in 1992, and more recently the UK implementing the SAS in 
1996/1997. All three Asian countries, Australia, the UK and Canada are 
Commonwealth Countries (and formerly part of the British Empire), which shared 
similar income tax provisions, particularly during the early years of their independence. 
Studies in Slovenia and Croatia are also compared in lieu of transitional countries. A 
summary of the key findings on corporate compliance costs in the current study in a 
comparison between selected countries is shown in Table 7.8.  
 
Overall, the current Malaysian study shows that computational components (in contrast 
to planning costs) are high compared to others corporate compliance costs studies, with 
two exceptions, namely Hong Kong and Australia. This finding is expected as the 
current Malaysian study is undertaken in the SAS regime. In terms of sources, an 
internal component also shows a similar trend, with a comparable high percentage 
observed in the US and transition countries. Under the SAS regime, the high trend of 
internal costs is expected, especially within SME companies. Nonetheless, a high 
internal component in the 1992 US study (Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996) is surprising 
as this study was confined to big corporations. 
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Table 7.8: Comparison of Corporate Compliance Costs Studies by Main Findings a 
Country b MAS SING HKG IND AUS US CAN UK SLO CRO 
Tax Year 2006 1999 1995 1995 1994 1995/ 
1996 
2001/ 
2002 
1986/ 
1987 
1990/ 
1991 
1992 1996 2001 1995 1986/
1987 
2002 2001/ 
2002 
Assessment System c SAS OAS OAS OAS OAS OAS SAS OAS OAS SAS SAS SAS SAS OAS SAS SAS 
Tax Rate (%) 20 d 28 30 27 27 16.5 38.5 49 39 39.1 e 39.9 e 40 e f 35 g 25 g 20 
Compliance Costs:                 
By Component (%)                 
- Computational 74 59 61 50 51 74 n/a 55 76 n/a n/a n/a h n/a n/a n/a 
- Planning   26 41 39 50 49 26 n/a 45 24 n/a n/a n/a h n/a n/a n/a 
By Sources (%)                   
- Internal  75  59 28 42 42 30 n/a 50 i 48 84 82 75 80 53 74 82 
- External   25 41 72 58 58 70 n/a 50 i 62 16 18 25 20 47 26 18 
Relative to:                 
- Tax revenue (%) 9.3 3.7 
7.7 j 
0.4 0.3 0.4 n/a 5.6 - 
14.5 
11.4 - 
23.7 
22.9 3.2 n/a 28.0 -
29.6 
5 2.2 4.2 k  11.8 
- GDP (%) 0.19 l n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.25 - 
0.53 
0.86 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.08 1.00 1.20 
a See Appendices D and E, for other details, including the full references. This comparison only covers specific studies on corporation and income taxation. However, a recent UK study on 
SME companies (Kauser et al. 2005) is not included as data needed for this table is not available (refer Chapter Two, subsection 2.3.1). 
b Malaysia (MAS), Singapore (SING), Hong Kong (HKG), India (IND), Australia (AUS), the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Slovenia (SLO) and Croatia (CRO). 
c During the study period, Self-Assessment System (SAS) or Official Assessment System (OAS). Australia implemented full SAS in 1992; the UK in 1996/1997.  
d This rate applies for SME companies having taxable income up to RM500,000. Any remainder income will be subject to the normal corporate rate of 26%. 
e This figure was taken from Mintz and Weichenrieder (2007). 
f Canadian corporations are subjected to both federal and provincial taxes. In 1995, the federal tax rate on large corporations was 21% and 28% for manufacturing and other sectors 
respectively, plus a surtax amounting to 1.12%. Provincial taxes range from 9% to 17%, with a special rate applying for the manufacturing sector in some jurisdictions (Erard 1997b). 
g A reduced rate applies for some companies. 
h This Canadian study classified compliance costs into three components: keeping records and filing; research and planning; and audit, appeals and litigation. 
i  Pope, Fayle and Chen (1991, p. 103) stated that external costs account for around half of total estimated compliance costs. No actual proportions were given. 
j Adjusted to represent the current definition of SMEs. See also Table 7.7, note b.  
k This figure represents costs for all three types of taxes paid by Slovenian corporations. 
l Estimated 2006 total compliance cost of SME companies of RM1,084 million divided by the 2006 GDP figure of RM572,555 million (current prices). The GDP amount is derived from the 
Economic Report (Treasury of Malaysia, 2007, Statistical Table 2.1). 
n/a - not available
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The Malaysian SME compliance costs expressed in terms of a percentage of tax 
revenue (nine percent) seems relatively high compared to almost all studies, with the 
exceptions of Australia at 23 percent (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1994) and Croatia at 12 
percent (Blazic 2004), and the recent US 2001 study at 28–30 percent (Slemrod and 
Venkatesh 2002). The fact that tax compliance costs of Australian companies were 
highly significant compared with other countries (as shown in Table 7.8) is not 
surprising as an international comparison on corporate compliance costs (Pope, Fayle 
and Chen 1994, pp. 99-100) and business compliance costs (Evans et al. 1997, pp. 75-
76) indicated such a trend earlier. Comparison with the US 2001 study should be treated 
more cautiously as this study included a sample population that pays no taxes,173 which 
elevated the compliance costs ratio as a result of lower tax revenue (i.e. the 
denominator).174 
 
The tax compliance costs relative to tax revenue in the earlier US study (Slemrod and 
Blumenthal 1996) was 3.2 percent. As a useful comparison, income tax compliance 
costs of all businesses—including corporations—as a percentage of tax revenue, ranged 
from as low as 2.8 percent in the UK (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989), four 
percent in the Netherlands (Allers 1994) to as high as 15.8 percent in Australia (Evans 
et al 1997) and 19.6 percent in New Zealand (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992). Overall, 
the current Malaysian estimate of around nine percent, although it could be of some 
concern, is within the international range of between two percent and 10 percent of tax 
revenue as observed by Evans (2003b, p. 71).   
 
In terms of GDP, with the exception of the UK study, the 2006 Malaysian corporate 
SME compliance costs of nearly 0.2 percent is the lowest when compared to companies 
in Australia (0.9 percent), Slovenia (one percent) and Croatia (1.2 percent). Comparison 
with earlier Asian studies unfortunately is not possible, as the current study is the first to 
estimate total compliance costs in Malaysia. In terms of all businesses, including 
corporations, an international comparison of major studies in the UK (Sandford, 
                                                 
173 Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) referred to this firm as ‘a pass-through entity’ and argued that the costs 
portion would be significantly lower if the effects of these entities are excluded.  
174 See Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002, p. 27) for full details.  
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Godwin and Hardwick 1989),175 New Zealand (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992), the 
Netherlands (Allers 1994) and Australia (Evans et al 1997) indicates a ratio of income 
tax compliance costs of between one and two percent of corresponding GDP.  
 
Despite some similarities among these studies, especially for companies, analysis 
should be made cautiously due to differences in company size, tax features and 
methodology. More importantly, the considerable lag between those studies should be 
noted. For example, the lag between the current study and the 1986/1987 UK (Sandford, 
Godwin and Hardwick 1989) and 1986/1987 Australian (Pope, Fayle and Chen 1991) 
studies is over 20 years, and over 10 years for most of the other studies. It seems that 
only four studies have been conducted since 2000, including the current study. It is 
observed that most of the recent international compliance costs studies (with the 
exception of Asian studies) tend to focus on VAT/GST payers (see for example, 
Hasseldine and Hansford 2002; Rametse and Pope 2002; Yesegat 2009). This trend is 
not surprising due to the introduction of GST/VAT in many countries and, more 
importantly, as a result of high compliance costs and its regressivity towards GST/VAT 
payers (Sandford 1995, p. 5). The GST is yet to be introduced in Malaysia. As 
discussed in Chapter One,176  the current study emphasises corporations, as tax revenue 
from this sector is highly significant in Malaysia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
175 The percentage for the UK was cited in Pope (1994, p. 100 - Table 9).  
176 See Chapter One, subsection 1.2.1. 
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7.3 TAX ATTITUDES 
 
7.3.1 Comparison with Web Survey 
Tax attitudes of respondents in both SME surveys largely illustrated similar perceptions, 
as shown in Table 7.9. Comparatively, mean scores are slightly higher for tax attitudinal 
aspects in the web survey, except for tax incentives and the IRB relationship. The 
ranking of mean scores also indicated similar patterns in both surveys. The highest 
score for the web survey is recorded for tax incentives (4.12) and the lowest mean for 
tax audit (2.90). Despite some small variations, the overall findings show that corporate 
income tax laws are complex, but relatively fair in terms of both tax law and tax rate 
structure. More tax incentives are anticipated to the SME sector. The SME relationship 
with the IRB is perceived to be somewhat neutral since the implementation of the SAS. 
Finally, respondents are leaning towards disagreement or an almost neutral view about 
the low chances of tax auditing in the SMEs.  
 
Table 7.9: Tax Attitudes by Survey Method 
Tax  Aspects Postal Survey Web Survey 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Tax Complexity 3.56 3.67 3.60 3.67 
Tax Rate  3.34 3.33 3.45 3.67 
Tax Fairness  3.22 3.20 3.34 3.40 
Tax Incentives  4.15 4.00 4.12 5.00 
IRB Relationship 3.15 3.00 3.04 3.00 
Tax Audit 2.75 3.00 2.90 3.00 
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7.3.2 Comparison with Tax Professionals’ Survey 
Perceptions of SME respondents regarding all tax attitudinal aspects differ slightly from 
the responding tax professionals. Mean scores in the tax professionals’ survey (see 
Table 7.10) are relatively lower, except for fairness of tax law. Despite this trend, the 
order of mean scores indicated a similar pattern, with the highest and lowest score 
recorded for tax incentives (3.84) and tax audits (2.48) respectively. The lower score in 
a few aspects has resulted in different interpretations. SME respondents perceived 
corporate income taxation as complex but relatively fair in terms of both tax law and the 
tax rate structure. Comparatively, tax professionals perceived corporate taxation to be 
less complex, fairer, but neutral with regards to the tax rate structure. Recognising their 
knowledge and expertise in the area of taxation, a lower tax complexity level and higher 
tax fairness as perceived by the tax professionals is not surprising. A neutral view on the 
tax rate structure is comprehensible as tax professionals may not be concerned too much 
about the tax rate of their client. Perhaps the amount of tax paid, or more importantly 
tax savings, is more relevant to their role as an advisor. 
 
In terms of tax audits, professionals are more inclined towards disagreeing with the 
likely low chances of tax auditing in SMEs compared to SME respondents who disagree 
but lean slightly to an indifferent view. Tax professionals are regularly in touch with the 
IRB officers on behalf of their SME clients. Thus, practically, they might have more 
knowledge with regards to tax auditing data from the IRB. 
 
Table 7.10: Tax Attitudes of SMEs and Tax Professionals  
Tax  Aspects Postal Survey Professional Survey 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Tax Complexity 3.56 3.67 3.19 3.33 
Tax Rate  3.34 3.33 3.06 3.00 
Tax Fairness  3.22 3.20 3.32 3.40 
Tax Incentives  4.15 4.00 3.84 4.00 
IRB Relationship 3.15 3.00 2.94 3.00 
Tax Audit 2.75 3.00 2.48 3.00 
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However, acknowledging the role of tax professionals, a few differences in tax 
attitudinal aspects are in the expected direction. Thus, perceptions towards all six tax 
attitudinal aspects in the current study (i.e. main postal survey) have been reasonably 
supported in the survey of tax professionals. 
 
7.3.3 Comparison with Prior Malaysian Studies 
As discussed in Chapter Two,177 all prior Malaysian tax compliance studies focussed on 
individual taxpayers, with only one study entirely confined to self-employed business 
individuals and a few others that included some self-employed business respondents. As 
a result, a straightforward comparison of findings is not possible. However, some 
comparison to prior studies with some business respondents is valuable in the context of 
the current study of SME corporate taxpayers.  
 
The finding of the current study with regards to the complexity of corporate tax laws is 
as anticipated. The perceived complexity of the income tax laws has been evident in 
Malaysia even before the commencement of the SAS. Hanefah (1996) provided 
evidence on the presence of some degree of tax complexity of personal taxpayers in 
Malaysia. In 2001, Hanefah, Ariff and Kasipillai (2001) judged that the level of tax 
complexity in Malaysia was on an increasing trend following major amendments being 
made to existing income tax law or the introduction of a SAS. The difficulties or 
uncertainties faced by taxpayers in interpreting and taking advantage of the 
amendments are among the indicators of tax complexity (Kasipillai 2005, p. 26). The 
current study shows that almost 95 percent of SMEs employed tax professionals in 
complying with corporate tax laws in 2006.178 An examination of respondents’ reasons 
for using paid external tax professionals shows that almost 81 percent and 66 percent of 
them indicated lack of technical knowledge and tax law complexity as their main 
reasons for employing tax professionals respectively.179 Thus, the presence of tax 
complexity is supported from this perspective as well. 
 
                                                 
177 See subsection 2.2.2. 
178 See Chapter Five, Table 5.15. 
179 See Chapter Five, Table 5.21. 
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Regarding tax fairness, the current study shows that respondents’ perceptions towards 
tax law are inclined towards fairness, suggesting optimistic perceptions in this regard. 
Findings of prior Malaysian studies are somewhat mixed, nonetheless sound and 
realistic, considering the assessment system used during the study period. Hanefah 
(1996) observed that tax law was perceived to be unfair during the pre-SAS era. 
However, recent studies conducted during the SAS regime demonstrated a moderate 
view (Che Azmi and Perumal 2008) and a rather neutral view (Sia et al. 2008). From 
this trend (i.e. from unfair to a moderate or neutral view), the findings of the current 
study (i.e. prone towards fairness) are considered reasonable. Interestingly, both studies 
used a similar measurement for fairness, i.e. adapted from the original work of Gerbing 
(1988), and subsequently used in a number of international studies (see for example 
Christensen, Weihrich and Gerbing 1994; Richardson 2006). Some of the questions 
used in the Hanefah study were also adapted from Gerbing. On the other hand, the 
measurement used in the current study was adopted from Roberts (1994). This and other 
methodological differences between these three prior studies and the current studies 
should be noted.  
 
In terms of tax rate structure, the current study shows that respondents are prone 
towards fairness. This finding is similar to prior studies (Che Azmi and Perumal 2008; 
Sia et al. 2008), both conducted during the SAS regime. One noteworthy aspect is that 
the measurement used for tax rate fairness in all three studies in the SAS regime, 
including the current study, was adapted from the work of Gerbing (1988). Nonetheless, 
other methodological differences between the studies should be noted. A comparison 
with the pre-SAS study is not possible, as Hanefah (1996) did not examine tax rate 
fairness separately.  
 
The view of SMEs in regard to tax incentives is as expected, as tax incentives will offer 
some balance in facing business and financial challenges and constraints. A similar 
finding is reported by Abdul Manaf (2004), however in the context of individual land 
taxpayers. It is acknowledged that tax authorities worldwide are often willing to provide 
incentives to SMEs, particularly to small businesses (Freedman 2003, 2006).  
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Small and Medium Enterprises perceive that their relationship with the IRB has fairly 
improved during the SAS. No straightforward comparison is possible as previous 
studies focused either on the effectiveness of the tax administration (Hanefah 1996) or 
the IRB (Ramasamy et al. 2003) and not on the perceived relationship between taxpayer 
and tax officers. Both studies were carried out under the previous OAS system. Hanefah 
(1996) demonstrated that the Malaysian tax administration is fairly efficient, and thus 
suggested that the SAS be implemented so as to further improve the efficiency of the  
Malaysian tax system. However, a study by Ramasamy et al. (2003) failed to provide 
evidence of the influence of IRB effectiveness on tax compliance decisions made by 
individual business taxpayers. More recently, though, Loo (2006a) included a question 
on IRB relationships, but it was merely part of a series of questions that measure 
attitudes toward taxation, and thus it was not reported as a specific item. Under the SAS 
regime, the current researcher believes that taxpayer perceptions of their relationship 
with the IRB is an important aspect in enhancing attitudes towards the effectiveness of 
the IRB, which subsequently could lead to higher voluntary compliance.  
 
In terms of the issue of a tax audit arising in the SAS environment, findings of the 
current study suggest that respondents are unsure about the probability of their SME 
business facing tax auditing. Since the introduction of the SAS, Loo (2006a; 2006b) 
was probably the first to consider tax audits as amongst tax structure features that could 
determine tax compliance behaviour. Unfortunately, the study does not report the level 
of perceptions on tax audits specifically (the effect of tax audit on tax compliance 
behaviour is discussed later).180 The low score on tax audits is possibly due to tax audit 
information not being publicly available. Currently, there are some details in the annual 
report of the IRB on the number of tax audit cases and the corresponding amount 
recovered from audit activities. However, the probability of taxpayers being selected for 
audit purposes is not publicly available or highlighted. The IRB may want to consider 
appropriate measures to change this perception. A further discussion and related 
specific recommendations are presented in Chapter Eight.181 
                                                 
180 See subsections 7.6.1 and 7.6.3. See also Chapter Six, Section 6.7. 
181 See subsection 8.3.3. 
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7.3.4 Comparison with International Studies 
As discussed in Chapter Two,182 a study by Joulfaian (2000) was among the first to 
adapt a framework of tax compliance study on individuals into the corporate sector.  
The understatement of personal income tax by managers was used as a proxy of 
managerial preferences of corporations. On the other hand, the remaining limited 
number of international studies on corporate taxation normally assesses the influence of 
corporate characteristics, such as business size, tax rates and audit coverage on 
corporate tax compliance. The current study is among the first to consider corporate tax 
attitudes from a business managerial perspective. 
 
To some extent, it is possible to compare previous international findings on individual 
taxpayers, but this approach is not adopted here mainly due to the structural differences 
of tax systems between countries (such as assessment system and the tax rate structure) 
and/or methodological differences among studies (measurement-related in particular). 
The effect of the latter is often emphasised in the tax compliance literature—see 
especially Long and Swingen (1991)—and the former is also regarded as an important 
concern (Gilligan and Richardson 2005). Gilligan and Richardson were probably the 
first to compare perceptions of individuals (regarding tax fairness) in two different tax 
jurisdictions, Australia and Hong Kong. A similar instrument for measuring tax fairness 
(adopted from Gerbing 1988) was adopted in their study. Their findings indicate that 
perceptions of Hong Kong individuals are slightly better than the Australian, with 
significant differences being observed, particularly in terms of general fairness and 
personal fairness. The fact that a different tax system applies in both countries (i.e. SAS 
in Australia and OAS in Hong Kong) was believed to be the main reason for their 
findings (Gilligan and Richardson 2005).  
 
Given the above methodological concern, the international comparison of tax attitudinal 
aspects is not pursued here, but these attitudes are discussed later within the overall 
research objective of the current study, i.e. to establish whether tax attitudes from a 
business managerial point of view could be linked to corporate tax behaviour. 
                                                 
182 See subsection 2.2.1. 
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7.4 COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR  
 
7.4.1 Comparison with Web Survey 
Mean scores of the respective tax behaviour are slightly higher in the web survey, as 
shown in Table 7.11. A similar trend is observed for tax attitudes in the web survey as 
well (see Table 7.9). The likely non-compliance behaviour, measured at both the non-
compliance type or at the SME level, broadly indicates a similar view, with one 
exception. Respondents in the web survey are noticeably indifferent with regards to 
overstatement of deductions. 
 
Table 7.11: Tax Behaviour by Survey Method 
Likely Tax  Behaviour Postal Survey Web Survey 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Understatement of Income 2.28 2.00 2.48 3.00 
Overstatement of Deductions 2.76 3.00 3.06 3.00 
Both Non-compliance a 2.52 2.50 2.78 3.00 
a This refers to the combined category of both understatement of income and overstatement of deductions.  
 
 
7.4.2 Comparison with Tax Professionals’ Survey 
Tax professionals have relatively better compliance behaviour than SME respondents, 
as shown by lower mean scores in the tax professionals’ survey, as shown in Table 7.12. 
The compliance behaviour among tax professionals is rather obvious in relation to 
overstatement of deductions. 
 
Table 7.12: Tax Behaviour of SMEs and Tax Professionals 
Likely Tax  Behaviour Postal Survey Professional Survey 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
Understatement of Income 2.28 2.00 2.10 2.00 
Overstatement of Deductions 2.76 3.00 2.19 2.00 
Both Non-compliance a 2.52 2.50 2.14 2.00 
a This refers to the combined category of both understatement of income and overstatement of deductions.  
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Overall, the above finding is practically appropriate as tax professionals are expected to 
provide tax advice with reasonable care. They are subjected to a penal structure in the 
case of assisting their tax clients in the understatement of tax liability. In such cases, tax 
professionals may be liable to a fine of between RM2,000 and RM20,000, or to 
imprisonment of up to three years, or to both [Section 114 (1A)]. 
 
7.4.3 Comparison with Prior Malaysian Studies 
The current study shows that the respondents are inclining towards tax compliance, in 
terms of income reporting, but are likely to register between compliant and neutral 
behaviour for tax deductions. These findings are consistent with prior studies in 
Malaysia, which largely indicated compliance behaviour in most tax situations 
(Kasipillai, Aripin and Amran 2003; Kasipillai, Mat-Udin and Zainol-Arifin 2003; 
Kasipillai and Abdul-Jabbar 2006) and a neutral view in some other cases (Kasipillai 
and Abdul-Jabbar 2006). It must be emphasised that a number of studies have examined 
tax compliance behaviour and some determinants of individual taxpayers in 
Malaysia.183 However, most studies have tended to focus their discussion on the 
determinants of compliance behaviour (see for example Ramasamy et al. 2003; Loo 
2006a). Regrettably, only a few studies reported their findings on both the level of 
compliance and its determinants (Kasipillai, Aripin and Amran 2003; Kasipillai, Mat-
Udin and Zainol-Arifin 2003; Kasipillai and Abdul-Jabbar 2006). Even a study by Loo 
(2006a) in the SAS regime did not report the level of tax compliance separately.  
 
More recently, despite the fact that a study by Sia et al. (2008) relates to tax 
compliance, tax compliance behaviour is not measured. Instead, they assumed that those 
who are subjected to tax audits were non-compliers, and non-audited taxpayers were 
compliers. As such, a comparison is only possible with those former three studies (i.e. 
studies by Kasipillai, Aripin and Amran 2003; Kasipillai, Mat-Udin and Zainol-Arifin 
2003; Kasipillai and Abdul-Jabbar 2006), which were carried out prior to SAS, but are 
subject to some methodological differences within the studies; for example, the nature 
of tax scenarios, their measurement, and the amount of consideration used are different. 
                                                 
183 See Chapter Two, subsection 2.2.2. 
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7.4.4 Comparison with International Studies 
Similar to tax attitudes,184 comparing the level of tax compliance among countries 
would be misleading. All prior studies on US corporations measured ‘actual’ non-
compliance by employing the IRS audit data, especially the TCMP.185 On the other 
hand, the current study employs the survey approach to hypothetical tax scenarios,186 
which merely measures ‘possible’ non-compliance behaviour of corporate SMEs from a 
managerial perspective and not the actual.187 Nonetheless, the determinants of corporate 
tax compliance, both in Malaysia and internationally, are useful for tax policy 
consideration and are thus discussed latter.188 
 
 
7.5 THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG TAX ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOUR AND 
COMPLIANCE COSTS 
 
A comparative analysis of the relationships among tax attitudes, tax behaviour and 
compliance costs mainly in the SMEs surveys and some relevant findings of the tax 
professionals’ survey are presented in this section. The survey of tax professionals 
concerned external compliance costs only, thus the relationship between part of the 
compliance costs and tax attitudes or tax behaviour is not analysed further. Out of six 
attitudinal items, the perceived IRB relationship is the only aspect that was found to 
have a very weak direct association with compliance costs in the postal survey, as 
shown in Table 7.13. The current study also fails to confirm the directions of the 
relationships as the findings are mostly contradicted among both SME surveys. Taken 
as a whole, the findings of both the postal and web surveys did not signify a statistical 
association between tax attitudes and compliance costs. Similarly, compliance costs are 
also not statistically associated with tax behaviours in both surveys.189 
 
                                                 
184 See subsection 7.3.4. 
185 See Chapter Two, Section 2.2.1. 
186 See Chapter Four, subsection 4.4.3. 
187 See Chapter Eight, Section 8.4, for details on this and other limitations. 
188 See subsections 7.6.3. and 7.6.4 
189 See Chapter Six, Tables 6.12 and 6.22. 
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Table 7.13: Tax Attitudes and Compliance Costs: Correlation Analysis 
 Tax Attitudinal Aspects Postal Survey Web Survey 
Complexity - - 
Fairness - - 
Rate - - 
Incentives - - 
Audit - - 
IRB Relationship √ a (+) - 
a Significant at the five percent level. Positive (+) sign denotes a direct relationship. 
 
As for the relationship between tax attitudes and tax behaviour, Table 7.14 shows 
similar survey findings with regards to tax audit and tax fairness. A tax audit is the only 
aspect that was found to be positively associated with both types of tax behaviour in 
both forms of surveys and, more importantly, in similar directions. On the other hand, 
tax fairness has no correlation to tax behaviours. Further, tax complexity is also largely 
associated with tax behaviour, with one exception in the web survey for the 
overstatement of deductions.  
 
Table 7.14: Tax Attitudes and Tax Behaviour: Correlation Analysis 
Tax Attitudes Understatement of Income Overstatement of Deductions 
  Postal Survey  Web survey Postal Survey Web survey 
Complexity    √ b (+)   √ b (-)   √ a (+) - 
Fairness - - - - 
Rate - √ b (+) - √ b (+) 
Incentives - - - √ b (+) 
Audit   √ b (+)   √ a (+)   √ a (+) √ b (+) 
IRB relationship - - - - 
a Significant at the one percent level. b Significant at the five percent level.  
Positive (+) or negative (-) signs denote a direct or indirect significant relationship respectively.   
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Overall, findings of the main postal survey are generally supported by the web survey, 
although some variation is noted in the web survey. However, from the perspective of 
tax professionals, all six tax attitudinal aspects are found to have no statistical 
relationship with likely tax behaviour.190 It must be emphasised that the survey of tax 
professionals had 31 responses only. This finding should be treated as tentative subject 
to a further study. Regarding prior studies, the combined effect of a number of variables 
(i.e. multivariate analysis) is essential, and it is often emphasised in previous studies 
that just the relationship among two variables (i.e. bivariate relationship) is insufficient. 
Comparative findings and discussion with regards to multivariate analysis is presented 
in Section 7.6 below.  
 
 
7.6 DETERMINANTS OF COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR 
 
7.6.1 Comparison with Web Survey 
The importance of each independent variable in the respective three models, in both 
surveys, is presented in Table 7.15. The tax audit is the only variable that constantly 
influences the likely tax behaviour of SME respondents in all three models in both 
postal and web surveys. Another five variables, namely business size, estimated tax 
level, amount of compliance costs, perceived fairness and perceived IRB relationship 
consistently indicated otherwise (i.e. non-determinants). In most cases, tax complexity 
also influences tax complying behaviour. Despite the above similarities, a few 
inconsistent findings are observed between the postal and web surveys. Business length 
and business sector (i.e. construction) are also found to be a significant determinant in 
some models in the postal survey. On the other hand, in the web survey the tax rate and 
tax incentives influenced tax behaviour in all three models and two of the models 
respectively.  
 
 
                                                 
190 See Appendix T, Table T.2. 
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Table 7.15: Significance of Independent Variables in the Regression Models 
 Likely Tax Behaviour 
 Understatement 
of Income 
Overstatement  
of Deductions 
Both  
Non-compliance a 
Survey Type Postal Web Postal Web Postal Web 
Variables:        
Audit √ d √ b √ b √ c √ b √ b 
Complexity √ c √ b √ b - √ b √ c 
Rate  - √ c - √ c - √ c 
Length √ d - - - √ d - 
Sector: Construction - - √ c - √ d - 
Incentives - - - √ c - √ c 
Size  - - - - - - 
Tax - - - - - - 
Compliance Costs - - - - - - 
Fairness - - - - - - 
IRB Relationship - - - - - - 
a This refers to the combined category of both understatement of income and overstatement of deductions.  
b Significant at the one percent level. 
c Significant at the five percent level. 
d Significant at the ten percent level. 
 
 
Overall, the findings of the web survey, to a large extent, add consistency to the postal 
survey. The current study provides evidence that two aspects (tax audits and tax 
complexity) have an influence on tax complying behaviour, that five variables (business 
size, tax level, compliance costs, fairness and IRB relationship) do not, and that the 
effect of the remaining four variables (length, sector, rate and incentives) is 
unfortunately indeterminate.  
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7.6.2 Comparison with Tax Professionals’ Survey 
From the tax professionals’ perspective, none of the tax attitudinal aspects influence 
their tax compliance behaviour. The fact that the survey of tax professionals has just 31 
responses, and the regression analysis considered tax attitudinal items only, limits the 
value of these findings. 
 
7.6.3 Comparison with Prior Malaysian Studies 
The current study is the first to consider corporate tax compliance behaviour in 
Malaysia; thus, this section discusses relevant current findings with previous studies on 
individuals that include a number of business respondents.191 Although findings of a 
postal survey are a central concern in this study, it is useful to consider the determinants 
of tax behaviour in both postal and web surveys. Overall findings of both surveys have 
shown that two factors, i.e. tax complexity and tax audit, consistently influence likely 
tax behaviour; five factors, i.e. business size, tax level, compliance costs, tax fairness 
and the perceived IRB relationship, do not; and the remaining four factors, i.e. business 
length, business sector, tax rate and tax incentives, vary between the surveys and types 
of non-compliance.192 
 
A straightforward comparison of the current study to previous Malaysian studies is of 
limited use. This is due to the differences in the assessment system (either OAS or SAS) 
and/or the methodology in particular, including factors that have been subjected to 
examination. Even within the previous studies, only four equivalent factors, i.e. tax 
knowledge, tax fairness, compliance of other taxpayers’ and the perceived IRB 
administration have been examined in at least in two studies, with tax fairness often 
being investigated, as shown in Table 7.16. The current study replaces individual 
demographics with corporate SME characteristics. Compliance costs estimates and tax 
incentives are the new two variables, with the former investigated for the first time, 
while the latter has been employed earlier in a Malaysian land tax study by Abdul 
Manaf (2004).  
                                                 
191 See Chapter Two, subsection 2.2.2. For a list of studies see Table 2.2. 
192 See subsection 7.6.1. 
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Table 7.16: Determinants of Tax Compliance for Malaysian Businesses a 
Author(s) 
 
Hanefah Ramasamy  
et al 
Abdul 
 
Loo 
 
Sia 
et al 
Current 
 
Publication Year 1996 2003 2003 2006a 2008 2009 
Assessment System OAS OAS/ 
SAS 
SAS SAS 
Business Taxpayers: b  
Individual (IND)/ 
Corporate (CORP) 
 
IND 
 
IND 
 
IND 
 
IND 
 
IND 
 
CORP 
Determinants c       
Business Characteristics: 
Size 
Length 
Sector 
Tax Level 
      
N 
M 
M 
N 
Tax Knowledge D d N - D - - 
Attitudes/Perceptions: 
Tax Fairness 
IRB Relationship 
Tax Rate 
Tax Complexity 
Tax Audit 
Tax Penalty 
Others’ Compliance 
Incentives  
Morale 
 
D d 
- 
D d 
D d 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
D 
N 
- 
- 
- 
- 
D 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
D e 
D e 
- 
- 
N g 
D g 
- 
- 
- 
N 
- 
N f 
- 
- 
- 
N 
- 
N 
 
N 
N 
M 
D 
D 
- 
- 
M 
- 
Financial constraint - - - N - - 
Compliance Costs - - - - - N 
D denotes determinants, N non-determinants, and M inconclusive factors due to mixed findings between the survey 
types and types of non-compliance. 
a See Table 2.2 for key findings and Appendix B for other relevant details.  
b Studies, other than Ramasamy et al, also include non-business individuals. This study focuses on SME businesses. 
c Demographic factors were excluded as these were unrelated to corporations. Corporate characteristics were not 
relevant to earlier studies on individuals and thus appear in shaded boxes.  
d Hanefah (1996) argued that these factors influence tax behaviour. He did not directly measure their influence on tax 
behaviour but rather analysed perceptions by demographic factors. See subsection 2.2.2.    
e Tax fairness and the perceived IRB relationship were measured as part of  attitudes toward taxation. 
f Tax rate dimension is one of the five dimensions of fairness measured in this study.  
g Tax audit and penalty were measured as part of tax structures features.   
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Out of 11 variables examined in the current corporate study, only five are comparable to 
previous studies, i.e. tax fairness, tax complexity, the tax rate, tax audits, and the 
perceived IRB relationship. A comparative analysis indicates consistent findings 
regarding tax complexity, contrary results concerning tax audits, and mixed results for 
the remaining three factors, i.e. tax fairness, the tax rate and the IRB relationship.  
 
Similar to personal income taxation (Hanefah 1996), the current findings indicate that 
complexity is also an important concern within corporate tax compliance. A 
contradictory finding for tax audits is probably justified, as the concept of a tax audit is 
rather new to individual taxpayers during the study period, but not to corporate 
taxpayers.193  
 
The findings regarding tax fairness contradict three earlier studies (Hanefah 1996; 
Ramasamy et al. 2003; Loo 2006a), but are consistent with the most recent study (Sia et 
al. 2008). Apart from fundamental differences between corporate and individual 
taxation, and also other methodological differences, this inconsistent result is probably 
linked to the type of tax assessment system. Two of the three former studies were 
conducted during the previous OAS regime, with the remaining study during the 
transitional period. On the other hand, studies by Sia et al. (2008) and the current 
researcher were conducted under the SAS regime.  
 
On the tax rate structure, inconclusive findings are not surprising, for this seems to 
support previous contradictory findings on individuals (Hanefah 1996;  compared to 
Loo 2006a). The differences in the tax rate structure between corporate and individual 
taxation may also have contributed to this outcome. Findings about the perceived IRB 
relationship are similar to Ramasamy et al. (2003) in the pre-SAS study, but contradict 
Loo’s (2006a) in the conversion period. However, the fact that the perceived IRB 
relationship forms part of the measurement of overall tax attitudes in the Loo (2006a) 
                                                 
193 The concept of a tax audit is an important aspect in the SAS implementation. The SAS was introduced 
first to companies in 2001 and subsequently to individuals in 2005 (tax year 2004). 
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study must be noted. It is also possible that perceptions on the tax rate structure depend 
on specific types of non-compliance.  
 
The current study, in general, provides evidence on the effect of the above five 
factors—complexity, audits, fairness, the tax rate structure, and the IRB relationship—
in the context of corporation taxation, SMEs in particular. Some inconsistency observed 
in the current study is not surprising as it is often evident in the context of individual 
taxpayers internationally (Jackson and Milliron 1986; Richardson and Sawyer 2001) 
and even within Malaysian studies. For example, tax knowledge is found to be a 
significant factor in two previous studies (Hanefah 1996; Loo 2006a), but otherwise in 
the Ramasamy et al. (2003) study. This demonstrates the importance of a few key 
determinants of tax compliance in the context of Malaysian corporate SMEs. Despite 
some basic differences between individual and corporate taxation, it is fully 
acknowledged that methodological differences, in particular, should always be an 
important concern in evaluating tax compliance studies. 
 
7.6.4 Comparison with International Studies 
As discussed in Chapter Two, all five corporate tax compliance studies were conducted 
in the US,194 and more importantly in a developed economy. The current Malaysian 
study is probably the first in developing countries. Despite this and other key tax 
structural and methodological differences, discussion regarding determinants of 
corporate tax compliance internationally is valuable in policy considerations. For this 
purpose, similar to a comparison of Malaysian studies,195 the overall findings of both 
postal and web surveys are considered.  
 
The current study indicates that the managerial perceptions about tax complexity and 
tax audits influence corporate tax compliance. Unfortunately, the former was not 
considered empirically (at least as a determinant of corporate compliance) in the prior 
studies and the latter was measured in terms of audit rates and not perceptions. Despite 
                                                 
194 Subsection 2.2.1. 
195 Subsection 7.6.3. 
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this, some evidence of the possible association between complexity and corporate tax 
compliance is discussed below.  
 
In the context of individuals, including businesses, the negative impact of complexity 
upon tax compliance is commonly acknowledged (Cuccia and Carnes 2001; McKerchar 
2002a). Several studies on corporations have investigated the problem areas of tax 
compliance (Erard 1997a, 1997b) and their specific sources of complexity (Slemrod and 
Blumenthal 1996; Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002). The Canadian studies, on both SMEs 
(Erard 1997b) and large (Erard 1997a) corporations, found that tax complexity is among 
the frequently cited compliance problems by businesses of all sizes (large and SMEs). 
The US study on large and medium corporations (Slemrod and Blumenthal 1996, p. 
428; Slemrod and Venkatesh 2002, p. 30) found that the depreciation rules and the 
alternative minimum tax provisions were the most frequently cited areas that increase 
tax complexity and the compliance burden. The impact of tax complexity is also 
believed to be among the major problems of small businesses in the US (Ashby 2000; 
Slemrod 2004a).  
 
Regarding the remaining ten variables, only two factors examined in the current 
Malaysian study are comparable to the previous US studies, i.e. business size and 
business sector, as shown in Table 7.17. A number of other business features, such as 
public/private, national/multinational, domestic/foreign ownership, are likely to be 
relevant to large corporations in Malaysia but not to corporate SMEs. Business size is 
not an influencing factor in the current study. This result is similar to the earliest study 
on corporations (Rice 1992), but contradicts two later studies (Joulfaian 2000; Hanlon, 
Mills and Slemrod 2005). Focusing on a specific group of business taxpayers and on 
differences in the proxies used to measure business size may contribute to this variation.  
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Table 7.17: Determinants of Corporate Tax Compliance Internationally a 
Author(s)  
Rice 
 
Kamdar 
 
Mills 
 
Joulfaian 
Hanlon 
Mills & 
Slemrod 
 
Current 
 
Publication year 1992 1997 1998 2000 2005 2009 
Country US Malaysia 
Determinants:      
Business Characteristics: 
Size b 
Profit/Income 
Marginal tax rate 
Tax level 
Foreign ownership 
Industry/Sector 
Public/Private 
Multi-Nationality 
Length of Business 
 
N 
D 
D 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
D 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
D 
D 
D 
- 
N 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
D 
- 
- 
- 
D 
D 
D 
D 
- 
 
N 
- 
- 
N 
  - c 
M 
  - c 
  - c 
M 
Audit Rate - D - D - - 
Public Disclosure D - - - - - 
Book-tax difference - - D - - - 
Managerial Preferences: 
Non-compliance manager 
Managerial Attitudes: 
Complexity 
Fairness 
Tax Rate 
Audit 
Relationship tax authority 
Incentives 
 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
D 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
 
D 
N 
M 
D 
N 
M 
Compliance Costs - - - - - N 
D denotes determinants, N non-determinants, and M inconclusive factors due to mixed findings between the 
survey types and types of non-compliance. 
a See Table 2.1 for key findings and the full sources.  
b Various size proxies were employed; assets and/or sales in the US and three alternatives, i.e. turnover, staff 
number, and a combination of both, in the Malaysian  study. 
c These factors are not likely to be relevant to corporate SMEs in Malaysia. 
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A study by Rice (1992) was confined to medium-sized corporations, i.e. assets between 
US$1 million and US$10 million; Joulfaian (2000) covers both small and medium-sized 
corporations, i.e. assets of US$10 million or less; on the other hand, Hanlon, Mills and 
Slemrod (2005) focus on large and medium-sized corporations, i.e. assets between 
US$10 million and over US$5 billion.196 For a size proxy, Rice (1992) considered total 
value of assets; Joulfaian (2000) employed annual sales level; Hanlon, Mills and 
Slemrod (2005) considered both assets and sales measures; and the current study 
examined this in terms of three alternatives, i.e. turnover, staff number, and a 
combination of both criteria, as established by the NSDC.  
 
Regarding business sectors, the current findings provide some evidence of the influence 
of business sectors on overstatement of deductions, but not of the understatement of 
income or the overall compliance at the firm level. These findings, especially the effect 
of the business sector on the overall tax compliance (firm level) contradict earlier 
findings by Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod (2005). Apart from fundamental differences 
between these studies and the size of corporations, differences in the classification of 
business sector between the Malaysian and the US study could be a reason. The current 
Malaysian study categorised businesses into four main sectors compared to eight sectors 
in the US study.  
 
 
7.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has shown similar estimates of compliance costs of RM9,300 per SME 
company in both postal and web surveys. The computational-planning costs breakdown 
is also similar, but a slight difference has been observed in terms of the internal-external 
costs proportion. However, overall, the current 2006 estimates have shown that the 
income tax compliance costs of SMEs have decreased significantly compared to earlier 
1999 estimates during the pre-SAS regime. One noteworthy aspect is that the regressive 
nature of compliance costs on small businesses remains an important area in tax policy 
                                                 
196 US$1 = RM3.52 (1 July 2009, Bank Negara Malaysia). 
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considerations, as evident in both pre-SAS (1999 estimates) and post-SAS (the current 
2006 estimates) surveys. As for international comparisons, the Malaysian corporate 
SME compliance costs of nine percent and 0.2 percent relative to tax revenue and GDP 
respectively are within the international range in both terms.  
 
In terms of tax attitudes and the likely compliance behaviour, overall, both the primary 
SME postal and web surveys demonstrated similar perceptions, while perceptions of tax 
professionals are slightly better, as would be expected. Findings regarding determinants 
of tax non-compliance are also comparable in both surveys, with the following overall 
patterns: tax complexity and tax audits as determinants; business size, tax level, 
compliance costs, tax fairness and the perceived IRB relationship as non-determinants; 
and, the length in business, sector, the tax rate and tax incentives as inconclusive. 
However, compared to earlier Malaysian studies on individuals, the current corporate 
SME study provides support for the influence of tax complexity, indicating to some 
extent conflicting results concerning tax audits, and demonstrating mixed results in 
terms of perceptions of tax fairness, the tax rate and the IRB relationship. In terms of 
international comparisons, the effect of business size is uncertain, as the current 
findings are similar to Rice (1992), but contradict studies by Joulfaian (2000) and 
Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod (2005). On the other hand, this thesis contradicts the study 
by Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod (2005) that finds the business sector as a determinant of 
tax compliance. Overall, the current study offers preliminary evidence in the context of 
Malaysian corporations, SMEs in particular. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
arising from this study, together with major limitations, are presented in Chapter Eight.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents conclusions on the overall corporate SME income tax compliance 
costs estimates and corporate SME business managerial perceptions about tax attitudes 
and likely tax compliance behaviour. The overall objective of this study is to examine 
the determinants of non-compliance behaviour of corporate SMEs, with particular 
emphasis on income tax compliance costs under the SAS regime. For this purpose, a 
review of the key findings is discussed by reference to three research questions.197 
Policy recommendations arising from the compliance costs estimates, in particular, and 
other key findings, are then presented.  Major limitations of this research are discussed 
next. This is followed by suggestions for future research. The final section presents the 
author’s concluding remarks on this thesis. 
 
 
8.2 THE SUMMARY OF  KEY FINDINGS 
 
8.2.1 Compliance Costs Estimates 
The first research question of this study is to estimate the corporate income tax 
compliance costs for Malaysian SMEs under the SAS regime. This study has shown that 
the average income tax compliance costs are RM9,295 per SME company, amounting 
to RM1,084 million in aggregate for the tax year 2006. The ratios of internal-external 
costs and computational-planning costs are 59:41 percent and 74:26 percent of 
compliance costs respectively. In terms of costs distribution, measured as a percentage 
of business turnover, the usual regressive nature of compliance costs for Malaysian 
SMEs has been confirmed under the SAS regime. The compliance costs percentage for 
SMEs in the lowest turnover level is as much as six times, 20 times and 82 times higher 
                                                 
197 See Chapter One, Section 1.3. 
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than the second, third and fourth levels respectively, and over 43 times higher than the 
overall SME compliance costs distribution of 0.19 percent.  
 
The average 2006 estimate of RM9,295 per company shows that compliance costs of 
SME companies are around 58 percent lower compared to the 1999 pre-SAS figure of 
RM21,964. The income tax simplification measures taken by the IRB, a period of 
relative stability in both the economic climate and tax system for the past six years or 
so, and the likely removal of high start-up compliance costs are among major possible 
reasons for the significant decline in the compliance costs in this study. 
Notwithstanding the above, the ratios of both external to internal costs and 
computational to planning costs increased, as would be expected under a SAS regime.  
 
Despite a significant reduction in compliance costs, compliance costs expressed as a 
percentage of tax revenue indicate a slight increase from eight percent in 1999 to nine 
percent in 2006. Thus, compliance costs relative to tax revenue before and after the SAS 
are considered about equivalent. In terms of GDP, income tax compliance costs for 
corporate SMEs are estimated to be around 0.2 percent in 2006. Unfortunately, 
comparison is not possible with prior studies as the current study is the first to estimate 
aggregate compliance costs in Malaysia, and probably even in Asia as whole.  
 
For international comparison, the current estimates of tax compliance costs of around 
nine percent to tax revenue and nearly 0.2 percent to GDP are within the international 
range, i.e. two to 10 percent of tax revenue and up to 2.5 percent of GDP respectively as 
pointed out by Evans (2003b, p. 71). Within the Asian countries, having acknowledged 
the differences in the targeted company size and the other usual methodological and 
structural concerns, the fact that the Malaysian SME cost-ratio to tax revenue is high 
compared to Hong Kong and Singapore, and within the Indian estimates, is not 
surprising. This is because both Hong Kong and Singapore continue to adopt the OAS, 
while India has moved to the SAS. But the fact that Malaysian costs estimates (relative 
to tax revenue) were previously higher, even in the pre-SAS regime, should be 
recognised. However, in terms of GDP, the compliance costs of Malaysian SME 
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companies of around 0.2 percent is considered low compared to the overall international 
ratio of less than two percent. As an overall comparison, the 2006 Malaysian corporate 
SME compliance costs, expressed in GDP terms, are high compared to the 1986/87 UK 
estimates, but the lowest when compared to ratios in Australia, Slovenia, and Croatia. 
Tax compliance costs relative to GDP for other countries, including Asian and 
developed countries, i.e. Canada, and the US, unfortunately are not available. 
 
Two forms of offsetting benefits of tax compliance are recognised for Malaysian 
corporate SMEs, i.e. tax deductibility and cash flow benefits, but the availability of data 
only allows estimation of the former. The estimated value of tax deductibility is almost 
RM1,700 per SME company or 18 percent of tax compliance costs, amounting to 
RM196 million for the corporate SMEs in 2006. Taking into account this benefit, the 
average net compliance costs per SME company are almost RM7,600, amounting to 
RM888 million in aggregate. A comparison between net compliance costs estimates 
(RM7,600) and the compensation amount that is expected by the respondents 
(RM7,300) demonstrates comparable results that add reliability to the estimates. 
Further, an analysis of a separate web survey also confirms the consistency of the 
estimates made in the primary postal survey. 
 
Overall, the current estimates demonstrate that compliance costs at the SME level have 
decreased substantially in current value terms, are identical in relation to tax revenue, 
and the effect of fixed costs remains an important concern. 
 
8.2.2 The Relationship between Compliance Costs and Compliance Behaviour  
The second research question addresses the extent to which tax compliance costs 
influence the likely compliance behaviour of corporate SMEs. Compliance costs are 
estimated to address research question one. As for compliance behaviour, this study, as 
measured by two independent hypothetical tax scenarios from a business managerial 
perspective, shows that SME companies are largely compliant towards both income 
reporting and tax deductions behaviour, either measured for the full amount of 
RM10,000 or part thereof.  
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For the full amount of RM10,000, relatively more SME companies (59 percent) are 
compliant towards reporting behaviour than to the correctness of their deductions (41 
percent). This finding suggests that non-compliance through overstatement of 
deductions probably needs further attention in the Malaysian SME context, particularly 
in selecting companies for a tax audit. On the contrary, for partial consideration, more 
respondents are compliant in terms of deductibility of expenses (42 percent) as 
compared to income reporting (38 percent). The outcome is not surprising given that the 
much higher risk of detection is possibly recognised by the respondents in case of 
partial non-compliance. 
 
Theoretically, tax compliance costs are expected to influence the complying behaviour 
of taxpayers. The findings of this study show that the relationship is in the expected 
direction, i.e. higher compliance costs may lead to non-compliance. This is applicable 
either to understatement of income, overstatement of deductions, or the combined non-
compliance at the SME level. Unfortunately, both the mean comparison and the 
correlation analysis failed to indicate a statistically significant relationship between tax 
compliance costs and the likely compliance behaviour of SMEs, and more importantly, 
regardless of the amount involved. The same conclusion is drawn from the separate 
analysis in the web survey. The effect of compliance costs on tax compliance, taken 
together with other factors, is discussed in the next section.198  
 
A lack of a relationship between compliance costs and the likely compliance behaviour 
is possibly due to the fact that the current study focuses on homogeneous business size. 
In corporate tax compliance studies, significant differences in tax behaviour were 
evident when researchers covered all business sizes (Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod 2005), 
and contrary findings were identified when a specific business size was targeted (Rice 
1992). From this perspective, it is possible that there may be a significant association 
between compliance costs and compliance behaviour among different business sizes i.e. 
small, medium and large. 
 
                                                 
198 Subsection 8.2.3. 
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8.2.3 Determinants of Tax Compliance Behaviour  
The third research question examines the influence of tax compliance costs on 
compliance behaviour, taken together with corporate SME characteristics and business 
managerial attitudes regarding corporate taxation. Eleven determinants are examined in 
this study, with business characteristics comprising four factors—size, sector, length in 
business and estimated tax amount, and managerial perceptions—obtained for six tax 
attitudinal aspects, namely complexity, fairness, rate structure, incentives, audits and the 
IRB relationship. For business size, three alternative measures, i.e. turnover level, 
number of staff employed and the combined criteria under the NSDC definition are 
used, with the turnover criteria as the primary size measure. Three main regression 
analyses were carried out separately for each of the three compliance behaviour, i.e. 
understatement of income (Model 1), overstatement of deductions (Model 2) and the 
combined non-compliance (Model 3), with further regressions undertaken by using the 
other two alternative size proxies for all three dependent variables. 
 
Overall, the current study provides evidence that tax complexity and tax audits 
influence the likely tax compliance behaviour of SMEs, with the possibility of non-
compliance increasing as the perceived tax complexity increases and the probability of 
tax audit decreases. Five factors, i.e. business size, tax level, fairness, IRB relationship, 
and more importantly, compliance costs, have no effect on tax behaviour. The effect of 
the remaining four variables (length, sector, rate and incentives) is inconclusive due to 
mixed findings between types of compliance and surveys. It is also evident that non-
compliance in terms of income reporting (or tax deductions) possibly affects the 
accuracy of the deductions (or income reporting).  
 
Findings in the context of individual businesses are considered for comparative 
purposes as there is no previous study on corporate businesses. For this purpose, only 
five out of eleven factors are comparable to prior studies, i.e. tax fairness, tax 
complexity, the tax rate, tax audits, and the perceived IRB relationship. Overall, the 
effect of tax complexity is supported fully; the contradictory effect of a tax audits is 
fairly supported; and there are mixed effects for the remaining three factors, i.e. tax 
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fairness, the tax rate, and the IRB relationship. The mixed effects are, to some extent, 
sensible as contradictory findings are often evident in tax compliance research 
internationally (Jackson and Milliron 1986; Richardson and Sawyer 2001).  
 
For international comparison of compliance research, analysis within the limited 
number of corporate tax compliance studies suggests that only two factors examined in 
the current study are equivalent to the previous US studies, i.e. business size and 
business sector. In the Malaysian corporate SME context, the former is found not to 
influence tax behaviour, and the effect of the latter is somewhat mixed. The finding 
regarding business size is similar to the first study on corporate tax compliance (Rice 
1992), but is contradicted by two recent studies (Joulfaian 2000; Hanlon, Mills and 
Slemrod 2005). Targeting different company sizes and, more importantly, adopting 
different size measures may partly explain these diverse findings. As for business 
sectors, differences in the classification of sectors between Malaysia and the US could 
be among possible justifications. Above all, it is recognised that the fundamental 
differences in the tax system and methodology may have contributed to this trend.  
Notwithstanding this, the current study offers preliminary evidence in the context of 
corporate Malaysian SMEs. Further research in this area of corporate tax compliance is 
needed, both in Malaysia and internationally. 
 
8.2.4 Other Key Findings 
This study also assessed the business managerial attitudes about corporate SME 
taxation regarding complexity, fairness, rate structure, audits, incentives and the IRB 
under the SAS regime. Corporate taxation for SMEs is perceived to be complex and fair 
both in terms of tax laws and the tax rate structure. Corporate SMEs are expecting more 
tax incentives, are uncertain about the likelihood of audit, and consider that their 
relationship with the IRB improved to some extent during the SAS regime.  
 
In terms of the relationship between tax attitudes and compliance, the correlation 
analysis shows that only complexity of the corporate tax law and probability of a tax 
audit are statistically connected to both types of non-compliance, either measured 
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separately or jointly. This suggests that the possibility of non-compliance increases as 
the perceived level of tax complexity increases and the chances of a tax audit decreases. 
Regarding compliance costs, only the perceived IRB relationship indicates a significant 
association. Unfortunately, the direction of the relationship is not conclusive due to 
contradictory findings in the postal and web surveys.  
 
 
8.3 MAJOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.3.1 Institutional and Policy Recognition of Tax Compliance Costs 
The importance of SMEs has been evident in Malaysia, particularly over the last five 
years, and this has led to the establishment of the NSDC in 2004 and, more recently, the 
transformation of SMIDEC into the SME Corp.199 Unfortunately, the issue of 
compliance burden, particularly the tax burden surrounding SMEs and even large 
businesses in Malaysia, is yet to be recognised fully or explicitly. 
 
On 7 February 2007, the Special Taskforce to Facilitate Business (STFB, or known as 
PEMUDAH) was established to address the issue of bureaucracy in business-
government dealings, including taxation.200 The aim of the STFB is to improve 
Malaysia’s competitive position internationally (The Special Taskforce to Facilitate 
Business 2008), and this demonstrates the early recognition of business regulatory 
concerns at the national level. In terms of its membership, the STFB comprises 23 
members from both the private and public sectors, including the chief executive officer 
of SMIDEC,201 but the absence of SME business involvement is noteworthy.  
 
In earlier developments specifically applying to taxation, the establishment of the Tax 
Review Panel, or TRP, (Ministry of Finance Malaysia 2004) seems to have been mainly 
                                                 
199 See Chapter One, Footnote 6.  
200 Focus Group on Paying Taxes is one of the five focus groups (2007; six in 2008) under the Working 
Group on Efficiency Issues (The Special Taskforce to Facilitate Business 2008, 2009). The membership 
of this focus group, unfortunately, is not available. 
201 The membership of the Taskforce and other details, are available at http://www.pemudah.gov.my.  
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directed towards the proposed GST,202 with the absence of SME participation being 
notable. The IRB’s recognition of the extent of the small business compliance burden 
may be considered rather limited, especially at the time of the initial stages of the 
current study (mid-2006). For example, the Small Traders’ Support Service Unit 
provides assistance and advice on taxation issues to small traders that are not 
represented by tax professionals, i.e. the self-employed. On the other hand, a number of 
preferential tax treatments have been introduced to corporate SMEs, including dual tax 
rates and, more recently, the exclusion of advance tax estimation provisions during the 
first two years from business commencement.203 
 
One of the IRB objectives is to collect taxes without imposing an excessive burden 
(compliance costs) on the public with a minimal cost to the government. The average 
tax administrative costs (known as management costs in Malaysia) per year just exceed 
one percent of the direct tax collection, as shown in Table 8.1. This ratio is comparable 
to those of Australia and the UK, but more than two times higher than the US (OECD 
2004, p. 65). The ratios need to be interpreted with caution due to significant 
differences between countries, for example, differences in tax rates, tax structure and 
the nature of taxes administered by tax authorities. As for private sector costs, such 
yearly estimates of tax compliance costs are practically impossible. No country 
estimates yearly tax compliance costs, but the practice of tax authorities elsewhere 
(such as in Australia, the UK, the US) indicates that they normally require a Tax Impact 
Statement prior to any major tax changes. 
                                                 
202 Since the postponement of the proposed GST, unfortunately the current status and progress of TRP is 
not available publicly (Singh 2007).  
203 See Chapter Three, subsection 3.2.3. 
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Table 8.1: Tax Management Costs a for Direct Taxes in Malaysia, 2000–2006 
Year Tax Management Costs 
(RM million) b 
Tax Management Costs  
as a Percentage of Tax Collected 
2000 328 c 1.13 c 
2001 359 0.86 
2002 544 1.23 
2003 532 c 1.18 
2004 565 1.17 c 
2005 640 1.07 c 
2006 701 0.97 
a This term is as used by the IRB. The usual term used in the international tax compliance costs 
literature is ‘tax administrative costs’. 
b Includes all operating costs, with staff costs comprising around two-third. For 2003 and onwards, 
total figures are not shown in the IRB reports, thus computed by the author.    
c Figures in the latest report are used. The actual figures reported in the relevant annual report were 
slightly different. 
Sources:  Inland Revenue Board (2003; 2004; 2005; 2007; 2008a). 
Note: As at 1 July 2009, the 2007 report is yet to be published. 
 
Since the operation of the SAS, the IRB has implemented a number of measures for 
business taxpayers, including tax simplification.204 This indicates an increasing 
recognition of the burden upon the business sector primarily and, to some extent, to 
SMEs. Nonetheless, the current estimates of compliance costs, expressed as a 
percentage of turnover, continue to serve as an indicator of the usual disproportionate 
nature of the income tax burden faced by small businesses. 
 
Little is known of the extent to which relevant parties, particularly the IRB, TRP, 
NSDC, professional accountants, as well as SME related organisations, have 
acknowledged specifically the compliance burden of SMEs.205 General SME business 
issues, such as financing problems, staff training, usage of technology, and problems in 
business operations, are frequently highlighted (see especially National SME 
Development Council 2006, pp. 31-34). Taxation only arises as a minor issue and the 
SMEs usually urge the government to provide more tax incentives in order for them to 
                                                 
204 See Chapter Three, subsection 3.2.3. 
205 Other than overall recognition of business regulations by the STFB (discussed earlier in this section).  
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remain competitive in the market (National SME Development Council 2006, p. 34). 
There needs to be a much greater specific focus on taxation issues and on ensuring the 
SME tax compliance burden is minimised. The above background suggests that explicit 
recognition of the ‘real’ tax compliance burden to businesses, SMEs in particular, is 
essential for policy consideration.  
 
Theoretically, Sandford, Hardwick and Godwin (1989, p. 209) stressed the importance 
of tax compliance costs for government in four areas: to recognise the importance of 
compliance costs explicitly; not to reduce the administrative costs at the expense of 
compliance costs; to minimise compliance costs, especially for small business; and 
finally, to compensate for compliance costs. However, convincing the government to 
consider the tax compliance burden as a policy area is not simple in practice. Pope 
(1993b, pp. 71-73) identified six stages in the development of the compliance costs of 
taxation as a policy area: non-recognition or lack of interest in the subject area (stage 1); 
qualitative recognition by the professionals (stage 2); estimation and evaluation (stage 
3); policy recognition (stage 4); effective policy measures (stage 5); and continual 
monitoring of compliance costs (stage 6). From this perspective, Malaysia is possibly in 
stage one, with some development in stages two and three having taken place during the 
late 1990s.  
 
The current compliance costs estimates in the SAS regime contribute mainly to stage 
three, which is valuable for government policy consideration (stage 4). As the current 
study is confined to corporate SMEs, further studies on compliance costs are possibly 
essential to convince the IRB in this regard. Currently, the IRB does not have a specific 
policy on the compliance costs of SMEs. However, it is acknowledged that tax 
simplification measures taken by the IRB do reduce compliance costs, in absolute value, 
as is evident in this study. At this stage, it is recommended that the first and most 
important policy area that should be addressed is to recognise fully the compliance 
burden of the SMEs at the national level.  
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Accordingly, the establishment of a relevant investigative committee to undertake a 
comprehensive review of SME income taxation in Malaysia is recommended. This is 
similar to the Beddall Committee (1990) or the Small Business Deregulation Task 
Force, the SBDTF (1996),206 in Australia. In the context of Malaysian SMEs, the 
establishment of a committee with a composition similar to that of the SBDTF is 
probably much better.207 It should be emphasised that having greater consultation with 
small business organisations in the process of tax reform is among key 
recommendations (No. 25) made in the Beddall Report (1990). As such, the proposed 
committee in Malaysia should be comprised of members mainly from the SME business 
sector, with appropriate representation by industry groups and organisations, and the 
chairman or a representative from the NSDC, SME Corp, TRP, STFB and the Small 
and Medium Industry Association of Malaysia. The committee should also include 
representatives from tax professionals, including the Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants, the Malaysian Institute of Taxation, lawyers, and academics with 
expertise in the taxation of SMEs. The proposed committee would be expected to 
provide a list of specific policy recommendations for SMEs.  
 
Subsequently, the potential impact of any tax reforms or changes, particularly to SMEs, 
is worth assessing by requiring a government TIS, similar to that which has been 
implemented in OECD countries decades ago (Evans and Walpole 1999). Even 
presently, tax compliance costs remain as an important consideration in tax policy 
development (Hansford, Hasseldine and Howorth 2003, p. 489). The recent Malaysian 
experience on the GST postponement demonstrated the importance of TIS in tax policy 
debate. At this point of time, an impact study could be problematic due to data 
availability. The proposed committee would be a significant development in this regard.  
  
8.3.2 Tax Simplification and Compliance Costs Minimisation 
The current findings are evidence of the effects of tax complexity and tax audits on the 
likely non-compliance behaviour of corporate SMEs. Thus, measures to improve the 
                                                 
206 Also referred to as the Bell Committee. 
207 The members of the SBDTF were mostly from the business sector, including accountants and lawyers. 
On the other hand, the Beddall Committee was comprised only of Members of Parliament. 
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voluntary tax compliance of corporate SMEs should address these two aspects. This 
section presents a discussion of the overall policy and provides specific 
recommendations regarding tax complexity. Policy suggestions on tax audits are 
presented in the next subsection.208  
  
Tax complexity is ‘a mirror image’ of tax simplicity (Tran-Nam 1999), with the high 
costs of compliance demonstrating a complex tax system and vice-versa (Slemrod 1992, 
p. 53; Pope 1993b, p. 70). Kasipillai (2005, p. 26) insists that tax law should be 
systematically simplified for three reasons, namely, to lower both compliance costs and 
administrative costs, to reduce uncertainty faced by taxpayers (tax complexity), and to 
improve the level of voluntary compliance. Tax simplification measures are likely to 
minimise tax compliance costs (Pope 1993b, p. 81), improve voluntary tax compliance 
behaviour, and ensure higher tax revenue (Pope 1993a, p. 284).  
 
Various tax simplification measures, largely based on overseas practice, have been 
introduced since the year 2000.209 These simplification measures are likely to contribute 
to lower tax compliance costs based on the current compliance costs estimates.210 The 
most recent income tax change for companies, i.e. from the imputation tax system to a 
single tier tax system,211 will remove the corporate SMEs’ burden substantially. Apart 
from this recent measure, further income tax simplification is needed to lessen the tax 
compliance burden of SMEs. 
 
Until recently, Malaysia seems to have adopted an incremental approach to tax 
simplification. This trend is not surprising as the tax compliance burden is yet to be 
recognised fully. Sandford (1993, pp. 201-205) provides a comprehensive discussion on 
the advantages and disadvantages of the incremental and package approaches, but 
asserts that the success of tax reform is more likely to be achieved by way of the latter 
approach (p. 228). Thus, further income tax simplification for Malaysian businesses in a 
                                                 
208 See subsection 8.3.3.  
209 See Chapter Three, subsection 3.2.3. 
210 See Chapter Seven, subsection 7.2.2 
211 See Chapter Three, subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.  
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more comprehensive and systematic manner, preferably involving all business sizes,212 
is strongly recommended. 
 
Future tax simplification measures should take account of the views of business 
taxpayers, past experiences in Malaysia, the lessons learnt from other tax regimes (both 
developed and developing countries) and, more importantly, specific suggestions to be 
made by the proposed national investigative committee.213 These considerations are 
expected to benefit all business taxpayers, regardless of business sector or size. 
Effective measures to improve tax compliance should take into account the level of tax 
complexity and tax compliance costs simultaneously; therefore, a package approach is 
highly recommended.  
 
Overall, the current study has highlighted the importance of considering the tax 
compliance burden of the SME sector in tax policy development. A full list of 
suggestions and recommendations would be provided following a comprehensive 
review by the proposed committee. Some of the suggestions made by the respondents in 
this survey include simplification of the tax form, further tax incentives and a reduction 
in tax rates.214 This and other areas for consideration through income tax simplification 
(preferably in the near future) for corporate SMEs are as follows:   
 
Standardisation of the Small and Medium Enterprise Definition for Tax Purposes 
and Extension of Incentives 
Since 2005, Malaysia has adopted a national definition for SMEs.215 Regarding income 
tax, currently there are at least three definitions that are in force for different purposes 
covering companies only, with three different proxies used to measure the size of the 
company: paid-up capital, shareholder’s fund and authorised capital, as shown in Table 
8.2.  
                                                 
212 A similar suggestion has been recently made by Freedman (2006; 2009).  
213 See subsection 8.3.1. 
214 Respondents were asked, by way of two open-ended questions, to provide specific suggestions on how 
to reduce the tax preparation work of SMEs (Question 19–Appendix F) and to provide overall comments 
on the taxation of SMEs as a whole (Question 20–Appendix F). Unfortunately, only a few responded to 
these questions, as shown in Appendix U. 
215 See Chapter One, subsection 1.5.3.  
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Table 8.2: Examples of Different Definitions of SMEs for Tax Purposes 
Types of  Incentives/deductions Definition of Small and Medium Enterprises 
Dual corporate tax rates. Company (resident in Malaysia) with an 
ordinary paid-up capital up to RM2.5 million at 
the beginning of the basis year.    
Deductions for pre-incorporation 
expenses. 
Company (incorporated in Malaysia) and 
having authorized capital of not more than 
RM2.5 million.   
Pioneer status or investment tax 
allowance.  
A small-scale company (incorporated in 
Malaysia) with a shareholder’s funds not 
exceeding RM500,000. 
Source: Adapted from Pope and Abdul-Jabbar (2007). 
 
As a measure of standardisation and simplification, a uniform definition of SMEs 
should be considered for tax purposes. Moreover, a lower tax rate and various tax 
incentives (mainly pioneer status and investment tax allowance) eligible to certain SME 
companies could be extended to include all SME companies. Measures that have been 
implemented in other developing countries, such as Singapore, are worthy of 
consideration. For example, the IRAS provides a tax exemption scheme for new 
companies during their first three years of operation (Ong and Imm 2007). However, 
from an IRB perspective, the trade-off between losses of tax revenue and benefits of tax 
simplification would be of particular concern.  
 
Reduce the Issuance of Public Rulings and Encourage Private Rulings  
Since the implementation of the SAS system, there is a growing list of Public Rulings 
issued, with an average of six per year.216 However, a growing list of Public Rulings 
may increase tax complexity (Pope and Abdul-Jabbar 2007). The right to request a 
Private Ruling similar to Australian legislation (Crist 2004) would be a better measure, 
particularly for specific tax issues. A government plan to introduce Advance Rulings 
was first announced in the 2007 Budget (Ministry of Finance Malaysia 2006a), and 
                                                 
216 A number of Public Rulings relevant to this thesis are discussed in Chapter Three, subsections 3.2.2. 
and 3.2.3. 
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almost one and half years later, the Guidelines on Advance Rulings were issued by the 
IRB (2008b). The IRB commitment to the issuing of an advance ruling within sixty 
days from the date of application is encouraging, but the imposition of fees (RM500 for 
application and reimbursement for external advice and other costs), could be 
burdensome to SMEs in particular. Charging a fee for a private ruling is a normal 
practice in most countries, including Canada, New Zealand, the US (The Australian 
Treasury 2004b, p. 6) and Singapore, with the exception of Australia (The Australian 
Treasury 2004a, p. 23). The Australian approach not to charge fees is worth considering 
for Malaysian SME businesses. 
 
Simplify the Record Keeping Requirements for Small Businesses 
Simplifying record keeping for small business would allow businesses to allocate more 
resources to doing business. This includes a substantial reduction in the length of tax-
related forms and all accompanying supporting documents. For example, in Singapore, 
the IRAS has simplified income tax returns for all business taxpayers by reducing the 
number of pages; income tax returns for companies were reduced from eight to five 
pages in 2004 (Ong and Imm 2007, p. 7).  
 
Apart from the above, the IRB in particular, and relevant business authorities in 
Malaysia, should continuously and actively encourage small businesses to maintain 
good record keeping (Singh 2002, p. 277). The positive side of tax compliance, such as 
managerial benefits arising from tax compliance, needs to be repeatedly emphasised. 
 
8.3.3 Publicising Tax Audit Information 
The current study provides evidence that the possibility of non-compliance increases as 
the probability of a tax audit decreases. Overall, the respondents were somewhat 
uncertain about the possibility of their company being subjected to a tax audit as 
probably no information is available in this regard. There are some details in the annual 
report of the IRB on the number of tax audit cases and the corresponding amount 
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recovered from audit activities.217 However, the probability of taxpayers being selected 
for audit purposes is not publicly available or highlighted.  
 
During the initial years of SAS, the IRB has emphasised preparing both taxpayers and 
tax officials to the new system by way of education and training respectively.  It has 
been more than eight years since the implementation of the SAS to the corporate sector 
in Malaysia, so it is now the right timing for the IRB to highlight some general details 
of their audit activities publicly. Available academic data suggest that the current 
corporate tax audit rate appears to be rather low, i.e. less than half of one percent for the 
year 2007 (Pope and Mohd Isa 2009). It is likely that the IRB will increase gradually 
the corporate audit rate. At this stage, the IRB may want to publicise (including using 
the website effectively) more of their audit activities and, to some extent, their basic 
data at the aggregate level, including the number of audit cases and the amount of 
revenue recovered from their audit activities. This measure is expected to effectively 
inform taxpayers (Singh 2007) if undertaken on a timely basis (Singh 2008) and, more 
importantly, increase the level of tax audit awareness among businesses, which is 
important as a deterrent to non-compliance. 
 
8.3.4 Overall Tax Administration in Malaysia 
Apart from income tax simplification, changes to tax administrative processes are 
among the ten main lessons identified by Ariff and Pope (2002, pp. 279-289) as a policy 
guide for developing countries. Modernisation of tax administration must take place 
primarily with a view to simplifying the tax rules, making them taxpayer-friendly, and 
reducing both administrative and compliance costs, with a particular emphasis on the 
small business sector (Ariff and Pope 2002). 
 
Currently, administration of direct taxes and indirect taxes are governed by two 
government authorities, i.e. the IRB and RCM respectively, with both bodies responsible 
to the Ministry of Finance.218 It is timely that the government should consider seriously a 
                                                 
217 See Chapter One, Table 1.3. 
218 See Chapter Three, subsection 3.2.1. 
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suggestion made by Kasipillai and Baldry (2004) regarding merging the administration 
of both direct and indirect tax administrations into a single agency. This has been a 
common practice in most countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, the 
US, and recently, the UK. Kasipillai and Baldry (2004) believed that the compliance 
task of business will be simplified and, for tax authorities, the compliance enforcement 
tasks can be carried out more efficiently. The TRP in particular could lead the initial 
move towards a single tax authority in Malaysia.  
 
Probably, a specific national committee on tax administration, preferably similar to the 
UK O’Donnell Committee (2004), should be considered to conduct a detailed study and 
provide recommendations accordingly. Relevant parties, such as the IRB, RMC, and 
representatives from business sectors and professionals (such as accountants and 
lawyers) as well as other national bodies, including the STFB and NSDC, should take 
part in the process. Further, the proposed committee may consider the fundamental 
features of leading modern tax administrations, as recently outlined by Hasseldine 
(2008, p. 16). This includes concern over cost efficiency and effectiveness, engagement 
with stakeholders, introduction of technology applications, and factors that influence the 
behaviour of both taxpayers and tax professionals. 
 
 
8.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study provides empirical evidence and has contributed to the body of tax 
knowledge in the context of corporate income taxation. This covers both areas of tax 
compliance behaviour and compliance costs in a single study, with particular attention 
to the SME sector. Despite this, the results of the current study should be interpreted as 
being subject to several limitations.  
 
First, this study has obtained an effective response rate of 16 percent in the primary 
postal survey. Despite many recommendations, especially by Sandford (1995), Pope 
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(1995) and Dillman (2007), being adopted into the current study,219 the number of 
responses received is considered low in the context of international tax studies, which  
typically have a rate of around 25 percent to 30 percent. Nonetheless, it is broadly 
comparable to a response rate of around 14 percent to 26 percent, and about 10 percent 
to 20 percent in a number of Asian tax and business studies respectively (Abdul-Jabbar 
and Pope 2008a, p. 297). It is also comparable to the average response rate of just over 
21 percent for the 16 international corporate tax compliance costs studies reviewed in 
this thesis,220 with five studies having a response rate of less than 16 percent. Further, 
analyses of non-response bias suggest fairly similar responses between respondents and 
non-respondents, thereby removing the possibility of significant non-response bias in 
this study.221 
 
Secondly, it is acknowledged that evaluating the sample responses to the overall SME 
population in Malaysia is difficult due to availability of data, but the representation of 
the sample is reasonably supported by reference to a sample population and available 
government data.222 Thus, the generalisation of the current findings to Malaysian 
corporate SME taxation is satisfactory. However, the generalisation into SME 
companies in other tax jurisdictions may be subject to further study; more importantly, 
additional caution is necessary as different measures apply in defining the SME sector. 
 
Thirdly, compliance costs are derived based on estimates gathered through self-
reporting surveys. The external costs and additional costs are straightforward monetary 
costs to estimate as compared to valuation of internal time, which is a possible area of 
concern. This study categorises staff into four groups: manager/accountant, accounting 
staff, administrative staff, and other staff. The borderline between income tax 
compliance work and other work may not be easily understood by respondents. Further, 
it is possible that respondents were not able to recall their internal time spent accurately. 
The fact that compliance costs estimates are merely a measure of the magnitude of 
                                                 
219 See Chapter Four, Section 4.3. 
220 See Appendix D. 
221 See Chapter Four, Section 4.9. 
222 See Chapter Five, Section 5.2, paragraphs below Table 5.6. 
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compliance costs (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick 1989; Sandford 1995) is fully 
acknowledged. 
 
Fourthly, the tax attitudes and non-compliance of SME companies are measured from 
the managerial or respondent perspectives, which are assumed to indicate tax attitudes 
and likely compliance/non-compliance of corporate SMEs. In practice, corporate tax 
returns are mostly lodged by tax professionals on behalf of their corporation clients. 
Overall, the separate survey of tax professionals indicates comparable perceptions to 
SME respondents. The survey of tax professionals in the current study has been carried 
out for a small sample size of 300, with only 31 responses. Thus, comparable 
perceptions between SME respondents and tax professionals should be treated as 
tentative.  
 
Fifthly, the current study measured tax non-compliance by way of hypothetical tax 
scenarios. It is acknowledged that the actual judgment of the respondents may vary. 
Further, the scenario is restricted to two specific types of non-compliance behaviour, 
more specifically involving two single transactions of RM10,000 each. Further, the 
scenarios were stated in the context of self-employment. The findings therefore should 
be treated with caution with regard to other types of non-compliance and/or other 
specific amounts for consideration.  
 
Finally, other usual self-reporting mail survey limitations are to be recognised, 
especially in the sensitive area of tax compliance. Apart from the honesty of the 
respondents, it is possible that the survey questionnaire may be interpreted differently 
by the respondents.  
 
 
8.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
The current study is likely to act as a base for future tax compliance research, involving 
corporations and covering both compliance costs and compliance behaviour. However 
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due to constraints discussed above,223 it is strongly recommended that future research 
take the following points into consideration. 
 
In the future, researchers may select samples from the actual population of business 
taxpayers. Such an approach would provide valuable comparison findings. Another 
prospect of examining this area lies in the context of analysing compliance costs 
estimates and managerial perceptions of actual compliant and non-compliant business 
taxpayers, similar to Sia et al. (2008), but confined to individuals. However, the fact 
that the true population and the actual compliant/non-compliant taxpayers are not 
publicly available means that this would not be possible without the full cooperation of 
the tax authority. For example, a review of prior Malaysian studies undertaken in this 
thesis, indicates that there are only three studies that have used the IRB data, all of these 
having been carried out by staff/former staff of the IRB (i.e. Che-Ayub 1994; Abdul 
2003; Sia et al. 2008). Nonetheless, a more recent development indicates that the IRB 
has started allowing other researchers (i.e. Pope and Mohd Isa 2009) to use their tax 
data, to some extent. This trend is motivation for tax academics to undertake further tax 
research in Malaysia. 
 
This study has focussed on two types of hypothetical tax behaviour—understatement of 
income and overstatement of income—specifically in the context of the self-employed. 
Measuring non-compliance through other alternative approaches, such as using official 
data and experimentation, is strongly recommended. Future studies may include other 
specific types of non-compliance behaviour as well. If hypothetical tax scenarios are to 
be used, other business contexts and, more importantly, a sensitivity analysis involving 
different amounts, are also worth considering. Further, investigating a specific area of 
taxation that is complex for the SME sector is also recommended, and this would be in 
alignment with studies in Australia and the US (e.g. McKerchar 2005; McKerchar, 
Ingraham and Karlinsky 2005; Tran-Nam and Karlinsky 2008). Similar studies could 
also include other business taxpayers, such as the self-employed, partnerships and large 
companies, with considerable attention towards tax compliance costs. 
                                                 
223 See Section 8.4. 
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Finally, more studies of corporate tax compliance in other tax jurisdictions are needed. 
Replication or several extensions of this study—taking into account limitations and 
suggestions above—to both developed and developing countries could make further 
contributions to corporate tax knowledge, tax administration and practices.  
 
 
8.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study has been among the first to integrate tax compliance costs, tax attitudes and 
the likely compliance behaviour of corporations, Malaysian SMEs in particular, and 
this, more importantly, from a business managerial perspective. The usual regressivity 
of tax compliance costs is evident, with both tax complexity and tax audit found to 
influence corporate tax behaviour. Thus, at this stage, the IRB is urged to continue tax 
simplification measures that would be expected to significantly minimise the 
compliance burden of all taxpayers, including businesses of all sizes. The magnitude of 
tax audit activities should be increased substantially, and important information derived 
from such activities should be utilised effectively to enhance the awareness of business 
taxpayers.  
 
To sum up, it is hoped that the issue of the income tax compliance burden of businesses 
will be recognised fully at the national level and, at a later stage, be considered as an 
important element for any future tax policy decision-making in Malaysia, especially 
involving the SME sector.  
 
 
 
 
    
  247
REFERENCES 
 
Abdul-Jabbar, H 1996, The Implementation of Schedular Monthly Tax Deduction: The 
Case of Small and Medium Industries in Kedah Darul Aman, Master Thesis, 
University Utara Malaysia.  
 
Abdul-Jabbar, H & Pope, J 2008a, 'The Effects of the Self-Assessment System on the 
Tax Compliance Costs of Small and Medium Enterprises in Malaysia', 
Australian Tax Forum, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 289-307.  
 
Abdul-Jabbar, H & Pope, J 2008b, 'Exploring the Relationship between Tax 
Compliance Costs and Compliance Issues in Malaysia', Journal of Applied Law 
and Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-20.  
 
Abdul-Jabbar, H & Pope, J 2009 (Forthcoming), 'Tax Attitudes and Compliance among 
Small and Medium Enterprises in Malaysia', New Zealand Journal of Taxation 
Law and Policy, vol. 13, no. 3.  
 
Abdul-Manaf, NA 2004, Land Tax Administration and Compliance Attitudes in 
Malaysia, PhD Thesis, Nottingham University.  
 
Abdul-Manaf, NA & Abdul-Jabbar, H 2006, 'A Survey of Perception towards Tax 
Evasion as a Crime', in M Walpole & M McKerchar (eds), Further Global 
Challenges in Tax Administration, Fiscal Publications, Birmingham, pp. 183-99. 
 
Abdul-Manaf, NA, Hasseldine, J & Hodges, R 2005, 'The Determinants of Malaysian 
Land Taxpayers' Compliance Attitudes', eJournal of Tax Research, vol. 3, no. 2, 
pp. 206-21.  
 
Abdul, M 2003, Income Tax Non-compliance in Malaysia, Prentice Hall, Petaling Jaya. 
 
Abdul, M & Sheehan, P 2003, 'Estimating the Extent of Income Tax Non-compliance in 
Malaysia and Australia using the Gap Approach (part I)', Tax Nasional, vol. 12, 
no. 4th Quarter, pp. 22-34.  
 
Ahmad, MAR, Hanefah, M & Mohd Noor, MA 2007, 'The Effects of Knowledge on 
Tax Compliance Behaviours among Malaysian Taxpayers', in International 
Conference on Business and Information, Tokyo, 11-13 July. 
 
Allers, M 1994, Administrative and Compliance Costs of Taxation and Public Transfers 
in the Netherlands, Woltersgroep Gronigen. 
 
Allingham, MG & Sandmo, A 1972, 'Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis', 
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 1, pp. 323-38.  
 
  248
Andreoni, J, Erard, B & Feinstein, J 1998, 'Tax Compliance', Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 818-60.  
 
Ariff, M, Ismail, Z & Loh, A 1997, 'Compliance Costs of Corporate Income Taxation in 
Singapore', Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, vol. 24, no. 9 & 10, 
pp. 1253-68.  
 
Ariff, M, Loh, A & Talib, A 1995, 'Compliance Costs of Corporate Income Taxation in 
Singapore, 1994', Accounting Research Journal, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 75-87.  
 
Ariff, M & Pope, J 2002, Taxation & Compliance Costs in Asia Pacific Economies, 
University Utara Malaysia Press, Sintok. 
 
Armstrong, S & Overton, T 1977, 'Estimating Nonresponse Bias in Mail Surveys', 
Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 14, pp. 396-402.  
 
Ashby, CM 2000, IRS' Effort to Serve Small Business Taxpayers: Testimony of the 
General Accounting Office before the Senate Committee on Small Business, 
General Accounting Office, GAO/T-GGD-00-138.  
 
Babbie, E 1989, The Practice of Social Research, 5th edn, Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, Belmont: CA. 
 
Baldry, J & Kasipillai, J 1996, 'Malaysia: Income Tax Enforcement', Asia-Pacific Tax 
Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 9, pp. 268-72.  
 
Bank Negara Malaysia 2004, 'Conclusion of the Second National SME Development 
Council Meeting', Press Release, 2 December.  
 
Bank Negara Malaysia 2009, Ringgit Foreign Exchange Rates. Retrieved 1 July, from 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/statistics/exchangerates.php 
 
Bartholomew, S & Smith, A 2006, 'Improving Survey Response Rates from Chief 
Executive Officers in Small Firms: The Importance of Social Networks', 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 83-96.  
 
Baruch, Y 1999, 'Response Rate in Academic Studies - A Comparative Analysis', 
Human Relations, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 421-38.  
 
Beattie, V, Goodacre, A & Thomson, SJ 2006, 'Corporate Financing Decisions: UK 
Survey Evidence', Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 33, no. 9 & 
10, pp. 1402-34.  
 
Becker, GS 1968, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach', The Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 169-217.  
 
  249
Beddall Report 1990, Small Business in Australia: Challenges, Problems and 
Opportunities AGPS, Canberra, Report of the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology.  
 
Bertolucci, A 2002, The Compliance Costs of Taxation in Brazil: A Survey of Costs in 
Brazilian Public Companies', University of Sao Paulo, cited in Evans (2003b).  
 
Blazic, H 2004, 'Tax Compliance Costs of Companies in Croatia', Ekonomický časopis, 
vol. 6, pp. 723-38.  
 
Blumenthal, M & Kalambokidis, L 2006, 'The Compliance Costs of Maintaining Tax 
Exempt Status', National Tax Journal, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 235-52.  
 
Blumenthal, M & Slemrod, J 1992, 'The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual 
Income Tax System: A Second Look after Tax Reform', National Tax Journal, 
vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 185-202.  
 
Board of Taxation 2007, Scoping Study of Small Business Tax Compliance Costs: A 
Report to the Treasurer, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.  
 
Brau, J & Fawcett, S 2006, 'Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and 
Practice', The Journal of Finance, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 399-436.  
 
Brunton, C 2005, Measuring the Tax Compliance Costs of Small and Medium-sized 
Businesses – A Benchmark Survey: Final Report, Wellington, Report prepared 
for Inland Revenue Department New Zealand.  
 
BT Online 1996, Malaysia's SMIDEC: Making SMEs the Main Engine of Growth. 
Retrieved 11 Jun 2006, from 
http://www.asia1.com/bizcentre/Enterprise50/supp32_1.html 
 
Business New Zealand/KPMG 2005, Summary Report of the Business New Zealand – 
KPMG Compliance Cost Survey, Wellington.  
 
Business New Zealand/KPMG 2006, Summary Report of the Business New Zealand – 
KPMG Compliance Cost Survey, Wellington.  
 
Business New Zealand/KPMG 2007, Summary Report of the Business New Zealand – 
KPMG Compliance Cost Survey, Wellington.  
 
Chan, CW, Troutman, CS & O'Bryan, D 2000, 'An Expanded Model of Taxpayer 
Compliance: Empirical Evidence from the United States and Hong Kong', 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 
83-103.  
 
  250
Chan, S, Cheung, D, Ariff, M & Loh, A 1999, 'Compliance Costs of Corporate Taxation 
in Hong Kong', International Tax Journal, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 42-68.  
 
Charron, L, Chow, G & Halbesma, J 2008, The Hidden Tax Burden: A Business 
Perspective on the Cost of Complying with Taxes, Canadian Federation of 
Independent Business (CFIB).  
 
Chattopadhyay, S & Das-Gupta, A 2002a, The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Indian 
Corporations, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.  
 
Chattopadhyay, S & Das-Gupta, A 2002b, The Personal Income Tax in India: 
Compliance Costs and Compliance Behaviour of Taxpayers, National Institute 
of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.  
 
Che-Ayub, SM 1994, Tax Administration Reform for the Malaysian Inland Revenue 
Department with an Adaptation of the Voluntary Compliance Function, DPA 
Dissertation Thesis, Golden Gate University.  
 
Che Azmi, A & Perumal, K 2008, 'Tax Fairness Dimensions in an Asian Context: The 
Malaysian Perspective', International Review of Business Research Papers, vol. 
4, no. 5, pp. 11-9.  
 
Chittenden, F, Kauser, S & Poutziouris, P 2003, 'Tax Regulation and Small Business in 
the USA, UK, Australia and New Zealand', International Small Business 
Journal, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 93-115.  
 
Chittenden, F, Kauser, S & Poutziouris, P 2005, 'PAYE-NIC Compliance Costs: 
Empirical Evidence from the UK SME Economy', International Small Business 
Journal, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 635-56.  
 
Chittenden, F, Poutziouris, P, Kauser, S & Shamutkova, M 2005, 'Income Tax Self-
assessment Compliance Costs: Empirical Evidence from the UK', in C Gray & 
G Bannock (eds), Government Regulation and the Small Firm, Institute for 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship, Milton Keynes, pp. 27-39. 
 
Chittenden, F & Sloan, B 2007, 'Taxation and Public Policy Towards Small Firms: A 
Review', Australian Tax Forum, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 31-45.  
 
Christensen, AL, Weihrich, SG & Gerbing, MD 1994, 'The Impact of Education on 
Perceptions of Tax Fairness', Advances in Taxation, vol. 6, pp. 63-94.  
 
Collins, JH, Milliron, V & Toy, DR 1992, 'Determinants of Tax Compliance: A 
Contingency Approach', The Journal of the American Taxation Association, vol. 
14, no. Fall, pp. 1-29.  
 
  251
CPA Australia 2003, Small Business Survey Program: Compliance Burden CPA 
Australia, Melbourne.  
 
Crawford, C & Freedman, J 2008, Small Business Taxation: A Special Study of the 
Structural Issues Surrounding the Taxation of Business Profits of Owner 
Managed Firms, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, Prepared for the 
Report of a Commission on Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century, 
Chaired by Sir James Mirrlees.  
 
Crist, N 2004, 'Review of Tax Regime Plain, Simple Outcome is Expected', The Star, 
15 September 2004.  
 
Cuccia, AD 1994, 'The Economics of Tax Compliance: What Do We Know and Where 
Do We Go?' Journal of Accounting Literature, vol. 13, pp. 81-116.  
 
Cuccia, AD & Carnes, GA 2001, 'A Closer look at the Relation between Tax 
Complexity and Tax Equity Perceptions', Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 
22, no. 2, pp. 113-40.  
 
DeLuca, D, Greenland, A, Guyton, J, Hennessy, S & Kindlon, A 2005, 'Measuring the 
Tax Compliance Burden of Small Businesses', in IRS Research Conference, 
Washington DC, 7-8 June. 
 
Dennis, W 2003, 'Raising Response Rates in Mail Surveys of Small Business Owners: 
Results of an Experiment', Journal of Small Business Management, vol. 41, no. 
3, pp. 278-95.  
 
Department of Statistics Malaysia 2005, The General Report of the Population and 
Housing Census 2000, Kuala Lumpur 2005.  
 
Department of Statistics Malaysia 2007, Census of Establishments and Enterprises 
2005: Profile of Small and Medium Enterprises, Kuala Lumpur.  
 
Department of Statistics Malaysia 2008, Population (updated 5 September 2008) 
Retrieved 23 June 2009, from 
http://www.statistics.gov.my/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=50:population&catid=38:kaystats&Itemid=11 
 
Dillman, D 1978, Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method, John Wiley 
& Sons, New York. 
 
Dillman, D 1991, 'The Design and Administration of Mail Surveys', Annual Review of 
Sociology, vol. 17, pp. 225-49.  
 
Dillman, D 2007, Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method 2007, 2nd 
edn, John Wiley and Sons, New York. 
  252
 
Dornstein, M 1987, 'Taxes: Attitudes and Perceptions and their Social Bases', Journal of 
Economic Psychology, vol. 8, pp. 55-76.  
 
Elffers, H, Robben, HJ & Hessing, DJ 1992, 'On Measuring Tax Evasion', Journal of 
Economic Psychology, vol. 13, pp. 545-67.  
 
Elffers, H, Weigel, RH & Hessing, DJ 1987, 'The Consequences of Different Strategies 
for Measuring Tax Evasion Behavior', Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 8, 
no. 3, pp. 311-37.  
 
Embong, AR 1996, 'Social Transformation, the State and the Middle Classes in Post-
independence Malaysia ', Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 524-47.  
 
Employment Act (Act 265) 1955, International Law Book Services, Petaling Jaya. 
 
Erard, B 1997a, The Income Tax Compliance Burden on Canadian Big Business, 
Department of Finance, Ottawa, Working paper 97-2, prepared for the Technical 
Committee on Business Taxation.  
 
Erard, B 1997b, The Income Tax Compliance Burden on Small and Medium-sized 
Canadian Businesses, Department of Finance, Ottawa, Working Paper 97-12, 
Prepared for the Technical Committee on Business Taxation.  
 
Evans, C 2003a, The Operating Costs of Taxing the Capital Gains of Individuals: A 
Comparative Study of Australia and the UK, with Particular Reference to the 
Compliance Costs of Certain Tax Design Features, PhD Thesis, University of 
New South Wales.  
 
Evans, C 2003b, 'Studying the Studies: An Overview of Recent Research into Taxation 
Operating Costs', eJournal of Tax Research, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 64-92.  
 
Evans, C, Carlon, S & Massey, D 2005, 'Record Keeping Practices and Tax Compliance 
of SMEs', eJournal of Tax Research, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 288-334.  
 
Evans, C, Pope, J & Hasseldine, J (eds.) 2001, Taxation Compliance Costs: A 
Festschrift for Cedric Sandford, Prospect Media Pty Ltd, Sydney. 
 
Evans, C, Ritchie, K, Tran-Nam, B & Walpole, M 1996, A Report into the Incremental 
Costs of Taxpayer Compliance, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra.  
 
Evans, C, Ritchie, K, Tran-Nam, B & Walpole, M 1997, A Report into Taxpayer Costs 
of Compliance, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.  
 
  253
Evans, C, Ritchie, K, Tran-Nam, B & Walpole, M 1998, 'Taxation Compliance Costs: 
Some Recent Empirical Work and International Comparisons', Australian Tax 
Forum, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 93-122.  
 
Evans, C, Tran-Nam, B & Andrew, B 2007, 'Towards Systemic Reform of the 
Australian Personal Income Tax: Developing a Sustainable Model for the 
Future', Australian Tax Forum, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 15-47.  
 
Evans, C, Tran-Nam, B & Jordan, B 2002, 'Assessing the Potential Compliance 
Costs/Benefits of the Tax Value Method', Australian Tax Forum, vol. 17, no. 1, 
pp. 33-58.  
 
Evans, C & Walpole, M 1999, Compliance Cost Control: A Review of Tax Impact 
Statements in the OECD, Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney, 
Research Study No. 27.  
 
Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers 2007, Annual Salary, Benefits and Employment 
Conditions Survey of the Manufacturing Sector 2006, Kuala Lumpur.  
 
Fernandez, P & Oats, L 1998, 'The Small Business under a Goods and Services Tax 
Regime', in C Evans & A Greenbaum (eds), Tax Administration: Facing the 
Challenges of the Future, Prospect Media Pty Ltd, Sydney, pp. 159-76. 
 
Fischer, CM 1993, Perceived Detection Probability and Taxpayer Compliance: A 
Conceptual and Empirical Examination (Detection Probability), PhD Thesis, 
Pennsylvania University.  
 
Fischer, CM, Wartick, M & Mark, MM 1992, 'Detection Probability and Taxpayer 
Compliance: A Review of the Literature', Journal of Accounting Literature, vol. 
11, pp. 1-46.  
 
Forsgren, R 1989, 'Increasing Mail Survey Response Rates: Methods for Small 
Business Researchers', Journal of Small Business Management, vol. 27, no. 4, 
pp. 61-6.  
 
Fowler, FJ 1995, Improving Survey Questions: Design and Evaluation, SAGE 
Publications, Thousand Oaks. 
 
Freedman, J 2003, 'Small Business Taxation: Policy Issues and the UK', in N Warren 
(ed.), Taxing Small Business: Developing Good Tax Policies, Australian Tax 
Research Foundation. 
 
Freedman, J 2006, 'Why Taxing the Micro-business is Not Simple - A Cautionary Tale 
from the "Old World" ', Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association, 
vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 58-77.  
 
  254
Freedman, J 2009, 'Reforming the Business Tax System: Does Size Matter? 
Fundamental Issues in Small Business Taxation ', in C Evans & R Krever (eds), 
Australian Business Tax Reform in Retrospect and Prospect, Thomson Reuters, 
Pyrmont, pp. 153-78. 
 
Garson, D n.d., Statnotes: Topics in Multivariate Analysis. Retrieved 21 August 2006, 
from http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/statnote.htm 
 
Gerbing, MD 1988, An Empirical Study of Taxpayer Perceptions of Fairness, PhD 
Thesis, University of Texas.  
 
Gilligan, G & Richardson, G 2005, 'Perceptions of Tax Fairness and Tax Compliance in 
Australia and Hong Kong - A Preliminary Study', Journal of Financial Crime, 
vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 331-43.  
 
Glover, J & Tran-Nam, B 2005, 'The GST Recurrent Compliance Costs/Benefits of 
Small Business in Australia: A Case Study Approach', Journal of the 
Australasian Tax Teachers Association, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 237-58.  
 
Graetz, M & Wilde, L 1985, 'The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy', 
National Tax Journal, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 355-63.  
 
Graham, J & Harvey, C 2001, 'The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: Evidence 
from the Field', Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 60, pp. 187-243.  
 
Griffis, S, Goldsby, T & Cooper, M 2003, 'Web-based and Mail Surveys: A 
Comparison of Response, Data and Cost', Journal of Business Logistics, vol. 24, 
no. 3, pp. 237-58.  
 
Guyton, JL, Korobow, AK, Lee, PS & Toder, EJ 2005, 'The Effects of Tax Software 
and Paid Preparers on Compliance Costs', National Tax Journal, vol. 58, no. 3, 
pp. 439-48.  
 
Guyton, JL, O’Hare, JF, Stavrianos, MP & Toder, EJ 2003, 'Estimating the Compliance 
Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax', National Tax Journal, vol. 56, no. 3, 
pp. 673-88.  
 
Haig, RM 1935, 'The Cost to Business Concerns of Compliance with Tax Laws', 
Management Review, vol. 24, no. 11, pp. 323-33.  
 
Hair, J, Anderson, R, Tatham, R & Black, W 1998, Multivariate Data Analysis, 5th edn, 
Prentice-Hall International, New Jersey. 
 
Hall, A 1993, The High Cost of Tax Compliance for US Business, Tax Foundation, 
Washington, Special Report No 25.  
 
  255
Hanefah, M 1996, An Evaluation of the Malaysian Tax Administrative System and 
Taxpayers Perceptions towards Assessment System, Tax Law Fairness and Tax 
Law Complexity PhD Thesis, University Utara Malaysia.  
 
Hanefah, M & Al-Mureshi, A 1991, 'Accounting in Small and Medium Enterprises', 
Akauntan Nasional, Jan, pp. 14-5.  
 
Hanefah, M, Ariff, M & Kasipillai, J 2001, 'Compliance Costs of Small and Medium 
Enterprises', Journal of Australian Taxation, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 73-97.  
 
Hanefah, M, Hassan, H & Othman, Z 2008, 'E-commerce Implication: Potential 
Problems and Challenges in Malaysia', International Business Research, vol. 1, 
no. 1, pp. 43-57.  
 
Hanlon, M, Mills, L & Slemrod, J 2005, An Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax 
Non-compliance, University of Michigan, Working Paper No.1025.  
 
Hansford, A, Hasseldine, J & Howorth, C 2003, 'Factors Affecting the Costs of UK 
VAT Compliance for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises', Environment and 
Planning C: Government and Policy, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 479-92.  
 
Hashim, MK 2007, SMEs in Malaysia: A Brief Handbook, August Publishing, Petaling 
Jaya. 
 
Hasseldine, J 1999, 'Gender Differences in Tax Compliance', Asia-Pacific Journal of 
Taxation, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 73-89.  
 
Hasseldine, J 2001, 'Linkages between Compliance Costs and Taxpayer Compliance 
Research', in C Evans, J Pope & J Hasseldine (eds), Taxation Compliance Costs: 
A Festschrift for Cedric Sandford, Prospect Media Pty Ltd, Sydney, pp. 3-14. 
 
Hasseldine, J 2008, 'The Search for Best Practice in Tax Administration', in M Walpole 
& C Evans (eds), Tax Administration: Safe Harbours and New Horizons, Fiscal 
Publications, Birmingham, pp. 7-18. 
 
Hasseldine, J & Hansford, A 2002, 'The Compliance Burden of VAT: Further Evidence 
from the UK', Australian Tax Forum, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 367-85.  
 
Hasseldine, J & Hite, P 2003, 'Framing, Gender and Tax Compliance', Journal of 
Economic Psychology, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 517-33.  
 
Hasseldine, J & Kaplan, S 1992, 'The Effect of Different Sanction Communications on 
Hypothetical Taxpayer Compliance: Policy Implication from New Zealand', 
Public Finance, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 45-60.  
 
  256
Hasseldine, J, Kaplan, S & Fuller, L 1994, 'Characteristics of New Zealand Tax 
Evaders: A Note', Accounting and Finance, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 79-93.  
 
Hasseldine, J & Li, Z 1999, 'More Tax Evasion Research Required in New Millennium', 
Crime, Law & Social Change, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 91-104.  
 
Hessing, DJ, Elffers, H & Weigel, RH 1988, 'Exploring the Limit of Self-reports and 
Reasoned Action: An Investigation of the Psychology of Tax Evasion 
Behaviour', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 
405-13.  
 
Hite, P 1988, 'The Effect of Peer Reporting Behaviour on Taxpayer Compliance', The 
Journal of the American Taxation Association, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 47-64.  
 
Hite, P 1997, 'Identifying and Mitigating Taxpayer Non-compliance', Australian Tax 
Forum, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 155-81.  
 
Hite, P & McGill, G 1992, 'An Examination of Taxpayer Preference for Aggressive Tax 
Advice', National Tax Journal, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 389-403.  
 
Income Tax Act (Act 53) 1967, International Law Book Services, Petaling Jaya. 
 
Inland Revenue Board 2000a, Public Ruling No. 7/2000. Retrieved 7 March 2009, from 
http://www.hasil.org.my/english/eng_NO4_5_2_11.asp 
 
Inland Revenue Board 2000b, Public Rulings No. 1/2000 - 3/2000. Retrieved 7 March 
2009, from http://www.hasil.org.my/english/eng_NO4_5_2.asp 
 
Inland Revenue Board 2001a, Annual Report 2000, Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia.  
 
Inland Revenue Board 2001b, Public Rulings No. 4/2000 - 6/2000 (revised). Retrieved 
7 March 2009, from http://www.hasil.org.my/english/eng_NO4_5_2.asp 
 
Inland Revenue Board 2001c, Public Rulings No. 4/2001 - 7/2001. Retrieved 7 March 
2009, from http://www.hasil.org.my/english/eng_NO4_5_2.asp 
 
Inland Revenue Board 2002, Annual Report 2001, Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia.  
 
Inland Revenue Board 2003, Annual Report 2002, Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia.  
 
Inland Revenue Board 2004, Annual Report 2003, Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia.  
 
Inland Revenue Board 2005, Annual Report 2004, Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia.  
 
Inland Revenue Board 2007, Annual Report 2005, Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia.  
 
  257
Inland Revenue Board 2008a, Annual Report 2006, Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia.  
 
Inland Revenue Board 2008b, Guidelines on Advance Rulings, Inland Revenue Board 
of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. 
http://www.hasil.org.my/english/pdf/Guide_LinesAR.pdf. 
 
Inland Revenue Board 2008c, Public Ruling No. 1/2008 Retrieved 7 March 2009, from 
http://www.hasil.org.my/english/pdf/PR012008.pdf 
 
International Monetary Fund 2009, World Economic Outlook, April 2009: Crisis and 
Recovery. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf. 
 
Jackson, BR & Milliron, VC 1986, 'Tax Compliance Research: Findings, Problems, and 
Prospects', Journal of Accounting Literature, vol. 5, pp. 125-65.  
 
Johnston, KS 1963, Corporations' Federal Income Tax Compliance Costs: A Study of 
Small, Medium-size, and Large Corporations, Bureau of Business Research, 
College of Commerce and Administration, Ohio State University, Columbus, 
Monograph 110.  
 
Joulfaian, D 2000, 'Corporate Income Tax Evasion and Managerial Preferences', The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 82, no. 4, pp. 698-701.  
 
Kamdar, N 1997, 'Corporate Income Tax Compliance: A Time Series Analysis', 
Atlantic Economic Journal, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 37-49.  
 
Kaplan, SE, Newberry, KJ & Reckers, PMJ 1997, 'The Effect of Moral Reasoning and 
Educational Communications on Tax Evasion Intentions', The Journal of the 
American Taxation Association, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 38-54.  
 
Kasipillai, J 1997, Aspects of the Hidden Economy and Tax Non-compliance in 
Malaysia, PhD Thesis, The University of New England.  
 
Kasipillai, J 1999, 'Overview of Malaysian Tax System: An Examination of Deliberate 
Non-compliance', Akauntan Nasional, June, pp. 44-51.  
 
Kasipillai, J 2003, Malaysian Income Tax System: Policy Options and Considerations 
for the Future, University Utara Malaysia Press, Sintok. 
 
Kasipillai, J 2005, A Comprehensive Guide to Malaysian Taxation: Current Year 
Assessment, McGraw-Hill, Kuala Lumpur. 
 
Kasipillai, J & Abdul-Jabbar, H 2006, 'Gender and Ethnicity Differences in Tax 
Compliance', Asian Academy of Management Journal, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 75-90.  
 
  258
Kasipillai, J, Aripin, N & Amran, NA 2003, 'The Influence of Education on Tax 
Avoidance and Tax Evasion', eJournal of Tax Research, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 134-
46.  
 
Kasipillai, J & Baldry, J 2004, 'Getting the GST Right', The Chartered Secretary,  
November, pp. 18-20.  
 
Kasipillai, J, Baldry, J & Prasada-Rao, DS 2000, 'Estimating the Size and Determinants 
of Hidden Income and Tax Evasion in Malaysia', Asian Review of Accounting, 
vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 25-41.  
 
Kasipillai, J & Hanefah, M 2000, 'Tax Professionals' Views on Self Assessment 
System', Analisis, vol. 7, no. 1 & 2, pp. 107-22.  
 
Kasipillai, J, Hanefah, M, Mat-Udin, N & Marimuthu, M 1999, 'Are Malaysian 
Taxpayers' Prepared for the Self Assessment System?' Tax Nasional,  
September, pp. 9-17.  
 
Kasipillai, J & Liew, R 2004, 'The Small and Medium Enterprise under a GST Regime', 
Accountants Today, November.  
 
Kasipillai, J, Mat-Udin, N & Zainol-Arifin, Z 2003, 'How Do Moral Values Influence 
Tax Compliance Behaviour? Findings from a Survey', The Chartered Secretary 
Malaysia, June, pp. 10-5.  
 
Kauser, S, Chittenden, F, Poutziouris, P & Sloan, B 2005, 'Corporation Tax Self-
assessment Compliance Costs: Empirical Evidence from the UK', in C Gray & 
G Bannock (eds), Government Regulation and the Small Firm, Institute for 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship Milton Keynes, pp. 15-26. 
 
Kerlinger, FN & Lee, HB 2000, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 4th edn, Harcourt 
College Publishers, Orlando: FL. 
 
Kinsey, KA 1984, Survey Data on Tax Compliance: A Compendium and Review, 
American Bar Association, Chicago, Taxpayer Compliance Project Working 
Paper 84-2.  
 
Kirchler, E & Maciejovsky, B 2001, 'Tax Compliance within the Context of Gain and 
Loss Situations, Expected and Current Asset Position, and Profession', Journal 
of Economic Psychology, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 173-94.  
 
Klepper, S & Nagin, D 1989, 'Tax Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of 
Detection and Criminal Prosecution', Law & Society Review, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 
209-40.  
 
  259
Klun, M 2004a, 'Compliance Costs for Personal Income Tax in a Transition Country: 
The Case of Slovenia', Fiscal Studies, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 93-104.  
 
Klun, M 2004b, 'Taxation Compliance Costs for Companies in Slovenia ', Economic 
and Business Review for Central and South - Eastern Europe, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 
325-36.  
 
KPMG 1996, Tax Simplification: A Survey of UK Listed Companies, KPMG, London, 
cited in Evans (2003b).  
 
Krejcie, R & Morgan, D 1970, 'Determining Sample Size for Research Activities', 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, vol. 30, pp. 607 - 10. Cited in 
Sekaran (2003, pp. 293-294). 
 
Kreutzer, D & Lee, DR 1986, 'On Taxation & Understated Monopoly Profits', National 
Tax Journal, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 241-3.  
 
Kreutzer, D & Lee, DR 1988, 'Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions: A Reply', 
National Tax Journal, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 583-4.  
 
Lai, M-L, Sheikh-Obid, S-N & Meera, AK 2004, 'Towards an Electronic Filing System: 
A Malaysian Survey', eJournal of Tax Research, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 100-12.  
 
Lassila, D & Smith, M 1997, 'Tax Complexity and Compliance Costs of US 
Multinational Corporations', Advances in International Accounting, vol. 10, pp. 
207-37.  
 
Lee, K 1998, 'Tax Evasion, Monopoly, and Nonneutral Profit Taxes', National Tax 
Journal, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 333-8.  
 
Lignier, P 2008, Identification and Evaluation of the Managerial Benefits Derived by 
Small Businesses as a Result of Complying with the Australian Tax System, PhD 
Thesis, University of New South Wales.  
 
Little, A 1988, Development of Methodology for Estimating the Taxpayer Paperwork 
Burden, Washington D.C., Final report to the Department of the Treasury, 
Internal Revenue Service.  
 
Loh, A, Ariff, M, Ismail, Z, Shamsher, M & Ali, M 1997, 'Compliance Costs of 
Corporate Income Taxation in Malaysia, 1995', Pacific Accounting Review, vol. 
9, no. 1, pp. 27-42.  
 
Long, SB & Swingen, JA 1987, 'An Approach to the Measurement of Tax Law 
Complexity', The Journal of the American Taxation Association, vol. 8, no. 2, 
pp. 22-36.  
 
  260
Long, SB & Swingen, JA 1991, 'Taxpayer Compliance: Setting New Agendas for 
Research', Law and Society Review, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 637-84.  
 
Loo, EC 2006a, 'Determinants of Individual Taxpayers' Compliance Behaviour: 
Experience of the Transition from the Pre to Post Self Assessment in Malaysia', 
in M Walpole & M McKerchar (eds), Further Global Challenges in Tax 
Administration, Fiscal Publications, Birmingham, pp. 201-26. 
 
Loo, EC 2006b, 'Tax Knowledge, Tax Structure and Compliance: A Report on a Quasi-
experiment', New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy, vol. 12, no. 2, 
pp. 117-40.  
 
Loo, EC & Ho, JK 2005, 'Competency of Malaysian Salaried Individuals in Relation to 
Tax Compliance under Self Assessment', eJournal of Tax Research, vol. 3, no. 
1, pp. 47-64.  
 
Malaysian Employers Federation 2007, Salary and Fringe Benefits Survey 2006, 
Petaling Jaya.  
 
Mansor, M, Saad, N & Ibrahim, I 2003, 'The Self-assessment System and its 
Compliance Costs', National Accounting Research Journal, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1-
15.  
 
Marrelli, M 1984, 'On Indirect Tax Evasion', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 25, pp. 
181-96.  
 
Mason, R & Calvin, D 1978, 'A Study of Admitted Tax Evasion', Law & Society 
Review, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 73-89.  
 
Mason, R & Calvin, D 1984, 'Public Confidence and Admitted Tax Evasion', National 
Tax Journal, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 489-96.  
 
Mathieu, L, Waddams, C & Antwi, F 2007, 'The Distribution of UK Personal Income 
Tax Compliance Costs', Applied Economics, vol. iFirst, no. 1, pp. 1-18. 
Retrieved 2 June 2008, from 
http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/00036840701604370. 
 
McKerchar, M 2002a, 'The Effects of Complexity on Unintentional Noncompliance for 
Personal Taxpayers in Australia', Australian Tax Forum, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 3-26.  
 
McKerchar, M 2002b, The Impact of Complexity upon Unintentional Noncompliance 
for Australian Personal Income Taxpayers, PhD Thesis, University of New 
South Wales.  
 
McKerchar, M 2005, 'The Impact of Income Tax Complexity on Practitioners in 
Australia', Australian Tax Forum, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 529-54.  
  261
 
McKerchar, M, Ingraham, L & Karlinsky, S 2005, 'Tax Complexity and Small 
Business: A Comparison of the Perceptions of Tax Agents in the United States 
and Australia', Journal of Australian Taxation, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 289-327.  
 
McManus, J & Warren, N 2006, 'The Case for Measuring Tax Gap', eJournal of Tax 
Research, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 61-79.  
 
Miller, DC 1991, Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement, 5th edn, 
SAGE Publications, Newbury Park: CA. 
 
Mills, L 1996, 'Corporate Tax Compliance and Financial Reporting', National Tax 
Journal, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 421-35.  
 
Mills, L 1998, 'Book-tax Differences and Internal Revenue Service Adjustment', 
Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 343-56.  
 
Ministry of Finance Malaysia 1999, 'The 2000 Budget Speech', 29 October. 
 
Ministry of Finance Malaysia 2004, 'The 2005 Budget Speech', 10 September. 
 
Ministry of Finance Malaysia 2006a, 'The 2007 Budget Speech', 1 September. 
 
Ministry of Finance Malaysia 2006b, 'GST Postponement', Media Release, 22 February.  
 
Ministry of Finance Malaysia 2008, 'The 2009 Budget Speech', 29 August. 
 
Mintz, JM & Weichenrieder, A 2007, 'The Indirect Side of Direct Investment: 
Multinational Company Finance and Taxation', in Manuscript prepared for the 
CESifo Series at MIT Press. Cambridge MA, Corporate tax rates have been 
taken from Appendix, available at http://www.wiwi.uni-
frankfurt.de/profs/weichenrieder/2009_Appendix_tax-rates.pdf. 
 
Moody, JS, Warcholik, PW & Hodge, AS 2005, The Rising Costs of Complying with 
the Federal Income Tax, Tax Foundation, Washington, Special Report No. 138.  
 
Myers, RH 1990, Classical and Modern Regression with Applications, 2 edn, PWS-
KENT, Boston. 
 
National Audit Office 1994, HM Customs and Excise: Cost to Business of Complying 
with VAT Requirements, Her Majesty Stationery Office, London. 
 
National SME Development Council 2005, Definition for Small and Medium 
Enterprises in Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.  
 
  262
National SME Development Council 2006, Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) 
Annual Report 2005, Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.  
 
National SME Development Council 2008, Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) 
Annual Report 2007, Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.  
 
Nelson, M, Elliott, J & Tarpley, R 2002, 'Evidence from Auditors about Managers’ and 
Auditors’ Earnings Management Decisions', The Accounting Review, vol. 77, 
no. supplement, pp. 175-202.  
 
Nunnally, J 1978, Psychometric Theory, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
O'Donnell Report 2004, Financing Britain's Future: Review of the Revenue 
Departments, HM Treasury, UK, cm 6163.  
 
OECD 2004, Compliance Risk Management: Managing and Improving Tax 
Compliance, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration.  
 
Ong, W & Imm, L 2007, 'Taxation of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in 
Singapore', in ITD Global Conference on Taxation of Small and Medium 
Enterprises, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 17–19 October. 
 
Osman, I & Hashim, MK 2003, 'An Evaluation of the Business Practices in Malaysian 
SMEs', Malaysian Management Review, vol. 38, no. 2, available at 
http://mgv.mim.edu.my/MMR/0312/031202.htm.  
 
Othman, Z & Hanefah, M 2006, 'Taxation, E-commerce and Determination of 
Permanent Establishment', Malaysian Accounting Review, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 1-12.  
 
Palil, R 2004, 'The Effect of E-commerce on Malaysian Tax System: An Empirical 
Evidence from Academicians and Malaysian Tax Practitioners', Jurnal 
Akuntansi & Keuangan, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 1-9.  
 
Palil, R 2005a, 'Does Tax Knowledge Matters in Self-assessment Systems? Evidence 
from Malaysian Tax Administrative', The Journal of American Academy of 
Business, Cambridge, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 80-4.  
 
Palil, R 2005b, 'Taxpayers Knowledge: A Descriptive Evidence on Demographic 
Factors in Malaysia', Jurnal Akuntansi & Keuangan, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 11-21.  
 
Plamondon and Associates Inc 1993, GST Compliance Costs for Small Business in 
Canada: A Study for the Department of Finance Tax Policy, Department of 
Finance, Ottawa.  
 
Pope, J 1993a, The Compliance Costs of Major Commonwealth Taxes in Australia, PhD 
Thesis, Curtin University of Technology.  
  263
 
Pope, J 1993b, 'The Compliance Costs of Taxation in Australia and Tax Simplification: 
The Issues', Australian Journal of Management, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 69-89.  
 
Pope, J 1994, 'Compliance Costs of Taxation: Policy Implications', Australian Tax 
Forum, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 85-121.  
 
Pope, J 1995, 'The Compliance Costs of Major Taxes in Australia', in C Sandford (ed.), 
Tax Compliance Costs Measurements and Policy, Fiscal Publications, Bath: UK, 
pp. 101-25. 
 
Pope, J 2000, The Administrative and Compliance Costs of International Taxation: An 
Introduction for Research Students, Curtin Business School, Perth, Working 
Paper 2000.42.  
 
Pope, J 2003, 'Research Methodology for Estimating the Compliance Costs of the 
Goods and Services Tax in Australia', in A Lymer & D Salter (eds), 
Contemporary Issues in Taxation Research, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, pp. 
69-86. 
 
Pope, J 2005, 'Tax Compliance Costs', in M Lamb, A Lymer, J Freedman & S James 
(eds), Taxation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 203-16. 
 
Pope, J 2007, 'Taxation Compliance Costs', in P O'Hara (ed.), International 
Encyclopedia of Public Policy, vol. 2, Global Political Economy Research Unit 
(GPERU), Perth, pp. 521-34. 
 
Pope, J 2008, 'Favourable Small Business Taxation: To What Extent is it Justified from 
a Tax Policy Perspective?' Journal of Applied Law and Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 
21-34.  
 
Pope, J & Abdul-Jabbar, H 2007, 'Tax Simplicity and Small Business in Malaysia: Past 
Developments and the Future', in 19th Annual Conference of Australasian Tax 
Teachers Association, Brisbane, 22- 24 January. 
 
Pope, J & Abdul-Jabbar, H 2008, 'Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and Tax 
Compliance Burden in Malaysia: Issues and Challenges for Tax Administration', 
Small Enterprise Research: The Journal of SEAANZ, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 47-60.  
 
Pope, J, Fayle, R & Chen, DL 1991, The Compliance Costs of Public Companies' 
Income Taxation in Australia, 1986/87, Australian Tax Research Foundation, 
Sydney, Research Study No. 13.  
 
Pope, J, Fayle, R & Chen, DL 1993a, The Compliance Costs of Employment Related 
Taxation in Australia, Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney.  
  264
 
Pope, J, Fayle, R & Chen, DL 1993b, The Compliance Costs of Wholesale Sales Tax in 
Australia, Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney, Research Study No 19.  
 
Pope, J, Fayle, R & Chen, DL 1994, The Compliance Costs of Companies’ Income Tax 
in Australia, Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney, Research Study No 
23.  
 
Pope, J, Fayle, R & Duncanson, M 1990, The Compliance Costs of Personal Income 
Taxation in Australia, 1986/87, Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney, 
Research Study No 9.  
 
Pope, J & Mohd Isa, K 2009, 'Tax Audit Programs: What can Malaysia Learn from 
Other Countries?' 21st Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, 
Christchurch.  
 
Porcano, TM 1988, 'Correlates of Tax Evasion', Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 
9, no. 1, pp. 47-67.  
 
Promotion of Investments Act (Act 327) 1986, International Law Book Services, 
Petaling Jaya. 
 
Pyle, DJ 1989, Tax Evasion and the Black Economy, Macmillan, Houndmills: UK. 
 
Ramasamy, M, Thurasamy, R, Haron, H & Ang, J 2003, 'Factors Influencing 
Compliance Behaviour of Small Business Entrepreneurs', Tax Nasional, vol. 12, 
no. 1, pp. 20-6.  
 
Rametse, N 2006, Start-up Compliance Costs of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) for 
Small Businesses in Australia, PhD Thesis, Curtin University of Technology.  
 
Rametse, N & Pope, J 2002, 'Start-up Tax Compliance Costs of the GST: Empirical 
Evidence from Western Australian Small Businesses', Australian Tax Forum, 
vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 407-22.  
 
Reckers, PMJ, Sanders, DL & Roark, SJ 1994, 'The Influence of Ethical Attitudes on 
Taxpayer Compliance', National Tax Journal, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 825-6.  
 
Rice, EM 1992, 'The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small 
Corporations', in J Slemrod (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and 
Enforcement, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 125-66. 
 
Richardson, G 2005, 'A Preliminary Study of the Impact of Tax Fairness Dimensions on 
Tax Compliance Behaviour in Australia', Australian Tax Forum, vol. 20, no. 3, 
pp. 407-34.  
 
  265
Richardson, G 2006, 'Determinants of Tax Evasion: A Cross-country Investigation', 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 
150-69.  
 
Richardson, M & Sawyer, A 2001, 'A Taxonomy of the Tax Compliance Literature: 
Further Findings, Problems and Prospects', Australian Tax Forum, vol. 16, pp. 
137-320.  
 
Rimmer, S & Wilson, S 1996, Compliance Costs of Taxation in Australia, Office of 
Regulation Review, Productivity Commission, Canberra, Staff Information 
Paper.  
 
Roberts, ML 1994, 'An Experimental Approach to Changing Taxpayers' Attitudes 
towards Fairness and Compliance via Television ', The Journal of The American 
Taxation Association, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 67-86.  
 
Roscoe, JT 1975, Fundamental Research Statistics for the Behavioural Sciences, 2 edn, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, Cited in Sekaran (2003, p. 295). 
 
Roth, JA, Scholz, JT & Witte, AD 1989, Taxpayer Compliance: An Agenda for 
Research, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
 
Sandford, C 1973, Hidden Costs of Taxation, Institute for Fiscal Studies, Bath: UK. 
 
Sandford, C 1993, Successful Tax Reform: Lessons from an Analysis of Tax Reform in 
Six Countries, Fiscal Publication, Bath: U.K. 
 
Sandford, C (ed.) 1995, Tax Compliance Costs Measurement and Policy, Fiscal 
Publications, Bath: U.K. 
 
Sandford, C, Godwin, M & Hardwick, P 1989, Administrative and Compliance Costs of 
Taxation, Fiscal Publication, Bath: U.K. 
 
Sandford, C, Godwin, M, Hardwick, P & Butterworth, M 1981, Costs and Benefits of 
VAT, Heinemann, London. 
 
Sandford, C & Hasseldine, J 1992, The Compliance Costs of Business Taxes in New 
Zealand, The Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington. 
 
Sapiei, N-S & Abdullah, M 2008, 'The Compliance Costs of the Personal Income 
Taxation in Malaysia', International Review of Business Research Papers, vol. 
4, no. 5, pp. 2219-30.  
 
SBP 2005, Counting the Costs of Red Tape for Business in South Africa, SBP, 
Johannesburg.  
 
  266
Sekaran, U 2003, Research Methods for Business: A Skill-building Approach, 4th edn, 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New York. 
 
Sia, G-F 2008, Tax Compliance Behaviour of Individuals under Self Assessment System, 
PhD Thesis, University Putra Malaysia. 
 
Sia, G-F, Salleh, A, Sambasivan, M & Kasipillai, J 2008, 'Determinants of Individual 
Tax Compliance: A Comparative Study on Compliant and Non-compliant 
Taxpayers', 20th Australian Taxation Teachers’ Association Conference, 
Hobart.  
 
Singh, V 2002, 'Issues relating to Self-assessment', in M Ariff & J Pope (eds), Taxation 
& Compliance Costs in Asia Pacific Economies University Utara Malaysia 
Press, Sintok, pp. 269-77. 
 
Singh, V 2003, Tax Compliance and Ethical Decision-making: A Malaysian 
Perspective, Pearson Malaysia, Petaling Jaya. 
 
Singh, V 2007, 'A Fluid Undertaking', in Malaysian Business, 1 July. 
 
Singh, V 2008, 'Tax Reforms, Simplification and Service Delivery Initiatives - A South-
East Asian Perspective', Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 15-22.  
 
Slemrod, J 1992, 'Did the Tax Reform Act of 1986 Simplify Tax Matters', Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 45-57.  
 
Slemrod, J 1997, Measuring Taxpayer Burden and Attitudes for Large Corporations: 
1996 and 1992 Survey Results, Office of Tax Policy Research, Michigan, Report 
to the Coordinated Examination Program of the Internal Revenue Service, 
Working Paper No. 97-1.  
 
Slemrod, J 2004a, 'Small Business and the Tax System', in HJ Aaron & J Slemrod (eds), 
The Crisis in Tax Administration, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C, 
pp. 69-123. 
 
Slemrod, J 2004b, 'Written Testimony Submitted to the Committee on Ways and Means 
'. Subcommittee on Oversight, Hearing on Tax Simplification, Washington D.C, 
15 June. 
 
Slemrod, J & Blumenthal, M 1996, 'The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big Business', 
Public Finance Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 411-38.  
 
Slemrod, J & Sorum, N 1984, 'The Compliance Cost of the US Individual Income Tax 
System', National Tax Journal, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 461-74.  
 
  267
Slemrod, J & Venkatesh, V 2002, The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Large and Mid-
size Businesses, Ross School of Business Working Paper Series, University of 
Michigan, Working Paper No. 914.  
 
Small Business Deregulation Task Force 1996, Time for Business: Report of the Small 
Business Deregulation Task Force, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.  
 
Song, Y-d & Yarbrough, T 1978, 'Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey', Public 
Administration Review, vol. 38, pp. 442-52.  
 
Tan, G 1993, 'The Next NICs of Asia', Third World Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 57-73.  
 
Tan, LM & Chin-Fatt, C 2000, 'The Impact of Tax Knowledge on the Perceptions of 
Tax Fairness and Attitudes towards Compliance', Asian Review of Accounting, 
vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 44-58.  
 
Tayib, M 1998, The Determinants of Assessment Tax Collection: The Malaysian Local 
Authority Experience, PhD Thesis, University of Glamorgan.  
 
The Australian Treasury 2004a, Report on Aspects of Income Tax Self Assessment, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.  
 
The Australian Treasury 2004b, Review of Aspects of Income Tax Self Assessment, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Discussion Paper.  
 
The Special Taskforce to Facilitate Business 2008, Annual Report 2007, PEMUDAH, 
Kuala Lumpur.  
 
The Special Taskforce to Facilitate Business 2009, Annual Report 2008, PEMUDAH, 
Kuala Lumpur.  
 
Torgler, B 2007, Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham: UK. 
 
Tran-Nam, B 1999, 'Tax Reform and Tax Simplification: Some Conceptual Issues and a 
Preliminary Assessment', Sydney Law Review, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 500-22.  
 
Tran-Nam, B 2000, 'The Implementation of the GST in Australia: Concepts, 
Preliminary Estimates and Implications', Journal of Australian Taxation, vol. 3, 
no. 5, pp. 331-43.  
 
Tran-Nam, B 2001, 'Tax Compliance Costs Methodology: A Research Agenda for the 
Future', in C Evans, J Pope & J Hasseldine (eds), Tax Compliance Costs: A 
Festschrift for Cedric Sandford, Prospect Media Pty Ltd, Sydney, pp. 51-68. 
 
  268
Tran-Nam, B & Evans, C 2002, 'The Impact of Cedric Sandford on the Discipline of 
Tax Compliance Costs', Australian Tax Forum, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 389-406.  
 
Tran-Nam, B & Glover, J 2002a, 'Estimating the Transitional Costs of the GST in 
Australia: A Case Study Approach', Australian Tax Forum, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 
499-536.  
 
Tran-Nam, B & Glover, J 2002b, 'Tax Reform in Australia: Impacts of Tax Compliance 
Costs on Small Business', Journal of Australian Taxation, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 338-
81.  
 
Tran-Nam, B & Karlinsky, S 2008, 'Small Business Tax Law Complexity in Australia', 
in M Walpole & C Evans (eds), Tax Administration: Safe Harbours and New 
Horizons, Fiscal Publications, Birmingham, pp. 321-48. 
 
Treasury of Malaysia 1999, 'Economy Report 1999/2000'. Ministry of Finance. 
 
Treasury of Malaysia 2000, 'Economy Report 2000/2001'. Ministry of Finance. 
 
Treasury of Malaysia 2001, 'Economy Report 2001/2002'. Ministry of Finance. 
 
Treasury of Malaysia 2002, 'Economy Report 2002/2003'. Ministry of Finance. 
 
Treasury of Malaysia 2003, 'Economy Report 2003/2004'. Ministry of Finance. 
 
Treasury of Malaysia 2004, 'Economy Report 2004/2005'. Ministry of Finance. 
 
Treasury of Malaysia 2005, 'Economy Report 2005/2006'. Ministry of Finance. 
 
Treasury of Malaysia 2006, 'Economic Report 2006/2007'. Ministry of Finance. 
 
Treasury of Malaysia 2007, 'Economic Report 2007/2008'. Ministry of Finance. 
 
Treasury of Malaysia 2008, 'Economic Report 2008/2009'. Ministry of Finance. 
 
Vaillancourt, F 1989, The Administrative and Compliance Costs of the Personal Income 
Tax and Payroll Tax System in Canada, 1986, Canadian Tax Foundation, 
Ontario. 
 
Vaillancourt, F & Clemens, J 2008, 'Compliance and Administrative Costs of Taxation 
in Canada', in J Clemens (ed.), The Impact and Cost of Taxation in Canada: The 
Case for Flat Tax Reform, The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, pp. 55-102. 
 
Violette, G 1989, 'Effects of Communicating Sanctions on Taxpayer Compliance', The 
Journal of the American Taxation Association, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 92-104.  
 
  269
Wallace, O & Mellor, C 1988, 'Nonresponse Bias in Mail Accounting Surveys: A 
Pedagogical Note', British Accounting Review, vol. 20, pp. 131-9.  
 
Wallschutzky, I 1984, 'Possible Causes of Tax Evasion', Journal of Economic 
Psychology, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 371-84.  
 
Wallschutzky, I & Gibson, B 1993, 'Small Business Cost of Compliance ', Australian 
Tax Forum, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 511-43.  
 
Wang, LFS & Conant, JL 1988, 'Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions of the 
Uncertain Monopolist', National Tax Journal, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 579-81.  
 
Wartick, M 1994, 'Legislative Justification and the Perceived Fairness of Tax Law 
Changes: A Referent Cognitions Theory Approach', The Journal of the 
American Taxation Association, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 106-23.  
 
Webley, P, Cole, M & Eidjar, O-P 2001, 'The Prediction of Self-reported and 
Hypothetical Tax-evasion: Evidence from England, France and Norway', 
Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 141-55.  
 
Webley, P, Robben, HJ, Elffers, H & Hessing, DJ 1991, Tax Evasion: An Experimental 
Approach, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Weigel, RH, Hessing, DJ & Elffers, H 1987, 'Tax Evasion Research: A Critical 
Appraisal and Theoretical Model', Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 8, no. 
2, pp. 215-35.  
 
Wenzel, M 2002, 'The Impact of Outcome Orientation and Justice Concern on Tax 
Compliance: The Role of Taxpayers' Identity', Journal of Applied Psychology, 
vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 629-45.  
 
Wenzel, M 2005a, 'Misperceptions of Social Norms about Tax Compliance: From 
Theory to Intervention', Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 
862-83.  
 
Wenzel, M 2005b, 'Motivation or Rationalisation? Causal Relations between Ethics, 
Norms and Tax Compliance', Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 26, no. 4, 
pp. 491-508.  
 
Yesegat, WA 2009, Value Added Tax in Ethiopia: A Study of Operating Costs and 
Compliance, PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales.  
 
"Every reasonable effort has been made to acknowledge the owners of copyright 
material. I would be pleased to hear from any copyright owner who has been omitted or 
incorrectly acknowledged." 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
Definitions for Small and Medium Enterprises in Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  270
 
 
 
 
  271
 
 
 
 
  272
 
 
 
 
  273
 
 
 
 
  274
 
 
 
 
  275
 
 
 
 
  276
 
 
 
 
  277
 
 
 
 
  278
 
 
 
 
  279
 
 
 
 
  280
 
 
 
 
  281
 
 
 
 
  282
 
 
 
 
  283
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Summary of Tax Compliance Studies in Malaysia 1994–2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  284 
Summary of Tax Compliance Studies in Malaysia 1994–2008 
Authors(s); 
(year) 
Subject(s) Method Sample size  
(sampling method) 
Response number 
(and/or Rate) 
Main outcomes  
(relevant to compliance behaviour) 
Che-Ayub 
(1994) 
 
(i) Tax officers  
 
(ii) Tax agents  
 
Survey  
(mail questionnaire) 
(i) 358  
 
(ii) 359 
 
(random) 
(i) 307 (85.7%) 
 
(ii) 124 (35.0%) 
- Tax officers believed tax evasion occurs due to 
taxpayer attitudes or there is an opportunity for non-
compliance 
- Tax agents alleged that taxpayers’ lack the ability to 
comply. 
- Tax administrative reform shall be in place to 
enhance voluntary compliance. 
Hanefah 
(1996) 
 
Individuals 
(including business) 
Survey  
(personally 
administered) 
300  
 
(stratified) 
248 (82.7%) - Malaysian tax administrative system was generally 
seen as efficient and productive 
- Tax law was perceived to be not fair and tax 
complexity existed. 
- Some knowledge and understanding of the tax 
system would enhance compliance.  
- The compliance costs of owner-manager taxpayers 
are higher than other individual taxpayers. 
Kasipillai 
(1997) 
(i) Tax professionals 
 
(ii) Individuals 
(i) Survey (mail) 
 
(ii) Survey  
(personally 
administered) 
 
 
 
 
(i) 80 
(convenient) 
 
(ii)150 
(convenient) 
(i) 60 (75%) 
 
 
(ii) 120 (80%) 
- Tax evasion was estimated for an average of 20 
percent of income tax collection for the period 1971 
to 1994. 
- Taxpayers generally have a reasonable level of 
understanding of many aspects of the tax laws. 
- Knowledge differences are noted for some group of 
taxpayers; taxpayers with low education levels and 
unskilled occupations groups have a relatively low 
score on tax knowledge.  
- Top five sectors generating hidden income were 
construction sector, professions (doctors, engineers, 
etc), cuts and kickbacks on contracts, multinational 
companies and restaurants. 
Tayib 
(1998)b 
Individuals 
(land taxpayer) 
Survey (mail) 324 
(not reported) 
305 (94%) - Financial information disclosure influenced 
compliance attitudes.  
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Author(s); 
(year) 
Subject(s) Method Sample size  
(sampling method) 
Response number 
(and/or Rate) 
Main outcomes  
(relevant to compliance behaviour) 
Kasipillai et al. 
(1999) 
Individuals 
(including business) 
Survey (mail) 900  
(random) 
153 (17%) 
 
147 (16.4%) 
- Respondents are able to compute their own taxes 
provided that minimal guidance is given by the 
Inland Revenue Board. 
Singh  
(2003) 
Accountants  Survey (mail) 180  
 
(purposive) 
119 
 
(66.1%)  
 
[useable 103/62.8%] 
- Moral reasoning does play a significant role in the 
tax compliance decision making process.  
- Size of tax deductions is a major explanatory 
variable in the tax compliance decision making 
process. 
Abdul 
(2003) 
 
(i) Individuals 
    (including   
business) 
 
(ii) Tax officers 
(i) File review  
 
 
 
(ii) Survey     
     (interview) 
 
 
(i) 507 file 
 
(relevant file) 
 
(ii) 60 officers 
 
(purposive) 
(i) 507 file 
 
 
 
(ii) 60 officers 
- Four types of non-compliance were evident, i.e. fail 
to declare income, under-declaring income, over-
claiming deductions and over-claiming expenses. 
- Non-compliance is severe in older persons, males 
with high taxable income levels and those who 
received non-salary income. 
- Tax officers believed that taxpayers’ intention, role 
of tax agents, taxpayers’ ignorance of tax law and 
financial strain were the main reason of non-
compliance 
Kasipillai, Aripin 
and Amran 
(2003) 
Individuals 
(Students) 
 
Survey  
(administered in 
class) 
Stage 1  
- 560 
 
Stage 2 
390 560 
 
(convenience) 
Stage 1 
553 (98.8%) 
 
Stage 2 
551 (98.4%) 
- A positive relationship exists between tax 
knowledge  and tax compliance 
- Significant perceptions existed in terms of ethnic 
groups.  
Ramasamy et al. 
(2003) 
Individuals  
(Small business 
entrepreneurs) 
 
Survey (interview) 500 
 
(non-random)  
312 (62.4%) - Attitudes towards others’ compliance and fairness 
positively related to compliance behaviour. 
- Tax knowledge and attitudes towards effectiveness 
of the IRB has no relationship to compliance 
behaviour. 
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Author(s); 
Year 
Subject(s) Method Sample size  
(sampling method) 
Response number 
(and/or Rate) 
Main outcomes  
(relevant to compliance behaviour) 
Kasipillai,  
Mat-Udin and 
Zainol-Arifin 
(2003) 
Individuals 
(including business) 
Survey (mail) 800  
 
(random) 
270 (34%) 
 
[useable 219/29.2%] 
 
- Tax compliance is perceived to be an ethical issue. 
- Moral values do influence tax compliance 
behaviour. 
Abdul Manaf  
(2004)b 
Individuals  
(land taxpayer) 
Survey (mail) 750  
 
(not relevant) c  
179 (24%) - Age, race, education, income, occupation and ethics 
strongly influence land tax compliance attitudes. 
- Tax fairness, tax knowledge, incentives and location 
also influence land tax compliance. 
Palil 
(2005a; 2005b) 
Individuals 
(Part-time students)  
 
Survey  
(administered in 
class) 
153 
 
(convenience) 
153 (100%) - Level of tax knowledge was found to be below the 
average. 
- Tax knowledge is a major factor in determining the 
accuracy of tax return. 
Loo and  Ho 
(2005) 
Individuals Survey 
(administered in a 
meeting) 
250 
(random) 
106 (42.4%) - Taxpayers do not possess sufficient tax knowledge, 
and thus may not be competent to compute their 
personal income tax during self-assessment system. 
Kasipillai and 
Abdul-Jabbar 
(2006)  
Individuals   Survey  
(personal interview) 
500 
 
(random) 
153 (30.6%) - Male and females have similar attitudes toward tax 
compliance.  
- Gender together with education level and tax 
preparer determines compliance attitudes. 
- Compliance attitudes and having cash income 
influenced understatement behaviour of taxpayer. 
Abdul Manaf and 
Abdul-Jabbar 
(2006)a 
Individuals Survey  
(personally 
administered) 
1,168 
  
(not relevant) d 
404 (34.6%) - Tax evasion items were perceived to be a least 
serious offence compared to the other 29 crimes and 
violations. 
Loo  
(2006a) 
 
Individuals 
(including business) 
 
Survey (mail) Stage 1  
2,500 
 
Stage 2 
3,500 
 
(random) 
Stage 1  
350 (14%) 
 
Stage 2 
589 (17%) 
- Change from OAS to SAS had to some extent 
influenced compliance behaviour of taxpayers.  
- Tax knowledge, tax structure, perception towards 
tax fairness and perception towards tax 
administration were found to influence tax 
behaviour, but tax knowledge had the most effect.  
- Financial constraints did not show any effect on 
compliance behaviour. 
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Author(s); 
year 
Subject(s) Method Sample size  
(sampling method) 
Response number 
(and/or Rate) 
Main outcomes  
(relevant to compliance behaviour) 
Loo (2006b) Individuals 
(students) 
Experimental 125 
(not reported) 
125 - Specific tax knowledge had an influence on tax 
behaviour of participants.  
- Audit rates and tax rates had significant interactions 
with tax knowledge of the participant. 
Ahmad, Hanefah 
and Mohd Noor 
(2007) 
Individuals 
(students)  
Experimental Experimental group  
42 (quota) 
 
Control group 
46 (stratified random) 
 
41 
 
 
44 
- Tax knowledge had influence on tax compliance 
behaviour of subjects. 
- Subjects with tax knowledge had better compliance 
behaviour. 
Sia et al. 
(2008) 
 
Individuals 
(including business) 
 
Survey (mail) 2,500 
(not reported) 
247 (9.9%) - Compliant and non-compliant taxpayers had similar 
perceptions toward tax fairness, tax morals and peer 
influence. 
Che Azmi  
and Perumal  
(2008) 
Individuals 
(including business) 
 
Survey 
(administered in the 
IRB office) 
500 
(convenience) 
390 (78%) - Tax system was perceived to be moderately fair. 
- Tax fairness is distinguished in three dimensions: 
general fairness, tax rate structure and self interest.    
a The main focus of study is tax evasion. 
b The study focuses on local government taxes. 
c All individuals with a complete mailing address from the list of land taxpayers were chosen.  
d All individuals in the selected organisation were chosen.  
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Other Tax Studies (not compliance-related) in Malaysia 
Author(s); 
(year) 
Focus of 
study 
Subject(s) Method Sample size   
(sampling method) 
Response number 
(and/or Rate) 
Main outcomes  
 
Palil 
(2004) 
Income Tax 
(e-commerce) 
(i)Tax academic 
 
(ii) Tax practitioners 
Survey 
(mail) 
(i) 40 
 
(ii) 300 
 
(i) 22 (55%) 
 
(ii) 82 (27.3%) 
- The derived and remittance basis of 
taxation may no longer be appropriate 
in an e-commerce environment. 
Kasipillai and 
Hanefah 
(2000) 
 
Income Tax  Tax practitioners Survey 
(mail) 
280 
(random) 
85 (30%) 
 
[83 useable] 
 
- Tax professionals believe that their 
clients prefer the SAS.  
Lai, Sheikh-
Obid and Meera 
(2004) 
 
 
 
Income Tax 
(e-filing) 
 
Tax practitioners 
 
 
Survey 
(mail) 
 
572 
 
(systematic) 
 
192 (33.6%) 
- Tax practitioners have high usage 
intentions of the e-filing system.  
- The level of technology readiness is 
positively related to the usage 
intentions towards e-filing system. 
 
Othman and 
Hanefah  
(2006) 
Income Tax 
(e-commerce) 
Tax experts and 
officers 
Interview 20 20 - Existing criteria used to define 
permanent establishment needs to be 
reviewed to cater for e-commerce 
trading.     
 
Hanefah, 
Hassan and 
Othman 
(2008) 
Income Tax 
(e-commerce) 
(i) Tax practitioners 
(ii) Tax academics 
(iii) Tax officers  
Survey  
(Mail) a   
(i) 625 
(ii) 20 
(iii) 10 
- total 625 
 
 
 
 
60 (9%) 
- The possible inefficiency of tax 
administration and tax evasion are 
regarded as potential tax problems 
posed by e-commerce. 
- The Malaysian attitudes towards 
potential tax-related problems are 
similar to that of other countries.   
 
a  A survey of tax officers was administered personally. 
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Summary of Major Compliance Costs Studies on Corporate Income Taxation, 1980s until recently a 
Authors(s); 
(year) 
Subject(s); 
(country) 
Method Sample size; 
response number 
(response rate) 
Main Findings 
 
Sandford, 
Godwin and 
Hardwick (1989)
Corporation 
(UK) 
Survey (mail) 3,000 
680 
(24%) 
 
- Compliance costs in 1986-87 were UK₤300 million or 2.22% of 
corporate tax revenue, with around half of the costs being fees paid to 
external advisors. 
 
Pope, Fayle and 
Chen (1991) 
 
Public companies 
(Australia)  
 
Survey (mail) 
 
1,837 
298 
(16%) 
 
 
- Gross compliance costs of public companies in 1986-87 were 
between A$646 million and A$1.341 million, or between 11.4% and 
23.7% of corporate tax revenue. 
- Cash flow benefits were estimated to be A$954 million or 16.9% of 
corporate tax revenue. 
 
Pope, Fayle and 
Chen (1994) 
 
Companies 
(Australia)  
 
Survey (mail) 
 
2,531 
571 
(23%) 
 
 
 
- Gross compliance costs of companies’ income tax in 1990-91 were 
A$3,245.9 million or 22.9% of revenue yield. 
- Cash flow benefits were estimated to be A$1,194 million or 8.4% of 
corporate tax revenue. 
- Net compliance costs of companies’ income tax were A$2,052 
million or 14.5% of corporate tax revenue. 
 
Ariff, Loh and 
Talib (1995) 
 
Listed companies 
(Singapore) 
 
Survey (mail) 
 
200 
65 
(33%) 
 
- In 1994, the average compliance costs per listed company were 
S$78,396; with external costs portion being higher (58%) than 
internal costs time costs (42%). 
- The computational and planning costs portion is almost equal. 
Slemrod and 
Blumenthal 
(1996) 
Largest 
corporation 
(US) 
 
Survey (mail) 
 
 
 
1,329 
365 
(27%) 
 
- In 1992, the average compliance costs per company were US$1.57 
million. 
- The estimated aggregate cost for all 1329 companies equals US$2.08 
billion or 3.2 percent of revenue yield. 
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Authors(s); 
(year) 
Subject(s); 
(country) 
Method Sample size; 
response number 
(response rate) 
Main Findings 
 
KPMG (1996) Listed companies 
(UK) 
Survey (mail) 1,200 
266 
(22%) 
 
- Compliance costs of listed companies in 1995-96 were UK₤265 
million. 
 
Slemrod (1997) 
Largest 
corporation 
(US) 
 
Survey (mail) 
1,697 
309 
(18%) 
 
 
- The average compliance costs per company in 1996 were US$1.90 
million. 
- In real terms (i.e. inflation-adjusted), the 1996 estimate is 8.1 percent 
higher than the 1992 estimates. 
 
Ariff, Ismail and 
Loh (1997) 
 
Listed companies 
(Singapore) 
 
Survey (mail) 
 
234 
62 
(26%) 
 
- Compared to the earlier estimates in 1994, the 1995 average 
compliance costs per listed company decreased significantly to 
S$54,615. 
- The decrease was mainly due to income tax simplification measures. 
 
Erard (1997a) 
Largest 
corporation 
(Canada) 
 
Survey (mail) 
250 
59 
(24%) 
 
 
- The combined federal-provincial income and capital tax compliance 
burden for the top 500 Canadian corporations in 1995 was estimated 
at C$507,000 per company, amounting to C$250 million in aggregate 
or about 5 percent of taxes paid. 
 
Chan et al. 
(1999) 
 
Listed companies 
(Hong Kong) 
 
Survey (mail) 
 
496 
75 
(15%) 
 
 
 
- The average tax compliance costs per public listed company were 
estimated at HK$346,483 for tax year 1995-1996. 
- A large portion of the average compliance costs (70%) are external 
fees. 
- There is a positive link between business size and its compliance 
costs. 
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Authors(s); 
(year) 
Subject(s); 
(country) 
Method Sample size; 
response number 
(response rate) 
Main Findings 
 
 
 
Slemrod and 
Venkatesh 
(2002) 
 
 
Large and mid-
size corporations 
(US) 
 
 
Survey (mail) 
 
 
2,499 
225 
(9%) 
 
 
 
 
- The estimated average compliance costs per company are 
US$254,451 and between US$21 billion and US$22.3 billion in 
aggregate, i.e. between 28 and 29.6 percent of tax revenue.  
- Almost 75 percent of average total compliance comprised of internal 
costs (personnel costs and non-personnel costs). 
- Companies committed an average of 50 percent of their internal 
spending time to filing activities, 38.8 percent to pre-filing activities, 
and 11.2 percent to post-filing activities. 
Bertolucci 
(2002) b 
Listed companies 
(Brazil) 
Survey  
(mail and e-mail) 
211 
25 
(12%) 
 
- The total compliance costs were R$7.2 billion, with internal costs 
comprising around 80% of all costs. 
 
Chattopadhyay 
and Das Gupta 
(2002a) 
 
Companies 
(India)  
 
Survey (mail) 
 
3,913 
45 
(1%) 
 
 
 
- The gross corporate compliance costs for 2000-2001 were estimated 
around 5.6% to 14.5% of corporate tax revenues. 
- The net corporate compliance costs, i.e. after taking into 
consideration tax deductibility and cash flow benefits, were expected 
to be reduced/increased between – 0.7% and + 0.6% of corporate tax 
revenues. 
 
Klun (2004b) c 
 
Companies  
(Slovenia) 
 
Survey (mail, plus 
interviews) 
 
200 
126 
(64%) 
 
 
- In 2002, compliance costs per company were SIT 1.5 million or 4.2 
percent of tax revenue; 1.00 percent of GDP.  
- The above compliance costs represent costs for complying with 
corporate income tax (23%), VAT (67%) and taxes deduced from 
wages (10%).  
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Authors(s); 
(year) 
Subject(s); 
(country) 
Method Sample size; 
response number 
(response rate) 
Main Findings 
 
Blazic (2004) d Companies  
(Croatia) 
Survey (interviews) 1200 
339 
(28%) 
 
 
 
 
- Compliance costs for 2001/2002 were HRK27,113 per company and  
HRK2,038.6 million in aggregate level, representing  around 1.2% of 
the GDP.  
- Tax compliance costs, measured as a percentage of relevant tax 
revenues, were 4.47 percent for VAT, 2.90 percent for wage taxes 
including social security, and 11.76 for profit tax. 
Kauser et al. 
(2005) 
SME Companies 
(UK) 
Survey  
(mail and e-mail) 
8,000 e 
131 
(< 2%) 
 
- The aggregate compliance costs of SME companies in 2001 
amounted to UK£608 million, with more than half internal in 
nature. 
a This summary includes studies that primarily focussed on corporation and income tax. Studies that cover corporations as part of a comprehensive study on all business taxes 
and business taxpayers were not included. These include a major study in New Zealand (Sandford and Hasseldine 1992) and in Australia (Evans et al, 1997). Sandford and 
Hasseldine (1992, p. 94—Table 7.12), reported mean compliance costs by turnover levels only and not the overall compliance costs of corporation. The Australian study 
reported the compliance costs amounted to A$7,291 per company and A$3,813 million at the aggregate level (Evans et al. 1997, p 52 –Table 4.12). 
b This study covers other business taxes as well. 
c This study estimated compliance costs for companies on three types of taxes i.e. corporate income tax, VAT and social security contribution with payroll tax. 
d This study estimated compliance costs for companies for all types of taxes (i.e. profit tax, VAT, wage taxes and social security contributions), but excluded customs and 
excise duties. 
e This is an approximate number reported in Kauser et al. (2005).  
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Summary of Costs of Compliance Studies in Malaysia (Additional Details a) 
Authors 
(year) 
Taxes 
(focus) 
Subject Method Sample Coverage Sample size  
(sampling 
method) 
Response number 
(and/or rate) 
Loh et al. 
(1997) 
Income Tax 
(Corporate) 
Public Listed 
Companies 
 
Survey (mail)  Nationwide 300 
(random) 
80 
 (27%) 
 
[useable 48/16%] 
 
Hanefah, Ariff  
and  Kasipillai 
(2001) 
Income Tax 
(Corporate) 
SME 
Companies b 
Survey (mail) c  
 
Northern Peninsular 
(Perlis, Kedah and 
Penang) 
 
 
300 
(random) 
 
67  
(22.3%) 
Mansor, Saad and  
Ibrahim 
(2003)  
Income Tax 
(Corporate) 
SME 
Companies b 
 
Survey (mail) Northern Peninsular 
(Perlis, Kedah and 
Penang) 
 
Not reported 
(convenience 
sampling) 
 
56 
(not available) 
Sapiei and Abdullah 
(2008) 
Income Tax 
(Individual) 
Individuals d Survey (mail)  Klang-valley 
(Selangor and Kuala 
Lumpur) 
 
 
500 
(not reported) 
 
144  
(29%) 
a Key Details and findings are presented in Chapter Two, Table 2.4. 
b Similar SME definition was employed in both studies, i.e. company with employees not exceeding 150 with an annual turnover not exceeding RM250 million. 
c Plus face-to-face interviews. 
d Including self-employed business taxpayers. 
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Primary Postal Survey Questionnaire (Malay Version) 
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First Contact: Advance E-Mail Notification/Initial E-Mail 
Survey on SME Companies in Malaysia 
 
Dear [Name and/or Position], 
[Name of the Company] 
 
Within the next few days, you will be invited to participate in a brief online 
web survey on the regulatory compliance burden of small and medium-sized 
(SME) companies in Malaysia. The study is being conducted by Universiti 
Utara Malaysia (UUM) in collaboration with the Small and Medium Industries 
Development Corporation (SMIDEC) in response to many concerns expressed 
by SME companies in Malaysia regarding the considerable burden imposed on 
business by government regulations, particularly in the area of taxation. 
 
I would greatly appreciate it if you are able to take the few minutes necessary 
to complete the online survey. I look forward to your contribution toward the 
study in helping the relevant authorities provide further assistance to the SME 
sectors. 
 
Thank you in advance for your help. 
 
  
 
 
Second Contact: Invitation to Participate in a SME Survey 
 
Dear [Name and/or Position],  
[Name of the Company] 
 
I am referring to my previous e-mail sent a few days ago about a survey on 
SME companies in Malaysia conducted by UUM in collaboration with 
SMIDEC. 
 
You have been invited to participate in this survey. The survey is expected to 
take only about 15 minutes to complete. If you have any questions or 
concerns, please call me on 019-6639340 or e-mail me at hijat@uum.edu.my. 
I look forward to your contribution towards the study. 
 
To participate, please click on the link below. 
 
[Address of the Web Survey] a 
 
Thank you so much for your kind cooperation and assistance. 
 
a The first page of the web survey contain the same covering letter as for the primary postal survey        
(refer Appendix H). 
  315
 
Third and Fourth Contact: First and Second Reminder about SME Survey 
 
Dear [Name and/or Position],  
[Name of the Company] 
 
Recently I invited you to participate in a survey. As the study is expected to 
provide valuable input for the government in providing greater assistance to 
SME companies, your contribution towards the study would be greatly 
appreciated. 
 
If you are yet to complete it, I wish to inform you that the survey is still 
available should you wish to take part. 
 
The survey is titled: "Survey of the Tax Compliance Burden of Small and 
Medium-sized Companies in Malaysia". To participate, please click on the 
link below: 
 
[Address of the Web Survey] a 
 
 a The first page of the web survey contain the same covering letter as for the primary postal survey        
(refer Appendix H). 
 
 
 
Fifth Contact: Third Reminder about SME Survey 
 
Dear [Name and/or Position],  
[Name of the Company] 
 
Recently I sent you a questionnaire on SME survey.  I note that you have not 
yet completed the survey. If you do not wish to fill in the form, I would be 
grateful if you would just respond to ONE question only.  
 
Your response is vital in ensuing that the issue of the tax compliance burden 
of SME companies is properly considered by the government and other SME 
agencies. 
 
Please click here to answer ONE question only. 
 
[Address of the Web Survey].a 
 
a The single question in the web survey is the same as for the primary postal survey (refer Appendix 
K). 
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Table N.1: Sample Frame and Response Rate (Web Survey)  
  Number of SMEs 
Population with e-mail address 4,033 
(-) Duplicate e-mail address a 111 
(-) Selected in mail sample 387 
Gross Sample Frame  3,535 
(-) Out of frame b 83 
(-) Unusable responses c 3 
Net Sample Frame 3,449 
    
Useable Response 75 
Useable Response Rate (%) 2.17 
a SMEs sharing similar e-mail address belong to the same group or management. 
b These are largely due to undelivered email as a result of insufficient space in the 
respondent’s mailbox (74 percent), followed by a refusal to participate (16 percent). 
The remaining 10 percent is due to other reasons, such as a dormant or new business 
and automated vacation reply.  
c Responses discarded due either to incompleteness (two cases) or to not being within 
the definition of SMEs (one case).  
 
 
Table N.2: Respondents’ Position (Web Survey) 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Chief Executive Officer 10 13.3 
Managing Director/Director 35 46.7 
Manager 18 24.0 
Accountant 7 9.3 
Other a 5 6.7 
Total 75   100.0 
a Comprising one accounting and three non-accounting staff respectively. The single 
remainder did not expose his/her position. 
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Table N.3: Business Profile of Responding SMEs (Web Survey) 
 Number of SMEs a  Percentage b
Business Year-end   
28 February 1 1.3 
31 March 4 5.3 
31 May 1 1.3 
30 June 9 12.0 
31 July 1 1.3 
31 August 5 6.7 
30 September 3 4.0 
30 November 1 1.3 
31 December 50 66.7 
Main Business Sector   
Manufacturing 15 20.0 
Manufacturing-related Services 13 17.3 
Services 41 54.0 
Construction 6 8.0 
Business Length   
Less than 2 years c 11 14.9 
2 to 5 years c  16 21.6 
More than 5 years 47 63.5 
Source of Income Tax Work     
Internal and External 58 77.3 
No External (i.e. internal only) 12 16.0 
No Internal (i.e. external only) 5 6.7 
Overall 75 100.0 
a Total respondents of less than 75 for some sections due to missing case/s.    
b Total percentage of less than one hundred for some sections due to rounding. 
c Similar to the postal survey, these categories are combined into a single category. 
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Table N.4: Size of Responding SMEs (Web Survey) 
 Number of SMEs a  Percentage b
Number of Staff Employed   
4 or less 21 28.8 
5 to 19 34 46.6 
20 to 50 11 15.1 
51 to 150 7 9.6 
Turnover Level   
Less than RM250,000 19 25.3 
RM250,000 to RM999,999 21 28.0 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999 24 32.0 
RM5,000,000 and more c 11 14.7 
NSDC Size   
Micro 26 34.7 
Small 38 50.7 
Medium 11 14.7 
Business Paid-up Capital   
RM500,000 or less 52 71.2 
RM500,001 to RM2,500,000 17 23.3 
RM2,500,001 or more 4 5.5 
Estimated Tax liability   
No tax 22 29.3 
RM1 to RM99,999 43 57.3 
RM100,000 and more c 10 13.3 
Overall 75 100.0 
a Total respondents of less than 75 for some sections due to missing case/s.    
b Total percentage of less than one hundred for some sections due to rounding. 
c Similar to the postal survey, this is a combined category. 
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Table N.5: Tax-related Difficulties for SMEs, 2006 (Web Survey) 
 Number of Overall Percent 
 Responses Percent of Cases
Estimating Income Tax payable 49 19.2 70.0 
Cash flow position to pay monthly tax 
instalments 
43 16.9 61.4 
Increasing burden of record keeping for tax 
purposes 
32 12.5 45.7 
Maintaining records for Income Tax purpose 31 12.2 44.3 
Understanding Income Tax legislation 29 11.4 41.4 
Implementing the Income Tax changes 24 9.4 34.3 
Dealing with external tax advisers 17 6.7 24.3 
Short period of time to lodge the tax return 16 6.3 22.9 
Dealing with the tax authority 14 5.5 20.0 
Total     255 a  100.0 b     - 
a Total responses exceeds 75 as respondents were allowed to select more than one aspect. 
b Does not total up to one hundred percent due to rounding. 
 
 
Table N.6: Main Reason for using External Tax Professionals, 2006 
(Web Survey) 
 Number of Overall Percent 
 Responses Percent of Cases
Technical knowledge is not readily available 
internally 
47 29.7 75.8 
It is more cost-effective to use external tax 
professionals 
42 26.6 67.7 
Income tax matters are too complicated 33 20.9 53.2 
External opinion was required 23 14.6 37.1 
For income tax planning 13 8.2 21.0 
Total 158 a  100.0     - 
a Total responses exceeds 75 as respondents were allowed to select more than one aspect. 
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Table N.7: Yearly Hours Spent on Tax Activities by Staff Categories 
(Web Survey) 
Staff Categories Mean  Minimum a Maximum Standard  
Deviation 
Manager/Accountant  163  0 960 236 
Accounting Staff 306  0 1,920 467 
Administrative Staff 131  0 960 250 
Other Staff 15  0 432 61 
Overall 616  0 3,840 759 
a Five respondents spent no internal time (see Table N.3). Around 71 percent of respondents 
estimated time spent as a combination of staff, namely; two (32 percent), three (30 percent) and four 
(9 percent) categories.  
 
 
Table N.8: Monthly Wage Rates (RM) by Staff Categories (Web Survey) 
Staff Categories a Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Manager/Accountants  (63) 3,591 500 7,000 1,217 
Accounting Staff          (58) 1,670 300 3,200 643 
Administrative Staff    (41) 1,169 500 1,600 429 
Other Staff                   (19) 811 200 1,600 550 
a The number of respondents is given in parentheses. This number was less than 75 as wage rates 
only apply if there was time spent in the respective staff categories. 
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Table N.9: Mean Compliance Costs by Business Characteristics (Web Survey) 
 Mean Cost Sources Costs Types 
Business Characteristics a Costs Internal b External Computation Planning 
 RM Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Business Sector       
Manufacturing 10,217 66 34 73 27 
Manufacturing-related Services 11,101 74 26 71 29 
Services 8,166 69 31 79 21 
Construction 10,630 75 25 67 33 
Business Length       
Up to 5 years c 9,102 76 24 76 24 
More than 5 years 9,346 66 34 75 25 
Number of Staff Employed      
4 or less 6,704 71 29 80 20 
5 to 19 9,905 69 31 78 22 
20 to 50 7,568 68 32 71 29 
51 to 150 17,729 73 27 66 34 
Turnover      
Less than RM250,000 5,398 69 31 88 12 
RM250,000 to RM999,999 9,629 73 27 75 25 
RM1,000,000 to RM4,999,999 9,531 66 34 75 25 
RM5,000,000 or more c 14,780 72 28 68 32 
NSDC Size      
Micro 6,418 70 30 78 22 
Small 10,668 74 26 75 25 
Medium 11,261 58 42 67 33 
Overall 9,282 70 30 75 25 
a Refer Tables N.3 and N.4 for details pertaining to the number of respondents. For cost types, 
number of responses is equal to 62 as 13 respondents did not indicate their estimated percentage for 
at least one of their computational or planning costs. 
b Inclusive of additional non-staff costs. 
c Similar to a postal survey, this is a combined category. 
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Table N.10: Comparative Perceived Level of Compliance Costs (Web Survey) 
Level of   Full Web Survey  Single Web Question Survey 
 Compliance Costs Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Very Low  3 4.1 3 1.8 
Low 7 9.6 19 11.6 
Neutral  32 43.8 66 40.2 
High 17 23.3 46 28.0 
Very high 14 19.2 30 18.3 
      73 a 100       164 100 b 
Overall Mean c   3.44 3.49 
a Number of respondents equals to 73, there were two missing values. 
b Does not total up to one hundred percent due to rounding. 
c Out of five. 
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Table N.11: Details of Responses for Tax Attitudes and Tax Behaviour in a 
Web Survey 
 
Description 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard  
Deviation 
Disagree/ 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
Agree/ 
Strongly 
Agree 
Tax Attitudes:       
Comp 1 3.61 4.00 1.01 9  
(12.0) 
25  
(33.3) 
41  
(54.7) 
Comp 2 2.25 2.00 0.96 48  
(64.0) 
19  
(25.3) 
8  
(10.7) 
Comp 3 3.19 3.00 1.07 15  
(20.3) 
33  
(44.6) 
26  
(35.1) 
Comp 4 3.45 4.00 1.09 15  
(20.0) 
22  
(29.3) 
38  
(50.7) 
Fair 1 4.04 4.00 1.02 4 
(5.3) 
19 
(25.3) 
52 
(69.3) 
Fair 2 3.18 3.00 0.98 14 
(18.9) 
34 
(45.9) 
26 
(35.1) 
Fair 3 3.12 3.00 0.95 13 
(17.6) 
40 
(54.0) 
21 
(28.4) 
Fair 4  3.03 3.00 0.76 11 
(16.7) 
40 
(60.6) 
15 
(22.7) 
Fair 5 3.37 3.00 0.84 6 
(9.2) 
35 
(53.8) 
24 
(36.9) 
Rate 1  2.93 3.00 1.45 27 
(36.5) 
20 
(27.0) 
27 
(36.5) 
Rate 2  3.73 4.00 1.41 18 
(24.7) 
9 
(12.3) 
46 
(63.0) 
Rate 3 3.71 4.00 1.46 15 
(20.5) 
12 
(16.4) 
46 
(63.0) 
IRB Relationship 3.04 3.00 1.09 14 
(19.7) 
36 
(50.7) 
21 
(29.6) 
Tax Audit  2.90 3.00 1.42 28 
(38.9) 
19 
(26.4) 
25 
(34.7) 
Tax Incentives 4.12 5.00 1.28 11 
(14.7) 
6 
(8.0) 
58 
(77.3) 
Tax Behaviour:       
Understatement 
of Income 
2.48 3.00 1.35 36 
(49.3) 
23 
(31.5) 
14 
(19.2) 
Overstatement of 
Deductions  
3.06 3.00 1.33 22 
(31.4) 
23 
(32.9) 
25 
(35.7) 
Number of respondents equals 75. Total responses of less than 75 for some items is due to missing 
cases. The percentage of responses is given in parentheses. Total percentage of less than 100 for 
some items is due to rounding.  
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Table N.12: Detailed Results of Multiple Regressions in a Web Survey  
(Turnover as Primary Size Measure)  
Model/ 
Independent Variables 
Understatement  
of Income 
(Model 1) 
Overstatement  
of Deductions 
(Model 2) 
Both Non- 
compliance 
(Model 3)  
Turnover: 
- Less than RM250,000 
 
- RM1,000,000 – RM4,999,999 
 
- RM5,000,000 or more 
 
0.028 
(0.177) 
0.018 
(0.119) 
0.067 
(0.444) 
 
- 0.059 
(- 0.356) 
0.134 
(0.844) 
- 0.079 
(- 0.499) 
 
- 0.033 
(- 0.215) 
0.066 
(0.449) 
- 0.011 
(- 0.072) 
Sector: 
- Manufacturing 
 
- Manufacturing-related 
 
- Construction 
 
- 0.099 
(- 0.789) 
- 0.007 
(- 0.061) 
0.117 
(0.881) 
 
- 0.206 
(- 1.563) 
- 0.008 
(- 0.067) 
  - 0.003 
(- 0.022) 
 
- 0.178 
(- 1.456) 
- 0.012 
(- 0.102) 
  0.034 
(0.265) 
Year   - 0.117 
(- 0.825) 
- 0.188 
(- 1.221) 
  - 0.189 
(- 1.377) 
Tax: 
- No Tax 
 
- RM100,000 or more 
 
- 0.029 
(- 0.221) 
- 0.080 
(- 0.583) 
 
- 0.071 
(- 0.518) 
- 0.162 
(- 1.126) 
 
- 0.030 
(- 0.232) 
- 0.143 
(- 1.075) 
Compliance Costs - 0.023 
(- 0.181) 
0.122 
(0.951) 
0.044 
(0.360) 
Complexity   - 0.370 a 
(- 2.900) 
  - 0.182 
(- 1.374) 
  - 0.319 b 
(- 2.577) 
Fairness - 0.048 
(- 0.397) 
0.110 
(0.860) 
0.029 
(0.248) 
Rate 0.260 b 
(2.110) 
0.280 b 
(2.091) 
0.288  b 
(2.409) 
Incentives 0.200 
(1.632) 
0.269 b 
(2.094) 
0.248  b 
(2.083) 
Audit   0.418 a 
(3.630) 
  0.314 b 
(2.573) 
  0.415 a 
(3.706) 
IRB - 0.086 
(- 0.673) 
- 0.101 
(- 0.747) 
- 0.115 
(- 0.925) 
R2 0.394 0.373 0.428 
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.169 0.252 
Standard Error 1.198 1.218 1.035 
F-value 2.115 1.825 2.431 
P-value   0.022 b   0.055 c   0.008 b 
Number of respondents equals 69, except 66 in Model 2. T-value is given in parenthesis. 
a Significant at the one percent level. b Significant at the five percent level. c Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table N.13: Detailed Results of Multiple Regressions in a Web Survey 
(Alternate Size Measure) 
Model/ 
Independent 
Variables 
Understatement 
of Income 
(Model 1) 
Overstatement 
of Deductions 
(Model 2) 
Both Non- 
compliance 
(Model 3) 
Proxy for Business size Staff NSDC Staff NSDC Staff NSDC 
Staff: - 4 or less 
 
          - 20–50 
 
          - 51 to 150 
 
- 0.043 
(- 0.307) 
- 0.095 
(- 0.734) 
0.046 
(0.286) 
- - 0.098 
(- 0.653) 
- 0.131 
(- 0.943) 
0.082 
(0.479) 
- - 0.082 
(- 0.608) 
- 0.131 
(- 1.048) 
0.071 
(0.459) 
- 
NSDC: - Micro 
 
            - Medium 
 
- - 0.126 
(- 0.858) 
0.026 
(0.202) 
- - 0.076 
(- 0.480) 
0.138 
(1.021) 
- - 0.127 
(- 0.889) 
0.083 
(0.676) 
Sector: 
- Manufacturing 
 
- Manufacturing-related 
 
- Construction 
 
- 0.097 
(- 0.756) 
0.007 
(0.059) 
0.121 
(0.968) 
 
- 0.113 
(- 0.994) 
- 0.006 
(- 0.052) 
0.115 
(0.920) 
 
- 0.236 c 
(- 1.744) 
0.007 
(0.054) 
  0.038 
(0.281) 
 
- 0.232 c 
(- 1.823) 
0.020 
(0.157) 
  0.026 
(0.271) 
 
- 0.190 
(1.541) 
0.080 
(0.071) 
  0.061 
(0.502) 
 
- 0.200 c 
(- 1.733) 
0.004 
(0.035) 
  0.057 
(0.469) 
Year - 0.125 
(- 0.901) 
  - 0.059 
(- 0.421) 
- 0.252 
(- 1.668) 
  - 0.194 
(- 1.275) 
  - 0.222 
(- 1.655) 
  - 0.152 
(- 1.116) 
Tax: 
- No Tax 
 
- RM100,000 or more 
 
- 0.026 
(- 0.205) 
- 0.079 
(- 0.513) 
 
- 0.010 
(- 0.082) 
- 0.072 
(- 0.556) 
 
- 0.083 
(- 0.608) 
- 0.278 c 
(- 1.704) 
 
- 0.082 
(- 0.607) 
- 0.282 b 
(- 2.067) 
 
- 0.043 
(- 0.350) 
- 0.203 
(- 1.366) 
 
- 0.028 
(- 0.227) 
- 0.201 
(- 1.612) 
Compliance Costs - 0.040 
(- 0.302) 
- 0.061 
(- 0.487) 
0.091 
(0.667) 
0.102 
(0.784) 
0.024 
(0.189) 
0.013 
(0.108) 
Complexity   - 0.375 a 
(- 3.020) 
  - 0.347 a 
(- 2.847) 
  - 0.208 
(- 1.567) 
  - 0.165 
(- 1.275) 
  - 0.342 a 
(- 2.857) 
  - 0.303 b 
(2.565) 
Fairness - 0.065 
(- 0.558) 
- 0.034 
(- 0.292) 
0.026 
(0.211) 
0.058 
(0.476) 
- 0.022 
(- 0.194) 
0.015 
(0.138) 
Rate 0.276 b 
(2.194) 
0.236 
(1.929) 
0.296 b 
(2.167) 
0.261 c 
(1.971) 
0.312 b 
(2.565) 
0.267 b 
(2.254) 
Incentives 0.201 
(1.613) 
0.214 c 
(1.746) 
0.284 b 
(2.133) 
0.273 b 
(2.092) 
0.259 b 
(2.150) 
0.261 b 
(2.195) 
Audit   0.420 a 
(3.594) 
  0.412 a 
(3.695) 
  0.288 b 
(2.322) 
  0.286 b 
(2.390) 
  0.406 a 
(3.601) 
  0.401 a 
(3.707) 
IRB - 0.096 
(- 0.770) 
- 0.064 
(- 0.517) 
- 0.156 
(-1.170) 
- 0.105 
(- 0.796) 
- 0.150 
(-1.252) 
- 0.105 
(- 0.878) 
R2 0.402 0.401 0.369 0.364 0.444 0.438 
Adjusted R2 0.218 0.232 0.163 0.174 0.273 0.279 
Standard Error 1.190 1.180 1.222 1.214 1.020 1.016 
F-value 2.184 2.366 1.793 1.911 2.598 2.751 
P-value 0.018 b 0.011 b   0.060 c   0.045 b    0.005 a    0.003 a 
Number of respondents equals 69, except 66 in Model 2. T-value is given in parenthesis.  
a Significant at the one percent level. b Significant at the five percent level. c Significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
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DATA VALIDATION 
 
All returned questionnaires were assessed for their completeness of individual 
questions. The response rates for individual questions were almost 100 percent, 
except for eight items, as shown in Table P.1. Nonetheless, the overall missing 
percentage of less than five percent suggests that the issue of missing items is not a 
serious concern in the current study. Almost all questions with missing values were 
requiring respondents to provide similar kinds of estimates (either monetary, 
percentage or hours). All responses, in particular for all the three questions on 
compliance costs (i.e. questions 9, 10-3 and 13-3), were scrutinised for validity and 
a few questionnaires with extreme outliers and missing values were replaced by 
imposing a realistic maximum value and imputed mean value respectively.  
 
Table P.1: Question (and sub-question) with Missing Items 
Question  Description Questionnaire  Missing  
Number  Total a Completed  Percentage 
18 Compensation amount 175 106 39 
13-4 b Breakdown of external work  165 113 32 
11 Breakdown of internal work  169 120 29 
10-3 b Additional non-staff cost 65   53 18 
  9 Internal time spent and wages 175 147 16 
  8-2 b Possible refund  43   37 14 
13-3 b External tax fees 165 152 8 
10-2 b Nature of additional cost 65   60 8 
a Does not total up to 175 cases due to non-applicability to some respondents. 
b The sub-question’s number is not indicated in the survey questionnaire. The number refers to the 
position of the question. For example, question 13-4 refers to the fourth sub-question in question 13.   
 
Overall, 40 cases had missing values, at least for one of its compliance cost 
components, mainly for internal time spent and wages (28 cases). Out of 175 
respondents, 147 provided answers to one or more of four staff categories, but left 
other category(s) blank. In such cases, a ‘blank’ response was treated as zero. The 
fact that not all categories of staff are involved in tax-related work must be 
acknowledged. If questions were left blank (i.e. not answered), then such cases were 
treated as missing items (28 cases). Missing values for the three costs component 
  331
were replaced by their respective mean value. Following mean substitution, the 
average compliance costs are estimated at RM9,295.224 
 
A few questionnaires with extreme outliers were replaced by imposing a realistic 
maximum value. The reference value for wages (for relevant equivalent position) 
was obtained from the Annual Salary Survey 2006 (Federation of Malaysian 
Manufacturers 2007). Broadly, it is also comparable to a Salary and Fringe Benefits 
Survey 2006 conducted by the Malaysian Employers Federation (2007). The 
reference value for tax fee was obtained from a separate survey of tax professionals 
(see Chapter Four, subsection 4.11.2 and Chapter Six, subsection 6.9.1). No 
appropriate reference values are available for internal time spent by staff categories 
and for non-staff additional costs. Accordingly, the researcher’s best judgment was 
used in handling extreme outliers for those variables. This approach is reasonable, 
since the main objective of imposing a maximum value is to take out the gross effect 
of an extreme value. Replies for the remaining questions (i.e. other than compliance 
cost components) have no implication on the compliance cost computation. 
Available responses sufficed for general descriptive purposes, provided that the 
effects of extreme outliers (if any) are removed. Similar to additional costs, extreme 
outliers for tax refund (four cases) and possible compensation claim (five cases) 
were replaced. As for breakdown of routine and planning work (for both internal and 
external), a few incorrect and/or illogical responses (i.e. a total percentage was not 
equal to/more than 100 percent) were re-computed based on the given percentage, 
an approach similar to that adopted in Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002). 
 
A similar approach was adopted for the web survey. The case of outliers is less 
marked and, broadly, missing percentages are lower in the context of the web 
survey. Relative to the mail survey, a higher missing percentage was observed for 
two questions, i.e. additional non-staff costs (28 percent—seven cases) and external 
fees (11 percent—seven cases). As for additional cost, a detailed check on the nature 
of additional cost indicates that six respondents described a non-tax related cost as 
an additional cost. Accordingly, these responses were changed to having no 
additional cost.  
                                                 
224 If the Expectation-Maximization substitution approach is to be used to impute the missing values, 
the compliance costs would be reduced to RM9,264 or by only 0.3 percent. 
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Rotated Component Matrix for Factor Analysis 
  Tax Attitudinal Aspects 
  Complexity Fairness Rate 
Personally I consider corporate Income Tax return 
preparations difficult. [Comp 1] .807   
Corporate Income Tax law is relatively simple. 
[Comp 2—Reverse Coded] .745   
Complexity in the Income Tax law is necessary so 
that companies are treated fairly. [Comp 3] -   
Corporate Income Tax is so complicated that only 
people who can afford to pay tax professionals 
can take advantage of most legal ways to save 
much taxes. [Comp 4] 
.844   
I believe that each company’s officers have a moral 
obligation to report all of their company’s 
income and pay the correct amount of Corporate 
Income Tax. [Fair 1] 
 .574  
Do you believe that the move to self-assessment 
system made the corporate tax laws more or less 
fair? [Fair 2] 
 .776  
Overall, has the move to self-assessment system 
made the distribution of the Corporate Income 
Tax burden among small, medium and large 
companies more or less fair? [Fair 3] 
 .746  
Do you believe that as result of changes in the 
Corporate Income Tax during the past five years 
SME companies are paying more or less taxes?  
[Fair 4—Reverse Coded] 
 .666  
Do you believe that as result of changes in the 
Corporate Income Tax during the past five years 
large companies are paying more or less taxes? 
[Fair 5] 
 .632  
A fair tax rate should be the same for every 
company, regardless of their size (small, 
medium, or large). [Rate 1] 
  .606 
Large companies have greater ability to pay Income 
Tax, so it is fair that they should pay a higher 
rate of tax than small and medium companies. 
[Rate 2] 
  .872 
It is fair that high-profit companies should pay a 
higher rate of tax than low-profit companies. 
[Rate 3] 
  .872 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; rotation method: varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Items ‘Comp 2’ and ‘Fair 4’ are reversed coded. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic 
was 0.631, signifying sample size in the current study was reasonable. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
was significant (p = 0.00), suggesting the survey data were suitable for factor analysis. 
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Regression Analysis: Assessment of Assumptions 
 
Assessment of the four assumptions underlying regression analysis (normality, 
linearity, homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity) is presented in this section. The 
normality of a data set is assessed through normal probability plots. Hair et al (1998) 
regarded the approach to be more reliable compared to a histogram approach. The 
normal distribution forms a straight diagonal line. Significant departures from this 
straight line indicate violation of the normality assumption. For all three dependent 
variables, Figure R.1 shows that the normal probability plots closely follow the 
diagonal line. Thus, the data set is considered approximately normal.  
 
Figure R.1: Normal Probability Plot 
  
 
Source: SPSS output of the current study 
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The assumption of linearity is examined through a scatterplot diagram between 
standardized residual values (ZRESID) and standardized predicted values (ZPRED). 
Linearity means that there is a straight line relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. Figure R.2 shows that a scatterplot of residuals 
indicates no evidence of non-linearity for all of the three dependent variables. 
 
Figure R.2: Scatter Plot Diagram 
 
Source: SPSS output of the current study 
 
The same scatterplot diagram is used to assess the assumption of homoscedasticity. 
Homoscedasticity refers to the assumption that the dependent variable exhibits 
similar amounts of variance across the range of values for an independent variable. 
Graphical patterns, such as cones or diamonds, exhibit departures of the assumption 
of homoscedasticity (Hair et al. 1998). The scatter plot diagrams, as shown in Figure 
R.2, show no clear evidence of unequal variances (heteroscedasticity) and thus 
exhibit homoscedasticity.  
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Finally, the potential effect of multicollinearity is assessed through the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) measure. Multicollinearity occurs when independent variables 
in the regression model are more highly correlated with other independent variables 
than with the dependent variable. A VIF of more than 10 indicates a high degree of 
multicollinearity (Myers 1990; Hair et al. 1998). The VIF recorded in the current 
study ranges between one to less than two, thus rejecting the severity of 
multicollinearity in this study. 
 
Overall, the researcher is satisfied that all the four underlying assumptions for 
multiple regressions were not violated. The above assessment primarily used 
turnover as a business size measure. A similar finding is obtained in terms of the 
other two size proxies, i.e. by staff number and NSDC definition. Assessments of 
assumptions in a web survey indicate similar results. 
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Table S.1: Detailed Results of Multiple Regressions (Turnover as Primary Size 
Measure) 
Model/ 
Independent Variables 
Understatement  
of Income 
(Model 1) 
Overstatement  
of Deductions 
(Model 2) 
Both Non- 
compliance 
(Model 3)  
Turnover: 
- Less than RM250,000 
 
- RM1,000,000–RM4,999,999 
 
- RM5,000,000 or more 
 
- 0.101 
(- 1.091) 
- 0.119 
(- 1.272) 
- 0.110 
(- 1.071) 
 
- 0.096 
(- 1.067) 
0.038 
(0.423) 
- 0.087 
(- 0.875) 
 
- 0.113 
(- 1.250) 
- 0.043 
(- 0.473) 
- 0.113 
(- 1.126) 
Sector: 
- Manufacturing 
 
- Manufacturing-related 
 
- Construction 
 
0.100 
(1.136) 
0.069 
(0.796) 
0.081 
(0.952) 
 
0.115 
(1.356) 
0.140 
(1.656) 
  0.173 b 
(2.094) 
 
0.123 
(1.446) 
0.121 
(1.430) 
  0.147 c 
(1.778) 
Year   - 0.137 c 
(- 1.671) 
- 0.107 
(- 1.346) 
  - 0.139 c 
(- 1.744) 
Tax: 
- No Tax 
 
- RM100,000 or more 
 
- 0.23 
(- 0.267) 
0.108 
(1.194) 
 
0.80 
(0.959) 
0.096 
(1.094) 
 
0.035 
(0.414) 
0.116 
(1.325) 
Compliance Costs 0.061 
(0.716) 
0.072 
(0.883) 
0.076 
(0.928) 
Complexity   0.168 b 
(2.086) 
  0.267 a 
(3.416) 
  0.251 a 
(3.203) 
Fairness - 0.028 
(- 0.34) 
- 0.002 
(- 0.020) 
- 0.016 
(- 0.205) 
Rate 0.114 
(1.444) 
0.029 
(0.380) 
0.080 
(1.045) 
Incentives - 0.043 
(- 0.546) 
- 0.005 
(- 0.067) 
- 0.027 
(- 0.350) 
Audit   0.155 c 
(1.899) 
  0.251 a 
(3.174) 
  0.234 a 
(2.953) 
IRB 0.065 
(0.788) 
- 0.071 
(- 0.888) 
- 0.006 
(- 0.076) 
R2 0.122 0.176 0.172 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.089 0.090 
Standard Error 1.204 1.250 1.059 
F-value 1.315 2.016 1.958 
P-value 0.195   0.015 b    0.019 b 
Number of respondents equals 172, t-value is given in parenthesis. 
a Significant at the one percent level. b Significant at the five percent level. c Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table S.2: Detailed Results of Multiple Regressions (Alternate Size Measure) 
Model/ 
Independent Variables 
Understatement 
of Income 
(Model 1) 
Overstatement 
of Deductions 
(Model 2) 
Both Non- 
compliance 
(Model 3) 
Proxy for Business size Staff NSDC Staff NSDC Staff NSDC 
Staff: 
- 4 or less 
 
- 20—50 
 
- 51 to 150 
 
 
0.072 
(0.846) 
- 0.037 
(- 0.439) 
0.035 
(0.364) 
 
- 
 
- 0.041 
(- 0.501) 
- 0.001 
(- 0.013) 
0.077 
(0.827) 
 
- 
 
0.015 
(0.185) 
- 0.021 
(- 0.258) 
0.065 
(0.697) 
 
- 
NSDC: 
- Micro 
 
- Medium 
 
 
- 
 
- 0.025 
(- 0.284) 
0.037 
(0.444) 
 
- 
 
- 0.127 
(- 1.513) 
- 0.015 
(- 0.183) 
 
- 
 
- 0.089 
(- 1.054) 
0.012 
(0.145) 
Sector: 
- Manufacturing 
 
- Manufacturing-related 
 
- Construction 
 
0.096 
(1.091) 
0.033 
(0.379) 
0.082 
(0.969) 
 
0.097 
(1.103) 
0.072 
(0.825) 
0.079 
(0.931) 
 
0.127 
(1.501) 
0.087 
(1.028) 
  0.164 b 
(2.005) 
 
0.125 
(1.476) 
0.131 
(1.546) 
  0.165 b 
(2.012) 
 
0.129 
(1.511) 
0.070 
(0.826) 
  0.143 c 
(1.740) 
 
0.128 
(1.499) 
0.117 
(1.382) 
  0.141 c 
(1.717) 
Year - 0.125 
(- 1.508) 
  - 0.150 c 
(- 1.831) 
- 0.126 
(- 1.578) 
  - 0.141 c 
(- 1.784) 
  - 0.144 c 
(- 1.795) 
  - 0.166 b 
(- 2.096) 
Tax: 
- No Tax 
 
- RM100,000 or more 
 
- 0.023 
(- 0.266) 
0.109 
(1.092) 
 
- 0.014 
(- 0.158) 
0.080 
(0.893) 
 
0.103 
(1.239) 
0.067 
(0.691) 
 
0.105 
(1.248) 
0.071 
(0.814) 
 
0.049 
(0.583) 
0.100 
(1.032) 
 
0.055 
(0.646) 
0.086 
(0.989) 
Compliance Costs 0.032 
(0.378) 
0.044 
(0.528) 
0.044 
(0.549) 
0.056 
(0.692) 
0.044 
(0.541) 
0.057 
(0.709) 
Complexity   0.182 b 
(2.252) 
  0.171 b 
(2.117) 
  0.279 a 
(3.560) 
  0.268 a 
(3.437) 
  0.266 a 
(3.394) 
  0.253 a 
(3.234) 
Fairness - 0.026 
(- 0.323) 
- 0.028 
(- 0.344) 
- 0.012 
(- 0.151) 
- 0.015 
(- 0.192) 
- 0.022 
(- 0.274) 
- 0.024 
(- 0.309) 
Rate 0.089 
(1.115) 
0.112 
(1.414) 
0.010 
(0.130) 
0.024 
(0.317) 
0.055 
(0.713) 
0.076 
(0.993) 
Incentives - 0.064 
(- 0.798) 
- 0.050 
(- 0.621) 
- 0.001 
(- 0.011) 
- 0.002 
(- 0.026) 
- 0.036 
(- 0.461) 
- 0.029 
(- 0.370) 
Audit   0.177 b 
(2.154) 
  0.157 c 
(1.920) 
  0.281 a 
(3.526) 
  0.269 a 
(3.414) 
  0.264 a 
(3.318) 
  0.246 a 
(3.108) 
IRB 0.050 
(0.614) 
0.074 
(0.914) 
- 0.093 
(-1.175) 
- 0.063 
(- 0.797) 
- 0.027 
(-0.346) 
0.004 
(0.051) 
R2 0.123 0.111 0.180 0.172 0.178 0.166 
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.024 0.092 0.090 0.084 0.084 
Standard Error 1.200 1.207 1.248 1.249 1.053 1.059 
F-value 1.319 1.271 2.056 2.106 2.029 2.019 
P-value 0.192 0.227   0.013 b   0.012 b    0.015 b    0.017 b 
Number of respondents equals 172, t-value is given in parenthesis. 
a Significant at the one percent level. b Significant at the five percent level. c Significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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Table T.1: Tax Professionals’ Views towards each Tax Attitudinal Item 
Description Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Comp 1 2.68 3.00 0.91 
Comp 2 2.61 3.00 0.80 
Comp 3 3.19 3.00 0.91 
Comp 4 3.52 4.00 1.09 
Fair 1 4.13 4.00 0.76 
Fair 2 3.16 3.00 0.64 
Fair 3 3.16 3.00 0.69 
Fair 4  3.10 3.00 0.94 
Fair 5 3.26 3.00 0.73 
Rate 1  3.06 3.00 1.06 
Rate 2  3.26 3.00 1.06 
Rate 3 2.87 3.00 1.19 
IRB Relationship 2.94 3.00 1.09 
Tax Audit  2.48 3.00 1.09 
Tax Incentives 3.84 4.00 0.97 
Tax Benefit 1  4.16 4.00 0.82 
Tax Benefit 2 4.13 4.00 0.67 
Tax Benefit 3 3.32 3.00 0.83 
Number of respondents equals 31. Description used is similar to postal and web survey but 
in the context of survey professionals. Refer Appendix O for the exact wording in the 
questionnaire. An additional three descriptions apply in the survey of professionals: Benefit 
1 (I believe that record keeping helps SME companies to manage their businesses more 
effectively), Benefit 2 (I believe that good record keeping may reduce the compliance costs 
of SMEs) and Benefit 3 (I believe that good record keeping may reduce the likelihood of 
the tax audit). 
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Table T.2: Tax Attitudinal Aspects and Tax Behaviour: 
Results of Correlation Analysis of Tax Professional Survey 
  Understatement 
of Income a 
Overstatement  
of Deductions a 
Both  
Non-compliance a 
Tax Complexity  - 0.120 - 0.098 - 0.116 
Tax Fairness + 0.015 - 0.072 - 0.031 
Tax Rate Structure + 0.110 - 0.168 - 0.033 
Tax Incentives + 0.094 + 0.184 + 0.149 
Tax Audit + 0.253 + 0.307 + 0.299 
IRB relationship - 0.139 - 0.108 - 0.132 
Tax Benefits - 0.164 - 0.277 - 0.236 
Number of respondents equals 31. Positive (+) or negative (-) signs denote a direct or 
indirect relationship respectively.   
 
 
Table T.3: Results of Multiple Regressions of Tax Professional Survey 
 
Model/ 
Independent Variables 
Understatement 
of Income 
(Model 1) 
Overstatement  
of Deductions 
(Model 2) 
Both 
Non-compliance 
(Model 3)  
Complexity   - 0.230 
(- 1.044) 
  - 0.296 
(- 1.387) 
  0.251 
(3.203) 
Fairness 0.152 
(0.728) 
0.089 
(0.442) 
- 0.016 
(- 0.205) 
Rate 0.130 
(0.590) 
- 0.257 
(- 1.210) 
0.080 
(1.045) 
Incentives 0.078 
(0.356) 
0.295 
(1.393) 
- 0.027 
(- 0.350) 
Audit   0.337 
(1.210) 
  0.171 
(0.636) 
  0.234 
(2.953) 
IRB - 0.282 
(- 1.305) 
- 0.218 
(- 1.042) 
- 0.006 
(- 0.076) 
Tax Benefits 0.043 
(0.154) 
- 0.101 
(- 0.378) 
- 0.006 
(- 0.076) 
R2 0.169 0.224 0.185 
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.012 0.063 
Standard Error 1.327 1.309 1.243 
F-value 0.667 0.950 0.744 
P-value 0.697 0.489  0.638 
Number of respondents equals 31; t-value is given in parenthesis. 
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Table U.1: Respondents’ Suggestions for Reducing Tax Preparation Work 
 Number Percent 
Simplify tax return form  13 50.0 
Less documentation to furnish 3 11.5 
Reduced record keeping year 3 11.5 
Less changes to tax laws   2 7.7 
Free tax updates from the IRB 2 7.7 
Tax exempt for first three years  2 7.7 
Free tax software 1 3.9 
Total 26 100.0 
Number of respondents equals 23. A number of respondents had more than one suggestion. 
 
Table U.2: Respondents’ Suggestions on Overall SME Taxation  
 Number Percent 
More tax incentives and low tax rates 28 43.1 
Abolish advanced tax estimates  7 10.8 
Tax relaxation (i.e. later deadline and cash 
basis for taxing SMEs) 
 
7 
 
10.8 
More free seminars  6 9.2 
Lower tax fees  3 4.6 
Exempt financial audit on SMEs  3 4.6 
Low penalties  4 6.2 
Eliminate ambiguous law on deduction 2 3.1 
Others (1 each) 
More government assistance 
Focus on educating and not to punish 
More friendly tax officer 
Reduce number of indirect taxes  
Rebate for good taxpayer 
5 7.7 
Total 65 100.0 a 
Number of respondents equals 33. A number of respondents had more than one suggestion. 
a Total percentage does not total up to one hundred due to rounding. 
